

STUDIA  
POETICA 5



STUDIA POETICA

auctoritate et consilio

Cathedrae Comparationis Litterarum Universarum

Universitatis Szegediensis

de Attila József nominatae

edita

Redigunt

G. M. Vajda et Z. Kanyó

C 43216

100

SZTE Egyetemi Könyvtár



J000902007



The cover design incorporates a  
photogram by László Moholy-Nagy.

Before he became a member of the  
Bauhaus group he worked in Szeged.

Der Umschlag wurde unter Verwendung  
eines Photogrammas von László Moholy-Nagy  
entworfen.

Bevor er Mitarbeiter des Bauhauses  
wurde, lebte und wirkte er in Szeged.

C 43216

S T U D I A P O E T I C A 5

Volumen quartum edendum curavit

Z. K a n y ó

FICTIONALITY

S z e g e d

1984

CONTENTS / INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

Z. Kanyó	
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	7
I. REFERENCE AND FICTIONALITY	
Z. Kanyó	
REFERENCE IN FICTIONAL TEXTS, INTRODUCTION . . .	13
J. Woods	
ANIMADVERSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS: REFERENCE, INFERENCE AND TRUTH IN FICTION . . . . .	33
T. G. Pavel	
ON THE EXISTENCE OF NON-EXISTING ENTITIES /ISSUES IN THE ONTOLOGY OF FICTION/ . . . . .	49
J. Pelc	
SOME THOUGHTS ON FICTITIOUS ENTITIES . . . . .	73
G. Rauh	
DEICTIC REFERENCE IN FICTIONAL TEXTS . . . . .	87
Á. Bernáth - K. Csúri	
ON THE RELEVANCE OF POSSIBLE-WORLDS SEMANTICS FOR LITERARY THEORY . . . . .	115
II. FICTIONALITY AND NARRATOLOGY	
H. H. Lieb	
QUESTIONS OF REFERENCE IN WRITTEN NARRATIVES . .	141
A. Steube	
TEMPORAL RELATIONS IN INTENSIONAL SEMANTICS . .	169

K. Csúri	
MODEL-STRUCTURES AND POSSIBLE WORLDS /A LITERARY THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE BORCHERT-STORY: DIE KÜCHENUHR/ . . . . .	183
Á. Bernáth	
NARRATOLOGY = THE THEORY OF THE EPIC? . . . . .	229
A. Bókay	
UNDERSTANDING AS CREATING NARRATIVE STRUCTURES /THE CONCEPT OF "WORLD" IN A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION/ . . . . .	241
L. Dolezel	
NARRATIVE STRUCTURE AND NARRATIVE STYLE . . . . .	271
III. STUDIES ON FICTIONALITY	
Z. Kanyó	
ACQUAINTANCE WITH NON-EXISTING ENTITIES: RUSSELL'S VIEWS ON FICTIONALITY . . . . .	301
L. Tarnay	
"PRETENDS", LINGUISTICS, AND GAME-THEORY /A PARADIGM CASE OF GENERATING FICTION/ . . . . .	373

Zoltán Kanyó

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Our team in Szeged which has now been widened to include colleagues working in Budapest, Debrecen and Pécs has organized several international conferences, some of which were held in Hungary, others abroad, the language of some conferences was Hungarian, in other cases we used English, German and French. We have published the material of these conferences in *Studia poetica* in Hungarian (vols. 1 and 6.), however we wanted to publish the important essays presented at our conferences in a volume published in abroad. We sent the whole material of our international conferences to Professor Margolis in the USA, who, with Professor J. Hintikka, was trying to organize a new aesthetic series. I gave my editorial remarks to Professor Margolis, but he did not reply to our questions, and so we asked him to send back the studies, unable to achieve anything. Therefore we had to take things into our own hands. We have already published E. Lang's paper "Die Sprache Edgar Wibeaus" in *Studia poetica* 3, pp. 183-241. Z. Kanyó's, G. L. Permjakov's and L. Tarnay's paper on simple forms in *Studia poetica* 4, pp. 7-47, 49-75, 99-167. However, the majority of the studies were still waiting for publication. At last our aim has been achieved: in volume 5 of *Studia poetica* we present the material of our working group in Vienna 1979, and an important part of our conference in Szeged 1980 and, in the last part, we publish some new material on fictionality.



Certainly it is rather late to publish the studies of the 1979 and 1980 conferences, and some authors have already published their studies in well-known literary periodicals; e.g. Woods's paper, a critical reaction to the critical remarks on his fictionality-book - was published in the second special issue of Poetics on fictionality and H.H. Lieb has published his excellent study in an enlarged form in Poetics. (1981) We understand the intention of these scholars, however, we are here publishing the studies which have already appeared else here as well as papers, which have been waiting for publication. From our conference "Reference and Fictionality" we have to admit that we lost a paper during our correspondance with Professor Margolis, It was written by U. Niklas, a young assistant professor at Warsaw University, but in has proved impossible to get her manuscript back. Another loss is the essential part of professor Pelc's rather long and interesting paper: he has changed his original opinion on several questions of fictionality and asked us only to publish the introduction, as the terminology had to be changed as well. Professor Pelc is working on a book on fictionality, this lecture in its abbreviated form should be considered its first version. It is a pity that M. Biervisch did not write his valuable contribution, as his linguistic and poetic studies are very highly appreciated in our circle; I have omitted the discussion of his ideas in my Introduction. This Introduction was a paper consecrated to the main problems of fictionality nowadays giving the possibility to speak about reference and fictionality seen in philosophy, linguistics and in theory of literature. Certainly the majority of the authors would probably change some details in their original text, but they are published here - with the exception of Prof. Pelc's paper-in their original form.

The second chapter of our volume contains some studies from our conference in Szeged 1980. This conference

was not uniquely consecrated to fictionality, its title was "The Structure of Narrative".

As we have already mentioned some papers from this conference were published in *Studia poetica* 3 and 4 most of the papers to be published in this volume under the title "Fictionality and Narratology". However some papers could not be published in this section, it is to be hoped that they will appear soon in another volume of *Studia poetica*. It was at our conference that Prof. H. H. Lieb read his valuable study - a very successful nominalistic summary of the use of fictionality. It appears here in its original form, i.e. without the enlargement in *Poetics X* (1981): 541-559. A. Steube tried to apply the results of her linguistic analyses to fictionality, our colleagues in Szeged - K. Csurí and A. Bernáth - wished to explicate the role of fictionality in the analysis of literary works and to deal with some classical theoretical questions on fictionality that appeared in the German theory of literature, our friend from Pécs, A. Bókay, has formulated his ideas in a hermeneutical language. M. Bierwisch has not formulated his manuscript, so we cannot publish it. At the end of this chapter you may read Professor L. Doležel's valuable contribution on narratology and fictionality.

The last chapter in our volume "Studies on Fictionality" publishes some new material from our group on fictionality. I formulated a rather long essay on "Russell's View on Fictionality" for the second Fictionality-issue of *Poetics XI*. (because of its length it was not accepted then Russell's semantic conception can be considered the representative of a nominalistic tendency in semantics (for the distinction between nominalistic and realistic tendencies in semantics cf. my essay "The Main Views on Fictionality in the Logico-Semantic Tradition" *Studia poetica* 3, pp. 115-124. and the study on Meinongian semantics "Semantik für heimatlose Gegenstände" *Ibid.* pp. 3-114)



Our present volume is brought to a close with L. Tarnay's study introducing a dialogical point of view in the explanation of fictionality.

I. REFERENCE AND FICTIONALITY



## REFERENCE IN FICTIONAL TEXTS

### Introduction

Zoltán Kanyó

A. József University, Szeged

Let us begin with a terminological question: Is the title of our working group correctly formulated at all? Do not the terms "reference" and "fictional text" stand in such opposition that any efforts to reconcile them are necessarily nullified? Certainly I do not hold this opinion: on the contrary, I am convinced that it is perfectly legitimate to speak about reference in fictional texts, but I would not be surprised if, e.g., a literary critic found this formulation strange or even inadmissible. Terminological disagreements are as a rule nothing but the materialisation of conceptual divergencies and as a matter of fact we should take into consideration right from the beginning the fact that there are different conceptions about fictionality and possibility of reference in fictional texts in accordance with the scientific paradigm which one assumes to be right. Our discussion would benefit considerably from the systematization of these special paradigms, this task cannot, however, be accomplished here in an extensive form, as it implies a minute and thorough historical treatment of at least three branches of science which all have a respectable tradition of some thousand years. What I can offer instead is to throw light on some main problems which I consider from the point of view of our present discussion rather decisive in connection with a theory or conception which can be held to be representative of the development of the branch of science or even - if this word can be allowed in this context - to be an archetype.

Several arguments can be advanced in favour of ordering our short overall view so that poetics should be treated first: as everybody knows the first theoretical conceptions about literature were inseparable from the perception of its fictional character. Man became aware of the theoretical problem of fictionality in poetics, and even today fictionality and literature are so closely associated that they are sometimes confused, i.e. it is thought that everything which is literature, is fictional, and everything which is fictional is literature, or the one is taken as a subclass of the other. These views are certainly erroneous as fiction can be used in any field of research and even in everyday communication without any poetic goal or effect. Literature offers nonetheless the most impressive examples of fictional texts and literary theory does not cease from producing newer and newer explanations for this peculiar phenomenon. We would have a veritable *embarras de richesse* if we were to report all the conceptions which have been elaborated in literary study under the heading of fictionality, realism, etc. Instead of that I shall confine my remarks to a classical work which determined the development in this field in a rather elementary way and is - curious as it may sound - in most respects superior to its followers. I mean Aristotle's Poetics, a work which is nowadays seen in quite a different light from some decades ago thanks to the philological research of recent years and to the theoretical investigations of modern poetics although these are based on methods and principles other than those on which Aristotelian Poetics rested, albeit appearing as a true analogon of the Aristotelian *techné*. What I am aiming at in connection with this classical work of theoretical poetics is a rather sacrilegious attempt at translating the main theses and presuppositions of this work concerning fictionality into the metalanguage of modern poetics and at scrutinizing the consequences which follow from them in order to make them

more understandable in a way which does not contradict the original Aristotelian spirit. The main arguments of Aristotelian Poetics as concerns our topic can be summed up as follows:

- 1; There is a class of human activities determined by special features which can be accounted for by general human abilities in imitation, rhythm and melody. This class of activities will be named poetic activities.
- 2; The original manifestations of poetic activities are special forms of oral communication.
- 3; Poetic activity imitates human actions in well structured stories.
- 4; The actions narrated in poetic works represent, according to the nature of poetic activity, possible or necessary actions.
- 5; Poetic activities as a class of human actions are governed by general, partly metaphysical, rules.

These theses need some elucidation and comment however, we can touch here only upon the most important connections.

The first mentioned thesis expresses the assumption that the predicates "poetic", "literature", "poeticity" "literariness", "aestheticity" etc. can be applied to a well-defined class of activities or to the results of these activities. Although supported both by the widespread naive conception about literature and by the main schools of modern poetics from the Russian Formalists to Generative Poetics, this assumption seems rather dubious, since neither traditional nor modern poetics have succeeded in setting up a full list of features by means of which the class of poetic phenomena could be unambiguously determined and any such attempt proves necessarily hopeless in an intensive examination. We do not wish to deny that there are human abilities which establish some features recurrent in some or even all poetic activities or texts, but this is only half of the truth, because there are also different abilities which can-



not be explained on the basis of a static anthropological structure. There is a possible solution of this problem if we raise the second thesis out of the rather subordinate position it occupies in Aristotelian Poetics and declare it as central. In this way poetic activity appears as a special form of communication which rests upon convention. It will certainly presuppose some human abilities, but in addition to this it will take into account some other factors as well, e.g. the special interests and goals of the community, whether the convention determining the special poetic activity is commonly accepted, institutionalized or is known only by a minority or even is persecuted, etc. In this view poetic activity and consequently literature have reality only in the context of a historically, sociologically and culturally, determined community disposing of a common convention or conventions and the comprehensive notion of literature or poetic activity can at the very best be conceived of as a family notion, in the sense of the late Wittgenstein, comprising a series of various literary language games. In full agreement with similar statements made by Searle<sup>1</sup> and others I would insist upon the fact that there is no convention embracing all the factual and possible poetic activities, and consequently there being no well definable poetic activity or literature as such, it cannot also be postulated as the starting-point of the theory. Aristotle's approach has for this reason some fundamental difficulties, namely, it is not possible to define the subject of poetics according to his proposal.

Among the distinctive features of poetic activities he mentions first mimesis. This much discussed notion expresses an inborn human ability and at the same time it points to the special semantic significance of such activities or of their results as a rule. As we are here interested in semantic questions this notion deserves some examination. If anybody thinks that "imitation" is too narrow a concep-

tion for literary semantics, he should be reminded that this term should not be taken literally but as a special sort of understanding or knowledge dependent on factual relations - the fact of this dependance will certainly be admitted generally, although its scope will be variously determined. As to the Aristotelian position according to the 3rd thesis we have to take into consideration the fact that mimesis, i.e. the correspondence between events and narration, rests upon the same structure of action in both cases, or, to put it in another way, narration imitates actual events in so far as the structures of real events are mirrored in the fundamental linguistic and narrative settings serving as essential components in narration. Narration itself is labelled "mythos", a word that had the same connotation as the term fiction has nowadays and is defined as follows: "by 'mythos' I mean the arrangement of the events"<sup>2</sup>. This means that at the level of narration there is no question of direct imitation, since narration is considered as constructed or invented according to the requirements of beauty by the poet, this maker of mythos and verses. The question of imitation and of reference can however be raised in a more general connection: If the poet invents a story then it has no referents which could be pointed out as such in the actual world, but it still applies to life as it represents an action structure which is bound to be analogous to a real action structure. Therefore if it proves to be consistent and fulfills all the social and cultural requirements for which Aristotle has the laconic expression beauty, this action will be conceived of as a possible or a necessary action, i.e. something that can or must happen. In this sense narration acquires generality by transcending the linkage to the actual world and to a series of concrete actions which at a primitive stage can be characteristic of certain poetic activities (e.g. iambic poetry) and this transcendence that poetry achieves

according to its very nature means semantically a shift from actual reference to modality. It should be emphasized that Aristotle assumes, just like modern modal logic, that the actual world is a possible state of affairs, therefore he does not see any problem in the embedding of reports of actual events or persons in poetic narration. As he writes "there is nothing to prevent some actual events being the kind that might probably happen, i.e. are capable of happening"<sup>3</sup>.

I cannot at present treat in full the Aristotelian conception about reference and generality in poetic narration. This theme, however, deserves thorough attention, since the sense of the conception outlined before has been profoundly misunderstood in literary theory and the consequences of this misunderstanding exert even today a negative influence on theoretic research in literary study. The basis of this misinterpretation was the inability to comprehend the broad and deep logical foundations of this poetics, the original logical notions having been mutilated and the modality problem taken into parenthesis. Everything had to be valued in accordance with actuality, and this constraint and its frustration gave birth to several peculiar ideas in poetics such a sociological types as referents, the opposition between naive imitation and free creation as archetypal poetic forms of self-expression, the explication of truth in literature by means of a category of particularity that should unify in itself generality and individuality in a dialectical way, etc. I do not wish to maintain that the history of literary theory has been a mere decline since Aristotle's death. The last mentioned thesis points to the fact that his Poetics followed a different scientific paradigm that the one modern scientists profess and I do believe that in methodological respect there is not only a difference, but an effective development, made possible by empirical research and by repressing mere speculation. But speculation has its

merits as well and a real theoretical revival of poetics can only be expected if poetics again acquires the theoretical knowledge it had as a basis in Aristotle's time.

Modern logic was for a long time not very favorable to theoretic research in fiction or generally to literary semantics; this rather negative appreciation can be maintained even if we acknowledge the importance of the aesthetic or poetic conceptions of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and other classics of modern logic. What literary semantics theoretically needs is the formulation of adequate truth conventions for literary texts, I mean the explication of naive intuition by means of which the members of a community may know, what states of affairs prevail in a narrative work belonging to a certain tradition. The truth of literature is an intricate notion, but we certainly need it if we want to make certain statements and inferences about literary texts. In connection with Aristotelian Poetics I have tried to explain that there is no literature and literariness but only concrete literary language games, and consequently there is no truth in literature in general, but according to the convention underlying the special communication forms - an extremely transitional relation determined by pragmatic factors. The claim to formulate truth conditions for fictional texts did not meet with understanding in classical extensional logic, there was even doubt cast on it by the program for the ideal language that should not contain any fictitious terms. Modern logics was interested first of all in truth conditions according to the actual world, therefore a different truth-relation is taken into consideration here than the relation I consider central for literary semantics: in that case we were concerned with the inner semantic constitution of texts according to the underlying convention, here we have to compare the states of affairs presented in the texts with the actual states of affairs; in the first case we try to explicate the understanding of the

text, in the second the stress is laid upon ontological considerations. I do not intend to deny the importance of this ontological question for the theory of fiction, however, I consider it secondary as compared to the semantic one, and the fact that modern logic raised it first contributed mainly to the confusion in the application of logical methods to fictional texts. In principle there are three possible answers to the question of what the truth-value of sentences containing fictional terms is, each of which determines a type of conception in modern logic. The three answers are the following: sentences containing fictional terms are per definitionem true - the Meinongian type, they are per definitionem false - the Russellian type, or they cannot have truth-values - the Frege - Strawson line. These different solutions appear at face value to be equals side by side, but they have rather different prestige and one may wonder if the Meinongian type belongs to modern logic at all as some of its theses contradict classical symbolic logic in such a way that this approach was for a long time totally discredited in modern logic. Due to the essential change that took place recently in logic the Meinongian views are considered much more favorably today, but this does not lessen the difference between the Fregean and the Meinongian ontological presuppositions, i.e. the Meinongian type remains a special class some of the representants of which are to be found among poetic and aesthetic conceptions, e.g. the well known concept of the Tartu-school of the secondary modelling system bears unmistakably Meinongian traits.

The Russellian type was influential for a certain time, but it has not many supporters nowadays, even if certain of its principles are henceforward acknowledged. The main problem of this approach from our point of view is its total insensitivity towards the semantic question of literary works. In his "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy" Rus-

sell writes: "... to maintain that Hamlet, for example, exists in his own world, namely, in the world of Shakespeare's imagination just as truly as (say) Napoleon existed in the ordinary world, is to say something deliberately confusing, or else confused to a degree which is scarcely credible. There is only one world, the 'real' world: Shakespeare's imagination is a part of it, and the thoughts that he had in writing Hamlet are real. So are the thoughts that we have in reading the play. But it is of the very essence of fiction that only the thoughts, feelings, etc. in Shakespeare and his readers are real, and that there is not, in addition to them, an objective Hamlet."<sup>4</sup> Russell's argument can be summed up as follows: fictitious names are concealed existential descriptions which do not denote any entity, consequently the sentences containing them must be false, if something were said about fiction or literature in a well-founded way, then this phenomenon had to be translated into a physicalistic or behaviouristic language - a program very impressively solved by Reichenbach in his Elements of Symbolic logic<sup>4a</sup>. Apart from the well-known problems of the description theory this approach implies that there is no inner logical solution for the fundamental semantical problem of fictional texts, this statement is theoretically as unacceptable as the proposed physicalistic reduction.

