BaNa: a noise resilient fundamental frequency detection algorithm for speech and music

Fundamental frequency (F0) is one of the essential features in many acoustic related applications. Although numerous F0 detection algorithms have been developed, the detection accuracy in noisy environments still needs improvement. We present a hybrid noise resilient F0 detection algorithm named BaNa that combines the approaches of harmonic ratios and Cepstrum analysis. A Viterbi algorithm with a cost function is used to identify the F0 value among several F0 candidates. Speech and music databases with eight different types of additive noise are used to evaluate the performance of the BaNa algorithm and several classic and state-of-the-art F0 detection algorithms. Results show that for almost all types of noise and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) values investigated, BaNa achieves the lowest Gross Pitch Error (GPE) rate among all the algorithms. Moreover, for the 0 dB SNR scenarios, the BaNa algorithm is shown to achieve 20% to 35% GPE rate for speech and 12% to 39% GPE rate for music. We also describe implementation issues that must be addressed to run the BaNa algorithm as a real-time application on a smartphone platform.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Speaker recognition using frequency filtered spectral energies

The spectral parameters that result from filtering the frequency sequence of log mel-scaled filter-bank energies with a simple first or second order FIR filter have proved to be an efficient speech representation in terms of both speech recognition rate and computational load. Recently, the authors have shown that this frequency filtering can approximately equalize the cepstrum variance enhancing the oscillations of the spectral envelope curve that are most effective for discrimination between speakers. Even better speaker identification results than using melcepstrum have been obtained on the TIMIT database, especially when white noise was added. On the other hand, the hybridization of both linear prediction and filter-bank spectral analysis using either cepstral transformation or the alternative frequency filtering has been explored for speaker verification. The combination of hybrid spectral analysis and frequency filtering, that had shown to be able to outperform the conventional techniques in clean and noisy word recognition, has yield good text-dependent speaker verification results on the new speaker-oriented telephone-line POLYCOST database.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Multiple-F0 estimation of piano sounds exploiting spectral structure and temporal evolution

This paper proposes a system for multiple fundamental frequency estimation of piano sounds using pitch candidate selection rules which employ spectral structure and temporal evolution. As a time-frequency representation, the Resonator Time-Frequency Image of the input signal is employed, a noise suppression model is used, and a spectral whitening procedure is performed. In addition, a spectral flux-based onset detector is employed in order to select the steady-state region of the produced sound. In the multiple-F0 estimation stage, tuning and inharmonicity parameters are extracted and a pitch salience function is proposed. Pitch presence tests are performed utilizing information from the spectral structure of pitch candidates, aiming to suppress errors occurring at multiples and sub-multiples of the true pitches. A novel feature for the estimation of harmonically related pitches is proposed, based on the common amplitude modulation assumption. Experiments are performed on the MAPS database using 8784 piano samples of classical, jazz, and random chords with polyphony levels between 1 and 6. The proposed system is computationally inexpensive, being able to perform multiple-F0 estimation experiments in realtime. Experimental results indicate that the proposed system outperforms state-of-the-art approaches for the aforementioned task in a statistically significant manner. Index Terms: multiple-F0 estimation, resonator timefrequency image, common amplitude modulatio

Sound Source Separation

This is the author's accepted pre-print of the article, first published as G. Evangelista, S. Marchand, M. D. Plumbley and E. Vincent. Sound source separation. In U. Zölzer (ed.), DAFX: Digital Audio Effects, 2nd edition, Chapter 14, pp. 551-588. John Wiley & Sons, March 2011. ISBN 9781119991298. DOI: 10.1002/9781119991298.ch14file: Proof:e\EvangelistaMarchandPlumbleyV11-sound.pdf:PDF owner: markp timestamp: 2011.04.26file: Proof:e\EvangelistaMarchandPlumbleyV11-sound.pdf:PDF owner: markp timestamp: 2011.04.2

Practical Hidden Voice Attacks against Speech and Speaker Recognition Systems

Voice Processing Systems (VPSes), now widely deployed, have been made significantly more accurate through the application of recent advances in machine learning. However, adversarial machine learning has similarly advanced and has been used to demonstrate that VPSes are vulnerable to the injection of hidden commands - audio obscured by noise that is correctly recognized by a VPS but not by human beings. Such attacks, though, are often highly dependent on white-box knowledge of a specific machine learning model and limited to specific microphones and speakers, making their use across different acoustic hardware platforms (and thus their practicality) limited. In this paper, we break these dependencies and make hidden command attacks more practical through model-agnostic (blackbox) attacks, which exploit knowledge of the signal processing algorithms commonly used by VPSes to generate the data fed into machine learning systems. Specifically, we exploit the fact that multiple source audio samples have similar feature vectors when transformed by acoustic feature extraction algorithms (e.g., FFTs). We develop four classes of perturbations that create unintelligible audio and test them against 12 machine learning models, including 7 proprietary models (e.g., Google Speech API, Bing Speech API, IBM Speech API, Azure Speaker API, etc), and demonstrate successful attacks against all targets. Moreover, we successfully use our maliciously generated audio samples in multiple hardware configurations, demonstrating effectiveness across both models and real systems. In so doing, we demonstrate that domain-specific knowledge of audio signal processing represents a practical means of generating successful hidden voice command attacks