Resource Allocation for the French National Grid Initiative

International audienceDistribution of resources between different communities in production grids is the combined result of needs and policies: where the users' needs dictate what is required, resource providers' policies define how much is offered and how it is offered. From a provider point of view, getting a comprehensive and fair understanding of resources distribution is then a key element for the establishment of any scientific policy, and a prerequisite for delivering a high quality of service to users. The resource allocation model which is currently applied within most national grid initiatives (NGIs) was designed with the needs of the EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-sciencE) projects and should now be revised: NGIs now especially need to assess how resources and services are delivered to their national community, and expose the return on investment for resources delivered to international communities. The French NGI "France Grilles" is currently investigating down this route, trying to define key principles for a national resource allocation strategy that would answer this concern while allowing for the proper definition of service level agreements (SLA) between users, providers and the NGI itself. After looking for clear definitions of who are the communities we are dealing with, we propose to look at how resource allocation is done in other environments such as high performance computing (HPC) and the concepts we could possibly reuse from there while keeping the specificities of the Grid. We then review different use-cases and scenarios before concluding on a proposal which, together with open questions, could constitute a base for a resource allocation strategy for the French national grid

Survey and Analysis of Production Distributed Computing Infrastructures

This report has two objectives. First, we describe a set of the production distributed infrastructures currently available, so that the reader has a basic understanding of them. This includes explaining why each infrastructure was created and made available and how it has succeeded and failed. The set is not complete, but we believe it is representative. Second, we describe the infrastructures in terms of their use, which is a combination of how they were designed to be used and how users have found ways to use them. Applications are often designed and created with specific infrastructures in mind, with both an appreciation of the existing capabilities provided by those infrastructures and an anticipation of their future capabilities. Here, the infrastructures we discuss were often designed and created with specific applications in mind, or at least specific types of applications. The reader should understand how the interplay between the infrastructure providers and the users leads to such usages, which we call usage modalities. These usage modalities are really abstractions that exist between the infrastructures and the applications; they influence the infrastructures by representing the applications, and they influence the ap- plications by representing the infrastructures

The Diversity of Design of TSOs

International audienceIt is puzzling today to explain diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. We argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within a Wilson (2002) modular framework. Applied to the management of electricity flows, at least three modules make the core of transmission design: 1° the short run management of network externalities; 2° the long run management of network investment; and 3° the coordination of neighboring Transmission System Operators for cross border trade. In order to tackle this diversity of designs of TSOs, we show that for each of these modules, three different basic ways of managing them are possible. Among the identified twenty seven options of organisation, we define an Ideal TSO. Second, we demonstrate that 1°monopoly design differs from this Ideal TSO and cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the “institutional” definition and allocation of property rights on transmission; while 2°definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they have to complement each other to be efficient. Some conclusions for regulatory issues of transmission systems operators are derived from this analysis of network monopoly organisation

Governing electricity in South Africa: wind, coal and power struggles

South Africa’s electricity policy is at a crossroads. Its historical dependence on cheap coal for approximately 90 per cent of its electricity generation is under threat. This paper firstly examines how the governance of South Africa’s electricity is inextricably bound up with the country’s historical dependence on cheap coal for export-oriented industry and complex political and economic legacy which has shaped its minerals-energy complex (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). Secondly it finds that despite regulatory hold-ups and departmental tensions, power dynamics in the electricity sector are shifting with the potential introduction of private renewable energy generation into the energy mix. Of this, wind is set to form the largest component. Meanwhile Eskom’s Medupi coal-fired power plant deemed as essential to the country’s generation expansion has been redefined as a ‘clean coal’ power plant following a World Bank loan of $3 billion in April 2010. The paper concludes that while vested interests in the country’s coal-based industrial trajectory are still very influential, they are simultaneously challenged with rising coal costs, imminent national electricity supply shortages and increasing tariffs, a funding crisis of the electricity utility, the demands of climate change mitigation and emerging stakeholders in renewable generation

The diversity of design of TSOs

It is puzzling today to explain diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. We argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within a Wilson (2002) modular framework. Applied to the management of electricity flows, at least three modules make the core of transmission design: 1° the short run management of network externalities; 2° the long run management of network investment; and 3° the coordination of neighboring Transmission System Operators for cross border trade. In order to tackle this diversity of designs of TSOs, we show that for each of these modules, three different basic ways of managing them are possible. Among the identified twenty seven options of organisation, we define an Ideal TSO. Second, we demonstrate that 1°monopoly design differs from this Ideal TSO and cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the “institutional” definition and allocation of property rights on transmission; while 2°definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they have to complement each other to be efficient. Some conclusions for regulatory issues of transmission systems operators are derived from this analysis of network monopoly organisation.design of TSOs; management of power flows; governance structure of transmission

Conceptualising public-private partnerships:a critical appraisal of approaches to meanings and forms

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to survey various meanings attached to a public-private partnership (PPP) and related aspects in Western literature, and identify commonalities and differences between them. Additionally, the article intends to critically assess conflicting and overlapping views on contractual and institutional PPPs, their forms and models, and draw insights for transitional economies. Design/methodology/approach – The article contrasts and compares views on PPP meanings, forms and models within Western PPP literature, and also draws comparisons with understanding of partnership aspects in the Russian language sources. The paper examines theories underpinning PPPs, builds connections to PPP advantages and drawbacks, and provides critical assessment of net benefits that PPPs may bring along to the society. Findings – The article concludes that future PPP research in transitional countries such as Kazakhstan and Russia, particularly in the area of organisational and power arrangements in partnerships, may delineate new concepts such as government as a guarantor of a PPP project, social significance of a PPP project, and risk management in a country’s contextual environment. Practical implications – In transitional countries, in which PPPs are in their infancy, clarification of theoretical positions, and identification of commonalities and differences between meanings attached to the PPP terminology may enable better decisions by researchers and practitioners in their selection and further development of partnerships and related concepts. Originality/value – Research in the field of PPPs in transitional countries such as Russia and Kazakhstan is in its infancy. The paper intends to contribute to the body of knowledge about PPPs by providing detailed account and categorisation of their principal meanings, forms, models, underpinning theories, and drawing insights for future research in transitional countries

Investing in Sustainable Energy Futures: Multilateral Development Banks' Investments in Energy Policy

Analyzes MDB loans for electricity projects and lays out policy reforms, regulations, and institutional capacities needed to enable public and private investment in sustainable energy and ways for MDBs to address them consistently and comprehensively