Leveraging Programmable Data Plane For Compressing Forwarding Tables

The Forwarding Information Base (FIB) resides in the data plane of a routing device and is used to forward packets to a next-hop, based on packets\u27 destination IP addresses. The constant growth of a FIB forces network operators to spend more resources on maintaining memory with line-rate Longest Prefix Match (LPM) lookup in a FIB, namely, expensive and energy-hungry Ternary Content-Addressable Memory (TCAM) chips. In this work, we review two different approaches used to mitigate the FIB overflow problem. First, we investigate FIB aggregation, i.e., merging adjacent or overlapping routes with the same next-hop while preserving the forwarding behavior of a FIB. We propose a near-optimal algorithm, FIB Aggregation with Quick Selections (FAQS), that minimizes the FIB churn and speeds BGP update processing by more than twice. In the meantime, FAQS preserves a high compression ratio (at most 73\%). FAQS handles BGP updates incrementally, without the need of re-aggregating the entire FIB table. Second, we investigate FIB (or route) caching, when TCAM holds only a portion of a FIB that carries most of the traffic. We leverage the emerging concept of the programmable data plane to propose a Programmable FIB Caching Architecture (PFCA), that allows cache-victim selection at the line rate and significantly reduces the FIB churn compared to FIB aggregation. PFCA achieves 99.8% cache-hit ratio with only 3.3\% of the FIB placed in a FIB cache. Finally, we extend PFCA\u27s design with a novel approach of integrating incremental FIB aggregation and FIB caching. Such integration needed to overcome cache hiding challenge when a less specific prefix in a cache hides a more specific prefix in a secondary FIB table, which leads to incorrect LPM matching at the cache. In Combined FIB Caching and Aggregation (CFCA), cache-hit ratio is maximized up to 99.94% with only 2.5\% entries of the FIB, while the total number of route changes in TCAM is reduced by more than 40\% compared to low-churn FIB aggregation techniques

An analytical model for Loc/ID mappings caches

Concerns regarding the scalability of the interdomain routing have encouraged researchers to start elaborating a more robust Internet architecture. While consensus on the exact form of the solution is yet to be found, the need for a semantic decoupling of a node's location and identity is generally accepted as a promising way forward. However, this typically requires the use of caches that store temporal bindings between the two namespaces, to avoid hampering router packet forwarding speeds. In this article, we propose a methodology for an analytical analysis of cache performance that relies on the working-set theory. We first identify the conditions that network traffic must comply with for the theory to be applicable and then develop a model that predicts average cache miss rates relying on easily measurable traffic parameters. We validate the result by emulation, using real packet traces collected at the egress points of a campus and an academic network. To prove its versatility, we extend the model to consider cache polluting user traffic and observe that simple, low intensity attacks drastically reduce performance, whereby manufacturers should either overprovision router memory or implement more complex cache eviction policies.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

On the scalability of LISP and advanced overlaid services

In just four decades the Internet has gone from a lab experiment to a worldwide, business critical infrastructure that caters to the communication needs of almost a half of the Earth's population. With these figures on its side, arguing against the Internet's scalability would seem rather unwise. However, the Internet's organic growth is far from finished and, as billions of new devices are expected to be joined in the not so distant future, scalability, or lack thereof, is commonly believed to be the Internet's biggest problem. While consensus on the exact form of the solution is yet to be found, the need for a semantic decoupling of a node's location and identity, often called a location/identity separation, is generally accepted as a promising way forward. Typically, this requires the introduction of new network elements that provide the binding of the two names-paces and caches that avoid hampering router packet forwarding speeds. But due to this increased complexity the solution's scalability is itself questioned. This dissertation evaluates the suitability of using the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP), one of the most successful proposals to follow the location/identity separation guideline, as a solution to the Internet's scalability problem. However, because the deployment of any new architecture depends not only on solving the incumbent's technical problems but also on the added value that it brings, our approach follows two lines. In the first part of the thesis, we develop the analytical tools to evaluate LISP's control plane scalability while in the second we show that the required control/data plane separation provides important benefits that could drive LISP's adoption. As a first step to evaluating LISP's scalability, we propose a methodology for an analytical analysis of cache performance that relies on the working-set theory to estimate traffic locality of reference. One of our main contribution is that we identify the conditions network traffic must comply with for the theory to be applicable and then use the result to develop a model that predicts average cache miss rates. Furthermore, we study the model's suitability for long term cache provisioning and assess the cache's vulnerability in front of malicious users through an extension that accounts for cache polluting traffic. As a last step, we investigate the main sources of locality and their impact on the asymptotic scalability of the LISP cache. An important finding here is that destination popularity distribution can accurately describe cache performance, independent of the much harder to model short term correlations. Under a small set of assumptions, this result finally enables us to characterize asymptotic scalability with respect to the amount of prefixes (Internet growth) and users (growth of the LISP site). We validate the models and discuss the accuracy of our assumptions using several one-day-long packet traces collected at the egress points of a campus and an academic network. To show the added benefits that could drive LISP's adoption, in the second part of the thesis we investigate the possibilities of performing inter-domain multicast and improving intra-domain routing. Although the idea of using overlaid services to improve underlay performance is not new, this dissertation argues that LISP offers the right tools to reliably and easily implement such services due to its reliance on network instead of application layer support. In particular, we present and extensively evaluate Lcast, a network-layer single-source multicast framework designed to merge the robustness and efficiency of IP multicast with the configurability and low deployment cost of application-layer overlays. Additionally, we describe and evaluate LISP-MPS, an architecture capable of exploiting LISP to minimize intra-domain routing tables and ensure, among other, support for multi protocol switching and virtual networks.En menos de cuatro décadas Internet ha evolucionado desde un experimento de laboratorio hasta una infraestructura de alcance mundial, de importancia crítica para negocios y que atiende a las necesidades de casi un tercio de los habitantes del planeta. Con estos números, es difícil tratar de negar la necesidad de escalabilidad de Internet. Sin embargo, el crecimiento orgánico de Internet está aún lejos de finalizar ya que se espera que mil millones de dispositivos nuevos se conecten en el futuro cercano. Así pues, la falta de escalabilidad es el mayor problema al que se enfrenta Internet hoy en día. Aunque la solución definitiva al problema está aún por definir, la necesidad de desacoplar semánticamente la localización e identidad de un nodo, a menudo llamada locator/identifier separation, es generalmente aceptada como un camino prometedor a seguir. Sin embargo, esto requiere la introducción de nuevos dispositivos en la red que unan los dos espacios de nombres disjuntos resultantes y de cachés que almacenen los enlaces temporales entre ellos con el fin de aumentar la velocidad de transmisión de los enrutadores. A raíz de esta complejidad añadida, la escalabilidad de la solución en si misma es también cuestionada. Este trabajo evalúa la idoneidad de utilizar Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP), una de las propuestas más exitosas que siguen la pauta locator/identity separation, como una solución para la escalabilidad de la Internet. Con tal fin, desarrollamos las herramientas analíticas para evaluar la escalabilidad del plano de control de LISP pero también para mostrar que la separación de los planos de control y datos proporciona un importante valor añadido que podría impulsar la adopción de LISP. Como primer paso para evaluar la escalabilidad de LISP, proponemos una metodología para un estudio analítico del rendimiento de la caché que se basa en la teoría del working-set para estimar la localidad de referencias. Identificamos las condiciones que el tráfico de red debe cumplir para que la teoría sea aplicable y luego desarrollamos un modelo que predice las tasas medias de fallos de caché con respecto a parámetros de tráfico fácilmente medibles. Por otra parte, para demostrar su versatilidad y para evaluar la vulnerabilidad de la caché frente a usuarios malintencionados, extendemos el modelo para considerar el rendimiento frente a tráfico generado por usuarios maliciosos. Como último paso, investigamos como usar la popularidad de los destinos para estimar el rendimiento de la caché, independientemente de las correlaciones a corto plazo. Bajo un pequeño conjunto de hipótesis conseguimos caracterizar la escalabilidad con respecto a la cantidad de prefijos (el crecimiento de Internet) y los usuarios (crecimiento del sitio LISP). Validamos los modelos y discutimos la exactitud de nuestras suposiciones utilizando varias trazas de paquetes reales. Para mostrar los beneficios adicionales que podrían impulsar la adopción de LISP, también investigamos las posibilidades de realizar multidifusión inter-dominio y la mejora del enrutamiento dentro del dominio. Aunque la idea de utilizar servicios superpuestos para mejorar el rendimiento de la capa subyacente no es nueva, esta tesis sostiene que LISP ofrece las herramientas adecuadas para poner en práctica de forma fiable y fácilmente este tipo de servicios debido a que LISP actúa en la capa de red y no en la capa de aplicación. En particular, presentamos y evaluamos extensamente Lcast, un marco de multidifusión con una sola fuente diseñado para combinar la robustez y eficiencia de la multidifusión IP con la capacidad de configuración y bajo coste de implementación de una capa superpuesta a nivel de aplicación. Además, describimos y evaluamos LISP-MPS, una arquitectura capaz de explotar LISP para minimizar las tablas de enrutamiento intra-dominio y garantizar, entre otras, soporte para conmutación multi-protocolo y redes virtuales

It bends but would it break?:topological analysis of BGP infrastructures in Europe

The Internet is often thought to be a model of resilience, due to a decentralised, organically-grown architecture. This paper puts this perception into perspective through the results of a security analysis of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing infrastructure. BGP is a fundamental Internet protocol and its intrinsic fragilities have been highlighted extensively in the literature. A seldom studied aspect is how robust the BGP infrastructure actually is as a result of nearly three decades of perpetual growth. Although global black-outs seem unlikely, local security events raise growing concerns on the robustness of the backbone. In order to better protect this critical infrastructure, it is crucial to understand its topology in the context of the weaknesses of BGP and to identify possible security scenarios. Firstly, we establish a comprehensive threat model that classifies main attack vectors, including but non limited to BGP vulnerabilities. We then construct maps of the European BGP backbone based on publicly available routing data. We analyse the topology of the backbone and establish several disruption scenarios that highlight the possible consequences of different types of attacks, for different attack capabilities. We also discuss existing mitigation and recovery strategies, and we propose improvements to enhance the robustness and resilience of the backbone. To our knowledge, this study is the first to combine a comprehensive threat analysis of BGP infrastructures withadvanced network topology considerations. We find that the BGP infrastructure is at higher risk than already understood, due to topologies that remain vulnerable to certain targeted attacks as a result of organic deployment over the years. Significant parts of the system are still uncharted territory, which warrants further investigation in this direction

The DNS in IoT:Opportunities, Risks, and Challenges

The Internet of Things (IoT) is widely expected to make our society safer, smarter, and more sustainable. However, a key challenge remains, which is how to protect users and Internet infrastructure operators from attacks on or launched through vast numbers of autonomously operating sensors and actuators. In this article, we discuss how the security extensions of the domain name system (DNS) offer an opportunity to help tackle that challenge, while also outlining the risks that the IoT poses to the DNS in terms of complex and quickly growing IoT-powered distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. We identify three challenges for the DNS and IoT industries to seize these opportunities and address the risks, for example, by making DNS security functions (e.g., response verification and encryption) available on popular IoT operating systems

Improving the accuracy of spoofed traffic inference in inter-domain traffic

Ascertaining that a network will forward spoofed traffic usually requires an active probing vantage point in that network, effectively preventing a comprehensive view of this global Internet vulnerability. We argue that broader visibility into the spoofing problem may lie in the capability to infer lack of Source Address Validation (SAV) compliance from large, heavily aggregated Internet traffic data, such as traffic observable at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). The key idea is to use IXPs as observatories to detect spoofed packets, by leveraging Autonomous System (AS) topology knowledge extracted from Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) data to infer which source addresses should legitimately appear across parts of the IXP switch fabric. In this thesis, we demonstrate that the existing literature does not capture several fundamental challenges to this approach, including noise in BGP data sources, heuristic AS relationship inference, and idiosyncrasies in IXP interconnec- tivity fabrics. We propose Spoofer-IX, a novel methodology to navigate these challenges, leveraging Customer Cone semantics of AS relationships to guide precise classification of inter-domain traffic as In-cone, Out-of-cone ( spoofed ), Unverifiable, Bogon, and Unas- signed. We apply our methodology on extensive data analysis using real traffic data from two distinct IXPs in Brazil, a mid-size and a large-size infrastructure. In the mid-size IXP with more than 200 members, we find an upper bound volume of Out-of-cone traffic to be more than an order of magnitude less than the previous method inferred on the same data, revealing the practical importance of Customer Cone semantics in such analysis. We also found no significant improvement in deployment of SAV in networks using the mid-size IXP between 2017 and 2019. In hopes that our methods and tools generalize to use by other IXPs who want to avoid use of their infrastructure for launching spoofed-source DoS attacks, we explore the feasibility of scaling the system to larger and more diverse IXP infrastructures. To promote this goal, and broad replicability of our results, we make the source code of Spoofer-IX publicly available. This thesis illustrates the subtleties of scientific assessments of operational Internet infrastructure, and the need for a community focus on reproducing and repeating previous methods.A constatação de que uma rede encaminhará tráfego falsificado geralmente requer um ponto de vantagem ativo de medição nessa rede, impedindo efetivamente uma visão abrangente dessa vulnerabilidade global da Internet. Isto posto, argumentamos que uma visibilidade mais ampla do problema de spoofing pode estar na capacidade de inferir a falta de conformidade com as práticas de Source Address Validation (SAV) a partir de dados de tráfego da Internet altamente agregados, como o tráfego observável nos Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). A ideia chave é usar IXPs como observatórios para detectar pacotes falsificados, aproveitando o conhecimento da topologia de sistemas autônomos extraído dos dados do protocolo BGP para inferir quais endereços de origem devem aparecer legitimamente nas comunicações através da infra-estrutura de um IXP. Nesta tese, demonstramos que a literatura existente não captura diversos desafios fundamentais para essa abordagem, incluindo ruído em fontes de dados BGP, inferência heurística de relacionamento de sistemas autônomos e características específicas de interconectividade nas infraestruturas de IXPs. Propomos o Spoofer-IX, uma nova metodologia para superar esses desafios, utilizando a semântica do Customer Cone de relacionamento de sistemas autônomos para guiar com precisão a classificação de tráfego inter-domínio como In-cone, Out-of-cone ( spoofed ), Unverifiable, Bogon, e Unassigned. Aplicamos nossa metodologia em análises extensivas sobre dados reais de tráfego de dois IXPs distintos no Brasil, uma infraestrutura de médio porte e outra de grande porte. No IXP de tamanho médio, com mais de 200 membros, encontramos um limite superior do volume de tráfego Out-of-cone uma ordem de magnitude menor que o método anterior inferiu sob os mesmos dados, revelando a importância prática da semântica do Customer Cone em tal análise. Além disso, não encontramos melhorias significativas na implantação do Source Address Validation (SAV) em redes usando o IXP de tamanho médio entre 2017 e 2019. Na esperança de que nossos métodos e ferramentas sejam aplicáveis para uso por outros IXPs que desejam evitar o uso de sua infraestrutura para iniciar ataques de negação de serviço através de pacotes de origem falsificada, exploramos a viabilidade de escalar o sistema para infraestruturas IXP maiores e mais diversas. Para promover esse objetivo e a ampla replicabilidade de nossos resultados, disponibilizamos publicamente o código fonte do Spoofer-IX. Esta tese ilustra as sutilezas das avaliações científicas da infraestrutura operacional da Internet e a necessidade de um foco da comunidade na reprodução e repetição de métodos anteriores

