Signaling in Quasipolynomial time

Strategic interactions often take place in an environment rife with uncertainty. As a result, the equilibrium of a game is intimately related to the information available to its players. The \emph{signaling problem} abstracts the task faced by an informed "market maker", who must choose how to reveal information in order to effect a desirable equilibrium. In this paper, we consider two fundamental signaling problems: one for abstract normal form games, and the other for single item auctions. For the former, we consider an abstract class of objective functions which includes the social welfare and weighted combinations of players' utilities, and for the latter we restrict our attention to the social welfare objective and to signaling schemes which are constrained in the number of signals used. For both problems, we design approximation algorithms for the signaling problem which run in quasi-polynomial time under various conditions, extending and complementing the results of various recent works on the topic. Underlying each of our results is a "meshing scheme" which effectively overcomes the "curse of dimensionality" and discretizes the space of "essentially different" posterior beliefs -- in the sense of inducing "essentially different" equilibria. This is combined with an algorithm for optimally assembling a signaling scheme as a convex combination of such beliefs. For the normal form game setting, the meshing scheme leads to a convex partition of the space of posterior beliefs and this assembly procedure is reduced to a linear program, and in the auction setting the assembly procedure is reduced to submodular function maximization

Quantum de Finetti Theorems under Local Measurements with Applications

Quantum de Finetti theorems are a useful tool in the study of correlations in quantum multipartite states. In this paper we prove two new quantum de Finetti theorems, both showing that under tests formed by local measurements one can get a much improved error dependence on the dimension of the subsystems. We also obtain similar results for non-signaling probability distributions. We give the following applications of the results: We prove the optimality of the Chen-Drucker protocol for 3-SAT, under the exponential time hypothesis. We show that the maximum winning probability of free games can be estimated in polynomial time by linear programming. We also show that 3-SAT with m variables can be reduced to obtaining a constant error approximation of the maximum winning probability under entangled strategies of O(m^{1/2})-player one-round non-local games, in which the players communicate O(m^{1/2}) bits all together. We show that the optimization of certain polynomials over the hypersphere can be performed in quasipolynomial time in the number of variables n by considering O(log(n)) rounds of the Sum-of-Squares (Parrilo/Lasserre) hierarchy of semidefinite programs. As an application to entanglement theory, we find a quasipolynomial-time algorithm for deciding multipartite separability. We consider a result due to Aaronson -- showing that given an unknown n qubit state one can perform tomography that works well for most observables by measuring only O(n) independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) copies of the state -- and relax the assumption of having i.i.d copies of the state to merely the ability to select subsystems at random from a quantum multipartite state. The proofs of the new quantum de Finetti theorems are based on information theory, in particular on the chain rule of mutual information.Comment: 39 pages, no figure. v2: changes to references and other minor improvements. v3: added some explanations, mostly about Theorem 1 and Conjecture 5. STOC version. v4, v5. small improvements and fixe

Mixture Selection, Mechanism Design, and Signaling

We pose and study a fundamental algorithmic problem which we term mixture selection, arising as a building block in a number of game-theoretic applications: Given a function $g$ from the $n$-dimensional hypercube to the bounded interval $[-1,1]$, and an $n \times m$ matrix $A$ with bounded entries, maximize $g(Ax)$ over $x$ in the $m$-dimensional simplex. This problem arises naturally when one seeks to design a lottery over items for sale in an auction, or craft the posterior beliefs for agents in a Bayesian game through the provision of information (a.k.a. signaling). We present an approximation algorithm for this problem when $g$ simultaneously satisfies two smoothness properties: Lipschitz continuity with respect to the $L^\infty$ norm, and noise stability. The latter notion, which we define and cater to our setting, controls the degree to which low-probability errors in the inputs of $g$ can impact its output. When $g$ is both $O(1)$-Lipschitz continuous and $O(1)$-stable, we obtain an (additive) PTAS for mixture selection. We also show that neither assumption suffices by itself for an additive PTAS, and both assumptions together do not suffice for an additive FPTAS. We apply our algorithm to different game-theoretic applications from mechanism design and optimal signaling. We make progress on a number of open problems suggested in prior work by easily reducing them to mixture selection: we resolve an important special case of the small-menu lottery design problem posed by Dughmi, Han, and Nisan; we resolve the problem of revenue-maximizing signaling in Bayesian second-price auctions posed by Emek et al. and Miltersen and Sheffet; we design a quasipolynomial-time approximation scheme for the optimal signaling problem in normal form games suggested by Dughmi; and we design an approximation algorithm for the optimal signaling problem in the voting model of Alonso and C\^{a}mara

