PENUNJUKAN ANGGOTA AKTIF TNI-POLRI MENJADI PENJABAT KEPALA DAERAH DITINJAU DARI UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 2 TAHUN 2002 TENTANG POLRI DAN UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 34 TAHUN 2004 TENTANG TNI

Most of the regional heads will leave their positions as governors or regents in their respective regions between 2022-2024. To fill the vacancy in the regional head position, the Regional Head Election Law provides a mandate through the appointment of acting regional heads until the regional head is elected through simultaneous regional head elections (Pilkada) in 2024. However, things are different if someone who is appointed as acting regional head comes from from active TNI-POLRI circles as happened in the West Seram district, West Papua Province and several other areas. The problems in this research are, First, what is the legality of appointing Active TNI-Polri members to be Acting Regional Heads in terms of Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the National Police and Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI. Second, what are the implications of appointing Acting Regional Heads from Active TNI-Polri Members. The aim of this research is to find out and comprehensively examine the legality and implications. This research method uses a normative juridical method. Then the results of this discussion violate the regulations or norms in the TNI-Polri law and have implications for the electoral system in Indonesia, TNI-Polri institutions, and Regional Government. Conclusions and suggestions regarding the legality of appointing active members of the TNI-Polri is contrary to existing laws, even the appointment This is not legal and has implications that do not reflect and harm democratic values. The first suggestion is that there needs to be a fit and proper test for acting regional heads before being appointed as acting; second, there is an institutional evaluation for active TNI-Polri members who hold concurrent positions; third, sanctions are given to active TNI/Polri members who hold multiple positions in order to achieve legal certainty

Explaining Myanmar's Regime Transition: The Periphery is Central

In 2010, Myanmar (Burma) held its first elections after 22 years of direct military rule. Few compelling explanations for this regime transition have emerged. This article critiques popular accounts and potential explanations generated by theories of authoritarian ‘regime breakdown’ and ‘regime maintenance’. It returns instead to the classical literature on military intervention and withdrawal. Military regimes, when not terminated by internal factionalism or external unrest, typically liberalise once they feel they have sufficiently addressed the crises that prompted their seizure of power. This was the case in Myanmar. The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies would destroy Myanmar’s always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalising in 2010, the regime sought to create a ‘disciplined democracy’ to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via ‘ceasefire capitalism’, which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total ‘victory’ for the military nor secured a genuine or lasting peace

Contribution of cod liver oil-related nutrients (vitamins A, D, E and eicosapentaenoic acid and docosahexaenoic acid) to daily nutrient intake and their associations with plasma concentrations in the EPIC-Norfolk cohort

Total nutrient intake (TNI) is intake from food and supplements. This provides an assessment of nutrient adequacy and the prevalence of excessive intake, as well as the response with respect to biomarkers. Cod liver oil (CLO) is the most frequently consumed supplement in the UK, containing nutrients that might have varying influences on health. We calculated TNI for vitamins A, D and E, as well as eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) and docosahexaenoic acid (DHA), and assessed associations with the respective blood concentrations

Self-Assembly of Coil/Liquid-Crystalline Diblock Copolymers in a Liquid Crystal Solvent

Diblock copolymers having a random-coil polymer block (polystyrene, PS) connected to a side-group liquid crystal polymer (SGLCP) self-assemble in a nematic liquid crystal (LC), 4-pentyl-4′-cyanobiphenyl, into micelles with PS-rich cores and SGLCP-rich coronas. The morphologies of block copolymers with varying PS content are characterized as a function of temperature and concentration using small-angle neutron scattering, rheometry, and transmission electron microscopy. Unlike conventional solvents, the nematic LC can undergo a first-order transition between distinct fluid phases, accessing the regimes of both strong and slight selectivity in a single polymer/solvent pair. Micelles dissolve away above a microphase separation temperature (MST) that is often equal to the solution’s isotropization point, TNI. However, increasing or decreasing the polymer’s PS content can shift the MST to be above or below TNI, respectively, and in the former case, micelles abruptly swell with solvent at TNI. Comparable effects can be achieved by modulating the overall polymer concentration

Analisis Yuridis Tentang Kedudukan Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) Setelah Berlakunya Undang-undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004

Indonesia is a country that is the largest in Southeast Asia , therefore, to maintain the defense of the country required a strong and professional institutions. But in history , TNI never been in one institution with POLRI that join the ABRI. In the development of TNI are separated by the Police through Tap No. VI / MPR / 2000 on TNI and POLRI. Then it is manifested by Act No. 34 of 2004 on TNI where TNI is the position , in the deployment and use of military force , TNI positioned under the President . While in terms of defense policy and strategy as well as administrative support , TNI under the coordination of the Ministry of Defence. Impact of the Law No. 34 Year 2004 on TNI is, the separation occurred between TNI and POLRI that have been incorporated in ABRI. While the position of TNI and POLRI are the same, but the soldiers in the field implentasinya TNI was higher position than POLRI so frequent conflicts between the soldier level especially soldiers TNI with POLRI. TNI and POLRI is an important institution in the State of Indonesia, so the alignment of the institutions necessary to find a solution to visit! Conflict in hopes of becoming an institution that has a high professional work