Beyond dispute the Frege-Strawson line can be considered as the most respected in logic and in certain schools of literary study as well. It is sufficient if we mention that logicians such as Frege, Strawson, Ryle, E.G. Moore and a scholar who began a new period in literary theory, R. Ingarden, are party to this line<sup>5</sup>. In spite of many deep insights into the structure of fictional texts which cannot even be tentatively enumerated here I should like to emphasize that as far as a possible solution of the central question of literary semantics is concerned it does not make

any tangible difference if the sentences containing fictional names are considered false or having no truth value and, in this respect, I agree with Mr. Bernáth's and Mr. Csuri's position concerning Frege's conception about literature.

All these models based on extensional logic belong to the prehistory of the logic of fiction and its formulation is the task of today. As Professor Woods is going to give a systematic overview of the recent discussions it is needless for me to recapitulate the main tendencies, instead of which I wish to point to some questions to which I attach importance. The main problem is to formulate the truth-condition for fictional texts in such a way that these special conditions should not contradict the general truth-conditions, i.e. the validity of these conditions should be limited to the semantic constitution of the relevant communication forms and relatedness of these connections to actuality should be taken into account in quite different terms. Several proposals have been outlined of which I shall mention three. The first is the introduction of a story operator most impressively represented in John Wood's *The Logic of Fiction* which is certainly one of the most important contributions to this question in the last years<sup>7</sup>. I must say, however, that I do not sympathize with this solution because there is no linguistic evidence on which such an operator could be based, the same text could be - as Castañeda has very convincingly pointed out - without the slightest change a fiction and a non-fiction, and if the story operator does not refer to the linguistic structure, but to the fact that the text is being uttered in a special literary communication form, then the story operator reflects a pragmatic feature of the text which cannot be conceived of as generally valid special logic or semantics but as dependant on the convention underlying the text. I presume therefore that Wood's *olim* operator should be reinterpreted in a

pragmatic sense. But this operation can be spared if we follow Routley's proposition to base the logic of fiction on context logic. The main thesis of his approach, that "there is no general uniform logic of fiction ... each work will have its own internal logic"<sup>8</sup> corresponds to the ideas I am trying to explain here. I certainly consider Routley's approach as a whole very promising, even if context logic itself is contested by some logicians. The third solution is the application of the central notion of modal logic "possible world" to fictional texts. It has the advantage that by means of the model theoretic apparatus a lot of problems can be technically solved unambiguously. The main question is, however, whether fiction can be considered at all as a possible world in the sense of intensional logic. Certainly we have no longer a comprehensive notion of fiction and an argument pointing out that there are narrative worlds representing logically impossible connections does not disturb us. We do know about conventions of building up nonsensical texts, but their existence is not a proof against the applicability of this notion to any fictional texts whatsoever. I mean there are classes of texts to which this notion can be applied, but not without certain essential changes. In this respect Mr. Bernath and Mr. Csuri will present an interesting experiment, whereas I should like to emphasize that the truth-conditions determined by pragmatistical conventions can only be stated empirically in connection with the community making use of the relevant communication form. In this respect I should like to touch upon one of the most discussed questions of the logic of fiction, namely what kind of entities are referred to in fictional texts. Professor Pavel's study and Professor Pelc's paper are devoted to this topic. I should like, however, to formulate briefly a somewhat different position. The majority of the theoreticians of literature and even a great number of logicians are inclined to take fictional characters such as Hamlet, Anna



Karenina, Sherlock Holmes, etc. for non-actual but well-individuated objects, a view supported either by pure analogies or by Meinongian ontology or by the fallacy that the possible world-semantics commits one to choose the possible constants and to give them extensional interpretations, etc. I do not wish to accept this rather doubtful ontology and I think the analyst having in view such well-known fictional characters is considerably misled, if he tries to determine the properties of fictional characters according to these most representative figures. Whoever has analysed folktales - a genre in which fiction appears in all likelihood historically for the first time - knows that there is no need for names, a singular indefinite description ("an old man") or a definite description ("the king") do the same. For convenience one can - as Aristotle mentioned - "tack on names afterward"<sup>9</sup>, but by this dubbing nothing has ontologically changed, there is no new entity coming into being, the name not being any more than a textual device of crossreference. As to the fictional character itself, it should not be conceived of as a constant but rather a variable which is at the same time determined by a number of properties prescribed by the game that involves it. If I say, let us imagine a game of chess, White applying strategy A, Black adopting strategy B, then White and Black are not two entities, but two roles of players defined by the game, logically explicated as two variables having the corresponding predicates in the scope of existential quantifiers. This is too simple an example to overcome all the difficulties in the semantics of fiction, nevertheless it points to what my deep conviction is: if there is a solution to this discussion, it is not to be found in ontological speculations but in empirical investigations revealing the inner structure of fictional narratives.

As far as linguistics is concerned I was compelled in the course of my explanation to take sides in one of the main linguistic discussions going on between defenders of an abstract language system of a Saussurian type and the partisans of a primarily conventionally determined language concept. For the sake of order I should like to make it clear that I belong to the last mentioned group, i.e. I consider that theoretical problems of literature, fiction and even reference can only be satisfactorily solved if we consider the use of the texts as basic. Only in so far as the contextual background is systematically taken into account can the problem of deictic particles, articles, pronouns - so differently treated in different grammatics, but in its importance generally underestimated - be settled in an adequate way. Nowadays there are two main approaches to this problem, the one I would label the extension of logic to natural language the other the recurrence of self-determining linguistic principles. Let us begin with the last one. This conception could hardly be illustrated better than by the following extracts of Mr. Bierwisch's classical, and anything but outdated, study "On classifying Semantic Features": "... an interpretation of reference indices and corresponding arguments along the lines (of usual logical analysis - Z.K.) must be given up. Instead of this I propose to consider an argument  $X_1$  as a variable to be substituted by the representation of a fraction of the (real or fictitious) universe talked about. This fraction is made up from one or more equivalent objects or individuals which are singled out for separate predication only under specific conditions. These conditions are either part of the predicate to be applied or expressed by particular specifiers and quantifiers such as 'every', 'all', 'two', 'many', etc. ... I suspect however that the proposed concept of 'global reference' cannot be explained in terms of more basic notions of a semantic theory, but must be taken as a primitive no-

tion itself. I presume, in other words that in this respect the quantification theory and the linguistic semantic theory are radically different in that they take opposing directions: whereas quantification theory takes individuals as the starting point from which exhaustive and partial sets are constructed by means of universal and existential quantification, linguistic semantics probably has to start with sets as primitive terms which may further be specified with respect to the participation to their elements in particular states of affairs"<sup>10</sup>. Though Mr. Bierwisch is one of the linguists from whom I personally have learned the most, I cannot follow him in this respect. More exactly I agree with him in the details, not however in the conclusions he seems to be compelled to draw. Since I have not enough time to propound my opinion let me formulate the hypothesis underlying my studies in this direction to the effect that logical and linguistic relations should not be opposed to each other and that logical relations reflect as a rule the abstract correspondences in the structure of natural language. However, in order to get an adequate picture of this last we need to take into account over and above the logical connections the features of the context the text is embedded in, as the consideration of context-relations may considerably transform the logical pattern. This principle was by the way very convincingly adapted by E. Lang, who unfortunately could not accept our invitation to participate in our discussion, in his excellent text-theoretic book "Semantik der koordinativen Verknüpfung"<sup>11</sup>. According to this principle my starting-point would not be a primitive notion "global reference" presupposing sets as primitive terms, but the usual distinctions by means of the appertinence of individuals to sets and of quantification. In accordance with the proposals of Bellert, van Dijk and others, certain features of the reference indices should be connected with the referential or the pragmatic context, classes of reference indices seem

to be specialised in order to indicate a certain type of determination of the objects they refer to. It is not possible and not even necessary to explain the theoretical basis of this conception, as I have done it elsewhere<sup>12</sup>.

What I have to do for illustrations's sake is to show that it is possible to give a consistent explication of the examples that led Mr. Bierwisch to the contested conclusions within the scope of the proposed theory. Mr. Bierwisch's examples refer to the use of the definite article "the" determining nouns in plural such as

- 1; The boys hit the girls.
- 2; The policemen rounded up the demonstration.
- 3; The whites oppress the negroes.
- 4; The Chinese of the seventh century knew porcelain.

The definite article is as a matter of fact a homonymic morphological unit for at least the following three different types of reference:

- 1; the generic one corresponding to the universal quantifier,
- 2; the referential one defining the speaker's reference to an object or a set of objects,
- 3; the existential one corresponding to the existential quantifier, this use being determined by syntactic constructions and the semantic features of the nouns and the verbs taking part in them.

Although Mr. Bierwisch's examples can certainly be differently interpreted, the problem Mr. Bierwisch pointed to is obviously joined to the referential use. Mr. Bierwisch is certainly right in pointing out that it is impossible to give a correct account of our first example by means of quantificational logic, since a quantification based on sets consisting of individuals compels us to take sides, viz. if every boy hit every girl or some boys hit some girls, etc. All possible variants do not seem to correspond with the original sentence. He is also right when in connection with

the third example he states: "Rather the groups referred to are understood as a plurality whose individuals are not singled out with respect to participation or nonparticipation in the states and processes in question. It is claimed only that the group as a whole is concerned"<sup>13</sup>. This however is not the consequence of the indeterminacy of reference in natural language, but is a rather normal effect of plurality. The definite article with a singular noun in its scope introduces an individual, that with a plural noun, however, a set the power of which is greater than one. By the use of the definite article and plural in general the speaker is not committed to anything more than the fact there is a set consisting of more than one element to which the speaker intends to refer. If he wishes to be more explicit, he has several numerical quantifiers at his disposal and he can very well explain how many individuals are concerned, since natural language has this possibility as well and it seems not at all a subordinated special case. In a word, it seems to me to be possible to preserve the essential insights of Mr. Bierwisch's analysis without being compelled to give up the inclusion of logical and set-theoretical relations in linguistics.

A last remark about narrative research: after the decline of the structuralistic approaches of the sixties the interest in empirical research - I do not mean interpretation - has perceptibly diminished. Dr. Rauh's paper resuming the main results of her doctoral dissertation makes an exception that we are very glad to include in our program. The general scene is, however, not very reassuring: on the one hand theoretic experiments amounting to the mere application of theories originally devoted to the explication of quite different connections, on the other hand empirical research and interpretations with insufficient theoretical foundations while the decisive questions, e.g. the question of a narrative syntax, are not even raised. Though the pres-

ent conditions are perhaps not very propitious for the undertaking of such an enterprise, scientific development gives important impulses. I have to mention first of all, action theory and game theory which promise to outline a structure, not static or linear as the structuralists have been thinking, but dynamic and dialectical, consisting in the strategic moves of opponent agents. Action theory and game theory have a deep influence on linguistics today and there are even some experiments on narrative topics as well. However, in this field, a rather old work remains the most instructive - Aristotle's Poetics.

Thus arriving at the starting point of my exposition, I put an end to my introductory remarks. If the listener is a bit disappointed that here I have raised so many questions without giving detailed answers, he should be reminded that nothing other could be my aim but to put the questions and to formulate them in a provocative way. The questions will be answered by our participants who are all distinguished specialists in their fields and should the listener be dissatisfied with one answer or another, he is kindly requested to look for an adequate solution and to work with us in the discussion.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> cf. Searle, J.R.: The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse, *New Literary History* 6/1975, pp. 319-332.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle: Poetics VI, 50a6. The English text follows - in this case not literally - G.E. Else's translation in: G.E. Else: Aristotle's Poetics The Argument. Leiden 1957. p. 238.

- <sup>3</sup> *ibid.* IX. 51 b30-32. resp.p. 315.
- <sup>4</sup> Russell, B.: *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, London 1967<sup>12</sup>, p. 168.
- <sup>4a</sup> Reichenbach, H.: *Elements of Symbolic Logic*, New York - London 1966<sup>10</sup>
- <sup>5</sup> cf. Frege, G.: *Über Sinn und Bedeutung*, in: Frege G.: *Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung, Fünf logische Studien*. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von G. Patzig, Göttingen 1975<sup>4</sup>, pp. 40-65., Frege, G.: *Schriften zur Logik*. Aus dem Nachlass, Berlin 1973, Strawson, P.F.: *On Referring*, *Mind* 235/1950, pp. 320-344. Strawson, P.F.: *Introduction to Logical Theory*, London 1967<sup>5</sup>, Ryle, G.: *Imaginary Objects* *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary vol. 12. (*Creativity, Politics and the A Priori*), 1933. pp. 18-43., Moore, G.E.: *Imaginary Objects*, *ibid.* pp. 55-70., Ingarden, R.: *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, Tübingen 1965<sup>3</sup>.
- <sup>6</sup> Woods, J.: *The Logic of Fiction*, The Hague 1974.
- <sup>7</sup> Castañeda, H.N.: *Fiction and Reality: their Fundamental Connections*, *Poetics* 1-2/1979, pp. 31-62.
- <sup>8</sup> Routley, R.: *The Semantical Structure of Fictional Discourse*, *Poetics* 1-2/1979, pp. 3-30, the quoted passage pp. 10-11.
- <sup>9</sup> Aristotle's *Poetics* IX. 51 b11. op. cit. p. 302.

- <sup>10</sup> Bierwisch, M.: On Classifying Semantic Features, in: Steinberg, D.D. - Jakobovits, L.A.: (eds.): Semantics. An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy Linguistics and Psychology, Cambridge 1971, pp. 410-435. The quoted passage p. 416.
- <sup>11</sup> Lang, E.: Semantik der koordinativen Verknüpfung. *Studia grammatica* XIV. Berlin 1977.
- <sup>12</sup> cf. Kanyó, Z.: Kriterien der Fortsetzbarkeit in monologischen konjunktiv verbundenen Ketten (Dargestellt an Hand von Strittmatters Kalendergeschichte "Der Spuk"), in: Dañes, F. - Viehweger, D. (eds.): Probleme der Textgrammatik II. *Studia grammatica* XVIII., Berlin 1977, pp. 33-72.
- <sup>13</sup> Bierwisch, M.: op. cit. p. 416.





ANIMADVERSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS:  
REFERENCE, INFERENCE AND TRUTH IN FICTION

John Woods  
The University of Calgary

1. I have long believed that a primary datum for the semanticist of fiction is the syntactic (rather than lexical) ambiguity of fictional sentences. After all, it is true is it not, that Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street, yet also true that he did no such thing? That we seem ready to acquiesce without embarrassment in such apparent contradictions suggests to me that they are indeed *only* apparent and that the appearance can be despatched by postulating ambiguity. So, then, though possessed of important pragmatic peculiarities, fictional discourse lays strong claim to a non-negligible semantic status; and the accommodating theories could be expected to articulate appropriate doctrines of reference, inference and truth.

2. The surface 'contradiction' that "Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street" is both true and not true requires clarification and eventual disposal in the theory of truth. If this is to be achieved by way of syntactic ambiguity, then the theory of truth needs to expound and regiment the ambiguity, of course; but it can also be expected to clarify the respects in which, if any, fictional pronouncements refer, and the manner in which fictional surface contradictions avoid authorization of the inference of everything whatever. So we may suppose that the theory of truth would give the lead to the theory of reference and the theory of inference. Truth theory would seem to be basic.

3. In some of my earlier work<sup>1</sup>, I attempted to find a semantic framework for fictional discourse that answers to these various tasks. It is clear to me now, as it was in 1974, that *The Logic of Fiction* did not give all the answers and that it was far from perfect, even as far as it went and goes. It may now be timely to quickly review this theoretical sketch, with three main purposes in mind:

- (1) To take account of whatever virtues it may still possess.
- (2) To expose and develop its evident deficiencies.
- (3) To use it as a benchmark (though manifestly an imperfect one) against which rival theoretical perspectives may be compared and assessed.

4. The theoretical sketch of *The Logic of Fiction* may be set out as follows:

A basic semantic datum, I have said, is that fictional sentences give rise to apparent contradictions by which are, except in deliberately theoretical moments, not in the least disturbed. We say that "Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street" is both true and not true, yet we do not blush. There is an ambiguity somewhere that annuls the contradiction and fully justifies our confident casualness. One way of representing the ambiguity is by assigning to "Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street", a pair of canonical representatives  $S$  and  $'O(S)'$  in an appropriate semantic metalanguage in which  $S$  can be declared not true and  $'O(S)'$  true.  $'O'$  is a (kind of) modal operator on sentence representations in the theory, the semantics of which should capture the truth theoretical peculiarities of fictional sentences. Ordinarily the operator  $'O'$  does not appear in the surface structure, in order that fictional sentences may achieve and preserve effective verisimilitude.

The truth theory for fictional sentences (or, more

precisely, for their canonical representations in the semantic metalanguage) defines a satisfaction relation for sentences, from which, in turn, a truth definition can be got. Initially we say that a sentence  $'O(\phi)'$  meets the *elementary sayso condition* iff

(S1)  $'O(\phi)'$  represents a sentence that occurs in a work of fiction. And let us say that a sentence  $'O(\phi)'$  meets the *author's sayso condition* iff (S2)  $'O(\phi)'$  meets the *elementary sayso condition* or

(S3)  $\phi$  is a logical consequence of  $\psi$ ,  $\psi$  is consistent, and  $'O(\psi)'$  meets the *author's sayso condition*.

The basis of the definition of *satisfaction of sentence*,  $\phi$  by a sequence,  $s$ , can now be given.

1. If  $\phi$  is  $'O(\psi)'$  meets the *sayso condition*,  $s$  satisfies  $\phi$ . The recursion clauses are as follows: Given that  $\phi$  does not meet 1, then
2. *Negation*. If  $\phi$  is  $'O(\neg\psi)'$  then  $s$  satisfies  $\phi$  iff there is a sentence  $'O(\chi)'$  that is satisfied by  $s$  and no sequence satisfying  $\chi^*$  fails to satisfy  $'\psi^*'$ , where any sentence  $\Gamma^*$  is exactly like the sentence  $\Gamma$  save for showing a free variable wherever  $\Gamma^*$  displays a fictional name.
3. *Negation*. If  $\phi$  is  $'\neg O(\psi)'$ , then  $\phi$  is satisfied by  $s$  iff  $'O(\psi)'$  is not satisfied by  $s$ .
4. *Conjunction*. If  $\phi$  is  $'O(\chi_1)'$  and  $\psi$  is  $'O(\chi_2)'$  then  $s$  satisfies  $'\phi \& \psi'$  iff  $s$  satisfies both  $\phi$  and  $\psi$ .
5. *Conjunction*. If  $\phi$  is  $'O(\psi \& \chi)'$  then  $s$  satisfies  $\phi$  iff  $s$  satisfies  $'O(\psi)'$  and  $'O(\chi)'$ .
6. *Implication*. If  $\phi$  is  $'O(\chi_1)'$  and  $\psi$  is  $'O(\chi_2)'$  then  $'\phi \rightarrow \psi'$  is satisfied by  $s$  iff  $s$  satisfies  $\psi$  or does not satisfy  $\phi$ .
7. *Implication*. If  $\phi$  is  $'O(\phi' \rightarrow \psi)'$  then  $s$  satisfies  $\phi$  iff  $s$  satisfies some sentence  $'O(\chi)'$  and no sequence that satisfies  $\chi$  fails to satisfy  $'\phi' \rightarrow \psi'$ .

8. *Quantification.* If  $\phi$  is  $\lceil \exists v_i O(\psi) \rceil$  then  $\phi$  is satisfied by  $s$  iff at least one of these conditions is met:

- (i)  $\lceil O(\psi) \rceil$  contains free occurrences of the variable  $v_i$  and  $v$  denotes the  $i$ -th element of some sequence  $s'$  differing from  $s$  in at most the  $i$ -th place,  $a$  is the name of that element and  $\chi$  is a substitution instance of  $\lceil O(\psi) \rceil$  with respect to  $a$ , and  $\chi$  meets the *sayso condition*.
- (ii) If  $O(\psi)$  is  $\lceil O(\chi(v_i, a)) \rceil$ , then  $v_i$  denotes the  $i$ -th element of some sequence  $s'$  differing from  $s$  in at most  $i$ -th place; that element knows  $\lceil O \exists v_k (v_k = a) \rceil$  to be true; the predicate  $\chi$  is such that in general  $\lceil \chi(v_j, v_h) \rceil$  is semantically equivalent to  $\lceil v_j$  believes that  $\lceil \chi(v_j, v_h) \rceil$  is semantically equivalent to  $\lceil v_j$  believes that  $\lceil \chi(v_j, v_h) \rceil$ ; and the element denoted by  $v_i$  believes that  $\lceil \chi(v_i, a) \rceil$ .

9. *Quantification.* If  $\phi$  is  $\lceil O(\exists v(\psi)) \rceil$  then  $\phi$  is satisfied by  $s$  iff for some name or singular term  $a$ , free for a free variable in  $\psi$ ,  $\lceil O(S_x^v(\psi)) \rceil$  is satisfied by  $s$ .

A truth-definition now easily drops out. *Truth is satisfaction by every sequence.* And truth, it should be noted, is governed by a single condition of *mat erial adequacy*:

(T)  $x$  is true iff  $y$

where  $x$  is the name of a sentence and  $y$  is the sentence named or a translation of it in our theory's semantic metalanguage. In particular, "O (Holmes lived in London)" is true if O (Holmes lived in London).

Now, though it would be dreadfully cumbersome here to set forth the details, it can be seen that this semantic sketch has, or seems to have a number of advantages.

(a) Condition 9 provides that "Moriarity discovered that Holmes really existed" is unsatisfiable, whereas "O (Moriarity discovered that Holmes really existed)" is allowed to be satisfiable.

(b) Conditions 8 and 9 allow for the representation of "Holmes had tea with Gladstone" by the harmless  $\lceil O(T(h, g)) \rceil$ , and of "Someone psychoanalyzed Grandiva" and "Someone loves Molly Jeavens" by the also harmless  $\lceil \exists_{\nu} O(\psi(\nu, \alpha)) \rceil$ . On the other hand, the theory will reject such sentences as "Pierre Trudeau waltzed with Molly Jeavens," as it rightly should.

(c) Conditions 2 and 3 concerning negation provide that  $\lceil O(\phi) \rceil$  and  $O(\lceil \neg \phi \rceil)$  are neither contradictories nor contraries, which gives us a respectable method of representing the indeterminacy of fictional beings, if it were our wish to do so, without doing violence to the Law of Excluded Middle. What is more, a canonical representation in the form  $\lceil O(\psi \& \lceil \neg \psi \rceil) \rceil$  is satisfiable, as is its implicandum  $\lceil O(\psi) \& O(\lceil \neg \psi \rceil) \rceil$ . Since,  $\lceil O(\psi) \rceil$  does not contradict  $\lceil O(\lceil \neg \psi \rceil) \rceil$ , it is impossible to derive from  $\lceil O(\psi \& \lceil \neg \psi \rceil) \rceil$ , any sentence whatever; and an all-important contradiction problem is disposed of.

(d) There are methodological virtues, as well. The system of *The Logic of Fiction*.

requires only the classical truth values, the semantic rudiments of first order systems, both referential and substitutional, - such items as sets, functions, substitution instances, and the like, a primitive alethic modality, possibility, and another primitive,  $O$ , which is a very weak modal. Negatively speaking, for a theory of fiction we do not need to depart the classical laws of Non-Contradiction and Excluded Middle; we do not need to postulate the multivocality of 'true' or of 'exists' or of 'is in the world'; we do not need to abandon classical negation for some many-valued interloper; we do not need many-valued composition logics; we do not need the neutral

quantifiers ' $\Sigma$ ' and ' $\pi$ '. We can still win and lose bets concerning the whereabouts of Holmes: "O (Holmes lived in Baker Street)" wins; "O (Holmes lived in Berczy Street)" loses<sup>2</sup>.

(e) And, finally, here is a theory of truth that does direct a certain amount of traffic in the theories of reference and inference.

(i) Reference. That we refer in fiction to fictional objects could be accounted for by the legions of sentences in the form ' $O(\psi x)$ ' and in the form ' $O\exists y(\psi y)$ ' that are assigned the truth-value T. That reference does *not* in such cases imply existence is conveyed by the unsatisfiability of such sentences as " $\exists x(\text{Sherlock Holmes} = x)$ ".

(ii) Inference. Getting the truth conditions right goes quite some way, of course, in charting the course of what, in fiction, follows from what and what does not. Certainly one of the largest claims of the truth theory of *The Logic of Fiction* is that it shows convincingly not only how 'contradictions' can be true but also how they do not sanction that classical nuisance, the inference *ex falso quodlibet*.

5. It is pleasant to have one's critics speak well one's work and to take it seriously. But an altogether more beneficial outcome of criticism is the disclosure of problems and perplexities. Here are some that have been unearthed by critics of *The Logic of Fiction*.

(a) Robert Howell<sup>3</sup> The semantic theory of *The Logic of Fiction* does in fact, and contrary to my intentions, allow that "inconsistent fiction, contrary to fact, does narrate everything". Proof. To show that if ' $O(\phi \& \neg \phi)$ ' is in a given story, then so is ' $O(\neg(\neg \psi))$ ', for arbitrary  $\psi$ . Let ' $O(\phi \& \neg \phi)$ ' be in the story; hence it meets the *elementary sayso condition* and is satisfied by  $s$ . To show that ' $O(\neg(\neg \psi))$ ' is also satisfied by  $s$ , we use *Negation rule 2* as follows. There is a sentence ' $O(\phi \& \neg \phi)$ ' that is sat-

isfied by  $s$ , and (vacuously) no sequence satisfying  $\lceil(\phi \& \lceil\phi)\rceil$  fails to satisfy  $\lceil\lceil\lceil\psi\rceil\rceil$ , for any  $\psi$ . So  $\lceil O(\lceil\lceil\psi\rceil)\rceil$  is satisfied by  $s$ .

(b) *Richard Routley*<sup>4</sup> Consider an authored self-contradiction represented as  $\lceil O(\phi \& \lceil\phi)\rceil$ . Then the story containing such a sentence yields  $O(\psi)$ , for arbitrary  $\psi$ . Proof. Since  $\lceil(\phi \& \lceil\phi)\rceil \equiv (\psi \& \lceil\psi)\rceil$  is a classical tautology, we have it by the modality of 'O' that  $\lceil O(\phi \& \lceil\phi)\rceil \text{ iff } \lceil O(\psi \& \lceil\psi)\rceil$ . Thus we also have  $\lceil O(\psi \& \lceil\psi)\rceil$ , hence by  $\&$ -distribution,  $\lceil O(\psi)\rceil$ , where  $\psi$  is any sentence you please.

(c) *Terence Parsons*<sup>5</sup> Formulas  $\lceil \exists v O(\psi_v, a) \rceil$  are taken to represent such fictional-real world truths as that "Someone psychoanalyzed Gradiya." The semantical rules of *The Logic of Fiction* provide that such a formula is (in the particular case before us) satisfied iff

- (i)  $v$  knows that  $O$  someone,  $w$ , is Gradiya.
- (ii)  $v$  believes that  $v$  psychoanalyzed Gradiya.
- (iii) for all  $w$  and  $u$ , that  $w$  psychoanalyzed  $u$  is equivalent to  $w$  believes that  $w$  psychoanalyzed  $u$ .

But it is not true, in particular, that "a psychoanalyzed b" is equivalent to "a believes that a psychoanalyzed b". It could have happened that Freud psychoanalyzed Gradiya and yet was immediately thereafter struck down with irreversible amnesia; or he might have died.

More importantly however, the rules utterly fail to account for such sentences as "A certain fictional detective is more famous than any real detective". Here is a bet-sensitive, indeed winning, asseveration, but it contains nothing even resembling an intensional verb, as required by rule 8 (ii).

6. Trouble indeed for the semantic account of *The Logic of Fiction*, perhaps even trouble enough to show that that en-



terprise was Fundamentally misconceived and that we should pursue the semantics of fiction in very different theories, or even that we should abandon the semantic pretense altogether and content ourselves with pragmatics. Let us see.

A. *Possible Worlds Semantics: Pavel*<sup>6</sup> Mature theories exist which give the semantics of possible worlds. True, some thinkers despair of a completely satisfying account of that powerful metaphor. Maximal sets of propositions have been put to the explicational test, and some still find it wanting, what with the notion of a proposition being no clearer than that of a possible world, or what with propositions being explicable only in terms of possible worlds. On the other hand, possible worlds semantics are certainly theoretically better-behaved than the theory of *The Logic of Fiction*; so would it not be preferable, if far from ideal, to look there?

No, I think not. For I take it that the predicate, "is fictional", which Holmes satisfies (e.g., " $\exists x(x = \text{Holmes} \ \& \ x \text{ is fictional})$ ") is governed by the following condition:

' $x$  is fictional' entails, for some  $\phi$ , possibly  $\phi x$  and  $\neg\phi x$ . That is, a fictional object,  $x$ , satisfies some such modalized inconsistent predicate by virtue of this circumstance that had the author so chosen,  $x$  would have behaved inconsistently, and the author could have so chosen. Moreover, if we allow for some standard reduction postulates for iterated modalities, we could obtain from 'Possibly  $\psi$ ' 'Necessarily (Possibly  $\psi$ )', from which, in the particular instance, we would have, essentially as it were, the necessary possible self-contradictoriness of fictional beings. Fictional beings would be *impossibilia*, and not intuitively plausible candidates for residency in any possible world.<sup>7</sup>

Now, it is quite true that a major thrust of *The Logic of Fiction* was to show that such fictional contradictions were only apparent. But, Howell and Routley have rather convincingly averred that the attempt failed. Therefore, show how the contradictoriness of fictional objects was "only" apparent, and how the derivation of everything whatever could be avoided. What is more, they would need to show that their solutions of such contradiction problems could be absorbed without theoretical violence into their possible world semantics. And finally, in order to show the *advantages* of their theory over my own, it would be required of them to show that their solutions of the contradiction problems could not, without theoretical violence, be absorbed into a theory of *The Logic of Fiction* sort. *Tu quoque*.

B. *Meinongean Semantics: Parsons*<sup>8</sup> The best treatment of Meinongean semantics is that of Terence Parsons. One of its most useful features is that it has been very deliberately developed so as to provide an adequate theoretical home for fictional objects. However, for me there is an uncertainty about its analysis of fictional objects. Part of it has to do with the general notion of a Meinongean object. Parsons' account provides that corresponding to each different non-empty set of properties there is a different specific object. Some might find this an over-generous criterion of objecthood and others, might wonder whether, say, *unit* sets of properties are ever property-rich enough adequately to individuate. It depends I suppose on how close a connection there is between uniqueness and individuatedness. For example, there is no particular reason to think that there is just one object that is red and has no other (nuclear) properties; but corresponding to the set {being red} there is one object at most. So we have a problem with uniqueness. Moreover, regardless of whether the-red-only-thing is unique, it is dubious that redness alone ever makes a substantive enough contribution to its bearer so as to confer genuine

individuality upon it. My own complaint, however, is somewhat different. *All* objects, fictional or otherwise, are by virtue of their corresponding sets. Thus fictional objects "were objects before they were written about: they were so to speak only identified by the author, and writing about them did not confer objecthood upon them." So, then, the requirement that fictional objects be run-of-the-mill Meinongean objects as such denies us the intuition that in a rather deep, and somewhat literal sense, fictional objects have a literary patermity; i.e., that they are created by their authors.

There is also something unsettling about the requirement that fictional objects should be incomplete in the manner of Parsons' treatment of this notion, that is, that they be indeterminate with respect to an enormous range of properties that one would have supposed them capable of exemplifying. On the face of it, it is not credible to say that Sherlock Holmes neither lacked nor possessed a kidney, ten toes, two elbows, or a mother; than he went to school or not, that he did not comport himself with Watson and the world in ways not chronicled by Doyle. Mind you, there are ever so many things about Holmes that we shall never know. But it is an over-reaction to elevate these *insolubilia* to ontological heights; it is a confusion of the *ordo essendi* with the *ordo cognoscendi*. Perhaps it might be thought that I am wrong to suppose that on the Meinongean analysis Holmes' incompleteness (epistemologically or ontologically rendered--it doesn't matter here) involve those properties of a few lines back. Nevertheless Holmes is a man. I would think that it would follow this, relative to elementary zoology, that Holmes had a mother, and that relative to human anatomy, he had two elbows, a kidney and a certain number of toes. I would also think that having shoulders and back, that either he was be-moled or not. It may be a deficiency of sorts that Parsons' Meinongean preoccupation is with

ontology and not with logic. Parsons says that he does not seek for a logic of fiction. But if I am not to know what follows about Holmes from what, I wonder whether the ontological project can satisfactorily proceed. Let A be any proposition ascribing to Holmes any property not in his representing set. Parsons elects to assign to A. and to not-A as well, the intermediate truth value "indeterminate" or *i*. This leaves us with the need to make up our minds about A or not-A. Are we to assign it *i* or do we attach the classical truth-value T? If we make the former choice, we abandon the law of excluded middle for fictional objects. If we go with the second option we tamper with the conventional truth-functionality of the law. Either way, we invest our decision and the theory which it advances with a logical significance that needs to be explained and justified.

3. *Pragmatics: Purtil*<sup>9</sup> Some authors have been tempted by the notion that the sentences actually constitutive of a piece of fiction (as opposed to those that are *about* fiction, those that a literary critic might use, for example) are spared all but the limits of semantic significance. They are not true and they are not false, and that is about all there is to their semantic "theory"; the deeper truths lie elsewhere--in pragmatics. Purtil is one who has yielded to such a temptation, but not with wholly convincing results<sup>10</sup>. As I have said, Purtil holds that the sentences literally constitutive of a piece of fiction are neither true nor false, that they do not make assertions, that (therefore) they do not make assertions about what they would appear to be about. Such sentences in fact *tell tales*, and in such non-assertive uses, they escape the burdens of all but the limits of semantic significance. That is, they are *not true* and they are *not false*. Purtil holds that if I tale-tell by means of a sentence, S, then S neither asserts nor denies anything, and that it cannot be inferred

either that S is true or that S is false. Purtil makes two claims which it is useful to distinguish:

- (A) In fiction sentences are forwarded non-assertively.
- (B) Any sentence forwarded non-assertively is non-truth-valued.

It is, of course, open to us to accept (A) without accepting (B). Proposition (B) is not obviously true, and some philosophers (Frege, for example, in "The Thought") have held that it is false. In particular, if a *statement* could be used unassertively, then tale-telling could perfectly well be the non-assertive presentation of statements; and I do not see why such statements couldn't be truth-valued, and why in such non-assertive uses we can't be said to be forgiven the obligation of staying on the semantics tracks.

But what of what we ourselves say about fictional goings-on, by way for example of literary criticism? Purtil thinks that, unlike the sentences constitutive of the fiction in question, these sentences do have some positive semantic significance, for they are true of false, and quite genuinely about something, of which something quite genuinely is asserted. They have syntactic significance as well, for they are "ellipses" for sentences that are more faithfully rendered in the form:

$\overline{\overline{F}}$  (Doyle, his readers, "Holmes solved the case of the Speckled Band"),

where ' $\overline{\overline{F}}$ ' is a quasi-operator with, as arguments, and author, the author's audience or readership, and the non-truth-valued, semantically bereft sentences with which the author makes his magic.

In this particular example, we have more or less obvious facts to take into account.

1. In this fashion, Doyle has tale-told us that Holmes solved the case of the Speckled Band.
2. Statement 1 is true ("straightforwardly true" as Professor Purtil might say).

3. The sentence "Holmes solved the case of the Speckled Band" makes a false assertion.

4. What was tale-told would make a false assertion; that is, what Doyle tale-tells, but does not assert, would make a false assertion.

Consider now the following inconsistent set:

- (i) *What Doyle tale-told is X.*
- (ii) *What Woods (say) non-elliptically asserted is Y.*
- (iii) *What Doyle tale-told is neither true nor false.*
- (iv) *What Woods non-elliptically asserted is false.*
- (v) *'X' = 'Y'.*

I think that we can quickly agree that Purtil is committed to the rejection of (v), for he would appear expressly to hold (i)-(iv). Suppose then that (v) is rejected. Then, though 'X' and 'Y' are the same sentence, 'X' was put to non-assertive, non-truth-valued purposes, and 'Y' to assertive, truth-valued purposes. The similarity is syntactic only. But, if so, it is unsurpassingly unclear (to me at least) whether the predicate in 'X' and 'Y' predicates the same thing, and unclear, as well, whether their common subject term has any, never mind whether it be the same, semantic role (e.g., does it refer to Holmes?). What, then, accounts for the urge in us all to think that the author's "Holmes scolded Watson" and the critic's "Holmes scolded Watson" show a common concern for Watson?

Purtill's views, perhaps like my own in *The Logic of Fiction*, rather quickly prove unconvincing. I do not, however, for a moment suppose that the difficulties with Purtil's pragmatic reconstruction indicate that the pragmatic approach is wrong in principle<sup>11</sup>. But I *do* think that the possible world and Mainongean approaches are wrong in principle; and about the approach of *The Logic of Fiction* I remain, for the time being at least, undecided and more baffled than I care to admit.

