6 research outputs found

    Physical Time-Varying Transfer Functions as Generic Low-Overhead Power-SCA Countermeasure

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    Mathematically-secure cryptographic algorithms leak significant side channel information through their power supplies when implemented on a physical platform. These side channel leakages can be exploited by an attacker to extract the secret key of an embedded device. The existing state-of-the-art countermeasures mainly focus on the power balancing, gate-level masking, or signal-to-noise (SNR) reduction using noise injection and signature attenuation, all of which suffer either from the limitations of high power/area overheads, performance degradation or are not synthesizable. In this article, we propose a generic low-overhead digital-friendly power SCA countermeasure utilizing physical Time-Varying Transfer Functions (TVTF) by randomly shuffling distributed switched capacitors to significantly obfuscate the traces in the time domain. System-level simulation results of the TVTF-AES implemented in TSMC 65nm CMOS technology show > 4000x MTD improvement over the unprotected implementation with nearly 1.25x power and 1.2x area overheads, and without any performance degradation

    Secure and Energy-Efficient Processors

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    Security has become an essential part of digital information storage and processing. Both high-end and low-end applications, such as data centers and Internet of Things (IoT), rely on robust security to ensure proper operation. Encryption of information is the primary means for enabling security. Among all encryption standards, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a widely adopted cryptographic algorithm, due to its simplicity and high security. Although encryption standards in general are extremely difficult to break mathematically, they are vulnerable to so-called side channel attacks, which exploit electrical signatures of operating chips, such as power trace or magnetic field radiation, to crack the encryption. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack is a representative and powerful side-channel attack method, which has demonstrated high effectiveness in cracking secure chips. This dissertation explores circuits and architectures that offer protection against DPA attacks in high-performance security applications and in low-end IoT applications. The effectiveness of the proposed technologies is evaluated. First, a 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) core for high-performance security applications is designed, fabricated and evaluated in a 65nm CMOS technology. A novel charge-recovery logic family, called Bridge Boost Logic (BBL), is introduced in this design to achieve switching-independent energy dissipation and provide intrinsic high resistance against DPA attacks. Based on measurements, the AES core achieves a throughput of 16.90Gbps and power consumption of 98mW, exhibiting 720x higher DPA resistance and 30% lower power than a conventional CMOS counterpart implemented on the same die and operated at the same clock frequency. Second, an AES core designed for low-cost and energy-efficient IoT security applications is designed and fabricated in a 65nm CMOS technology. A novel Dual-Rail Flush Logic (DRFL) with switching-independent power profile is used to yield intrinsic resistance against DPA attacks with minimum area and energy consumption. Measurement results show that this 0.048mm2 core achieves energy consumption as low as 1.25pJ/bit, while providing at least 2604x higher DPA resistance over its conventional CMOS counterpart on the same die, marking the smallest, most energy-efficient and most secure full-datapath AES core published to date.PHDElectrical EngineeringUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/138791/1/luss_1.pd

    Research on performance enhancement for electromagnetic analysis and power analysis in cryptographic LSI

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    制度:新 ; 報告番号:甲3785号 ; 学位の種類:博士(工学) ; 授与年月日:2012/11/19 ; 早大学位記番号:新6161Waseda Universit

    Seamless Communication for Crises Management

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    SECRICOM is proposed as a collaborative research project aiming at development of a reference security platform for EU crisis management operations with two essential ambitions: (A) Solve or mitigate problems of contemporary crisis communication infrastructures (Tetra, GSM, Citizen Band, IP) such as poor interoperability of specialized communication means, vulnerability against tapping and misuse, lack of possibilities to recover from failures, inability to use alternative data carrier and high deployment and operational costs. (B) Add new smart functions to existing services which will make the communication more effective and helpful for users. Smart functions will be provided by distributed IT systems based on an agents’ infrastructure. Achieving these two project ambitions will allow creating a pervasive and trusted communication infrastructure fulfilling requirements of crisis management users and ready for immediate application
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