Reducing Third Parties in the Network through Client-Side Intelligence

The end-to-end argument describes the communication between a client and server using functionality that is located at the end points of a distributed system. From a security and privacy perspective, clients only need to trust the server they are trying to reach instead of intermediate system nodes and other third-party entities. Clients accessing the Internet today and more specifically the World Wide Web have to interact with a plethora of network entities for name resolution, traffic routing and content delivery. While individual communications with those entities may some times be end to end, from the user's perspective they are intermediaries the user has to trust in order to access the website behind a domain name. This complex interaction lacks transparency and control and expands the attack surface beyond the server clients are trying to reach directly. In this dissertation, we develop a set of novel design principles and architectures to reduce the number of third-party services and networks a client's traffic is exposed to when browsing the web. Our proposals bring additional intelligence to the client and can be adopted without changes to the third parties. Websites can include content, such as images and iframes, located on third-party servers. Browsers loading an HTML page will contact these additional servers to satisfy external content dependencies. Such interaction has privacy implications because it includes context related to the user's browsing history. For example, the widespread adoption of "social plugins" enables the respective social networking services to track a growing part of its members' online activity. These plugins are commonly implemented as HTML iframes originating from the domain of the respective social network. They are embedded in sites users might visit, for instance to read the news or do shopping. Facebook's Like button is an example of a social plugin. While one could prevent the browser from connecting to third-party servers, it would break existing functionality and thus be unlikely to be widely adopted. We propose a novel design for privacy-preserving social plugins that decouples the retrieval of user-specific content from the loading of third-party content. Our approach can be adopted by web browsers without the need for server-side changes. Our design has the benefit of avoiding the transmission of user-identifying information to the third-party server while preserving the original functionality of the plugins. In addition, we propose an architecture which reduces the networks involved when routing traffic to a website. Users then have to trust fewer organizations with their traffic. Such trust is necessary today because for example we observe that only 30% of popular web servers offer HTTPS. At the same time there is evidence that network adversaries carry out active and passive attacks against users. We argue that if end-to-end security with a server is not available the next best thing is a secure link to a network that is close to the server and will act as a gateway. Our approach identifies network vantage points in the cloud, enables a client to establish secure tunnels to them and intelligently routes traffic based on its destination. The proliferation of infrastructure-as-a-service platforms makes it practical for users to benefit from the cloud. We determine that our architecture is practical because our proposed use of the cloud aligns with existing ways end-user devices leverage it today. Users control both endpoints of the tunnel and do not depend on the cooperation of individual websites. We are thus able to eliminate third-party networks for 20% of popular web servers, reduce network paths to 1 hop for an additional 20% and shorten the rest. We hypothesize that user privacy on the web can be improved in terms of transparency and control by reducing the systems and services that are indirectly and automatically involved. We also hypothesize that such reduction can be achieved unilaterally through client-side initiatives and without affecting the operation of individual websites