Notes

- <sup>1</sup> John Woods, *The Logic of Fiction: A Philosophical Sound-  
ing of Deviant Logic*. Mouton. 1974.
- <sup>2</sup> *The Logic of Fiction*, p. 143.
- <sup>3</sup> Review of *The Logic of Fiction*, *The Journal of Aesthetics  
and Art Criticism*, 34, pp. 354-55.
- <sup>4</sup> "The Semantical Structure of Fictional Discourse", to  
appear in *Poetics*.
- <sup>5</sup> Review of *The Logic of Fiction*, *Synthese*, forthcoming.
- <sup>6</sup> Thomas Pavel, "'Possible Worlds' in Literary Semantics",  
*The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 34, pp.  
165-76.
- <sup>7</sup> Except for a limiting case of the notion of "possible  
world" according to which there is a so-called world in  
which everything is the case. Not, certainly, a concept  
of possible worldhood that encourages one to think of  
fictional beings, should they inhabit such a world, as  
*possibilia*'. See Robert Stalnaker, "A Theory of Condi-  
tionals", *American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph  
Series*, 2, pp. 98-112. Cf. *The Logic of Fiction*, pp. 96ff.
- <sup>8</sup> Terence Parsons, "A Meinongean Analysis of Fictional Ob-  
jects," *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 1975, pp. 73-86,  
and "Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties: Meinong and  
Leibniz," *Nous*, 1978, pp. 137-52.
- <sup>9</sup> R. L. Purtill, "Telling the Tale," *Canadian Journal of  
Philosophy*, 1978.

<sup>10</sup> Susan Haack is another. See her Critical Notice of *The Logic of Fiction*, *The Canadian Journal of Philosophy*. 1976. pp. 303-20. Dr. Haack does not, however, indicate how the pragmatic development might proceed.

<sup>11</sup> It is interesting that Routley is so impressed by the dominant pragmatic features of fictional discourse. One may expect good work from this quarter. In fact, see Routley *op. cit.*

(Paper presented at the working group on *Reference in Fictional Texts* 1979).





ON THE EXISTENCE OF NON-EXISTING ENTITIES  
/ISSUES IN THE ONTOLOGY OF FICTION/

Thomas G. Pavel  
University of Ottawa

O. Current work in the semantics of fiction usually starts from post-Russellian ontologies in which, according to Quine's formula, "to exist is to be the value of a variable". The domain where these values are chosen is supposed to be the actual universe and its modal counterparts. In order to account for the semantics of fiction, some authors are ready to accept an extension of this domain, while others appear to think that the only real thing about fiction is fictional discourse: hence, the speech-act theory of fiction. In this paper I will criticize the attempt to ground the theory of fiction in a theory of fictional discourse and I will suggest an ontological expansion to account for fictional constructions.

1. A mime enters an empty stage. He greets an invisible person by taking off an invisible hat and putting it back on again. Offering a broad smile, he shakes an invisible hand and utters a few inaudible words. He then takes the arm of his /invisible/ partner and the two companions walk a few steps. It is by now clear that the invisible person is a woman. The mime smiles gallantly, puts his arm around her waist, carasses her hair, whispers a few words of love in her ear. His hand becomes more daring but the invisible woman soon puts things back in order. They stop and sit on a /visible/ bench. The /inaudible/ conversation becomes more and more



lively. As his partner does not appear to believe him, the mime insists, argues, swears, falls to his knees. Still timid, she rejects his advances. But soon they embrace. Black out.

There is little doubt that a competent public correctly grasps at least two kinds of facts about the mime's performance: first, that the mime is *only pretending* to meet, talk to or embrace someone, second, that the mime's activity on the stage can be described as pretending *something*. A naive or unperceptive spectator who believes that the mime *actually* speaks to and kisses shadows is certainly wrong. By the same token, a person who, while realizing that the performer is only acting, does not understand what all this coming and going on the stage means, is said to have missed the point of the performance.

Consider now two theorists who want to account for the mime's performance. One of them would argue that it is useless to look into what exactly the mime pretended to be doing. Did he meet a woman? Did he kiss her? Pointless questions, since it would be equally awkward to answer "Yes, he did" or "No, he didn't." In this theorist's views, what is essential about the mime's show would be precisely the fact that it is a piece of *acting*.

The second theorist would claim that despite the acting, in order to understand what the show is about, one has to correctly interpret each detail of it. For the second theorist, the answer to questions like "Did the mime meet a woman?" must be affirmative or negative. Indeed, would argue the second theorist, the meaning and the course of the act would change completely if at the beginning of the show the mime did not meet a woman but a mad dog.

In answering this, the first theorist may bring into the discussion conditions and rules which govern our relations with the external world and other minds. Suppose that he establishes a few rules of appropriateness, asking people to

use certain types of behaviour /e.g. talking, kissing/ only when interacting with other people, to make certain gestures only when handling the appropriate objects, etc. When checked against these rules of "appropriateness", the mime's behaviour is clearly spurious. The mime talks to and kisses non-existing entities, handles non-objects, etc. Therefore, the first theorist may argue that the mime's gestures lack the appropriateness of their counterparts in actual life. True, the moving of lips and smiling occurs in communicative situations, but the mime is not involved in such a situation. Whom does he kiss and talk to? No-one, the first theorist would answer. It is all a pretense. There is no need to worry about the woman: she is nothing but the result of "special effects" used by the mime.

But this argument need not convince the second theorist. For, it is clear that as the appearance of the woman is the result of the mime's industry, it is no less clear that *in the act*, the woman does play a role.

The first theorist may then add that he does not deny the woman's role in the act. All he is trying to show is that there are two types of acts: *actual actes* and *pretenses* and that some entities involved in pretenses do not exist, even if we can be brought to a certain kind of perceptual awareness of them. Although we may well believe that a woman is kissed by the mime, or rather we may suspend our disbelief that no woman is there to be kissed by the mime, it remains clear that there is no woman there on the stage. The first theorist would conclude by sketching a theory of the public: the audience may be said to have internalized a system of codes to be used in different situations. In order to correctly assess the mime's behaviour all the spectator has to do is to switch his system to, say, the code of "pretense" or of "artistic fiction". This triggers a modification in the spectator's perceptual framework allowing him to see what is not there, to hear what is not said, and to correctly in-

fer what is not the case from what is not genuine. Moreover, although the system has been switched to "pretense", there remain perceptual outlets which work on the "actuality" switch. Thus, the spectator knows all along that he is sitting in a theatre, that "in fact" the woman is not there, that he is more or less willingly suspending his disbelief, etc.

How many positions are on the switch-board? asks the second theorist.

At least two, answers his opponent, but not necessarily only two. Systems with more options can be thought of, with the important qualification that in each of these systems *to exist* would mean *to exist* in the basic "actual" option. In all the other options existence is a mere illusion.

Consider, however, another performance by the same mime, the second theorist would say. At some point in this performance, the mime is pretending to be a priest who blesses the audience. Is the blessing genuine? Certainly not, as both the actor and the audience correctly interpret the setting of the act. But think of a few variations on this theme. Consider, for example, the case of an unbeliever who attends a mass and sees the priest blessing the crowd. The unbeliever assumes that what he sees is either collective delusion or plain imposture. In the first alternative the priest is himself the victim of an unwarranted belief, in the second, he takes advantage of the popular faith. Suppose, moreover, that the ritual observed by the priest is assumed to compel a certain holy being to descend invisibly upon the heads of the attendants. Does this being exist? Not for the unbeliever, of course, who disdainfully scorns the popular piety. Nor does the holy being exist for a sceptic priest, who vacuously performs the sacred gestures. The crowd nonetheless, as well as a sincere minister, knows that the holy being is there. But let us consider the impostor priest. He "pretends" to invoke the holy spirit, while believing that there

is no such being. Suppose, in addition, that the ritual involves some manifestation of deeply felt belief, such as closing the eyes, trembling, sweating, etc. Suppose also that the attendants are trained to carefully scrutinize the minister in order to detect and punish superficial /and hence ineffectual/ enactments of the rite. The perjured performer of the rite has to perform it as "sincerely" as possible, while knowing perfectly well that his rapture is fake. But in order for his performance to appear genuine, he has to keep his own knowledge of the imposture as marginal as possible. In fact, he may be said to willingly suspend his disbelief in the epiphany of the holy spirit, and enter the performance of the rite with his system "switched" to some non-actual option. For more common situations similar to the invocation rite, think of the innumerable cases of false lovers who willingly and perversely suspend their disbelief in the presence of love, and simulate all the symptoms of this feeling: palor, shyness, blushes, tears, raptures, etc. Some get caught, as the simulation of love can sometimes conjure up the feeling itself. After repeatedly having lied "I love you," these lovers succumb to their own fantasy. To ask whether their love exists or not does not make sense. *They* would say yes, but they also did so when they were only lying. Soon they will forget that there was a time when they were not deeply in love, just as after their love passes, some will claim that it was never there.

The first theorist would certainly argue that love is as elusive as can be and that even if it is not impossible to grant love some sort of existence, it would be mistaken to give it the status of *entity*. Hence, the simile between the holy being and love does not work: one should not compare *entities* and *states*.

To this the second theorist can reply that in many cultures love has been thought of as an /invisible/ entity which takes possession of the body and soul. Contemporary biology

and psychology do not subscribe to a dybbuk-theory of love, but neither does modern science approve of invisible holy beings. And in any case, we are not talking about science, but about *pretense*. Now, as the previous examples suggest, pretense sometimes carries more reality than reality can itself provide. To see this better, let us examine again the mime's impersonation of a priest. Let us assume that the act takes place in a country where, against the general wishes of the people, religion has been entirely forbidden by a cruel, unscrupulous tyrant. Churches have been closed, priests imprisoned and true believers martyred. A well-orchestrated campaign against the old faith is launched; among other things, every artistic event is preceded by or includes some anti-religious act. The cultural leaders of the country force our mime to include in his repertoire a parody of priestly gestures. But suppose that, like the large majority of the inhabitants, the mime is a deeply religious man. Unable to refuse the performing of the blasphemous act, he decides to subtly transform it into an unobtrusive remembrance of the mass. Do not forget that the audience has been deprived of any sacred ceremony for a long time, so that even an imitation of the precious forbidden gestures can electrify the public. Moreover, the image of a minister has become so venerable in this society without ministers, that the spectators instinctively do not pay much attention to the parodic sequences of the anti-religious act. But then, in the midst of the performance, the mime turns towards the public and letting a saintly expression invade his face, he slowly and solemnly blesses the crowd. A stream of grace goes through the hall. No one present doubts the genuineness of the blessing. Neither do the few censors who supervise the performance; indeed, the next day the mime is arrested and executed.<sup>1</sup>

Was the blessing a true one? or was it nothing but the delusion of a deprived crowd bewitched by a poor tumbler? If the situation is seen as an emergency, then it may be judged

according to rules applicable in other similar emergencies. The Christian Church, which traditionally concedes baptism an essential role in the individual path towards salvation, and which jealously keeps for itself the privilege of distributing it, allows the layman to administer baptism in well-defined crisis situations. If new regulations concerning sacraments and blessings were ever made which would take into account the social conditions of modern tyrannies, they could carefully consider situations in which some rites acquire full force even if the usual conditions for their effectiveness are not met. Thus, not only could a layman validly baptize a still-born, in the absence of an ordained minister, but he would be equally enabled to felicitously pronounce a couple husband and wife in cases when, say, the two must depart for concentration camps.

2. The preceding examples all involve cases where the existence of some entity of state is not well established. The entities or states in question appear to exist according to some criteria, while they do not exist according to other criteria. Thus, it is not easy to decide whether the invisible woman in the mime's act exists or not, whether a holy being descends or not upon a crowd of believers, whether or not someone really is in love with someone else. Some of the examples equally involve situations where the opposition between genuine acts and competences and faked ones starts to blur. On the one hand, the blessing of the crowd by an impostor priest is not a genuine blessing.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, a juggler can sometimes acquire the competence of a priest. There appear thus to be situations in which the pretense of an action becomes the very action. Wouldn't the second theorist be justified in surmising that supposedly nonexistent beings, states or properties do possess after all some kind of existence? Shouldn't one refrain from too drastic a use of Occam's famous razor in situations where beards



should grow? Wouldn't a bit of trimming largely suffice in such situations?

But notice first that the mime's act is not a *text* made up of words and sentences.<sup>3</sup> The choice of this type of example is deliberate. It is only natural when examining a fictional text to be led to believe that what makes it *fiction* lies somewhere in its linguistic wrapping. Our first theorist, who supports the speech-act theory of fiction, would claim that fictional discourse embodies a special type of speech-act, characterized notably by the /deliberate/ failure to follow the rules of assertion. Thus, fictional discourse would transgress the following usual regulations for assertions. Notably the speaker must believe that his utterance is true /the rule of sincerity/. Some theoreticians add that the speaker must be prepared to defend the truth of his utterance /the rule of argumentation/; the speaker must be prepared to accept the consequences of his utterance /the rule of consequences/.<sup>4</sup> Since, in a sense, it may appear that a story-teller and more generally the originator of a fictional discourse does not believe in the truth of his utterance, nor is he prepared to defend it or to accept its consequences, the speech-act theorist may well claim that for fictional discourse the above rules are out of place.

But is this claim defensible? The second theorist, with whom we will side from now on, may find at least three ways of attacking it: by arguing that the above rules cover only a minor part of assertive utterances, by casting doubts on the notion of speaker or originator in the case of fictional discourse, finally by showing that linguistic meaning is only a subclass of a much wider category.

To begin with, the above rules for assertion cover only a small section of actual assertive utterances. They describe the behaviour of an ideal speaker whose capabilities far exceed those of human being. Thus, in order to follow the rule of sincerity a speaker has to be transparent to himself

with respect to his beliefs. But since his linguistic competence enables a speaker to utter an astronomically large number of/new/ assertions, in order to follow the rule of sincerity the speaker must possess at least two things: a set B of propositions he believes in and a machinery able to quickly pick up for each assertive utterance of the speaker the corresponding proposition belonging to the set B of sentences the speaker believes to be true. When the speaker utters a sentence, this machine is automatically triggered: if the result of its scanning the set B ends successfully, the speaker may be said to have been sincere, while if the machine fails to find the corresponding sentence in B, the speaker has been insincere.

However, when confronted with real speakers, this model of sincerity involves serious problems. First, it is highly improbable that real speakers possess anything like a set B of propositions that they believe to be true. The picture we get from actual situations appears rather to suggest that we more or less believe a limited number of propositions, while for a large number of propositions we simply do not know /in any serious sense of the word/, whether we believe them to be true or not. In many cases people assert sentences they think they believe, when in fact they adhere to these sentences for other reasons than belief. For instance, they may only strongly admire the person whom they heard assert these sentences. A speaker A, for example, will utter with conviction sentences like:

*/1/ In our riding X is the best candidate.*

in situations where A does not know anything about X, but has a friend B who asserted /1/ several times in the most convincing tone of voice. Equally often, speaker A may utter sentences like:

*/2/ The best vacation spot in Germany is  
Baden-Baden.*

*/3/ Under Mao Tze Tung the Chinese people lived*

*a free and happy life.*

despite the fact that he has never visited Germany and knows nothing about contemporary China. Again, these are his friend B's professed opinions and he feels that he has the right /and the duty/ to use them as his own. When uttering /1/ to /3/, is speaker A sincere? That is, does he believe in what he is saying? But what exactly do we mean by "A believes that utterance *a* is true?" Do we refer to rational belief? To irrational belief? Do we ask the speaker to believe deeply in the truth of *a*, or are we prepared to allow for a perfunctory assent of the speaker to his own sayings? Is the belief supposed to last for a long time, or are we satisfied with a belief equal in duration to the utterance believed to be true? And if the last alternative is chosen, should the belief be simultaneous with the utterance, or may it precede and/or follow the assertion?

These are not spurious questions. Witness the difficulty, in which we so often find ourselves, of discerning whether or not we in fact believe in the truth of some of our incautious statements. Does speaker A believe sentence /3/ to be true? If his life depended on his rejecting /3/, would he hesitate a single moment to /sincerely/ retract it? Are we not justified in claiming that, rather than believing that /3/ is true, A prefers to play with the idea that he believes /3/ to be true? Or take the case of a domestic quarrel, during which one of the partners asserts that the other is the basest human being ever to have lived on earth. Does the utterer believe this to be true? Probably yes, at least at the time of the argument. Or perhaps he believed it a few moments before saying it, but when the words were on the tip of his tongue, he suddenly realized that the statement sounded greatly exaggerated, without, however, his being able to stop the already triggered utterance. Or it could be that the speaker did not fully believe the words until later in the verbal exchange when he saw how right he had been. And so on.

Thus far we have examined only examples of evaluative assertions. When factual assertions are considered, the sincerity requirement appears even more out of place. Suppose that speaker A says:

/4/ *President Kennedy's murder was by  
Castro's orders.*

/5/ *The chemical composition of water is H<sub>2</sub>O.*

/4/ is a controversial statement which A has probably read in some newspaper or heard in a conversation with, say, his vocal friend B. The sincerity of A in uttering /4/ depends less on his own genuine belief that /4/ is the case than on his tuning in to the circulation of statements around him. Confronted with the pressing question "Do you really believe this?", A may well answer "I don't know. Many people say that" or "It's in the papers" or "They said so on T.V."

Such *sincerity by participation in a group* is even clearer in the case of the uncontroversial statement /5/. As has been pointed out by Putnam, a given community collectively masters its own language and its relation with reality. It may well be that as an individual a member of the community is not well acquainted with the full meaning of terms like *elm*, *gnosis*, or *werewolf*. One can employ such terms, however, by virtue of the social division of linguistic labour. An ignoramus may refer to *elm*, *gnosis* or *were-wolves* on the assumption that in the community there are specialists in elms, gnosis and werewolves who could provide all the information necessary should the need arise for a closer scrutinizing of the statements about elms, gnosis or werewolves. Similarly, speaker A can utter /5/ as carelessly as he wishes, without ever bothering to check whether he believes it to be true or not, since in uttering /5/, he can count on the testimony of innumerable chemists who know /5/ to be true. And more important, perhaps, he can rest on the firm support of an entire educational and academic apparatus strongly sanctioned by his society. To assert that the chem-

ical composition of water is H<sub>2</sub>O has less need of sincere belief in the truth of the statement than epistemological adherence to a given society.

What has been said about sincerity applies all the more to the rules of argumentation and consequence. As the image of a speaker capable of finding out whether or not he believes what he says appears to be rather unrealistic, how can one ask such unreliable speakers to defend the truth of their utterances or to accept their consequences? Speakers who are *sincere by participation* should not be expected to defend the truth of their utterances other than by reference to the community /"I don't know; my friends told me that," "It's in the newspapers," etc./, nor to readily accept the consequences of what they say /"How should I have known that saying 'X is a good leader' entails endorsing concentration camps?"/. Accordingly we have to reject the claim that fictional discourse differs from assertive discourse by the suspension in the former of rules of assertion in force in the latter. It appears, indeed, that in many cases the rules of assertion are far from being in force in assertive discourse itself. The application of these rules can be construed either as a normative idealization /corresponding probably to a more or less circumscribed attitude towards the ethics of language/, or as applying only to a few marginal cases, such as the assertions of people such as geniuses or saints who control exceptionally well the beliefs they share.

