Secure Position-Based Routing for VANETs

Vehicular communication (VC) systems have the potential to improve road safety and driving comfort. Nevertheless, securing the operation is a prerequisite for deployment. So far, the security of VC applications has mostly drawn the attention of research efforts, while comprehensive solutions to protect the network operation have not been developed. In this paper, we address this problem: we provide a scheme that secures geographic position-based routing, which has been widely accepted as the appropriate one for VC. Moreover, we focus on the scheme currently chosen and evaluated in the Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC). We integrate security mechanisms to protect the position-based routing functionality and services (beaconing, multi-hop forwarding, and geo-location discovery), and enhance the network robustness. We propose defense mechanisms, relying both on cryptographic primitives, and plausibility checks mitigating false position injection. Our implementation and initial measurements show that the security overhead is low and the proposed scheme deployable

Secure and robust multi-constrained QoS aware routing algorithm for VANETs

Secure QoS routing algorithms are a fundamental part of wireless networks that aim to provide services with QoS and security guarantees. In Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs), vehicles perform routing functions, and at the same time act as end-systems thus routing control messages are transmitted unprotected over wireless channels. The QoS of the entire network could be degraded by an attack on the routing process, and manipulation of the routing control messages. In this paper, we propose a novel secure and reliable multi-constrained QoS aware routing algorithm for VANETs. We employ the Ant Colony Optimisation (ACO) technique to compute feasible routes in VANETs subject to multiple QoS constraints determined by the data traffic type. Moreover, we extend the VANET-oriented Evolving Graph (VoEG) model to perform plausibility checks on the exchanged routing control messages among vehicles. Simulation results show that the QoS can be guaranteed while applying security mechanisms to ensure a reliable and robust routing service

SECMACE: Scalable and Robust Identity and Credential Management Infrastructure in Vehicular Communication Systems

Several years of academic and industrial research efforts have converged to a common understanding on fundamental security building blocks for the upcoming Vehicular Communication (VC) systems. There is a growing consensus towards deploying a special-purpose identity and credential management infrastructure, i.e., a Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI), enabling pseudonymous authentication, with standardization efforts towards that direction. In spite of the progress made by standardization bodies (IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI) and harmonization efforts (Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC)), significant questions remain unanswered towards deploying a VPKI. Deep understanding of the VPKI, a central building block of secure and privacy-preserving VC systems, is still lacking. This paper contributes to the closing of this gap. We present SECMACE, a VPKI system, which is compatible with the IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI standards specifications. We provide a detailed description of our state-of-the-art VPKI that improves upon existing proposals in terms of security and privacy protection, and efficiency. SECMACE facilitates multi-domain operations in the VC systems and enhances user privacy, notably preventing linking pseudonyms based on timing information and offering increased protection even against honest-but-curious VPKI entities. We propose multiple policies for the vehicle-VPKI interactions, based on which and two large-scale mobility trace datasets, we evaluate the full-blown implementation of SECMACE. With very little attention on the VPKI performance thus far, our results reveal that modest computing resources can support a large area of vehicles with very low delays and the most promising policy in terms of privacy protection can be supported with moderate overhead.Comment: 14 pages, 9 figures, 10 tables, IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation System