Networking in the food sector of regional economy

Purpose: The article aims to study the features and the directions of development of network interaction of subjects of the food sector in different regions of the economy. Design/Methodology/Approach: The use of different methodological approaches allowed us to formulate a holistic management concept for the development of a network of competences in the food sector of the regional economy. Findings: The study identified the subjects of such interaction, as well as features that allow them to unite into groups that form networks of competencies. Considering the food sector of the region's economy as a socio-economic system, noted its extreme structural complexity, which necessitates the development of special approaches to its management, or rather the need for structural management is presented. The format of such interaction is a network of competencies, representing a spatially localized socio-economic structure formed on the initiative of active subjects of the regional economy. Practical Implications: The results obtained can be used as a basis for designing a network form of development of the food sector of the region's economy, taking into account the nature of placement and interaction of participants, as well as allowing for effective use of their resource capabilities, experience and knowledge. Originality/Value: In order to overcome the problems associated with the formation of network identity, network management competence is proposed to use a structured approach allowing them to make targeted decisions based on objective conditions and institutional nature.peer-reviewe

Towards a Formal Model of Privacy-Sensitive Dynamic Coalitions

The concept of dynamic coalitions (also virtual organizations) describes the temporary interconnection of autonomous agents, who share information or resources in order to achieve a common goal. Through modern technologies these coalitions may form across company, organization and system borders. Therefor questions of access control and security are of vital significance for the architectures supporting these coalitions. In this paper, we present our first steps to reach a formal framework for modeling and verifying the design of privacy-sensitive dynamic coalition infrastructures and their processes. In order to do so we extend existing dynamic coalition modeling approaches with an access-control-concept, which manages access to information through policies. Furthermore we regard the processes underlying these coalitions and present first works in formalizing these processes. As a result of the present paper we illustrate the usefulness of the Abstract State Machine (ASM) method for this task. We demonstrate a formal treatment of privacy-sensitive dynamic coalitions by two example ASMs which model certain access control situations. A logical consideration of these ASMs can lead to a better understanding and a verification of the ASMs according to the aspired specification.Comment: In Proceedings FAVO 2011, arXiv:1204.579

OperA/ALIVE/OperettA

Comprehensive models for organizations must, on the one hand, be able to specify global goals and requirements but, on the other hand, cannot assume that particular actors will always act according to the needs and expectations of the system design. Concepts as organizational rules (Zambonelli 2002), norms and institutions (Dignum and Dignum 2001; Esteva et al. 2002), and social structures (Parunak and Odell 2002) arise from the idea that the effective engineering of organizations needs high-level, actor-independent concepts and abstractions that explicitly define the organization in which agents live (Zambonelli 2002).Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Making corruption harder: asymmetric information, collusion, and crime

We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the agent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and Martimort (1997) we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric information between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor’s incentives. We show it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved pre-existing patterns of private information. We provide a data-driven framework for policy evaluation requiring only unverified reports. A potential local policy change is an improvement if, everything else equal, it is associated with greater reports of crime

Some Remarks about the Complexity of Epidemics Management

Recent outbreaks of Ebola, H1N1 and other infectious diseases have shown that the assumptions underlying the established theory of epidemics management are too idealistic. For an improvement of procedures and organizations involved in fighting epidemics, extended models of epidemics management are required. The necessary extensions consist in a representation of the management loop and the potential frictions influencing the loop. The effects of the non-deterministic frictions can be taken into account by including the measures of robustness and risk in the assessment of management options. Thus, besides of the increased structural complexity resulting from the model extensions, the computational complexity of the task of epidemics management - interpreted as an optimization problem - is increased as well. This is a serious obstacle for analyzing the model and may require an additional pre-processing enabling a simplification of the analysis process. The paper closes with an outlook discussing some forthcoming problems