Both loved and feared: third party punishers are viewed as formidable and likeable, but these reputational benefits may only be open to dominant individuals

Journal ArticleResearch Support, Non-U.S. Gov'tCopyright: © 2014 Gordon et al.The datasets associated with this article are available in ORE at http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15639Third party punishment can be evolutionarily stable if there is heterogeneity in the cost of punishment or if punishers receive a reputational benefit from their actions. A dominant position might allow some individuals to punish at a lower cost than others and by doing so access these reputational benefits. Three vignette-based studies measured participants' judgements of a third party punisher in comparison to those exhibiting other aggressive/dominant behaviours (Study 1), when there was variation in the success of punishment (Study 2), and variation in the status of the punisher and the type of punishment used (Study 3). Third party punishers were judged to be more likeable than (but equally dominant as) those who engaged in other types of dominant behaviour (Study 1), were judged to be equally likeable and dominant whether their intervention succeeded or failed (Study 2), and participants believed that only a dominant punisher could intervene successfully (regardless of whether punishment was violent or non-violent) and that subordinate punishers would face a higher risk of retaliation (Study 3). The results suggest that dominance can dramatically reduce the cost of punishment, and that while individuals can gain a great deal of reputational benefit from engaging in third party punishment, these benefits are only open to dominant individuals. Taking the status of punishers into account may therefore help explain the evolution of third party punishment.School of Psychology, University of Exete

Both loved and feared: third party punishers are view as formidable and likeable, but these reputational benefits may only be open to dominant individuals (dataset)

The zip file contains the data for the three studies in SPSS (.sav format). The zip folder also includes an Excel file which describes the variables for each study.A link will be added to the associated article in PLoS One once it has been published. http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0110045 The article associated with this dataset are available in ORE at http://hdl.handle.net/10871/16699Third party punishment can be evolutionarily stable if there is heterogeneity in the cost of punishment or if punishers receive a reputational benefit from their actions. A dominant position might allow some individuals to punish at a lower cost than others and by doing so access these reputational benefits. Three vignette-based studies measured participants’ judgements of a third party punisher in comparison to those exhibiting other aggressive/dominant behaviours (Study 1), when there was variation in the success of punishment (Study 2), and variation in the status of the punisher and the type of punishment used (Study 3). Third party punishers were judged to be more likeable than (but equally dominant as) those who engaged in other types of dominant behaviour (Study 1), were judged to be equally likeable and dominant whether their intervention succeeded or failed (Study 2), and participants believed that only a dominant punisher could intervene successfully (regardless of whether punishment was violent or non-violent) and that subordinate punishers would face a higher risk of retaliation (Study 3). The results suggest that dominance can dramatically reduce the cost of punishment, and that while individuals can gain a great deal of reputational benefit from engaging in third party punishment, these benefits are only open to dominant individuals. Taking the status of punishers into account may therefore help explain the evolution of third party punishmen

Human Cooperation: The Race to Give

SummaryAn analysis of online charity donations reveals that, when males make large donations to attractive female fundraisers, other males respond in kind, providing field evidence for ‘competitive altruism’ in which helpful acts are used as a display to attract partners

Mimic Behavior in Home Waste-waters Management

We present results of a household-level survey on behaviors regarding refuses in the home waste-waters network. Interpreting survey results in a panel-data logit results show that most socio-economic and public good-related respondent's characteristics do not play a significant role in explaining choices to discard in the home waste-waters network. The only significant regressor, apart from the nature of the refuse itself, is, by far, the belief that the respondent has about her neighbors' and relatives' discarding behavior. We use Dong's endogeneity test [7] to show that that regressor is not endogenous. We argue that these results may be used by policymakers to reduce undesirable refuses in the home waste-waters network by means of properly designed nudges

The reputation of punishers

Punishment is a potential mechanism to stabilise cooperation between self-regarding agents. Theoretical and empirical studies on the importance of a punitive reputation have yielded conflicting results. Here, we propose that a variety of factors interact to explain why a punitive reputation is sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful. We predict that benefits are most likely to occur in forced play scenarios and in situations where punishment is the only means to convey an individual's cooperative intent and willingness to uphold fairness norms. By contrast, if partner choice is possible and an individual's cooperative intent can be inferred directly, then individuals with a nonpunishing cooperative reputation should typically be preferred over punishing cooperators

Minority influence in climate change mitigation

While the majority of people care about environmental quality, they keep engaging in carbon-intensive practices that exacerbate climate change. Can we expect humans to collectively change by themselves, from the bottom up? Social change is often initiated by minorities – individuals who challenge the status quo. The dominant literature paints a rather pessimistic picture about the ability of minorities to instigate change in the environmental domain: environmental activists, vegans, and other minority members often elicit social sanctions, thereby ironically reinforcing the majority’s commitment to current, environmentally harmful norms. Recent findings, however, point towards more optimism: pro-environmental minorities can pave the way towards ‘tipping points’ and spontaneous social change. Policymakers can speed up this process by offering top-down support for minorities – by giving them ‘voice’

Reward, punishment, and prosocial behavior: Recent developments and implications

Reward and punishment change the payoff structures of social interactions and therefore can potentially play a role in promoting prosocial behavior. Yet, there are boundary conditions for them to be effective. We review recent work that addresses the conditions under which rewards and punishment can enhance prosocial behavior, the proximate and ultimate mechanisms for individuals’ rewarding and punishing decisions, and the reputational and behavioral consequences of reward and punishment under noise. The reviewed evidence points to the importance of more field research on how reward and punishment can promote prosocial behavior in real-world settings. We also highlight the need to integrate different methodologies to better examine the effects of reward and punishment on prosocial behavior

Wolf pack activism

It is alleged that activist hedge funds congregate around a common target, with one acting as the "lead" activist and others as peripheral activists, or "wolf pack" members. We model this phenomenon as a coordination game, and show that the concentration of capital and skill matters: Holding constant total activist ownership, the presence of a lead activist increases the probability of successful activism due to improved coordination among activists. We model the dynamics of share acquisition by wolf pack members and the lead activist: Block acquisition by the lead activist spurs significant entry by wolf pack members, while the lead activist acquires only if the expected wolf pack is large enough. Finally, we provide predictions concerning which wolf pack activists will buy ahead of the lead activist, and which will wait to acquire until after the lead activist's stake is announced