The above considerations suggest that qualities such as sincerity, ability to argue about assertions, and readiness to accept their consequences are far from being *individually* possessed by speakers. In many cases the individual speakers behave as if their personal linguistic duties had somehow *waivered*. They need not scrupulously perform these duties, since at every failure to do so the community is there to cover for them. But if this is so, the very notion of the speaker as the originator and master of his own utterances

becomes suspect. When our speaker A irresponsibly carries over the assertions of his friend B, may he be said to be *the speaker*? Or, if we still want to qualify him as a speaker, should we not defuse some of the connotations of the term?

The contemporary notion of an ideal speaker in total command of his linguistic competence, knowing the syntax, the meaning of words, the speech-act rules, controlling his beliefs and his expectations, seems to be a modern offshoot of the cartesian subject, that motionless master of an inner space entirely under his own control. But when seen as a member of a social group that largely covers for his utterances, the individual speaker appears to be much less distinctively in charge of his discourse than the cartesian tradition maintains.

In any case, there are few areas where the cartesian notion of subject-speaker is more out of place than in relation to literary fiction. For, indeed, who is the speaker uttering a folk-tale? The raconteur narrating a token of the tale? But is the raconteur more than an occasional speaker who happens to utter the tale on this particular time? Aren't his chances of success increased as he smoothly enters the more formalized role of a tale-teller, as he so to speak lets the tale speak itself through his mouth? While dealing with speech-acts we are tempted to neglect the persistent testimony of story-tellers, bards, poets and writers, who so often mention a *vicarious speech experience* as one of the central aspects of poetic acts. The muse may have become a worn-out symbol, more often ridiculed than actually used. Reference to the muse is, nonetheless, far from spurious. Like the prophet's reference to his god, the poet's reliance on the muse, on inspiration, on the dictation of the sub-conscious, etc., is precisely a way of mentioning this particular type of speech experience, in which the speaker is "spoken through," as it were, by a voice which is not exactly his

own. Who is the originator of the literary utterance? Does it make sense at all to look for a "speaker"?

3. The absence of an individuated speaker does not mean that no speech-act can ever be performed. Take promises, for instance. There can be anonymous promises, or unclear promises, or promises implicit in the behaviour of a group of persons. Thus, the group of young ladies met by the narrator of "Remembrance of things past" on the Balbec beach did not perform an explicit speech-act when promising Marcel happiness. This was an implicit promise, deducible from the care-free appearance of the band, from their youth, from myriad details out of which the narrator gathers the resulting message: promise of happiness. The same thing can be said about warnings, denouncing, even assertion. For every speech-act with a well individuated originator, it is possible to find its "vague" equivalent, consisting of fuzzy communication conveyed by imperfect means, sometimes without any use of natural language, often without a clear originator. Let us call these "vague" equivalents of speech-acts *messages*. In the acceptation used here, natural events can carry messages as well. Dark clouds may be interpreted as a warning, a fresh morning as an exhortation, etc. That these are only anthropocentric interpretations of events which lack meaning is not important here. The fact is that the human species sees messages in many natural events and that linguistic and paralinguistic behaviour is only a narrow, specialized type of message-carrying activity. Speech-acts are only the tip of a huge non-linguistic iceberg: linguistic promises, warnings, assertions, etc. are but a subset of the mass of messages that surround us.

Now, if instead of speech-acts, we direct our attention towards messages, we can see that fictional discourse includes a large number of the latter. More generally all types of fiction, literary or non-literary, are replete with mes-

sages.

An interesting aspect of seeing speech-acts as a subset of the more general class of messages is that in this way we can dispense with the so-called *principle of expressibility*. While it may be strategically important for the theoretician of linguistic acts to postulate that any content is linguistically expressible, once the notion of message has been extended to include non-linguistic signs and signals, the principle of linguistic expressibility is no longer needed. Indeed, why should we assume that the class of messages is expressible in one of its sub-classes, namely the set of linguistic messages? Think of physiognomic expressions. Are all of them translatable in linguistic terms? The mixed feelings which can be instantly grasped on a face like Chaplin's in the last frames of *City Lights* are not necessarily expressible in our everyday language. The same point can be made about musical moods. Are the moods of any Beethoven piano sonatas or Mahler's symphonies translatable into words? Nonetheless, each section of these sonatas or symphonies can be said to convey a certain message. But aren't's music lovers correct in reacting impatiently when pedestrian critics translate these messages into trivial statements about, say, suffering, hope, heroism, and so on? Such statements essentially miss the linguistic inexpressibility of musical messages.

To recapitulate, we have seen that genuine speech-acts are only a minority of linguistic utterances, that consequently the notion of speaker or originator implied by speech-act theory should not be accepted as such, and that linguistic meaning is only a sub-class of a much wider category, which we called *messages*. All this points towards a rejection of the so-called 'speech-act' theory of fictional discourse. But this means that in order to understand how fiction /and perhaps literature/ works, one should not shun models involving nonexistent entities, states or properties.



4. Let us turn back again to our mime. How does he manage to attract our attention? How does he lead us to interpret his gestures correctly and to posit next to him the imaginary presence of a woman?

The public's attention is directed towards the mime by a score of conventional elements. An artistic production is a special happening carefully isolated from other activities, usually taking place in a hall reserved for artistic events, on a stage situated in such a way as to constitute the focal point of the hall. The beginning of the show is marked by a gong, by music, by the dimming of lights, by the raising of the curtain, etc. But more fundamental than these conventional ways of channeling attention is the /trivial/ fact that events which potentially carry messages recommend themselves to the attention in a natural fashion. One stops to see a car accident, one turns his head to better see two people arguing in the street, or an interesting physiognomy, or an elegant dress. Much of our daily activity /trivially/ consists of message detecting and decoding.

Now, a general characteristic of messages is their *in-completeness*. It suffices to notice a slowdown of highway traffic and the distant flashing of police car lights in order to understand the message: "car accident." A spark of hostility in a colleague's eye is enough to warn us that he /she doesn't agree with our ideas. The expression on the face of a passing woman may be all we need in order to feel that she is the only human being capable of loving us /Baudelaire, *A une passante*/. In no situation are we offered complete information on the state of affairs taking place. All we have access to are a few factual clues, from which we are programmed to infer a general message. The programming may be biological or cultural. In deriving configurations and messages from clues we have a bias towards an anthropological or at least animistic interpretation. Cultural specifications may be added at will, as well as individual idiosyncrasies.

Accordingly, a basic fact of our understanding of the environment in which we live, is that an individual belonging to the human species, born and raised in a given culture, must be capable of integrating the incomplete perceptual clues with which he is constantly faced into coherent pictures of states of affairs. In order to represent this capability, a theoretical model is needed, a model which shows how the individual constructs configurations out of facts. Whatever form the model takes, it will include some ability of hypothetically *positing worlds* in which the factual clues are included. Constructing worlds obeys different sets of rules which are both biologically and culturally determined. But basically all world positing involves *the positing of individuals whose presence may be only an indirect result of the processing of factual clues*. In other words, a model of our understanding of the environment must contain some device for positing individuals whose actual existence is unwarranted. The same reasoning applies to states, properties, acts, and so on. Not unlike the familiar Popperian scheme, tested /as opposed to unwarranted/ existence is obtained by checking the posited individuals, states, properties, etc. against some accepted battery of criteria, such as authority, personal experience or intersubjective observation.

Notice that the process described above is independent of the philosophical dispute between realism and antirealism. An Anti-realist can take the positing-checking scheme as involving unwarranted versus warranted assertibility /Dewey/, while a realist may see the scheme relating hypotheses and their partial confirmation, as a way of indefinitely approaching an *actual* world.

Now, if clue-processing and positing unwarranted worlds, individuals, states, and properties is a fundamental way of taking our environment into account, to posit the existence of an invisible woman next to our mime has nothing

special about it. Her Meinongian existence simply fails to result in actual existence after further checking is completed. But such was already the case with all Greek gods, with phlogiston and with ether.

5. From what has been said, it appears that in order to function epistemologically, human beings and presumably human communities as well, have to develop at least two abilities. On the one hand they should be capable of positing various worlds, individuals, states, etc. On the other, they should develop techniques for controlling these worlds and checking them in actuality. In order for the barber who handles Occam's razor to be able to make a living there must be a great deal of beard-growing. Or, to put it otherwise, actual ontology is but a particular case of Meinongian und ultra-Meinongian ontologies.<sup>5</sup>

However, if there is *nothing special* about the mime's girl friend, how can the difference between fiction and non-fiction be captured? We saw that this difference is not be found at the level of discourse. In what follows we will examine the possibility of explaining the difference between fiction and non-fiction and non-fiction at the level of ontologies. We will contrast mono-level and multi-level ontologies, plain and special ontologies, and ludic and non-ludic uses of ontologies.

Consider the following model. An ontology  $O$  is defined as an ordered pair  $/K, F/$  made up of a cosmos  $K$  and an ontic foundation  $F$ . The definition of the cosmos closely follows that of model structures. A cosmos  $K$  is an ordered triple containing a non-null set  $C$  of worlds, a world  $W$  belonging to  $C$  and given as the actual world and a binary relation  $A$  on  $C$ , the relation of accessibility. A world  $I$  belonging to  $C$  is defined as a pair  $/D_I, T_I/$ , constituted of a domain  $D_I$  of entities which exist in  $I$  and of a set  $T_I$  of sentences true in the world  $I$ . Depending on the constraints on  $D_I$  and

$T_I$ , we can include in the description of the world  $I$  such elements as properties, stages, events, acts, sensations, perceptions, values, etc. The ontic foundation  $F$  of an ontology  $O$  contains a set  $N$  of elements and a set  $M$  of functions, the ontic functions, which take as their domain members or ordered  $n$ -tuples of members of  $UD_I$  where  $I \in C$ , and as their values members or ordered  $n$ -tuples of members of  $N$ . According to this definition, it is possible to match a given ontic foundation with more than one cosmos and vice-versa. It is possible as well that a cosmos  $K$  belonging to a given ontology  $O_1$  serves as the ontic foundation of another ontology  $O_2$ , in the sense that the set  $UD_1$  of entities to be found in the worlds of the cosmos  $K$ , or some subset of  $UD_I$ , serves as the set  $N$  of elements of the ontic foundation of the second ontology  $O_2$ .

An example will show what is meant by this construction. Let us consider a fragment of a cosmos  $K_p$  belonging to the ontology  $O_p$  made up of two worlds  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ .  $W_1$  is the actual world of this cosmos. We concentrate upon a sub-domain of  $W_1$ , consisting of three individuals  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$  as well as upon some of the true sentences about these individuals. Assume that among these sentences one can find statements which characterize  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $c$  human beings, assign them proper names, a gender, a national and social status, etc. Suppose moreover that  $b$  and  $c$  are respectively the mother and father of  $a$  in  $W_1$  as well as in all worlds of the cosmos  $K_p$ . In most of these worlds and particularly in  $W_1$  and  $W_2$ ,  $a$  is a religious prophet who preaches the near coming of the end. The difference between  $W_1$  and  $W_2$  consists in that while in  $W_1$ , the actual world of  $K_p$ ,  $a$  becomes a martyr, in  $W_2$  he dies of sickness shortly after being tried and acquitted. Suppose now that these elements of  $K_p$  serve as the ontic foundation of a second ontology  $O_2 = /K_s, F_s/$ . The ontic foundation  $F_s$  is made up of a set of elements, among which  $a$ ,  $b$  and  $c$  are included, and of a set of relations. One of

these is the identification relation which associates some or all entities belonging to the new cosmos  $K_s$  with one and only one element of the set  $F_s$ . Let us suppose that among the entities of  $K_s$ , there are the elements  $g, d, e, f$ . Among the true sentences in the world  $W_s$  which is actual in  $K_s$ , there are sentences asserting that  $g$  is God,  $d$  is his son,  $e$  is the mother of  $d$  and  $f$  is the husband of  $e$  and protector of  $d$ . The identification relation contains the pairs  $/a,d/$ ,  $/b,e/$ ,  $/c,f/$ . This amounts to saying that he who in  $K_p$  is a religious prophet, in  $K_s$  is the son of God, his mother, in  $K_p$  is his mother in  $K_s$  as well, while his father in  $K_p$  becomes in  $K_s$  his protector. The ontic foundation should also contain a relation of correspondence, which matches relations in  $K_p$ . For instance, to the relation *father of*  $/c,a/$  in  $W_1 \in K_p$ , the correspondence relation associates *father of*  $/g,d/$  in  $W_s \in K_s$ .

It should be clear that this two-level ontological construction is designed to represent the contrast most societies make between the sacred and the profane. Indeed, according to the classical analyses of Mircea Eliade, the religious mind divides the universe into two regions qualitatively different. Space, time, and more generally the whole ontology divides along the sacred-profane distinction. The religious mind needs two different frames of reference, independent of one another, yet intimately interconnected. The Kwakiutl neophyte who shouts "I am in the Center of the World!" while being in the cult house next to the sacred pole, does not deny the *profane* reality of the pole; he only asserts the establishing of a sacred ontology, in which the pole becomes the Center of the World. Similarly, the Christian who asserts the divine nature of the Christ is using a sacred ontology having as its ontic foundation the profane ontology containing Jesus as a human being.

Multi-level ontologies are not in principle restricted to the sacred/profane opposition, nor to having at most two levels. Philosophers of science who oppose reductionism and believe in such notions as level-independence and emergence /Bunge, Polanyi/, may need a larger number of ontological levels. The point I wish to make here is that, besides their use by the religious mind, two-level ontologies typically serve artistic fiction. The mime's body and movements as they exist in the actual world serve as part of the ontic foundation in a second ontology in which he is the timid lover courting the /invisible in the first ontology/ woman. If so, we are prepared to understand why it is false to claim that "in *Little Red Riding Hood* both ... 'red' means red and yet ... the rules correlating 'red' with red are not in force" /Searle/. What happens in fact is that the rules correlating "red"-in-the-second-ontology with red-in-the-first-ontology are a bit more complex than the rules relating "red" with red in the first ontology. Indeed, as the first ontology serves as the ontic foundation of the fictional ontology, "red"-in- $O_2$  is matched with red-in- $O_1$  via the ontic relations. It is clear, however, from the way we define these relations, that nothing forces us to relate "red"-in- $O_2$  to red-in- $O_1$ . The writer of fiction can always fabricate a story about a land where red was in fact green. But he will choose to do so only rarely, probably because in order to be manageable, secondary ontologies have to respect as much as possible the inner structure of the primary ontologies they use as their ontic foundation.

A further distinction of some interest for our topic is that between plain and special ontologies. This distinction is meant to account for the contrast between plain existence and special kinds of existence. Again, this contrast is best seen in the ontology of the sacred, where the absolute reality of the sacred is crucially opposed to the plain existence of the profane. Sacred beings not only obey other

laws than sublunar creatures, but their way of being is *fundamentally different* [according to R. Otto's formula]. Christian theology, which reflected at length on this aspect of sacred ontology, arrived at the theory of the *analogy of being*, according to which most or all predications, especially those involving the verbs *to be* or *to exist*, are only analogically asserted of God and of his creatures. God's existence and being belong to a special ontology. Fictional constructions may be said to involve special ontologies as well, ontologies in which *being* and *existence* are only analogically similar to the same notions in plain ontologies. Without entering into the details of this hypothesis, it may well be that the main difference between plain and special ontologies lie in the status of existence; while in plain ontologies the Russellian explanation of the notion of existence in terms of variables and their values is in force, in special ontologies existence could still be a predicate, probably a predicate the content of which greatly varies from one special ontology to another.

Finally, if both sacred and fictional beings belong to special ontologies, what distinguishes them? For despite the frequent identification of myth with fiction, it must be pointed out that *for their users*, nothing could be farther apart than myth which have "absolute authority" [Eliade], and mere fictions. Like any other element of the accepted ontology, myths can be employed in fiction for as long as the public believes in them. When they are no longer in force, myths globally *become* fiction, or rather they start to be used as fiction. What seems to distinguish myth from its fictional uses is the *ludic* character of fiction. Theoreticians of ludic activities agree to a few common characteristics to be found in most of these: the *free* character of games, their *separation* from the rest of time and space, the *uncertainty* of their outcome, their *unproductivity*, their being governed by *rules*, their *fictional* character.<sup>6</sup> Clearly, as opposed to

belief in the myths of the community, which is in most cases compulsory, assent to fiction is *free* and clearly *circumscribed* in time and space. Myths are all supposedly fixed in advance and true forever, while new fictional constructions are always possible. Fiction is moreover governed by rules and conventions, and is /trivially/ fictional. The implications of the ludic use on the structure of fictional ontologies remains to be explored.

To conclude, we have seen that speech-act oriented theories of fictional discourse are inadequate. Fictional discourse should be seen as part of a more general class, that of fictional constructions. In order to understand fiction, one needs a strong ontological apparatus. Based on *multi-level ontologies*, fiction involves *special ontologies* and it differs from sacred ontologies in that its main use is ludic. Complex as they may seem, These ontologies could provide a non-reductionist and flexible basis for the semantics of fictional constructions.

#### Notes

- 1 One presumably has recognized in this apologue an updated version of Rotrou's tragedy *Saint-Genest, comédien et martyr*.
- 2 Incidentally, medieval philosophers were disturbed by the possible conflict between the social aspect of a rite and its secret effectiveness. According to Saint Bonaventure, a priest who celebrates the mass while in a state of sin does not have the power to perform the transsubstantiation. This entails the frightful consequence that a layman who



attends the mass officiated by the bad priest is in fact deprived of the benefit of it. If this answer appears to be a bit severe, let us think of a dying man who confesses his sins to and receives the last sacraments from an unordained impostor. Will the dying man be saved or damned? If the answer is "saved," why is it then necessary to maintain the conditions on genuineness and appropriateness of rites? (But then, what would the rites be, if genuineness and appropriateness are taken away from them?) If the answer is "damned," think that the impostor could later repent, confess to a genuine priest and thus be saved, and what, then, becomes of divine-justice?

