140 research outputs found

    Klepto for post-quantum encryption

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    (One) Failure Is Not an Option:Bootstrapping the Search for Failures in Lattice-Based Encryption Schemes

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    Lattice-based encryption schemes are often subject to the possibility of decryption failures, in which valid encryptions are decrypted incorrectly. Such failures, in large number, leak information about the secret key, enabling an attack strategy alternative to pure lattice reduction. Extending the failure boosting\u27\u27 technique of D\u27Anvers et al. in PKC 2019, we propose an approach that we call directional failure boosting\u27\u27 that uses previously found failing ciphertexts\u27\u27 to accelerate the search for new ones. We analyse in detail the case where the lattice is defined over polynomial ring modules quotiented by and demonstrate it on a simple Mod-LWE-based scheme parametrized à la Kyber768/Saber. We show that, using our technique, for a given secret key (single-target setting), the cost of searching for additional failing ciphertexts after one or more have already been found, can be sped up dramatically. We thus demonstrate that, in this single-target model, these schemes should be designed so that it is hard to even obtain one decryption failure. Besides, in a wider security model where there are many target secret keys (multi-target setting), our attack greatly improves over the state of the art

    Decryption Failure Attacks on Post-Quantum Cryptography

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    This dissertation discusses mainly new cryptanalytical results related to issues of securely implementing the next generation of asymmetric cryptography, or Public-Key Cryptography (PKC).PKC, as it has been deployed until today, depends heavily on the integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problems.Unfortunately, it has been well-known since the mid-90s, that these mathematical problems can be solved due to Peter Shor's algorithm for quantum computers, which achieves the answers in polynomial time.The recently accelerated pace of R&D towards quantum computers, eventually of sufficient size and power to threaten cryptography, has led the crypto research community towards a major shift of focus.A project towards standardization of Post-quantum Cryptography (PQC) was launched by the US-based standardization organization, NIST. PQC is the name given to algorithms designed for running on classical hardware/software whilst being resistant to attacks from quantum computers.PQC is well suited for replacing the current asymmetric schemes.A primary motivation for the project is to guide publicly available research toward the singular goal of finding weaknesses in the proposed next generation of PKC.For public key encryption (PKE) or digital signature (DS) schemes to be considered secure they must be shown to rely heavily on well-known mathematical problems with theoretical proofs of security under established models, such as indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA).Also, they must withstand serious attack attempts by well-renowned cryptographers both concerning theoretical security and the actual software/hardware instantiations.It is well-known that security models, such as IND-CCA, are not designed to capture the intricacies of inner-state leakages.Such leakages are named side-channels, which is currently a major topic of interest in the NIST PQC project.This dissertation focuses on two things, in general:1) how does the low but non-zero probability of decryption failures affect the cryptanalysis of these new PQC candidates?And 2) how might side-channel vulnerabilities inadvertently be introduced when going from theory to the practice of software/hardware implementations?Of main concern are PQC algorithms based on lattice theory and coding theory.The primary contributions are the discovery of novel decryption failure side-channel attacks, improvements on existing attacks, an alternative implementation to a part of a PQC scheme, and some more theoretical cryptanalytical results

    Enhancement of Nth degree truncated polynomial ring for improving decryption failure

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    Nth Degree Truncated Polynomial (NTRU) is a public key cryptosystem constructed in a polynomial ring with integer coefficients that is based on three main key integer parameters N; p and q. However, decryption failure of validly created ciphertexts may occur, at which point the encrypted message is discarded and the sender re-encrypts the messages using different parameters. This may leak information about the private key of the recipient thereby making it vulnerable to attacks. Due to this, the study focused on reduction or elimination of decryption failure through several solutions. The study began with an experimental evaluation of NTRU parameters and existing selection criteria by uniform quartile random sampling without replacement in order to identify the most influential parameter(s) for decryption failure, and thus developed a predictive parameter selection model with the aid of machine learning. Subsequently, an improved NTRU modular inverse algorithm was developed following an exploratory evaluation of alternative modular inverse algorithms in terms of probability of invertibility, speed of inversion and computational complexity. Finally, several alternative algebraic ring structures were evaluated in terms of simplification of multiplication, modular inversion, one-way function properties and security analysis for NTRU variant formulation. The study showed that the private key f and large prime q were the most influential parameters in decryption failure. Firstly, an extended parameter selection criteria specifying that the private polynomial f should be selected such that f(1) = 1, number of 1 coefficients should be one more or one less than -1 coefficients, which doubles the range of invertible polynomials thereby doubling the presented key space. Furthermore, selecting q 2:5754 f(1)+83:9038 gave an appropriate size q with the least size required for successful message decryption, resulting in a 33.05% reduction of the public key size. Secondly, an improved modular inverse algorithm was developed using the least squares method of finding a generalized inverse applying homomorphism of ring R and an (N x N) circulant matrix with integer coefficients. This ensured inversion for selected polynomial f except for binary polynomial having all 1 coefficients. This resulted in an increase of 48% to 51% whereby the number of invertible polynomials enlarged the key space and consequently improved security. Finally, an NTRU variant based on the ring of integers, Integer TRUncated ring (ITRU) was developed to address the invertiblity problem of key generation which causes decryption failure. Based on this analysis, inversion is guaranteed, and less pre-computation is required. Besides, a lower key generation computational complexity of O(N2) compared to O(N2(log2p+log2q)) for NTRU as well as a public key size that is 38% to 53% smaller, and a message expansion factor that is 2 to15 times larger than that of NTRU enhanced message security were obtained

