Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice

[EN]This paper contributes to the theory of rational choice under sequential criteria. Following the approach initiated by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) for single-valued choice functions, we characterize choice correspondences that are rational by two sequential criteria under a mild consistency axiom. Rationales ensuring the sequential rationalization are explicitly constructed and a uniquely determined, canonical solution is provided

Choice resolutions

AbstractWe describe a process to compose and decompose choice behavior, called resolution. In the forward direction, resolutions amalgamate simple choices to create a complex one. In the backward direction, resolutions detect when and how a primitive choice can be deconstructed into smaller choices. A choice is resolvable if it is the resolution of smaller choices. Rationalizability, rationalizability by a preorder, and path independence are all preserved (backward and forward) by resolutions, whereas rationalizability by a weak order (equivalently, ) is not. We characterize resolvable choices, and show that resolvability generalizes

A simple model of two-stage choice

I provide choice-theoretic foundations for a simple two-stage model, called transitive shortlist methods, where choices are made by sequentially by applying a pair of transitive preferences (or rationales) to eliminate inferior alternatives. Despite its simplicity, the model accommodates a wide range of choice phenomena including the status quo bias, framing, homophily, compromise, and limited willpower. I establish that the model can be succinctly characterized in terms of some well-documented context effects in choice. I also show that the underlying rationales are straightforward to determine from readily observable reversals in choice. Finally, I highlight the usefulness of these results in a variety of applications