- <sup>3</sup> In any case, not if by text we mean "a coherent sequence of sentences." As the term text sells quite well nowadays, it is not unlikely that someone has either already spoken or will speak of the 'text of pantomime', just as so many writers refer to the 'text of a dance', the 'text of a society' or even to the 'text of a city'. But these are, of course, metaphorical uses of the term.
- <sup>4</sup> These rules are argued for in G. Gabriel, "Fiction-- a semantic approach" in *Poetics* 8(1979), p. 249. J. Searle, in "The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse," *New Literary History* 7 (1975), pp. 319-32, uses only the sincerity rule.
- <sup>5</sup> By ultra-Meinongian ontology is understood an ontology containing beings about which it is impossible to speak adequately.
- <sup>6</sup> R. Caillois, *Les jeux et les hommes*, Paris: Gallimard, 1967, pp. 42-43.  
(Paper presented at the working group on *Reference in Fictional Texts* 1979)

SOME THOUGHTS ON FICTITIOUS ENTITIES\*

Jerzy Pelc  
Warsaw University

1 FICTIONALITY AND LITERARINESS

1.1 Circulus vitiosus in definiendo

Literature is often characterized in terms of fictionality:

- (i) those texts are defined as belonging to literature which refer to fictitious worlds.

On the other hand, fictionality is often characterized by its occurrence in literature:

- (ii) those texts are defined as referring to a fictitious world which belong to literature.

To claim both at the same time leads to a vicious circle. Instead, one should choose either the former or the former or the latter definition.

1.2 Definitional equivalences

The following definitions state both the necessary and the sufficient condition for literariness (Df.1) or fictionality (Df. 2):

Df.1.  $x$  belongs to literature =  $Df^x$  refers to a fictitious world;

Df.2.  $x$  refers to a fictitious world =  $Df^x$  belongs to literature.

1.3 Partial definitions

Suppose, however, that somebody understands (i) and (ii) in a weaker way:

Df.3. If  $x$  refers to a fictitious world  $x$  belongs to literature;

Df.4. If  $x$  belongs to literature,  $x$  refers to a fictitious world.

As far as Df.1. and Df.2. are concerned, one should know what it is to say about  $x$  that  $x$  refers to a fictitious world. And in the case of Df.2. and Df.4. - what it is to say about  $x$  that  $x$  belongs to literature. If he does not know the answers the definitions fall into the category of *ignotum per ignotum* for him.

#### 1.4 Kinds of reference in literary texts

I am not going to accept any of the definitions given above, although I acknowledge that each of them contains a *particularm veri*. Certainly, expressions referring to fictitious entities do occur in literature and, certainly, the mode of their reference, in particular the fictitious one, does depend on their context of use. But it is far from clear what relation holds between literariness and fictionality; and one reason for this is that both the concept of literature and the concept of fictionality need to be made more precise. To analyse the former is the business of the theorist of literature. I shall limit myself to a few remarks on the latter.

## 2 ON WHAT THERE ISN'T

### 2.1 The term 'fictitious' with reference to extralinguistic entities and to expressions

The main difference between the meanings of the term 'fictitious' is connected with the fact that the adjective in question is sometimes applied to a linguistic entity

and on other occasions to non-linguistic ones. Thus we have fictional terms, sentences or texts, and, on the other hand, fictitious objects, events or phenomena.

## 2.2 Non-existent entities

### 2.2.1. Subsistence and intentionality

When is a non-linguistic entity said to be fictitious? The answer found most often is: whenever the entity does not really exist, but, nevertheless, is being thought of, it constitutes an intentional object of somebody's desire, belief, dream, idea, etc. Some philosophers say that fictitious objects do not exist but subsist only, and that existence and subsistence are two kinds of being.

### 2.2.2. The kinds of non-existence

On closer analysis, it appears that among those non-existent entities some distinctions can be made.

#### 2.2.2.1. Absolute and relative non-existence

An entity does not exist, in the absolute way, iff it has never existed and will never exist, e.g., Apollo. An entity does not exist at time  $t$ , in the relative way, iff it does not actually exist but, e.g., Napoleon Bonaparte, it either existed, or, e.g., a next-week issue of a daily newspaper, will exist.

#### 2.2.2.2. Non-existent objects and non-existent events

Individual non-existent objects and/or persons, e.g., a magic carpet, a carnivorous cow, can be distinguished from non-existent events and/or phenomena, e.g., and earthquake in Warsaw in May, 1979, or the marriage of Hamlet and Lady Macbeth.

Notice, however, that when somebody contests the right of the latter to exist he does it sometimes for a different reason than in the case of objects. Namely he assumes that *to exist* means *to be an individual object, cognizable through senses*. If, in such a case, events, as different from concrete individual things, are said to be fictitious, fictitiousness is not opposed to being real or being factual but rather to being a physical object.

### 2.2.3. On a classification of non-existent entities

The two divisions presented in (2.2.2.1) intersect to form the following classification of the entities which happen to be called, by different authors, fictitious in various senses of the term:

ENTITIES KIND OF NON-EXISTENCE	INDIVIDUAL OBJECTS AND/OR PERSONS	EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA
ABSOLUTE NON-EXISTENCE	1 /see Table 1/	3 /see Tables 3 a-c/
RELATIVE NON-EXISTENCE	2 /see Table 2/	4 /see Tables 4 a-b/

Table 0: Non-existent entities

2.2.4. Non-existent objects

2.2.4.1. Absolutely non-existent objects

P O S S I B L E	/1/ LOGICALLY	Sherlock Holmes
	/2/ PHYSICALLY	The present king of France
	/3/ PRACTICALLY	-
I M P O S S I B L E	/1/ LOGICALLY	An apple totally red and at the same time totally green. The king of a republic.
	/2/ PHYSICALLY	A carnivorous cow. Apollo. An apple of 100 pounds of weight
	/3/ PRACTICALLY	The present king of France. A tarpaulin for the Sun.

Table 1: Absolutely non-existent individual objects and/or persons

*Logically possible*, above, means *consistent, non-contradictory*; *physically possible* means *in agreement with natural laws*; *practically possible* means *one that can be made*. All those terms, however, should be taken *cum grano salis*, i.e., we should remember that they, all of them, refer to absolutely non-existent objects. It follows that the physical possibility of a given object does not involve the possibility of its coming to existence in the future. If we say that something, e.g. a certain object, is physically possible in this strange sense we mean that it is in agreement with such natural laws as, for instance, the law of gravitation, in spite of the fact that the object under discussion does not exist. Only on this assumption can we say here that practical possibility implies physical pos-

sibility, and the latter in turn, implies logical possibility.

Let me make a comment on some of the examples.

The space for practical possibility has been left blank and empty, because, if something is practically possible, in the sense adopted here, it may occur in the future, and, therefore, belongs to relatively non-existent objects.

Is the present king of France a physically possible non-existent object, or rather a logically impossible one? This depends upon the meaning we assign to the proper name *France*. If we understand by it the French territory and nation, then it is physically possible for France to become a kingdom and for somebody to become its king; if, however, *France* is construed as *the French republic*, then the present king of France would be included in the category of logically impossible non-existent entities. Analogous arguments might be applied to the examples of physical impossibility.

I fully realize that the examples shown in Table 1 may appear controversial. More important, however, than this or that way of assigning examples to the categories distinguished in the above table are the categories themselves that we have obtained as the result of our classification. Their occurrence points to the fact that many various kinds of thing are included in the class of absolutely non-existent individual objects and, consequently, that different kinds of things and persons are sometimes called fictitious.

#### 2.2.4.2. Relatively non-existent objects

Section 2 of Table 0 above consists of two categories: the category of past individuals and the category of future individuals, as represented in Table 2.

PAST	Aristotle
FUTURE	The cathedral at Chartres in 1990

Table 2: Relatively non-existent individual objects and/or persons

2.2.5. Non-existent events

2.2.5.1. Absolutely non-existent events

Section 3 of Table 0, encompassing absolutely non-existent events and/or phenomena will be represented in Table 3 a-c

ABSOLUTELY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA					
POSSIBLE			IMPOSSIBLE		
LOGICALLY	PHYSICALLY	PRACT.	LOGICALLY	PHYSICALLY	PRACTICALLY
The appointment of Warsaw in 1978 as the seat of the central East-European Left-Luggage Office	The eruption of Vesuvius in May, 1979	-	The state of affairs consisting in Capri's being both higher and lower than Anacapri	The eruption of Aventine Hill	The covering of the Sun with a tarpaulin

Table 3a: Absolutely non-existent events and/or phenomena in which existent individual things and/or persons occur



EVENT OB- JECT		ABSOLUTELY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA						
		POSSIBLE			IMPOSSIBLE			
		LOGIC.	PHYSIC.	PRAC.	LOGICALLY	PHYSICALLY	PRACTICALLY	
A B S O L U T E L Y  N O N E X I S T E N T  I N D I V I D U A L  O B J E C T S	P O S S I B L E	L O G I C .	To shave the present king of France = /A/	To shave Sherlock Holmes = /B/	-	To kill Sherlock Holmes twice = /E/	The meeting of Hamlet with Sherlock Holmes = /F/	The meeting of Sherlock Holmes with Galdstone = /G/
		P H Y S I C .	/A/	/A/	-	/E/	/F/	/G/
		P R A C .	-	-	-	-	-	-
	I M P O S S I B L E	L O G I C .	To shave the king of a republic = /C/	To peel an apple totally red and totally green = /H/	-	That a king of a republic utters a sentence in two different lang. at t. /K/	To dissolve a totally red and totally green apple in water = /N/	To feed one. million persons with a small totally red and totally green apple = /R/
		P H Y S I C .	To shave Apollo = /D/	To milk a carnivorous cow = /I/	-	To milk a carnivorous cow and to leave it totally un milked at the same time = /L/	To keep a carnivorous cow under water = /O/	That Apollo speaks American English = /S/
		P R A C T I C .		To wash a tarpaulin For the Sun = /J/		To kill the present king of France twice = /M/	To dissolve the present king of France in water = /P/	That the present king of France delivers his speech from the throne in American English = /T/

Table 3b: Absolutely non-existent events and/or phenomena in which absolutely non-existent objects and/or persons occur

EVENTS		ABSOLUTELY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA					
		POSSIBLE			IMPOSSIBLE		
OBJECTS		LOGIC.	PHYSIC.	PRAC.	LOGICALLY	PHYSICALLY	PRACTICALLY
		RELATIVELY NON-EXISTENT FUTURE OBJECTS		That there will be only one planet revolving round the Sun tomorrow	That Michelin will publish a guidebook to the Moon in August 1979		To become a son of one's own daughter to be born in a year
	That Aristotle shaved himself with an electric shaver		That Aristotle is an author of a guidebook to Athens		That Aristotle is an author <i>unius libelli</i> and at the same time of all his philosophical writings	That Aristotle spoke American English	That Aristotle discussed philosophical problems with the Emperor of China of his time

Table 3c: Absolutely non-existent events and/or phenomena in which relatively non-existent objects and/or persons occur

2.2.5.2. Relatively non-existent events

Section 4 of Table 0 includes relatively non-existent events and/or phenomena. These can be divided according to what kinds of objects occur in them: existent /4a/ or relatively non-existent /4b/.

EVENTS OBJECTS	RELATIVELY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOMENA	
	PAST	FUTURE
EXISTENT INDIVIDU- AL OB- JECTS	The eruption of Vesuvius which destroyed Pompei	To morrow's sunrise

Table 4a: Relatively non-existent events and/or phenomena  
in which existent individual objects and/or  
persons occur

EVENTS OBJECTS	RELATIVELEY NON-EXISTENT EVENTS AND/OR PHENOM- ENA	
	PAST	FUTURE
R E A T I V E L Y	F U T U R E	To-morrow's sunrise
N O N E X I S T E N T	P A S T	The birth of Aristotle

Table 4b: Relatively non-existent events and/or phenomena  
in which relatively non-existent objects and/or  
persons occur

Please pay no attention to the examples in the tables  
above. I know that the examples are silly. And I do not  
insist on those particular that have been given. What is  
important is the general idea reflected in the tables. The  
idea is certainly controversial, and I am fully aware of

the fact. Can, for instance, an event be possible in spite of the fact that some impossible objects contribute to its occurrence? But, on the other hand, is it really impossible, in a kind of a so-called literary world, to peel a self-contradictory apple?

### 2.3 Fictitious entities

As we have seen, both absolutely and relatively non-existent *possibilia* and *impossibilia*, and, among them, both objects and events, are on various occasions considered fictitious.

#### 2.3.1. The meanings of 'fictitious' used with reference to entities

Fictitiousness is predicated of the various entities for a number of different reasons, which is tantamount to saying that there are many opposites to the adjective *fictitious* when it qualifies some entity. The opposites are: *existent*, *actually existent*, *factual*, *being an empirical object cognizable through senses*, *possible*.

#### 2.3.2. Kinds of texts referring to fictitious entities

Certainly it is not literature alone that is concerned with fictitious entities. Philosophers speak of circular squares, logicians - of the present king of France, physicists of an ideal gas: all these entities are absolutely non-existent, and at least some of them are sometimes called fictitious. Everyday life, with its expectations, beliefs, suspicions, desires, dreams, suppositions, and assumptions, provides numerous examples of referring to non-existent objects and events. History speaks of past events, scientific prognoses - of future ones: all of them are relatively non-existent. It seems that there is scarcely any kind of non-existent entity that could be pointed to as

occurring solely in literature, and also scarcely any kind of non-existent entity that would not once be called fictitious.

### 2.3.3. The concept of possible world

This being the case some scholars look for help to modal logics and try to use the nowadays fashionable concept of possible world as the last and only resort. Instead of saying that fictional texts refer to fictitious - in one of the meanings of the term - objects or events they maintain that the texts have whole worlds as their counterparts. Some authors try to prove that fictional texts speak of possible worlds (Eco, 1978: 29), while some others claim that the texts cannot refer to possible worlds, because it is characteristic of literary fictionality that it is directed to impossible entities (Woods, 1974: 76).

Oddly enough, the concept of possible world - at least so it seems to me - had been taken by the logicians from nowhere else but traditional considerations on literature where that loose, but suggestive and vivid, metaphor of a poetic or literary world used to appear in discussions concerning literary characters. The logicians, most probably following Leibniz, have subjected the traditional concept of imaginary world to modifications which have resulted in the concept, or rather concepts, of possible worlds. The concepts, as different from that of the poetic or literary world, are better adapted to special logical needs, for instance, to the requirements of the analysis of reasoning. But it does not follow that they meet equally well the needs of literary sciences. To answer the special purposes of literary-analysis the boomeranging concept of possible world should be redefined with these new aims in mind. Before, however, it has been done, literary theorists should make up their mind whether they really need a concept of *possible* world to speak of both possible and impossible

entities referred to in literature, and whether, they prefer to have one such concept for all the different kinds of prose and poetry of rather various concepts, each of them designed for a particular kind of literature, for instance, one for realistic novels, another for the phantastic ones.

#### 2.3.4. Language and the fictitiousness of entities

To account for the variety of kinds of non-existent entities, when at least some of them are being considered fictitious, one should realize to what extent it is language itself that imposes the distinctions between them. This is why, I think, we should pay attention not so much to the fictitious entities themselves as rather to fictional expressions, or, to be more precise, to such uses of expressions in which they become fictional. Fictionality is relative: with regard to a given verbal and situational context.

#### Note

- \* Professor J. Pelc read a rather extensive lecture in our working group in Vienna, however since that time his conception and terminology of fictionality have so fundamentally changed that we can publish here the introductory part of his study but we have to change his original terminology according to his new thesis: instead of the predicate "fictional" we have two terms: "fictitious" and "fictional". This change in terminology has theoretical reasons: "I have accepted the following terminology: FICTITIOUS PERSONS, THINGS, ANIMALS, and FICTIONAL EXPRESSIONS, SENTENCES, TEXTS." (J Pelc: Letter to Z. Kanyó, 15th November 1982.) Professor Pelc is working on



DEICTIC REFERENCE IN FICTIONAL TEXTS

Gisa Rauh  
University of Göttingen

0. As a guideline for the content of our contributions to this workshop we have been given three questions, which read as follows:

1. Which theory of semantics should be considered as basic in the explanation of fictional texts?
2. What is the importance of the reference to objects in the constitution of fictional texts?
3. What kind of relation exists between fictional texts and reality?

I first want to point out briefly how my contribution is related to these questions. As it stands, question (3) is obviously addressed to the philosophers amongst us and an answer cannot be or is not expected here. To the slightly modified version: What kind of relation exists between fictional texts and texts about reality?, however, a partial answer can be derived from what I have to say. Unfortunately, at the present stage of linguistic theory, there exists no semantic theory I know of which could be pointed at and thus be chosen as the one designed to successfully solve all the problems which emerge with the analysis of fictional texts. I shall therefore not attempt to do the impossible but restrict myself to displaying some of the essential problems a semantic theory has to meet if it strives for descriptive adequacy, not excluding the description of fictional texts. Thus question (1) will be touched upon and answered tentatively, though no exhaustive nor definite answer is intended. I de-



cided to concentrate on question /2/, since my topic, the use of deictic terms in texts, seems more than others suitable to demonstrate how expressions in a text are abstracted from their reference to objects of the real world and how, nevertheless, the experience which the user of linguistic expressions has developed from their reference to real objects is of essential relevance for the constitution and, conversely, for the analysis of fictional texts. I am going to show that deictic terms in fictional texts determine the role of their referents in the same way as in utterances issued in actual communicative situations.<sup>1</sup> An adequate interpretation of deictic terms in addition to the specification of the roles of their referents, however, requires an identification of the deictic center of orientation with respect to which they obtain the specified role. In an actual communicative situation this center of orientation is given by the speaker, his coding time and his coding place. The referents of deictic terms in this context are objects of the real world, to be found in the extralinguistic, situational context of the utterance or at least related to it and they constitute the concrete deictic field, which I call the frame of reference for deictic terms. In fictional texts, no such extralinguistic, situational context is given, but frames of reference, identical in structure to situational contexts, have to be identified here, too, if an adequate interpretation of deictic terms is to be achieved. I will show, therefore, that fictional texts are constituted by numerous frames of reference each of which can be identified as a concrete, though imaginary, deictic field, since it provides the referents of deictic terms as the concrete, real deictic field of a communicative situation provides the referents of deictic terms in utterances used in this context. Thus, an analysis of the constitution of a fictional text is dependent on an analysis of the use and function of deictic terms, which, as a prerequisite requires some information about the

special characteristics of this class of linguistic terms.

