Introducing disappointment dynamics and comparing behaviors in evolutionary games : Some simulation results

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly citedThe paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type: spontaneous agents, rigid players, and 'satisficers'. We use simulations to examine the performance of these types. Agents who change their strategies relatively easily tend to perform better in coordination games, but antagonistic games generally lead to more favorable outcomes if the individuals only change their strategies when disappointment from previous rounds surpasses some predefined threshold.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio

Characterization of the frequency of extreme events by the Generalized Pareto Distribution

Based on recent results in extreme value theory, we use a new technique for the statistical estimation of distribution tails. Specifically, we use the Gnedenko-Pickands-Balkema-de Haan theorem, which gives a natural limit law for peak-over-threshold values in the form of the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD). Useful in finance, insurance, hydrology, we investigate here the earthquake energy distribution described by the Gutenberg-Richter seismic moment-frequency law and analyze shallow earthquakes (depth h < 70 km) in the Harvard catalog over the period 1977-2000 in 18 seismic zones. The whole GPD is found to approximate the tails of the seismic moment distributions quite well above moment-magnitudes larger than mW=5.3 and no statistically significant regional difference is found for subduction and transform seismic zones. We confirm that the b-value is very different in mid-ocean ridges compared to other zones (b=1.50=B10.09 versus b=1.00=B10.05 corresponding to a power law exponent close to 1 versus 2/3) with a very high statistical confidence. We propose a physical mechanism for this, contrasting slow healing ruptures in mid-ocean ridges with fast healing ruptures in other zones. Deviations from the GPD at the very end of the tail are detected in the sample containing earthquakes from all major subduction zones (sample size of 4985 events). We propose a new statistical test of significance of such deviations based on the bootstrap method. The number of events deviating from the tails of GPD in the studied data sets (15-20 at most) is not sufficient for determining the functional form of those deviations. Thus, it is practically impossible to give preference to one of the previously suggested parametric families describing the ends of tails of seismic moment distributions.Comment: pdf document of 21 pages + 2 tables + 20 figures (ps format) + one file giving the regionalizatio

Learning to be Prepared

Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices.More recent choices can be more salient than other choices, or more readily available in the agent's mind.Alternatively, agents may have formed habits, use rules of thumb, or lock in on certain modes of behavior as a result of learning by doing.This paper provides discrete-time adjustment processes for strategic games in which players display precisely such a bias towards recent choices.In addition, players choose best replies to beliefs supported by observed play in the recent past, in line with much of the literature on learning.These processes eventually settle down in the minimal prep sets of Voorneveld [Games Econ.Behav. 48 (2004) 403-414, and Games Econ.Behav. 51 (2005) 228-232].

Stochastic learning dynamics and speed of convergence in population games

We study how long it takes for large populations of interacting agents to come close to Nash equilibrium when they adapt their behavior using a stochastic better reply dynamic. Prior work considers this question mainly for 2 × 2 games and potential games; here we characterize convergence times for general weakly acyclic games, including coordination games, dominance solvable games, games with strategic complementarities, potential games, and many others with applications in economics, biology, and distributed control. If players' better replies are governed by idiosyncratic shocks, the convergence time can grow exponentially in the population size; moreover, this is true even in games with very simple payoff structures. However, if their responses are sufficiently correlated due to aggregate shocks, the convergence time is greatly accelerated; in fact, it is bounded for all sufficiently large populations. We provide explicit bounds on the speed of convergence as a function of key structural parameters including the number of strategies, the length of the better reply paths, the extent to which players can influence the payoffs of others, and the desired degree of approximation to Nash equilibrium

Higher Order Game Dynamics

Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the players' strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces of change, specifying e.g. the acceleration of the players' evolution instead of its velocity (a viewpoint which emerges naturally when it comes to aggregating empirical data of past instances of play). To that end, we derive a wide class of higher order game dynamics, generalizing first order imitative dynamics, and, in particular, the replicator dynamics. We show that strictly dominated strategies become extinct in n-th order payoff-monotonic dynamics n orders as fast as in the corresponding first order dynamics; furthermore, in stark contrast to first order, weakly dominated strategies also become extinct for n>1. All in all, higher order payoff-monotonic dynamics lead to the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, followed by the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, thus providing a dynamic justification of the well-known epistemic rationalizability process of Dekel and Fudenberg (1990). Finally, we also establish a higher order analogue of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory, and we show that con- vergence to strict equilibria in n-th order dynamics is n orders as fast as in first order.Comment: 32 pages, 6 figures; to appear in the Journal of Economic Theory. Updated material on the microfoundations of the dynamic