    New Security Definitions, Constructions and Applications of Proxy Re-Encryption

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    La externalización de la gestión de la información es una práctica cada vez más común, siendo la computación en la nube (en inglés, cloud computing) el paradigma más representativo. Sin embargo, este enfoque genera también preocupación con respecto a la seguridad y privacidad debido a la inherente pérdida del control sobre los datos. Las soluciones tradicionales, principalmente basadas en la aplicación de políticas y estrategias de control de acceso, solo reducen el problema a una cuestión de confianza, que puede romperse fácilmente por los proveedores de servicio, tanto de forma accidental como intencionada. Por lo tanto, proteger la información externalizada, y al mismo tiempo, reducir la confianza que es necesario establecer con los proveedores de servicio, se convierte en un objetivo inmediato. Las soluciones basadas en criptografía son un mecanismo crucial de cara a este fin. Esta tesis está dedicada al estudio de un criptosistema llamado recifrado delegado (en inglés, proxy re-encryption), que constituye una solución práctica a este problema, tanto desde el punto de vista funcional como de eficiencia. El recifrado delegado es un tipo de cifrado de clave pública que permite delegar en una entidad la capacidad de transformar textos cifrados de una clave pública a otra, sin que pueda obtener ninguna información sobre el mensaje subyacente. Desde un punto de vista funcional, el recifrado delegado puede verse como un medio de delegación segura de acceso a información cifrada, por lo que representa un candidato natural para construir mecanismos de control de acceso criptográficos. Aparte de esto, este tipo de cifrado es, en sí mismo, de gran interés teórico, ya que sus definiciones de seguridad deben balancear al mismo tiempo la seguridad de los textos cifrados con la posibilidad de transformarlos mediante el recifrado, lo que supone una estimulante dicotomía. Las contribuciones de esta tesis siguen un enfoque transversal, ya que van desde las propias definiciones de seguridad del recifrado delegado, hasta los detalles específicos de potenciales aplicaciones, pasando por construcciones concretas

    NTRU-LPR IND-CPA: A New Ideal Lattices-based Scheme

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    In this paper, we propose NTRU-LPR IND-CPA, a new secure scheme based on the decisional variant of Bounded Distance Decoding problem over rings (DR-BDD). This scheme is IND-CPA secure and has two KEM variants IND-CCA2 secure in the random oracle model. NTRU-LPR IND-CPA is similar to NTRU LPRime and LPR Cryptosystem. NTRU-LPR IND-CPA does not have a problem of decryption failures. Our polynomial ring can be any ring of the form Z[x]/(q,f(x))\mathbb{Z}[x]/(q,f(x)), where ff is a polynomial of degree nn and qq is an integer. Relatively to the DR-BDD problem, we propose to use square-free polynomials and such polynomials include f(x)=xnx1f(x)=x^n-x-1 (as in NTRU LPRime) and f(x)=xn1f(x)=x^n-1 (as in NTRU). To avoid some weaknesses in Ring-LWE or NTRU-like schemes (Meet-in-the-middle attack, Hybrid attack, Weak keys, etc.), we do not use sparse polynomials or inversion of polynomials. Furthermore, to avoid backdoors, all polynomials in our scheme can be generated by hash functions. We also give a short comparative analysis between our new scheme and some proposals of the NIST Post-Quantum call (November 2017)

    A one-time single-bit fault leaks all previous NTRU-HRSS session keys to a chosen-ciphertext attack

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    This paper presents an efficient attack that, in the standard IND-CCA2 attack model plus a one-time single-bit fault, recovers the NTRU-HRSS session key. This type of fault is expected to occur for many users through natural DRAM bit flips. In a multi-target IND-CCA2 attack model plus a one-time single-bit fault, the attack recovers every NTRU-HRSS session key that was encapsulated to the targeted public key before the fault. Software carrying out the full multi-target attack, using a simulated fault, is provided for verification. This paper also explains how a change in NTRU-HRSS in 2019 enabled this attack
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