1.1. Deictic terms constitute a special class of linguistic expressions in that they do not characterize the objects they refer to, as general nouns do, but they express the relations that exist between their referents in a communicative situation. The set of deictic terms in a language and the relations between them constitute a system of variables, which K. Bühler (1934) called the deictic field ("Zeigfeld") of the language. Because of the special nature of the relations, Bühler compared a deictic field to a co-ordinate system, for every deictic expression is determined relative to a deictic center of orientation, the origo, which is linguistically represented by the basic deictic terms *I*, *here* and *now*. This three-fold determination conveys the fact that deictic relations are distinguished on three levels: person deixis, place deixis, and time deixis<sup>2</sup>. The origo establishes points of orientation for all three levels: the person coding an utterance, his coding time and this coding place. Person deictic relations characterize the roles which persons may obtain in a communicative situation: "speaker", "addressee" or "the other person talked about". In English, the pronouns of the first, second and third person refer to these roles respectively. Place deictic relations organize positions relative to the coding place of an utterance and can refer to positions either in the immediate vicinity, as expressed by *here*, or farther away, referred to by means of *there*. Time deictic relations organize temporal relations relative to the coding time of an utterance and can express "co-extending with", "before" or "after". Thus, a deictic field forms a complex system subdivided into three subsystems. Within each of these subsystems the positions of the constituent elements are defined in a unique way with respect to points of orientation. The definition of each position is at the same time a description of the deictic

term holding that position. That is, the existence of the abstract deictic field allows a context independent description of each deictic term, which is to be considered as a morphological realization of an abstractly defined position in the abstract deictic field<sup>3</sup>. This context independent description of a deictic term provides information about the role its referent obtains. Applying a feature analysis to deictic terms, this information could be expressed in the following manner:

<i>I</i>	<i>you</i>	<i>he, she, it</i>
+ I	- I	- I
- II	+ II	- II
-III	-III	+III
Present Tense	Past Tense	Future Tense
<i>now</i>	<i>yesterday</i>	<i>tomorrow</i>
	<i>last year</i>	<i>next year</i>
/+present/	/+past/	/-present -past/
<i>here</i>	<i>there</i>	
/-far/	/+far/	

Each set of features describing a deictic term can be considered as the description of its invariant meaning or its sense.

1.2. Deictic terms can be used in different ways. The difference in their use does not affect their invariant meaning defined in terms of features above, but is concerned with their interpretation or the identification of their referents. Bühler distinguishes three modes of pointing as types of use which he calls *demonstratio ad oculos et ad aures*,

anaphor and cataphor, and imaginary deixis ("Deixis an Phantasma"). Further literature on deixis discusses a fourth mode, discourse deixis (Harweg 1968; Fillmore 1971; 1971a).<sup>4</sup> The different uses of deictic expressions justify a classification of utterances in two classes: situation-bound utterances and situation-free utterances. I define a text, independent of its being fictional or non-fictional, as a sequence of situation-free utterances. Only in the case of situation-bound utterances is reference to objects of the real world performed by the use of deictic terms: The mode of pointing is the *demonstratio ad oculos et ad aures*. The identification of the referents of deictic terms is achieved non-verbally. The interpretation of the deictic field which establishes the frame of reference for deictic terms is the extra-linguistic, situational context of an utterance, its center being identified by the speaker, his coding time and his coding place. The first person pronoun refers to the actual speaker and the second person pronoun to the person addressed by the speaker. Tense and time deictic adverbs express temporal relations with respect to the coding time and place deictic expressions localize object or events relative to the coding place. Thus, in the case of *demonstratio ad oculos et ad aures* deictic terms refer to objects (in the broad sense of the word) of the real world. The deictic field is materialized by those objects which obtain a deictic function with respect to the speaker, his coding time and his coding place. In this sense deictic fields establish frames of reference for deictic terms.

If deictic terms are used anaphorically, cataphorically or discourse deictically the linguistic co-text establishes the frame of reference. Referents of deictic terms then are linguistic units, either syntactically classified (anaphor and cataphor), or not classified (discourse deixis). In the case of imaginary deixis the deictic field as the frame of reference is comparable to that of the *demonstratio ad oculos*,

although its ontological status is imaginary rather than real. The utterer presents an imagined or fictitious situation and transposes the deictic center of orientation into this situation in such a way that consequently deictic terms are to be interpreted with respect to the transposed center rather than with respect to the real deictic center of which the actual speaker forms a constitutive part. Clear cases of imaginary deixis are examples of quoted speech. Quotation marks are conventions applied to indicate that deictic terms inside and outside are related to separate deictic fields.

In an utterance as (1)

(1) *John said: "I am leaving now."*

the referent of the first person pronoun is not the actual speaker but a quoted one, and the time deictic adverbial *now* as well as the Present Tense do not refer to the actual coding time but to the coding time of the quoted utterance. The Past Tense, however, is to be interpreted relative to the actual coding time. The example shows that imaginary deixis is not restricted to fictional texts but may just as well be used to describe facts about the real world.

2.0 Of the four modes of pointing briefly discussed here, imaginary deixis is the one relevant for an analysis of deictic fields as frames of reference in fictional discourse. Although coded by a real person, the author, utterances which constitute a piece of fictional discourse, e. g. a novel short-story, or the like, do not count as<sup>5</sup> utterances of the author since deictic terms used in this context do not refer to his person, time or place, i. e. the author's situation does not provide the deictic center of orientation. As a consequence, *demonstratio ad oculos* cannot be the mode of pointing applied in fictional texts. Imaginary deixis, on the other hand, allows the author to establish deictic centers of orientation independent of his own situation. There are no restrictions as to the number of deictic centers he

may establish and, in addition, he may establish them on different levels. Proper analysis of the constitution of a fictional text, which is the prerequisite for an adequate semantic interpretation, therefore not only faces the problem of reconstructing deictic centers and related deictic fields but also the task of determining relations between them. In the following sections I shall provide empirical evidence for the necessity of reconstructing deictic centers in fictional texts in order to provide an interpretation for deictic terms occurring in this context.

2.1. An author may design a piece of fictional discourse as if it were narrated by a specific person. This fictitious person is commonly referred to as the "narrator" and counts as the utterer of all those utterances of the narrative which are not marked as being issued or coded by other, e.g. by characters of the narrative, to whom we shall turn later on. Deictic terms used in utterances of the narrator are interpreted within the deictic field of which his person, the coding time and the coding place of his utterances constitute the deictic center. The deictic field of the narrator may include the reader as the addressee. In this case, the narrator is the referent of the first person pronoun and the reader the referent of the second person pronoun, as in (2):

(2) *It is enough to tell you, that as some of my worst comrades (...) knew me by the name Moll Flanders, so you may give me leave to go under that name till I dare own who I have been, as well as who I am.*

*Defoe, Moll Flanders: 71*

Within the deictic field of the narrator the role of the addressee may be assumed by characters of the novel, as in (3):

(3) *Yes, Mrs. Reed, to you I owe some fearful pangs of mental suffering. But I ought to forgive you, for you knew not what you did.*

*(C. Bronte, Jane Eyre: 22)*

The identification of the referents of deictic terms is achieved non-verbally. The interpretation of the deictic field which establishes the frame of reference for deictic terms is the extra-linguistic, situational context of an utterance, its center being identified by the speaker, his coding time and his coding place. The first person pronoun refers to the actual speaker and the second person pronoun to the person addressed by the speaker. Tense and time deictic adverbs express temporal relations with respect to the coding time and place deictic expressions localize object or events relative to the coding place. Thus, in the case of *demonstratio ad oculos et ad aures* deictic terms refer to objects (in the broadest sense of the word) of the real world. The deictic field is materialized by those objects which obtain a deictic function with respect to the speaker, his coding time and his coding place. In this sense deictic fields establish frames of reference for deictic terms.

If deictic terms are used anaphorically, cataphorically or discourse deictically the linguistic co-text establishes the frame of reference. Referents of deictic terms then are linguistic units, either syntactically classified (anaphor and cataphor), or not classified (discourse deixis). In the case of imaginary deixis the deictic field as the frame of reference is comparable to that of the *demonstratio ad oculos*, although its ontological status is imaginary rather than real. The utterer presents an imagined or fictitious situation and transposes the deictic center of orientation into this situation in such a way that consequently deictic terms are to be interpreted with respect to the transposed center rather than with respect to the real deictic center of which the actual speaker forms a constitutive part. Clear cases of imaginary deixis are examples of quoted speech. Quotation marks are conventions applied to indicate that deictic terms inside and outside are related to separate deictic fields.

In an utterance as /1/

/1/ John said: "I am leaving now."

the referent of the first person pronoun is not the actual speaker but a quoted one, and the time deictic adverbial *now* as well as the Present Tense do not refer to the actual coding time but to the coding time of the quoted utterance. The Past Tense, however, is to be interpreted relative to the actual coding time. The example shows that imaginary deixis is not restricted to fictional texts but may just as well be used to describe facts about the real world.

2.0. Of the four modes of pointing briefly discussed here, imaginary deixis is the one relevant for an analysis of deictic fields as frames of reference in fictional discourse. Although coded by a real person, the author, utterances which constitute a piece of fictional discourse, e.g. a novel, short-story, or the like, do not count as<sup>5</sup> utterances of the author since deictic terms used in this context do not refer to his person, time or place, i.e. the author's situation does not provide the deictic center of orientation. As a consequence, *demonstratio ad oculos* cannot be the mode of pointing applied in fictional texts. Imaginary deixis, on the other hand, allows the author to establish deictic centers of orientation independent of his own situation. There are no restrictions as to the number of deictic centers he may establish and, in addition, he may establish them on different levels. Proper analysis of the constitution of a fictional text, which is the prerequisite for an adequate semantic interpretation, therefore not only faces the problem of reconstructing deictic centers and related deictic fields but also the task of determining relations between them.

In the following sections I shall provide empirical evidence for the necessity of reconstructing deictic centers in fictional texts in order to provide an interpretation for deictic terms occurring in this context.



If the narrator refers to characters of the narrative by using third person pronouns, they fulfill the person deictic relation of "the other person talked about" with respect to the narrator as the utterer, i. e. within the deictic field of the narrator. An example is the following sentence, which introduces the narrative *Across the River and into the Trees*:

- (4) *They started two hours before daylight, and at first, it was not necessary to break the ice across the canal as other boats had gone ahead*

(Hemingway, *Across the River*: 5)

The introductory use of the sentence and thus the lack of an antecedent for the interpretation of *they* disallows an anaphoric interpretation and thus necessitates a deictic interpretation. The point of orientation of time deictic relations in the deictic field of the narrator is provided by the time which counts as the coding time of the utterance under consideration. Thus, the Present Tense forms and the time deictic adverbial *now* in (5) and (6) are to be interpreted as co-extending with the coding time:

- (5) *I have been married ten years. I know what it is to live entirely for and with what I love best on earth. I hold myself supremely blest.*

(C. Brönte, *Jane Eyre*: 454)

- (6) *We are now grown old; I am come back to England, being almost seventy years of age, my husband sixty-eight, having performed much more than the limited terms of my transportation, and now, notwithstanding all the fatigues and all the miseries we are both in good heart and health.*

(Defoe, *Moll Flanders*: 295)

Past Tense forms and Future Tense forms refer to time intervals preceding and following the coding time, respectively as can be derived from the following examples. In the contexts they come from, example (7) follows (6) and (8) fol-

lows (5):

(7) *My husband remained there some times after me to settle our affairs, and at first I intended to go back to him, but at his desire I altered that resolution, and he is come to England also.*

(Defoe, *Moll Flanders*: 295)

8 *I know that a stranger's hand will write to me next, to say that the good and faithful servant has been called at length into the joy of his Lord. And why weep for this? no fear of death will darken St. John's last hour: his mind will be unclouded; his heart will be undoubted; his hope will be sure; his faith steadfast.*

(C. Bronte, *Jane Eyre*: 456)

Thus, examples (5)-(8) provide evidence that, in fact, in fictional discourse time deictic expressions in those utterances which are presented as issued by the narrator have to be interpreted relative to the coding time of the utterance they are contained in. In addition, examples (6) and (7) show that place deictic terms also may have to be interpreted in the deictic field of the narrator. The locative adverbial in (6), *I am come back to England*, represents the fact that the place of the narrator, who counts as the utterer of (5) and (6), is situated in England at coding time. As the reader knows, the source of the movement expressed by *come*, which at the same time is the place of the state expressed by *remain* in (7), is America. The narrator deictically refers to this locality by using the place deictic adverb *there* in *my husband remained there some times*, which is marked /+far/, indicating the relative distance with respect to the coding place.

The data presented in this section were chosen to demonstrate that deictic terms in fictional discourse - person deictic, time deictic and place deictic terms - may have to be interpreted within the deictic field of the narrator, i. e. with respect to the deictic center of orientation which is

established by the narrator, his coding time and his coding place. A deictic center of orientation can be defined as a function  $f$  of three variables  $s$ =utterer,  $t$ s=coding time and  $l$ s=coding place, where the function obtains a different value whenever one of the variables receives a different value. That is, there are possibly many deictic centers of orientation of which the narrator forms a constitutive part, taking into account that the variables coding time or coding place need not be and usually are not constant throughout the full length of the text. Consequently, several deictic fields of the narrator may have to be distinguished each of them presenting a frame of reference, which have to be reconstructed for a proper identification of the referents of deictic terms.

2.2. In addition to the deictic field or, rather, the deictic fields of the narrator an author of fictional discourse may establish further deictic fields centered around fictitious persons who function as characters in the narrative. An example of such additionally introduced deictic centers and, related to them, deictic fields, has been mentioned already: quoted speech. Every utterance in fictional discourse which is presented as if coded by one of the fictitious characters introduces a new deictic field the center of which is formed by the character, the coding time and the coding place of his utterance. Example (9) represents a conversation between three characters as quoted by the fictitious narrator of the narrative it comes from:

(9) *"It's a friend of mine - a Cheshire-Cat," said Alice: allow me to introduce 'it'.*

*"I don't like the look of it at all". said the King: "however, it may kiss my hand, if it likes."*

*"I'd rather not", the Cat remarked.*

*(Carroll, Alice: 81)*

The deictic terms in each quoted sentence refer to a different deictic field and, in addition, those occurring in the utterances of the narrator refer to yet another one. Thus, for an adequate interpretation of (9), at least four deictic fields will have to be distinguished.

Like quoted speech, "quoted thoughts" in fictional texts introduce new deictic centers of orientation and related deictic fields. In (10),

(10) *They always take it personally, he thought.*

(Hemingway, *Across the River*: 20)

*they* has to be interpreted with respect to the character whose thoughts are presented, whereas *he* has to be interpreted with respect to the narrator who is presenting the thoughts. In both cases the pronouns determine the person deictic role "the other person/s/ talked about", however, with respect to different centers. Therefore, an analysis of (10) will have to distinguish two frames of reference for the deictic terms.

Interior monologue can be viewed as a form of quoted thought lacking a quote indicating device. Since this is the only difference with respect to quoted thought, sentences representing this form are to be analyzed in the same way, i. e. for the present discussion, the deictic center of orientation for deictic terms used in interior monologue is the character whose thoughts are being verbalized. In (11b), which presents an example of interior monologue, place deictic, time deictic and person deictic terms are determined with respect to the character, his coding time and his coding place. (11a), immediately preceding (11b), however, has to be considered as being coded by the narrator and, consequently, deictic terms occurring in this context find their referents in the frame of reference determined by the deictic field surrounding the narrator:

- (11) a. *Grey horror seared his flesh. Folding the page into his pocket he turned into Eccless Street, hurrying homeward. Cold oils slid along his veins chilling his blood: age crusting him with a salt cloak.*
- b. *Well, I am here now. Morning mouth bad images. Got up the wrong side of the bed. Must begin again those Sandow's exercises.*

(Joyce, *Ulysses*: 63)

Thus, the analyst of fictional texts has to be prepared to distinguish different frames of reference for deictic terms in sequences of sentences, even though no change of orientation is indicated explicitly.

Different deictic frames of reference not only have to be distinguished if new characters are introduced, but one and the same character may be in the center of different deictic fields. The following examples are all taken from *Moby Dick*. In each of the examples the place deictic adverb *here* is used, referring to a place in the vicinity of the utterer. In each of the examples the utterer is the same, but the places referred to by *here* are different:

- (12) *Rather ominous in that particular, thought I. But it is a common name in Nantucket, they say, and I suppose this Peter here is an emigrant from there.*

(Melville, *Moby Dick*: 28)

- (13) *But look, here come more crowds pacing straight for the water, and seemingly bound for a dive (...). Inlanders all, they come from lanes and alleys, streets and avenues - north, east, south, and west. Yet here they all unite.*

(Melville, *Moby Dick*: 22)

- (14) *Look there, that chap running around the corner. He wears a beaver hat (...). Here comes another with a sou'-wester and a bombazine cloak.*

(Melville, *Moby Dick*: 49)

For the interpretation of *here* in each of the examples, therefore, a different place deictic point of orientation has to be assumed.

2.3. An interesting case of deictic reference is what goes under the name of "narrated monologue". While in the examples discussed so far frames of reference could be separated neatly because all deictic terms in one sentence were oriented at one deictic center, the situation is different here. Deictic terms in sentences of the form narrated monologue are oriented at two deictic centers of orientation, thus allowing collocations which otherwise are not permissible. (15) is an example of narrated monologue:

(15) *I joined tomorrow.*

(*Conrad, Youth: 116*)

In (15) the Past Tense indicates that the event described belongs to the past, whereas *tomorrow* locates it temporally in the future. The only sensible explanation for this superficial contradiction is that the event time is viewed with respect to two time deictic points of orientation<sup>6</sup>. As a consequence, to describe sentences like (15) two deictic centers of orientation will have to be established to provide the points of orientation for deictic terms used in this manner.

3.0. The examples presented may suffice to demonstrate that for an adequate interpretation of deictic terms in fictional texts and, in this sense, for the determination of the frames of reference which provide the referents for deictic terms, an identification of the deictic center of orientation is necessary. Feature analysis which represents the roles referents of deictic terms obtain, though necessary, is not sufficient for an adequate interpretation of deictic terms. In this respect, however, situation-free utterances as constituents of fictional texts do not differ from situa-

tion-bound utterances being used in an actual communicative situation. If, for example, John talks to Mary and Peter to Bill, then both, Mary and Bill, obtain the role of addressee, which can be interpreted on the basis of features describing the second person pronoun used to address them. But an adequate interpretation in addition has to answer the question "addressee with respect to whom?", i. e. with respect to what deictic center. Therefore, proper analysis of deictic terms is dependent on the identification of the deictic center and only if the deictic center is identified is an identification of the concrete deictic field as the frame of reference possible.

In an actual communicative situation, i. e. in the case of situation-bound utterances, the identification of the deictic center is easy, since it is identical to the acoustic source of an utterance. A change of the deictic center is indicated by a change of the acoustic source, i. e. if of several persons involved in a communicative situation another one takes up the role of the speaker, this implies that the deictic center of orientation has changed and that consequently the deictic terms used have to be interpreted with respect to the new center. In situation-free utterances the identification of the deictic center cannot be achieved by means of non-verbal, sensual activities, but it has to be reconstructed. The process of reconstruction follows the rules derived from language use in actual communicative situations: Since the interpretation of deictic terms is dependent on the situational context of an utterance, in situation-free utterances where no situational context is given the situation is imagined, its substance thus being different from, but its structure identical to real situations. To accomplish the necessary task of reconstructing deictic centers of orientation formally, i.e. within a linguistic theory, a contextual, pragmatic theory is needed which in some way provides a description of the abstract points of orientation with respect

to which deictic terms are to be interpreted. Such a contextual description will not have to be different for situation-bound and situation-free utterances. What differentiates situation-bound utterances and situation-free utterances, though, is that by definition deictic terms used in a situation-bound utterance are oriented at one deictic center of orientation and that, consequently, one contextual description for each utterance is sufficient. Situation-free utterances, on the other hand, which constitute fictional and non-fictional texts, may contain deictic terms oriented at more than one contextual description. In addition, a contextual theory for the analysis of text must provide means to describe deictic centers of orientation on different levels to account for the fact that different relations hold between deictic fields in texts, which can be identified as co-ordination, embedding and interference, as I shall demonstrate in the following section.

