Essence, Explanation, and Modal Knowledge

The primary aim of this project is to put forward a novel account of knowledge of metaphysical modality. I call this the “Essentialist Superexplanatory” account of modal knowledge, because it relies on the following two main theses: (a) knowledge of metaphysical necessity is grounded in knowledge of essence; and (b) essences are properties, sets of properties, or mechanisms, having distinctive explanatory powers for how things are. While thesis (a) is quite popular in the current debates, mostly thanks to Kit Fine’s recent work in modal metaphysics, thesis (b) introduces an original brand of essentialism. As I show by means of various examples involving both kinds and individuals, it seems fruitful to think of essences as underlying cores which cause a multitude of typical properties of things. Because of this, essences explain why those properties consistently co-occur in those kinds and individuals—in this sense essences are “superexplanatory” for how things are. This account of essence has crucial consequences at the epistemological level. For essences are things that we discover empirically, typically via scientific investigation. Although the discovery of essence has been held to be a central task of philosophy since Aristotle introduced it, essences have also been often disparaged in contemporary debates as hidden mysterious entities, or some sort of relic of a pre-scientific era. The Essentialist Superexplanatory account aims to overcome those prejudices and show that there is a scientifically grounded way to clarify in what sense essential properties constitute the “nature” of things. If this is correct, the epistemology of central cases of metaphysical necessity is much easier than many have thought. For we infer what is necessarily true of things from our knowledge of what is essential to things. The Essentialist Superexplanatory account owes much to the work of Saul Kripke in the 1970s and 1980s; especially to his main insight that modal knowledge proceeds inferentially, from premises concerning the actual makeup of the world to conclusions about the non-actual and necessary. In fact, a further crucial component of my account is a Kripkean bridge-principle connecting essence and necessity, both at the constitutive-metaphysical level and at the epistemic-normative level. In its simplest formulation, this bridge-principle says that if something is essentially in a certain way, then it is (metaphysically) necessarily that way: “If x is essentially F, then necessarily x is F”. Also importantly, from a methodological point of view, the Essentialist Superexplanatory account prioritizes the investigation of modal metaphysics, and of essence in particular, for elucidating knowledge of modality. I call it accordingly a “modal-metaphysics-first” approach to modal knowledge and oppose it to the more traditional “means-first” approach that has dominated the literature in the past twenty years or so. As to the structure of the work, this dissertation is not a traditional monograph. Instead, it is composed of three related but independent research articles, each with its own abstract, plus a final Appendix. Here is a brief summary of each piece. In the first article, “Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality”, I argue that Conceivability-theory as cashed out by David Chalmers does not help cast light on knowledge of genuine metaphysical modality as traditionally pictured by Kripke. Instead, Chalmers’ conceivability only safely ranges over logical-conceptual possibility under standards of ideal coherence. I show how, at bottom, Chalmers and Kripke are operating with two different, incompatible notions of metaphysical modality. This article was published in Synthese (“online first”) on February 1st, 2018: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1702-2. In the second article, “Putting Modal Metaphysics First”, I present my metaphysics-first approach to modal knowledge against the dominant tradition and lay out my positive “Essentialist Superexplanatory” account. I use chemical kinds as a case-study and illustrate how essences cause and explain the many properties that are typically shared by all the instances of a kind. Knowing what is essential to (the instances of) the kind in this sense is the basis for knowing what is necessary for (the instances of) the kind. This article was published in Synthese (“online first”) on May 29th, 2018: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1828-2. In the third article, “Essentialist Constraints on Counterfactual Knowledge”, I turn to Timothy Williamson’s Counterfactual-theory. I discuss a number of problems that have been raised for it by the recent literature and argue that those all ultimately trace back to the failure to elucidate the proper normative constraints on modal reasoning. By means of various examples, I show how the Essentialist Superexplanatory account instead clarifies such constraints, and thus constitutes a better account of how we gain modal knowledge. This article is in preparation for the volume “Modal Thinking”, edited by A. Vaidya and D. Prelevic, forthcoming with Oxford University Press. Finally, in the Appendix, I discuss a category of potentially problematic cases for the Essentialist Superexplanatory account, namely what I call the “purely a priori metaphysical necessities”. I lay out a pluralistic picture of modal space which distinguishes different kinds of necessity, based on their source. Specifically, it distinguishes between two kinds of metaphysical necessities: the “general” vs. the “distinctively” metaphysical necessities. I show how this helps us handle the a priori cases, and sketch a possible way forward for modal epistemology

Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity

This dissertation explores the way in which normative facts create a problem for naturalist approaches to philosophy. How can lumpy scientific matter give rise to technicolour normativity? How can normative facts show up in the world described from a scientific perspective? In this context, I start by analysing Hume’s discussion of ’is’ and ‘ought’, Moore’s open question argument, and Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. I then look at the nature of philosophical naturalism in detail, arguing that is fundamentally an epistemological commitment to the norms governing scientific publications. I consider the particular examples of Penelope Maddy’s approach to naturalising logic and the instrumentalist accounts of epistemic normativity favoured by advocates of naturalised epistemology. I argue, however, that these approaches to naturalising normativity are unsuccessful. In the second half of the dissertation, I develop a novel account of the nature of normative facts and explain how this relates to and resolves some of the difficulties raised in the first half. The account I defend has Kantian foundations and an Aristotelian superstructure. I associate the right with the necessary preconditions for engaging in valuable activity and the good with the satisfaction of the constitutive ends of activities and practices. I explain how my theory can account for epistemic normativity and defend a virtue-based theory of epistemic evaluation. Finally, I argue against desire-based accounts of reasons and in favour of a role for the emotions in normative cognition. The view I defend is intended to be compatible with our best scientific theories. However, it is not naturalistic insofar as it is justified by distinctively philosophical methods and relies on extra-scientific considerations

Learning from Experience: A Philosophical Perspective

This work examines philosophical solutions to David Hume’s problem of induction—a skeptical attack on our ability to learn from experience. I explore the logical, ontological, and epistemic difficulties behind the everyday assumption that the future will resemble the past. While historical solutions by philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper have been unsuccessful at tackling these complications, combining recent work on natural kinds and naturalistic epistemology has promise. Ultimately, I expand on work done by Howard Sankey, Hilary Kornblith, and Brian Ellis to create an account of nature and epistemology that explains why objects in nature have predictable behavior. I find Sankey\u27s solution incomplete, but I fix the major I identify and show why the work by Sankey builds into a powerful solution to Hume\u27s problem

How moral responsibility emerges from a deterministic world

Humans are only one of many species that populate the earth. Based on the way they have taken command of natural resources and rearranged the surface of the earth with a network of cities, roads, infrastructure and technology, they seem to have become the dominant and leading species alive. However, on the evolutionary scale of organic progression they are actually quite young. In this dissertation, a philosophical account will be given of how a deterministic cosmos managed to become partly alive. It will be shown how it harbours within itself the peculiar ability to evolve material and organic structures of high complexity – and how those structures became alive, self-conscious and morally responsive. It will be argued that humans have evolved within the bosom of the cosmos on account of intricate laws to become teleological agents of high advancement. That is, they represent those parts of the cosmos that can reflect upon its own existence, acquire knowledge of its nature and project it towards a future state of being.Die mensdom is maar een van verskeie spesies wat die aarde bewoon. Gebaseer op die wyse waarop hulle egter beheer neem oor al die natuurlike hulpbronne en die oppervlak van die aarde herorganiseer deur reuse stede, kommunikasienetwerke, infrastruktuur en tegnologie tot stand te bring, blyk dit asof hulle die dominante spesie is. Tog, op die evolusionêre skaal van organiese ontwikkeling is hulle maar ʼn redelike onlangse toevoeging. In hierdie verhandeling word daar ʼn filosofiese beskrywing gegee van hoe ʼn deterministiese kosmos dit kon regkry om gedeeltelik lewendig te word. Daar word gedemonstreer hoe die kosmos in sigself die besonderse vermoë het om materiële en organiese strukture van hoë kompleksiteit te produseer – en hoe hierdie strukture lewendig, selfbewus en moreel aktief raak. Dit word geargumenteer dat die mens in die boesem van die kosmos ontwikkel het deur middel van inherente natuurwette om uiteindelik teleologiese agente van ʼn hoë orde te wees. Hulle verteenwoordig dus daardie besonderse gedeelte van die kosmos wat oor hul eie bestaan kan nadink, wat kennis oor hul unieke aard kan ontwikkel en daaruit ʼn toekomsvisie projekteer.Philosophy, Practical and Systematic TheologyM.A. Philosoph

Does Changing the Definition of Science Solve the Establishment Clause Problem for Teaching Intelligent Design as Science in Public Schools? Doing an End-Run Around the Constitution

