Analyzing helicopter evasive maneuver effectiveness against rocket-propelled grenades

It has long been acknowledged that military helicopters are vulnerable to ground-launched threats, in particular, the RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade. Current helicopter threat mitigation strategies rely on a combination of operational tactics and selectively placed armor plating, which can help to mitigate but not entirely remove the threat. However, in recent years, a number of active protection systems designed to protect land-based vehicles from rocket and missile fire have been developed. These systems all use a sensor suite to detect, track, and predict the threat trajectory, which is then employed in the computation of an intercept trajectory for a defensive kill mechanism. Although a complete active protection system in its current form is unsuitable for helicopters, in this paper, it is assumed that the active protection system’s track and threat trajectory prediction subsystem could be used offline as a tool to develop tactics and techniques to counter the threat from rocket-propelled grenade attacks. It is further proposed that such a maneuver can be found by solving a pursuit–evasion differential game. Because the first stage in solving this problem is developing the capability to evaluate the game, nonlinear dynamic and spatial models for a helicopter, RPG-7 round, and gunner, and evasion strategies were developed and integrated into a new simulation engine. Analysis of the results from representative vignettes demonstrates that the simulation yields the value of the engagement pursuit–evasion game. It is also shown that, in the majority of cases, survivability can be significantly improved by performing an appropriate evasive maneuver. Consequently, this simulation may be used as an important tool for both designing and evaluating evasive tactics and is the first step in designing a maneuver-based active protection system, leading to improved rotorcraft survivability

Risk based resilient network design

This paper presents a risk-based approach to resilient network design. The basic design problem considered is that given a working network and a fixed budget, how best to allocate the budget for deploying a survivability technique in different parts of the network based on managing the risk. The term risk measures two related quantities: the likelihood of failure or attack, and the amount of damage caused by the failure or attack. Various designs with different risk-based design objectives are considered, for example, minimizing the expected damage, minimizing the maximum damage, and minimizing a measure of the variability of damage that could occur in the network. A design methodology for the proposed risk-based survivable network design approach is presented within an optimization model framework. Numerical results and analysis illustrating the different risk based designs and the tradeoffs among the schemes are presented. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

Model-Based Mitigation of Availability Risks

The assessment and mitigation of risks related to the availability of the IT infrastructure is becoming increasingly important in modern organizations. Unfortunately, present standards for Risk Assessment and Mitigation show limitations when evaluating and mitigating availability risks. This is due to the fact that they do not fully consider the dependencies between the constituents of an IT infrastructure that are paramount in large enterprises. These dependencies make the technical problem of assessing availability issues very challenging. In this paper we define a method and a tool for carrying out a Risk Mitigation activity which allows to assess the global impact of a set of risks and to choose the best set of countermeasures to cope with them. To this end, the presence of a tool is necessary due to the high complexity of the assessment problem. Our approach can be integrated in present Risk Management methodologies (e.g. COBIT) to provide a more precise Risk Mitigation activity. We substantiate the viability of this approach by showing that most of the input required by the tool is available as part of a standard business continuity plan, and/or by performing a common tool-assisted Risk Management

Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques

SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review of the selected approaches is provided along with their applicability