A Security Pattern for Cloud service certification

Cloud computing is interesting from the economic, operational and even energy consumption perspectives but it still raises concerns regarding the security, privacy, governance and compliance of the data and software services offered through it. However, the task of verifying security properties in services running on cloud is not trivial. We notice the provision and security of a cloud service is sensitive. Because of the potential interference between the features and behavior of all the inter-dependent services in all layers of the cloud stack (as well as dynamic changes in them). Besides current cloud models do not include support for trust-focused communication between layers. We present a mechanism to implement cloud service certification process based on the usage of Trusted Computing technology, by means of its Trusted Computing Platform (TPM) implementation of its architecture. Among many security security features it is a tamper proof resistance built in device and provides a root of trust to affix our certification mechanism. We present as a security pattern the approach for service certification based on the use TPM.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tec

Electronics systems test laboratory testing of shuttle communications systems

Shuttle communications and tracking systems space to space and space to ground compatibility and performance evaluations are conducted in the NASA Johnson Space Center Electronics Systems Test Laboratory (ESTL). This evaluation is accomplished through systems verification/certification tests using orbiter communications hardware in conjunction with other shuttle communications and tracking external elements to evaluate end to end system compatibility and to verify/certify that overall system performance meets program requirements before manned flight usage. In this role, the ESTL serves as a multielement major ground test facility. The ESTL capability and program concept are discussed. The system test philosophy for the complex communications channels is described in terms of the major phases. Results of space to space and space to ground systems tests are presented. Several examples of the ESTL's unique capabilities to locate and help resolve potential problems are discussed in detail

High-speed civil transport flight- and propulsion-control technological issues

Technology advances required in the flight and propulsion control system disciplines to develop a high speed civil transport (HSCT) are identified. The mission and requirements of the transport and major flight and propulsion control technology issues are discussed. Each issue is ranked and, for each issue, a plan for technology readiness is given. Certain features are unique and dominate control system design. These features include the high temperature environment, large flexible aircraft, control-configured empennage, minimizing control margins, and high availability and excellent maintainability. The failure to resolve most high-priority issues can prevent the transport from achieving its goals. The flow-time for hardware may require stimulus, since market forces may be insufficient to ensure timely production. Flight and propulsion control technology will contribute to takeoff gross weight reduction. Similar technology advances are necessary also to ensure flight safety for the transport. The certification basis of the HSCT must be negotiated between airplane manufacturers and government regulators. Efficient, quality design of the transport will require an integrated set of design tools that support the entire engineering design team

Using ACL2 to Verify Loop Pipelining in Behavioral Synthesis

Behavioral synthesis involves compiling an Electronic System-Level (ESL) design into its Register-Transfer Level (RTL) implementation. Loop pipelining is one of the most critical and complex transformations employed in behavioral synthesis. Certifying the loop pipelining algorithm is challenging because there is a huge semantic gap between the input sequential design and the output pipelined implementation making it infeasible to verify their equivalence with automated sequential equivalence checking techniques. We discuss our ongoing effort using ACL2 to certify loop pipelining transformation. The completion of the proof is work in progress. However, some of the insights developed so far may already be of value to the ACL2 community. In particular, we discuss the key invariant we formalized, which is very different from that used in most pipeline proofs. We discuss the needs for this invariant, its formalization in ACL2, and our envisioned proof using the invariant. We also discuss some trade-offs, challenges, and insights developed in course of the project.Comment: In Proceedings ACL2 2014, arXiv:1406.123

Certifying Services in Cloud: The Case for a Hybrid, Incremental and Multi-layer Approach

The use of clouds raises significant security concerns for the services they provide. Addressing these concerns requires novel models of cloud service certification based on multiple forms of evidence including testing and monitoring data, and trusted computing proofs. CUMULUS is a novel infrastructure for realising such certification models

Validation of Ultrahigh Dependability for Software-Based Systems

Modern society depends on computers for a number of critical tasks in which failure can have very high costs. As a consequence, high levels of dependability (reliability, safety, etc.) are required from such computers, including their software. Whenever a quantitative approach to risk is adopted, these requirements must be stated in quantitative terms, and a rigorous demonstration of their being attained is necessary. For software used in the most critical roles, such demonstrations are not usually supplied. The fact is that the dependability requirements often lie near the limit of the current state of the art, or beyond, in terms not only of the ability to satisfy them, but also, and more often, of the ability to demonstrate that they are satisfied in the individual operational products (validation). We discuss reasons why such demonstrations cannot usually be provided with the means available: reliability growth models, testing with stable reliability, structural dependability modelling, as well as more informal arguments based on good engineering practice. We state some rigorous arguments about the limits of what can be validated with each of such means. Combining evidence from these different sources would seem to raise the levels that can be validated; yet this improvement is not such as to solve the problem. It appears that engineering practice must take into account the fact that no solution exists, at present, for the validation of ultra-high dependability in systems relying on complex software

The future of Cybersecurity in Italy: Strategic focus area

This volume has been created as a continuation of the previous one, with the aim of outlining a set of focus areas and actions that the Italian Nation research community considers essential. The book touches many aspects of cyber security, ranging from the definition of the infrastructure and controls needed to organize cyberdefence to the actions and technologies to be developed to be better protected, from the identification of the main technologies to be defended to the proposal of a set of horizontal actions for training, awareness raising, and risk management

High-Integrity Performance Monitoring Units in Automotive Chips for Reliable Timing V&V

As software continues to control more system-critical functions in cars, its timing is becoming an integral element in functional safety. Timing validation and verification (V&V) assesses softwares end-to-end timing measurements against given budgets. The advent of multicore processors with massive resource sharing reduces the significance of end-to-end execution times for timing V&V and requires reasoning on (worst-case) access delays on contention-prone hardware resources. While Performance Monitoring Units (PMU) support this finer-grained reasoning, their design has never been a prime consideration in high-performance processors - where automotive-chips PMU implementations descend from - since PMU does not directly affect performance or reliability. To meet PMUs instrumental importance for timing V&V, we advocate for PMUs in automotive chips that explicitly track activities related to worst-case (rather than average) softwares behavior, are recognized as an ISO-26262 mandatory high-integrity hardware service, and are accompanied with detailed documentation that enables their effective use to derive reliable timing estimatesThis work has also been partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) under grant TIN2015-65316-P and the HiPEAC Network of Excellence. Jaume Abella has been partially supported by the MINECO under Ramon y Cajal postdoctoral fellowship number RYC-2013-14717. Enrico Mezzet has been partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under Juan de la Cierva-Incorporación postdoctoral fellowship number IJCI-2016- 27396.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Technical alignment

This essay discusses the importance of the areas of infrastructure and testing to help digital preservation services demonstrate reliability, transparency, and accountability. It encourages practitioners to build a strong culture in which transparency and collaborations between technical frameworks are valued highly. It also argues for devising and applying agreed-upon metrics that will enable the systematic analysis of preservation infrastructure. The essay begins by defining technical infrastructure and testing in the digital preservation context, provides case studies that exemplify both progress and challenges for technical alignment in both areas, and concludes with suggestions for achieving greater degrees of technical alignment going forward