[Excerpt] When Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection in 1859, it sparked some of the most contentious debates in American intellectual history, debates that continue to rage today. Although these debates have numerous political ramifications, the question posed in this paper is narrow: Does the Establishment Clause permit a particular assessment of current evolutionary theory – intelligent design (“ID”) – to be taught as science in American elementary and secondary public schools? This article shows that it does not. To understand current disputes over whether and how to teach the origins of life – including human life – in the science classes of public schools, it is necessary to understand both the legal and the scientific frameworks. I describe those general frameworks below in Part II. There I also show that Darwin’s theory of evolution meets the definition of science, an important step in showing that teaching evolution has a bona fide secular purpose as required by the Constitution. I also explain the relationship between Darwin’s theory and other explanations for the origins of life, such as creationism and classical versions of the design inference. I show, in particular, that neither creationism nor the design inference meets the definition of science, but belong rather to the religious domain. In Part III, I examine the origins of the conflict between evolutionary theory and creationism. That debate centered around two questions: May states constitutionally prohibit public schools from teaching evolution because its account of human origins is antithetical to the account set forth in the Book of Genesis? If not, does the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment permit a state to insist that its schools provide a balanced treatment of creationism and evolution when presenting human origins theories? Examining the historical development of the Establishment Clause in this context illuminates the question whether the current “teach the controversy” dispute is a historical product of the past controversies involving creationists. Answering that question helps determine whether efforts by ID proponents have a constitutionally impermissible religious purpose. In Part IV, I examine the modern theory of ID to determine whether it meets the definition of science. Again, answering that question helps to determine whether current efforts by ID proponents to “teach the controversy” have a secular purpose. I conclude that they do not, by showing that ID not only fails to meet the definition of science, but it also is linked to such famous proofs for the existence of God as St. Thomas Aquinas’ fifth proof, and Bishop Paley’s design inference. In Part V, I examine one school board’s solution to the constitutional problem – to change the definition of science. I conclude that the school board’s actions are unconstitutional to the extent they are attempting to inject proofs for the existence of God into public school science classes. And in Part VI, I draw some broad conclusions regarding the compatibility of theistic and scientific responses to origins of life inquiry

Toward a normative theory of rationality

This project offers an articulation of rationality in terms of normativity—that what it means to be acting rationally, in thought or in deed, can be understood via a notion of being bound or obliged to certain behaviors given a prior structure that delimits what is rational to assert in a discourse or perform in a society. In the explicit articulation of the role of norms in limning rationality, this project also emphasizes the opportunity and obligation to self-critically assess the value of the metalinguistic and metapractical standards that license rational assertions and behaviors. After an introduction, section 2 examines the role of rational constraint in Kant’s account of representation, concluding that the transcendental story his philosophy leaves us with impels us to look for an immanent socio-linguistic account of the normativity that obliges us to think and behave in certain ways, rather than lodging the force of normativity in transcendentality. Section 3 then examines Robert Brandom’s inferential semantics by addressing prominent responses to Brandom’s program, making explicit two ways in which normativity operates in inferentialism—one at the level of objectlanguage in the articulation of the propositional commitments and entitlements that specify propositional content, the other at the level of the metalinguistic appraisal of the standards that drive object-language inferentialism. Section 4 turns to the theoretical status of normativity and its role in practical behavior, where it is argued that a notion of normativity can underpin a theory of intentional states. Examining positions on naturalism, the author proposes that a causal account of intentionality, made explicit by the prescriptive nature of the theory advanced, provides a naturalist view of normativity for which norms are in explanations of social states as laws are in explanations of physical states. Hence the obligation to self-critically reflect on and revise the norms that delimit ethical behavior in social systems is understood as commensurate with the obligation to self-critically reflect on and revise the norms that delimit warranted assertions in epistemic discourse. The conclusion offers some remarks on the prospects for rational revision in both a discipline’s discourse and a society’s standards of behavior

Nominalism In Mathematics - Modality And Naturalism

I defend modal nominalism in philosophy of mathematics - under which quantification over mathematical ontology is replaced with various modal assertions - against two sources of resistance: that modal nominalists face difficulties justifying the modal assertions that figure in their theories, and that modal nominalism is incompatible with mathematical naturalism. Shapiro argues that modal nominalists invoke primitive modal concepts and that they are thereby unable to justify the various modal assertions that figure in their theories. The platonist, meanwhile, can appeal to the set-theoretic reduction of modality, and so can justify assertions about what is logically possible through an appeal to what exists in the set-theoretic hierarchy. In chapter one, I illustrate the modal involvement of the major modal nominalist views (Chihara\u27s Constructibility Theory, Field\u27s fictionalism, and Hellman\u27s Modal Structuralism). Chapter two provides an analysis of Shapiro\u27s criticism, and a partial response to it. A response is provided in full in chapter three, in which I argue that reducing modality does not provide a means for justifying modal assertions, vitiating the accusation that modal nominalists are particularly burdened by their inability to justify modal assertions. Chapter four discusses Burgess\u27s naturalistic objection that nominalism is unscientific. I argue that Burgess\u27s naturalism is inadequately resourced to expose nominalism (modal or otherwise) as unscientific in a way that would compel a naturalist to reject nominalism. I also argue that Burgess\u27s favored moderate platonism is also guilty of being unscientific. Chapter five discusses some objections derived from Maddy\u27s naturalism, one according to which modal nominalism fails to affirm or support mathematical method, and a second according to which modal nominalism fails to be contained or accommodated by mathematical method. Though both objections serve as evidence that modal nominalism is incompatible with Maddy\u27s naturalism, I argue that Maddy\u27s naturalism is implausibly strong and that modal nominalism is compatible with forms of naturalism that relax the stronger of Maddy\u27s naturalistic principles