ANALISIS PERTANDINGAN SEPAKBOLA TIM PS TNI PADA PUTARAN 2 PIALA JENDRAL SUDIRMAN TAHUN 2015

Permasalahan yang penulis ajukan pada penelitian ini mengenai analisis pertandingan sepakbola level profesional di Indonesia. Analisis pertandingan sepakbola tim PS TNI memberikan gambaran mengenai situasi teknik dan penguasaan bola selama mengikuti turnamen. Para pelatih di Indonesia masih banyak yang memberikan evaluasi pertandingan tanpa berdasarkan data yang ada. Oleh karena itu, peneliti ingin melakukan penelitian mengenai “Analisis Keterampilan Sepakbola Tim PS TNI Pada Putaran Kedua Piala Jendral Sudirman Tahun 2015”. Metode penelitian yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode observasi, dengan sampel tim PS. TNI dan instrumen penelitian menggunakan lembar observasi analisis pertandingan. Berdasarkan hasil pengolahan dan analisis data, maka penghitungan data diperoleh hasil dari analisis pertandingan tim PS TNI dengan observasi pada putaran kedua piala jenderal sudirman 2015 dari aspek teknik. Maka, kesimpulan dari hasil penelitian adalah keterampilan Passing Tim PS TNI adalah 81% berhasil dan 19% gagal, Dribbling Tim PS TNI adalah 77% berhasil dan 23% gagal, Shooting Tim PS TNI adalah 40% berhasil dan 60% gagal, Heading Tim PS TNI adalah 57% berhasil dan 43% gagal, dan Ball Possessions Tim PS TNI adalah 58%. Disarankan sebaiknya Tim PS TNI memperbaiki dari segi teknik Shooting karena dominan gagal daripada berhasil.;--

Le tableau numérique interactif comme un instrument d'enseignement-apprentissage à l'école primaire

National audienceCe travail s'intéresse à l'utilité de l'usage du tableau numérique interactif (TNI) en milieu scolaire. Nous nous focalisons sur les potentiels pédagogiques du TNI et sur ses avantages dans le domaine d'enseignement et d'apprentissage. Ce qui nous intéresse en utilisant le TNI, c'est de chercher à analyser, d'une part, la façon dont il modifie la manière d'enseigner-apprendre les mathématiques (instrumentalisation du TNI), d'une autre part, la façon dont on utilise le TNI pour l'enseignement-apprentissage des mathématiques (instrumentation du TNI). Pour théoriser cette problématique, nous nous focalisons sur la notion de médiation en nous appuyant sur l'approche instrumentale de Pierre Rabardel

The expanding role of the Indonesian military

The Indonesian military appears to be taking advantage of a weak president and unpopular police to try and regain some of the internal security functions that it lost as part of the country’s democratisation process. Introduction Since Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took office in October 2014, the actions of the police have triggered widespread public condemnation, with much less attention to the role of the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI). Both institutions seem to be testing the political waters to see how far they can push their authority in the face of a weak president with little experience in security affairs. The TNI, in particular, seems to be having some success, with its commander, Gen. Moeldoko, as the driving force. The imbroglio beginning in January 2015 surrounding Jokowi’s nomination of a police chief known for his unusual wealth led public confidence in the police as an institution to sink to new lows. Police efforts to weaken the respected Anti-Corruption Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) sank them further in public esteem. As daily revelations made the police look worse and worse, some voices in civil society and the local media began raising concerns that the military was exploiting both the poor image of the police and the president’s need for a reliable ally to press forward with its own interests. In particular, the TNI was interested in regaining some of the internal security functions ceded to police as part of the democratisation process that began following former President Soeharto’s resignation in 1998. The actions that triggered concerns included: Signing many Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) between civilian agencies (ministries and state enterprises) and the TNI for the provision of security services; Involvement of the TNI in government development programs, such as food self-sufficiency, especially in remote areas; Demand by the military for a greater role in counter-terrorism operations, especially in Poso; Perceived efforts to exclude the police from national security policy-making; Dubious military arrests of criminal suspects in a manner designed to embarrass or intimidate police; Pushing for a contentious national security bill to be reinserted on the legislative agenda; Delaying the clarification of “grey areas” between the military and police; and Expanding military commands. There is no suggestion that the TNI is intent on returning to the centre of the political stage. While often contemptuous of civilian leaders, senior TNI officers know that their legitimacy depends on full commitment to the democratic system. But there does seem to be a sense that various political factors have combined to give the TNI a new opening to address many accumulated frustrations and resentments. Many of these resentments are directed against the police, whom the army in particular sees as having not only usurped some of its functions but also its opportunities for rent-seeking. Some are related to the army trying to preserve its position under a presidency that is focused on maritime issues, and the priority that implies for the navy and the air force. All are occurring under a president who shares the military’s “can do” mentality but who relies heavily on military rather than civilian advisers on security matters and appears to see little danger in allowing the TNI to regain some of the powers it lost in Indonesia’s reform process