On the Hardness of Signaling

There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information available to players in the game. Lurking beneath this literature is a fundamental, yet largely unexplored, algorithmic question: how should a "market maker" who is privy to additional information, and equipped with a specified objective, inform the players in the game? This is an informational analogue of the mechanism design question, and views the information structure of a game as a mathematical object to be designed, rather than an exogenous variable. We initiate a complexity-theoretic examination of the design of optimal information structures in general Bayesian games, a task often referred to as signaling. We focus on one of the simplest instantiations of the signaling question: Bayesian zero-sum games, and a principal who must choose an information structure maximizing the equilibrium payoff of one of the players. In this setting, we show that optimal signaling is computationally intractable, and in some cases hard to approximate, assuming that it is hard to recover a planted clique from an Erdos-Renyi random graph. This is despite the fact that equilibria in these games are computable in polynomial time, and therefore suggests that the hardness of optimal signaling is a distinct phenomenon from the hardness of equilibrium computation. Necessitated by the non-local nature of information structures, en-route to our results we prove an "amplification lemma" for the planted clique problem which may be of independent interest

AM with Multiple Merlins

We introduce and study a new model of interactive proofs: AM(k), or Arthur-Merlin with k non-communicating Merlins. Unlike with the better-known MIP, here the assumption is that each Merlin receives an independent random challenge from Arthur. One motivation for this model (which we explore in detail) comes from the close analogies between it and the quantum complexity class QMA(k), but the AM(k) model is also natural in its own right. We illustrate the power of multiple Merlins by giving an AM(2) protocol for 3SAT, in which the Merlins' challenges and responses consist of only n^{1/2+o(1)} bits each. Our protocol has the consequence that, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH), any algorithm for approximating a dense CSP with a polynomial-size alphabet must take n^{(log n)^{1-o(1)}} time. Algorithms nearly matching this lower bound are known, but their running times had never been previously explained. Brandao and Harrow have also recently used our 3SAT protocol to show quasipolynomial hardness for approximating the values of certain entangled games. In the other direction, we give a simple quasipolynomial-time approximation algorithm for free games, and use it to prove that, assuming the ETH, our 3SAT protocol is essentially optimal. More generally, we show that multiple Merlins never provide more than a polynomial advantage over one: that is, AM(k)=AM for all k=poly(n). The key to this result is a subsampling theorem for free games, which follows from powerful results by Alon et al. and Barak et al. on subsampling dense CSPs, and which says that the value of any free game can be closely approximated by the value of a logarithmic-sized random subgame.Comment: 48 page

On palimpsests in neural memory: an information theory viewpoint

The finite capacity of neural memory and the reconsolidation phenomenon suggest it is important to be able to update stored information as in a palimpsest, where new information overwrites old information. Moreover, changing information in memory is metabolically costly. In this paper, we suggest that information-theoretic approaches may inform the fundamental limits in constructing such a memory system. In particular, we define malleable coding, that considers not only representation length but also ease of representation update, thereby encouraging some form of recycling to convert an old codeword into a new one. Malleability cost is the difficulty of synchronizing compressed versions, and malleable codes are of particular interest when representing information and modifying the representation are both expensive. We examine the tradeoff between compression efficiency and malleability cost, under a malleability metric defined with respect to a string edit distance. This introduces a metric topology to the compressed domain. We characterize the exact set of achievable rates and malleability as the solution of a subgraph isomorphism problem. This is all done within the optimization approach to biology framework.Accepted manuscrip