Compact routing for the future internet

The Internet relies on its inter-domain routing system to allow data transfer between any two endpoints regardless of where they are located. This routing system currently uses a shortest path routing algorithm (modified by local policy constraints) called the Border Gateway Protocol. The massive growth of the Internet has led to large routing tables that will continue to grow. This will present a serious engineering challenge for router designers in the long-term, rendering state (routing table) growth at this pace unsustainable. There are various short-term engineering solutions that may slow the growth of the inter-domain routing tables, at the expense of increasing the complexity of the network. In addition, some of these require manual configuration, or introduce additional points of failure within the network. These solutions may give an incremental, constant factor, improvement. However, we know from previous work that all shortest path routing algorithms require forwarding state that grows linearly with the size of the network in the worst case. Rather than attempt to sustain inter-domain routing through a shortest path routing algorithm, compact routing algorithms exist that guarantee worst-case sub-linear state requirements at all nodes by allowing an upper-bound on path length relative to the theoretical shortest path, known as path stretch. Previous work has shown the promise of these algorithms when applied to synthetic graphs with similar properties to the known Internet graph, but they haven't been studied in-depth on Internet topologies derived from real data. In this dissertation, I demonstrate the consistently strong performance of these compact routing algorithms for inter-domain routing by performing a longitudinal study of two compact routing algorithms on the Internet Autonomous System (AS) graph over time. I then show, using the k-cores graph decomposition algorithm, that the structurally important nodes in the AS graph are highly stable over time. This property makes these nodes suitable for use as the "landmark" nodes used by the most stable of the compact routing algorithms evaluated, and the use of these nodes shows similar strong routing performance. Finally, I present a decentralised compact routing algorithm for dynamic graphs, and present state requirements and message overheads on AS graphs using realistic simulation inputs. To allow the continued long-term growth of Internet routing state, an alternative routing architecture may be required. The use of the compact routing algorithms presented in this dissertation offer promise for a scalable future Internet routing system

Interdomain Route Leak Mitigation: A Pragmatic Approach

The Internet has grown to support many vital functions, but it is not administered by any central authority. Rather, the many smaller networks that make up the Internet - called Autonomous Systems (ASes) - independently manage their own distinct host address space and routing policy. Routers at the borders between ASes exchange information about how to reach remote IP prefixes with neighboring networks over the control plane with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). This inter-AS communication connects hosts across AS boundaries to build the illusion of one large, unified global network - the Internet. Unfortunately, BGP is a dated protocol that allows ASes to inject virtually any routing information into the control plane. The Internet’s decentralized administrative structure means that ASes lack visibility of the relationships and policies of other networks, and have little means of vetting the information they receive. Routes are global, connecting hosts around the world, but AS operators can only see routes exchanged between their own network and directly connected neighbor networks. This mismatch between global route scope and local network operator visibility gives rise to adverse routing events like route leaks, which occur when an AS advertises a route that should have been kept within its own network by mistake. In this work, we explore our thesis: that malicious and unintentional route leaks threaten Internet availability, but pragmatic solutions can mitigate their impact. Leaks effectively reroute traffic meant for the leak destination along the leak path. This diversion of flows onto unexpected paths can cause broad disruption for hosts attempting to reach the leak destination, as well as obstruct the normal traffic on the leak path. These events are usually due to misconfiguration and not malicious activity, but we show in our initial work that vrouting-capable adversaries can weaponize route leaks and fraudulent path advertisements to enhance data plane attacks on Internet infrastructure and services. Existing solutions like Internet Routing Registry (IRR) filtering have not succeeded in solving the route leak problem, as globally disruptive route leaks still periodically interrupt the normal functioning of the Internet. We examine one relatively new solution - Peerlocking or defensive AS PATH filtering - where ASes exchange toplogical information to secure their networks. Our measurements reveal that Peerlock is already deployed in defense of the largest ASes, but has found little purchase elsewhere. We conclude by introducing a novel leak defense system, Corelock, designed to provide Peerlock-like protection without the scalability concerns that have limited Peerlock’s scope. Corelock builds meaningful route leak filters from globally distributed route collectors and can be deployed without cooperation from other network