Sequentially Rationalizable Choice with Transitive Rationales

In this note, we analyze a sequentially rationalizable choice model with a transitive rationale and a standard preference. The model in this note is more restrictive than the Rational Shortlist Method (RSM) model which is proposed in Manzini and Mariotti (2007) to capture cyclic behavior. Yet, a decision maker in our model exhibits cyclic behavior in general. We prove that the cyclicity of an indirectly revealed preference is exactly what distinguishes the RSM framework (a sequential choice model with a non-standard preference) from our transitive-RSM framework (a sequential choice model with a standard preference). We also provide a partial identification result on the representation

Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice

[EN]This paper contributes to the theory of rational choice under sequential criteria. Following the approach initiated by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) for single-valued choice functions, we characterize choice correspondences that are rational by two sequential criteria under a mild consistency axiom. Rationales ensuring the sequential rationalization are explicitly constructed and a uniquely determined, canonical solution is provided

Choice resolutions

AbstractWe describe a process to compose and decompose choice behavior, called resolution. In the forward direction, resolutions amalgamate simple choices to create a complex one. In the backward direction, resolutions detect when and how a primitive choice can be deconstructed into smaller choices. A choice is resolvable if it is the resolution of smaller choices. Rationalizability, rationalizability by a preorder, and path independence are all preserved (backward and forward) by resolutions, whereas rationalizability by a weak order (equivalently, ) is not. We characterize resolvable choices, and show that resolvability generalizes

A simple model of two-stage choice

I provide choice-theoretic foundations for a simple two-stage model, called transitive shortlist methods, where choices are made by sequentially by applying a pair of transitive preferences (or rationales) to eliminate inferior alternatives. Despite its simplicity, the model accommodates a wide range of choice phenomena including the status quo bias, framing, homophily, compromise, and limited willpower. I establish that the model can be succinctly characterized in terms of some well-documented context effects in choice. I also show that the underlying rationales are straightforward to determine from readily observable reversals in choice. Finally, I highlight the usefulness of these results in a variety of applications