Distributed Signaling Games

A recurring theme in recent computer science literature is that proper design of signaling schemes is a crucial aspect of effective mechanisms aiming to optimize social welfare or revenue. One of the research endeavors of this line of work is understanding the algorithmic and computational complexity of designing efficient signaling schemes. In reality, however, information is typically not held by a central authority, but is distributed among multiple sources (third-party "mediators"), a fact that dramatically changes the strategic and combinatorial nature of the signaling problem, making it a game between information providers, as opposed to a traditional mechanism design problem. In this paper we introduce {\em distributed signaling games}, while using display advertising as a canonical example for introducing this foundational framework. A distributed signaling game may be a pure coordination game (i.e., a distributed optimization task), or a non-cooperative game. In the context of pure coordination games, we show a wide gap between the computational complexity of the centralized and distributed signaling problems. On the other hand, we show that if the information structure of each mediator is assumed to be "local", then there is an efficient algorithm that finds a near-optimal ($5$-approximation) distributed signaling scheme. In the context of non-cooperative games, the outcome generated by the mediators' signals may have different value to each (due to the auctioneer's desire to align the incentives of the mediators with his own by relative compensations). We design a mechanism for this problem via a novel application of Shapley's value, and show that it possesses some interesting properties, in particular, it always admits a pure Nash equilibrium, and it never decreases the revenue of the auctioneer

Quantum de Finetti Theorems Under Local Measurements with Applications

Quantum de Finetti theorems are a useful tool in the study of correlations in quantum multipartite states. In this paper we prove two new quantum de Finetti theorems, both showing that under tests formed by local measurements in each of the subsystems one can get an exponential improvement in the error dependence on the dimension of the subsystems. We also obtain similar results for non-signaling probability distributions. We give several applications of the results to quantum complexity theory, polynomial optimization, and quantum information theory. The proofs of the new quantum de Finetti theorems are based on information theory, in particular on the chain rule of mutual information. The results constitute improvements and generalizations of a recent de Finetti theorem due to Brandão, Christandl and Yard

A Birthday Repetition Theorem and Complexity of Approximating Dense CSPs

A $(k \times l)$-birthday repetition $\mathcal{G}^{k \times l}$ of a two-prover game $\mathcal{G}$ is a game in which the two provers are sent random sets of questions from $\mathcal{G}$ of sizes $k$ and $l$ respectively. These two sets are sampled independently uniformly among all sets of questions of those particular sizes. We prove the following birthday repetition theorem: when $\mathcal{G}$ satisfies some mild conditions, $val(\mathcal{G}^{k \times l})$ decreases exponentially in $\Omega(kl/n)$ where $n$ is the total number of questions. Our result positively resolves an open question posted by Aaronson, Impagliazzo and Moshkovitz (CCC 2014). As an application of our birthday repetition theorem, we obtain new fine-grained hardness of approximation results for dense CSPs. Specifically, we establish a tight trade-off between running time and approximation ratio for dense CSPs by showing conditional lower bounds, integrality gaps and approximation algorithms. In particular, for any sufficiently large $i$ and for every $k \geq 2$, we show the following results: - We exhibit an $O(q^{1/i})$-approximation algorithm for dense Max $k$-CSPs with alphabet size $q$ via $O_k(i)$-level of Sherali-Adams relaxation. - Through our birthday repetition theorem, we obtain an integrality gap of $q^{1/i}$ for $\tilde\Omega_k(i)$-level Lasserre relaxation for fully-dense Max $k$-CSP. - Assuming that there is a constant $\epsilon > 0$ such that Max 3SAT cannot be approximated to within $(1-\epsilon)$ of the optimal in sub-exponential time, our birthday repetition theorem implies that any algorithm that approximates fully-dense Max $k$-CSP to within a $q^{1/i}$ factor takes $(nq)^{\tilde \Omega_k(i)}$ time, almost tightly matching the algorithmic result based on Sherali-Adams relaxation.Comment: 45 page