Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?

Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role of delusions and that expected of beliefs. In response to this, an appeal to dispositionalism about the nature of belief has been proposed to vindicate the doxastic status of delusion. In this paper, I first present the objections to attributing beliefs to delusional patients and the application of dispositionalism in the attempt to vindicate doxasticism. I then assess this application and some responses to the objections to the doxastic characterization. Finally, I offer some conclusions about the limits of folk-psychological concepts in the characterization and explanation of complex psychological phenomena such as delusions

The Productive Anarchy of Scientific Imagination

Imagination is important for many things in science: solving problems, interpreting data, designing studies, etc. Philosophers of imagination typically account for the productive role played by imagination in science by focusing on how imagination is constrained, e.g., by using self-imposed rules to infer logically, or model events accurately. But the constraints offered by these philosophers either constrain too much, or not enough, and they can never account for uses of imagination that are needed to break today’s constraints in order to make progress tomorrow. Thus, epistemology of imagination needs to make room for an element of epistemological anarchy

Kierkegaard's post-enlightenment subject: the grammar and goal of belief

S0ren Kierkegaard's thesis, "Truth is Subjectivity", is presented in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, as the central philosophical concept of his pseudonymous authorship. Contrary to most readings, it is argued here that Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle is epistemologically normative, not for ethical and religious beliefs only, but for a wider, general epistemology as well. The significance of Kierkegaard's claim that truth is subjectivity is that Kierkegaard is recasting epistemological issues in theological and ethical terms.Part One argues that Kierkegaard formulates his subjectivity principle as a response to the Enlightenment epistemologies, specifically of Kant and Hegel, and more generally Descartes, that seek to ground epistemology infallibly in the metaphysical resources of human rationality. Kierkegaard limits the scope of reason and philosophy in a manner that is reminiscent of the late Wittgenstein, and understands the activity of philosophy as analogous to grammar. What is glossed over by Enlightenment epistemology is the human subject's involvement in any act of belief. Rather than seeing human subjectivity as a hindrance to the pursuit of truth, Kierkegaard understands subjectivity (for humans) to be the means of attaining truth.There are two basic types of subjectivity for Kierkegaard. Constitutional subjectivity refers to human persons as beings who achieve subjectivity, or a first person perspective on the world. Reflexive subjectivity, on the other hand, refers to the general subject-forming activities that comprise the process of becoming subjective, and has as its primary constituent a reflective component. These senses of subjectivity combine to provide Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle with its normative and critical capacity.Part Two outlines how Kierkegaard's two senses of subjectivity function normatively with respect to beliefs. This section demonstrates that Kierkegaard's grammar of subjectivity in the end is a grammar of belief also. The conclusion of the dissertation is that Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle is a meta-epistemological principle through which Kierkegaard details an ethic of belief that is ultimately theological in nature

Taming the runabout imagination ticket

The ‘puzzle of imaginative use’ (Kind and Kung in Knowledge through imagination, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) asks: given that imagination is arbitrary escape from reality, how can it have any epistemic value? In particular, imagination seems to be logically anarchic, like a runabout inference ticket: one who imagines A may also imagine whatever B pops to one’s mind by free mental association. This paper argues that at least a certain kind of imaginative exercise—reality-oriented mental simulation—is not logically anarchic. Showing this is part of the task of solving the puzzle. Six plausible features of imagination, so understood, are listed. Then a formal semantics is provided, whose patterns of logical validity and invalidity model the six features

Philosophical Perspectives on Imagination in the Western Tradition

Philosophers in the Western tradition have both theorized about imagination and used imagination in their theorizing about other matters. In this chapter, I first provide a brief overview of philosophical theorizing about imagination with a special focus on its relation to other mental states such as belief and perception. I then turn to a discussion of the methodological role that imagination has played in philosophy. I here focus on the imaginability principle, i.e., the claim that the imaginability of a given scenario entails that such a scenario is in some sense possible. Relying on this kind of principle, philosophers have used imagination to justify theories in domains such as philosophy of mind, metaphysics and ethics

Deeper Down the Rabbit-Hole: Unfolding the Dynamics of Imagination Acts

Estudiem les dinàmiques dels actes d'imaginació des d'un punt de vista filosòfic, formal i aplicat. Partim de tres teories que identifiquen els mecanismes involucrats en els actes d'imaginació i mostrem que comparteixen una estructura semblant. Definim la lògica dels escenaris imaginaris, en què creem una capa per als actes d'imaginació sobre una lògica epistèmica per a un sol agent. Tot analitzant les propietats de la lògica, veiem que la manera com els mons imaginaris es desenvolupen està massa simplificada. Una anàlisi més profunda porta a la definició d¿una nova teoria especialment dissenyada per a les dinàmiques dels actes d'imaginació: el marc comú per als actes d'imaginació i el rombe de la imaginació. Partint d'aquesta nova teoria, definim la lògica dels actes d'imaginació, en què introduïm quatre algorismes diferents que comporten una representació molt més modular de la imaginació. Finalment, presentem la implementació del prototip d'un programa informàtic que captura els algorismes definits en la lògica anterior.Estudiamos las dinámicas de los actos de imaginación desde un punto de vista filosófico, formal y aplicado. Partimos de tres teorías que identifican los mecanismos involucrados en los actos de imaginación y mostramos que comparten una estructura similar. Definimos la lógica de los escenarios imaginarios, en la que creamos una capa para actos de imaginación partiendo de una lógica epistémica para un solo agente. Al discutir las propiedades de la lógica, vemos que el modo en que los mundos imaginarios se desarrollan está demasiado simplificado. Un análisis más profundo nos lleva a la definición de una nueva teoría especialmente diseñada para las dinámicas de los actos de imaginación: el marco común para actos de imaginación y el rombo de la imaginación. Partiendo de esta nueva teoría, definimos la lógica de los actos de imaginación, en la que introducimos cuatro algoritmos distintos que conllevan una representación mucho más modular de la imaginación. Finalmente, presentamos la implementación del prototipo de un programa informático que captura los algoritmos definidos en la lógica anterior.We study the dynamics of imagination acts at a philosophical, formal and applied level. Our research is based on three theories that identify the mechanisms involved in imagination acts and show how all of them share a similar structure. We define the Logic of Imaginary Scenarios, in which we create a layer for imagination acts upon a single-agent epistemic logic. While discussing the properties of logic, we note that the way in which imaginary worlds are developed is oversimplified. A deeper analysis leads to the definition of a new theory especially suited for the dynamics of imagination acts, called the Common Frame for Imagination Acts, and the Rhombus of Imagination. With this new theory at hand, we define the Logic of Imagination Acts, in which we introduce four different algorithms that allow for a much more modular account of imagination. Finally, we provide an implementation of a computer programme prototype that captures the algorithms defined by our latter logic