3.1. Let us consider first a dialogue presented in a fictional text:

- /16/ a. *'You're in good shape, Colonel,' the surgeon said.  
'I'm sorry I can't go on the shoot. I can't even shoot.'*
- b. *'Hell,' said the Colonel. 'That doesn't make any difference. Neither can anybody else in this army. I'd like to have you around.'*
- c. *'I'll give you something else to back up what you'-re using.'*
- d. *'Is there anything?'*
- e. *'Not really. They're working on stuff, though.'*
- f. *'Let them work,' the Colonel said.*

*/Hemingway, Across the River: 12/*

(16a), (16b) and (16f) are examples of quoted speech proper in that they contain quoted utterances and quote indicating utterances. The quote indicating utterances are to be consi-



dered as utterances of the narrator which provide information about the identity of the interlocutors, who obtain the person deictic role of persons talked about in the deictic field of the narrator. The definite noun phrases *the surgeon* and *the Colonel* determine the reference of the first person pronoun in the quoted utterances (16a) and (16b), respectively. The deictic fields of the characters are in this sense dependent on the deictic field of the narrator. Since all deictic terms in the quoted utterances of (16a), (16b) and (16f) are oriented at the deictic center of a character and all utterances of the narrator at his deictic center, the dominance relation can be specified as one embedding. Examples (16c) - (16e) present alternating utterances of the interlocutors without interfering introductory remarks of the narrator. As utterances which constitute a dialogue in a real communicative situation these utterances are presented and have to be analyzed on the same level. Though each utterance requires its own contextual description, none of them is dominant with respect to the others. The relation between them is thus one of co-ordination.

In narrated monologue the pronoun used to refer to the character whose monologue is being narrated is a third person pronoun, unless the narrative is a first person narrative and the narrator presents his own thoughts, sensations or statements of the past in narrated monologue form. The use of the third person pronoun indicates that the character as the referent obtains the person deictic role of the other person talked about with respect to the narrator, i.e. the pronoun is interpreted with respect to the narrator. If a narrative is presented in the Past Tense, thus indicating that the events narrated are to be viewed as having occurred prior to the coding time of the narrator, then a Past Tense in narrated monologue indicates the same time deictic relation. It is therefore to be interpreted with respect to the coding time of the narrator and its referent is provided by

the frame of reference determined by the deictic field of the narrator. In narrated monologue, on the other hand, place deictic and time deictic adverbs as well as pronouns not referring to the character whose thoughts, sensations or statements are narrated determine the roles their referents assume within the deictic field of the character. In (17)

*/17/ She was glad she had done so while she could, for now she could not. There her daughters had been safe from war and revolution and the trouble of the people. There they were now, safe. Here she was alone*

*/Buck, Liang: 8/*

the pronoun *she* refers to the character and determines her role in the deictic field of the narrator as the Past Tense determines the events or states of affairs as past with respect to the narrator's present. The pronoun *they* also determines the person deictic role but with respect to the character's center, as *now* indicates co-extension of its referent with the coding time of the character, i. e. the time which counts as the time at which her thoughts and sensations were coded. *Here* and *there*, respectively, refer to places in the vicinity and not in the vicinity of the coding place of the character. Since the character in narrated monologue obtains the same person deictic role as in quoted speech or thought within the deictic field of the narrator the same relation of dominance holds here. Since, however, in the surface sentence deictic terms are oriented at two deictic centers, which results in an interference of deictic fields, this dominance relation may be specified as one of interference.

Thus, possible relations between deictic fields in fictional discourse are co-ordination (deictic fields of characters, e.g. in a dialogue), embedding (a deictic field of a character in relation to the deictic field of the narrator, e.g. in quoted speech or thought) and interference (a deictic

field of the narrator and a deictic field of a character, e.g. in narrated monologue). If a character quotes utterances of another character, then again, this represents a case of embedding one deictic field into another and both are embedded into the deictic field of the narrator if he is the one who presents the speech of the first character. Potentially there are no restrictions as to the number of embedding and co-ordinating deictic fields in fictional texts. A contextual theory, therefore will have to provide not only the means to formally describe a deictic center of orientation but also ways to account for co-ordination, embedding and interference of contextual reference. As I mentioned initially, I know of no linguistic theory, syntactically or semantically based, following generative grammarian or modal logic principles, which would be equipped to solve the problems here discussed. If, however, such a theory were developed, it would not only allow proper analysis of the reference of deictic terms in texts, but it would at the same time serve as a device to describe the pragmatic structure and thus an important aspect of the constitution of texts.


3.2. In Rauh (1978) I decided on using modified hypersentences as contextual descriptions.<sup>7</sup> I by no means maintain that a hypersentence model can be considered a final solution since too many problems are related to the concept of hypersentences. But it may, nevertheless, serve as a starting point to demonstrate what has to be done and what can be done.

According to the modified hypersentence model I applied, situation-bound utterances are described in deep structure as being embedded into one hypersentence which syntactically, i.e. by means of syntactic categories and features, represents the speaker, the addressee, the person(s) or thing(s) talked about, and the place and time deictic points of orientation, thus providing syntactically all points of orienta-

tion necessary for the interpretation of deictic terms. The verb in the hypersentence determines by means of features syntactic and semantic properties of the sentence which is finally generated as the surface sentence: A declarative sentence is marked by the feature (+declarative), an interrogative sentence by (+interrogative) and an imperative by (+imperative). A second feature marking the verb in the hypersentence indicates that the surface sentence serves the function of communication: (+communicatio). Constituent sentences of texts which contain deictic terms oriented at one deictic center of orientation are described in the same way as situation-bound utterances.


Sequences of sentences containing deictic terms oriented at one deictic center are described as a conjunction of sentences embedded into one hypersentence, as figure (F1) demonstrates:

(F1)




If quoted speech is presented either in a fictionally or non-fictionally used sentence, both the quoting and the quoted part are embedded in hypersentences in deep structure, the hierarchical structure describing the relation of dominance holding between the two:

(F2)



If a dialogue is quoted either in fictional or non-fictional texts in such a way that each quote is introduced by introductory sentences, then the introductory sentences appear as a conjunction of sentences embedded into the topmost hypersentence, each containing a hypersentence as a direct object representing the contextual description for the quoted sentences:



If, however, a dialogue is presented without introductory remarks, then the underlying structure describes a conjunction of hypersentences and each of these hypersentences contains as a direct object the sentence which later appears as the surface sentence. The description of each of the conjoined sentences thus equals the description of sentences used as situation-bound utterances. But sentences constituting a dialogue are not isolated units. They present cohesion in that alternating interlocutors change the roles of speaker and addressee and the referent of *you* used by speaker<sub>1</sub> is the referent of *I* used by speaker<sub>2</sub> and conversely. Thus, the relation of co-reference holds between constituents of conjoined hypersentences, which can be captured by means of rules. The relation of co-reference also holds between constituents of dominating and embedded hypersentences in examples of quoted speech. The referent of the noun phrase describing the person deictic relation of the other person talked about in the dominating hypersentence is identical to the referent of the noun phrase describing the role of the speaker in the embedded hypersentence.

Examples of situation-free utterances described so far, may occur either in fictional or non-fictional texts, their description being the same in both contexts. There is one difference, though, between sentences used fictionally or non-fictionally. Whereas in non-fictional contexts it is not possible for an utterer to present thoughts and sensations other than his own either in a directly verbally coded or narrated monologue way, this may be done by a fictitious, omniscient narrator who counts as the utterer of utterances issued in a narrative. To account for this fact descriptively, I introduced the features (+experience <sup>+</sup>cognition) as alternatives to the feature (+communication) marking the verb of a hypersentence to indicate the semantic function of the surface sentence. Hypersentences of this type dominate sentences representing quoted thoughts, interior monologue and narrated monologue. In the case of the latter two, these hypersentences are themselves immediately embedded into hypersentences of the normal type which serve as contextual descriptions of the narrator's situation. Thus, the similarity between interior and narrated monologue is accounted for, the difference between the two being described by deictic reference, since deictic terms in interior monologue are all determined with respect to the deictic center of the character, represented by the immediately dominating hypersentence, and deictic terms in narrated monologue are determined with respect to the deictic centers of both the character and the narrator, represented syntactically by the embedded and the dominating hypersentence, respectively.

②

4. Concluding my presentation, I return to the questions introduced initially, which served as a guideline for this contribution, and suggest more or less tentative answers. First it was asked which theory of semantics should be considered as basic in the explanation of fictional texts. Whatever theoretical framework is chosen for a linguistic

semantic theory, it will have to provide context independent descriptions of linguistic units which represent their sense. In the case of deictic terms considered here, such descriptions represent the roles referents of deictic terms obtain and are constant irrespective of the contexts in which deictic terms are used. Secondly, a linguistic semantic (or pragmatic) theory will have to provide means to account for the relevance of situational contexts for an appropriate interpretation of deictic terms. Context independent descriptions are not sufficient, as can be seen especially in the case of narrated monologue. In addition, contextual theories will have to be prepared to distinguish contextual descriptions on different levels and establish rules to describe the relations between them. Question (2) was concerned with the importance of the reference to objects in the constitution of fictional texts. I have attempted to show that a text is constituted by numerous frames of reference determined by the deictic fields which provide the referents for deictic terms in the text. Analyzing deictic reference in fictional texts, therefore, at the same time provides insight into the (pragmatic) constitution of these texts. I have not talked about how I view the difference in substance of referents of deictic terms being either objects of the real or a fictitious world, though I indirectly committed myself to an answer by applying a deictic theory which distinguishes such modes of pointing as imaginary deixis and *demonstratio ad oculos* and relates imaginary objects to deictic terms used in fictional texts and real objects to those used in situation-bound utterances which apply the mode of pointing called *demonstratio ad oculos*. Whether a referent exists or existed in reality, is believed or pretended to exist, or simply imagined, has no impact on the linguistic act of reference, which can be defined as a relation between a linguistic and a non-linguistic unit, whatever the latter's ontological status may be.

Question (3), finally, I modified slightly in order to be in a position to provide a non-speculative answer. The modified version asks for the relation that exists between fictional texts and texts about reality. I suggest subdividing texts about reality into two classes, one representing situation-bound utterances with a given situational context, the other representing situation-free utterances, such as letters, (auto)biographies, essays and the like, where situational contexts are not given but have to be reconstructed. Actually, it is only to the latter class that I relate the concept text. In this sense fictional texts and texts about reality linguistically differ only in one aspect in that in texts about reality it is not possible for a speaker to present another person's thoughts or sensations in a quasi performative way. If, therefore, a text contains thoughts or sensations verbalized and presented by a person who is not the experiencer, then this has to be taken as a fictional element in the constitution of the text. Otherwise, fictional texts and texts about reality cannot be distinguished on linguistic grounds. This implies, also, that imaginary deixis as a mode of pointing is not restricted to fictional texts but may just as well be applied in texts about reality, which, in fact, is the case.

#### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The term "actual communicative situation" used here refers to what Lyons calls the "canonical situation of utterance": "this involves one-one, or one-many signalling in the phonic medium along the vocal-auditory channel, with all the participants present in the same actual situation able to



see one another and to perceive the associated non-vocal paralinguistic features of their utterances, and each assuming the role of sender and receiver in turn" (Lyons, 1977:637). Not included are, therefore, such communicative situations where technical instruments, e.g. telephone, walky-talky, loud speaker and the like, are used.

- 2 Bühler only distinguishes these three levels. As Fillmore (1971; 1971a) has pointed out, the level of social deixis also has to be considered. Schmid (1972), in addition, includes the level of mode as a deictic category.
- 3 In Rauh (forthcoming) I present a more detailed discussion of the relation between the abstract deictic field and its possible realizations.
- 4 For further information on modes of pointing see Rauh (forthcoming) and the references given there.
- 5 The notion "count as" ("zählen als") was introduced and defined by A. Kratzer (1978) in the sense applied here.
- 6 More examples of narrated monologue which provide empirical evidence for the adequacy of the present analysis are provided in Rauh (1978). The related problem of "narrative tense" is discussed in detail in Rauh (forthcoming).
- 7 The hypersentence model I developed in Rauh (1978) is based on Sadock (1969), which, though more primitive than Sadock (1974), was preferred because of its being compatible with early Chomskyan generative syntactic theory, which was the general theoretical framework of my approach. Early Chomskyan theory, on the other hand had to be preferred to his more recent works because hypersentences have to be deleted, a process which is highly restricted since the introduction of the "Structure-Preserving Constraint" (Emonds, 1976). Under this constraint hypersentences cannot be deleted. See also Chomsky/Lasnik (1977).

## References

### Sources

- Bronte, C. (1960), *Jane Eyre*, The New American Library, New York/Scarborough, Ontario.
- Buck, P. S. (1969), *The Three Daughters of Madame Liang*, Pocket Books, New York.
- Carroll, L. (1960), *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland Through the Looking Glass*, New American Library, New York/Scarborough, Ontario.
- Conrad, J. (1960), *Youth*, in *The Portable Conrad*, The Viking Press, New York.
- Defoe, D. (1966), *Moll Flanders*, Everman's Library, London/New York.
- Hemingway, E. (1950), *Across the River and into the Trees*. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.
- Joyce, J. (1960), *Ulysses*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.
- Mellville, H. (1961), *Moby Dick or The White Whale*, The New American Library, New York.

### General

- Bühler, K. (1934)<sup>2</sup> 1965), *Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache*, Stuttgart.
- Chomsky, N. Lasnik, H. (1977), "Filters and Control", *Linguistic Inquiry* 8, 425-504.

- Emonds, J.E. (1976), *Transformational Approach to English Syntax. Root, Structure-Preserving, and Local Transformations*. New York, San Francisco, London.
- Fillmore, C.J. (1971), "Toward a Theory of Deixis", *The PCCLLU Papers* 3/4, 218-242.
- Fillmore, C.J. (1971a), "Lectures on Deixis", University of California Summer Program in Linguistics, Santa Cruz. Unpublished.
- Harweg, R. (1968), *Pronomina un Textkonstitution*, München.
- Kratzer, A. (1978), *Semantik der Rede. Kontexttheorie - Modalwörter - Konditionalsätze*, Königstein, Ts.
- Rauh, G. (1978), *Linguistische Beschreibung deiktischer Komplexität in narrativen Texten*, Tübingen.
- Rauh, G. (forthcoming), "Über die deiktische Funktion des epischen Präteritum: Die Reintegration einer scheinbaren Sonderform in ihren theoretischen Kontext", *Indogermanische Forschungen*.
- Sadock, J. M. (1969), "Hypersentences", Diss., Ann Arbor, Mich.
- Sadock, J.M. (1974), *Toward a Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts*, New York.
- Schmid, W.P. (1972), "Die pragmatische Komponente in der Grammatik" *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur* 9, 407-424.
- (Paper presented in the working group *Reference in Fictional Text* (1979.)

ON THE RELEVANCE OF POSSIBLE-WORLDS SEMANTICS FOR LITERARY THEORY

Árpád Bernáth - Károly Csuri  
A. József University, Szeged

1. *Outline*

If we start from a conventional conception of literature in a broad sense, then we can regard as "poetry" or "literary works" all those oral or written utterances which are so declared by the authors or so admitted by the recipients. A variety of outward forms is characteristic of these historic occurrences. Spells and magic tales, as well as the works of "concrete poetry" can be included here.

The following considerations, however, will refer only to a more restricted part of the varied and multi-functional poetry thus conceived. More precisely, to the literary works in connection with which the following questions are put: do they have any part in cognition, and if so, what may we come to know through them? It is enough to think of the culture of our continent, and we can see that the range of such works extends from Homer's epics to Beckett's dramas and further still. So it seems reasonable to ask that one of the central concerns of literary theory should be to answer these questions. In our opinion, every literary theory must be able to tell what the cognitive function is and what kind of knowledge may be attained through the analysis of literary works, or certain classes of these, forming the subject of literary research determined by the theory in question.

This set of questions has been present in European thinking for a long time. It already appears in mythological

forms of this thought in debated as to whether Hermes or Apollon should be the patron of poetry. In the relation between philosophy and poetry, Plato and Aristotle are the first to raise the questions with which we are concerned. But our purpose here is not to present a historical survey. We refer rather only to the essential methodological lessons drawn from such a survey: scientifically established results can only be achieved, if questions which seem particularly poetic are analysed in an overall theoretical framework. It will hardly be sufficient to define the relation between "poetry and reality" ("Dichtung und Wahrheit") by means of poetics only or of the conceptual system of aesthetics in some strict sense. Since the relationship in question can be seen as one special instance of the possible relationship between sign and significatum, it is expedient that we should take into consideration all those results attained in this field by linguistics, semiotics, logic and epistemology. Naturally, if the literary theoretician wants to exploit the results of the above mentioned disciplines, he is forced, then, to express his demands - in our case for a semantic theory satisfactory to literary theory - clearly and definitely. The profit, however, is not necessarily unilateral and unidirectional, since demands concerning the productivity of a semantic theory can at the same time mean a desirable challenge for scholars of the sciences mentioned above. A consistent and complete semantic theory, able to describe and explain from its own point of view, the mechanism of natural and artificial languages in all possible context of use, would no doubt come in useful to every scholar. In our opinion, this task cannot be solved by a considerable extension of the subject matter of any of the foregoing disciplines. Rather there is a need for interdisciplinary co-operation on the basis of common cognitive interest concerning semiotic systems. All the mentioned sciences examine the problem of how semiotic systems can deliver truths and how

they can orient the action of their users.

## 2. *The Frege paradigm*

From this last point of view, logic can be considered the fundamental discipline. Since logic, according to the founder of its modern, symbolical version, Gottlog Frege, is a science dealing with the most general laws of truth ("Wahrsein"). But if we study Frege's semantic theory from the viewpoint of literary theory, we must conclude that his thesis is not satisfactory for establishing the semantics of literary texts. While sketching our objections, we wish to illustrate with a concrete example: what demands does a literary theory raise for semantic theories? In the spirit of the foregoing, we shall show both the specific criteria on the basis of which literary theory may object to a semantic theory, and the advantages following the co-operation between the various branches of science. Undoubtedly, literary theory may become richer through the study and acquisition of versions of the logical semantics. In addition, a critical study with an eye to the demands of literary theory can lead to questions stimulating the improvement of the given theory of logical semantics.

The insufficiency of Frege's semantics demonstrable from the viewpoint of literary theory - in contrast with many other logical semantics - does not derive from the fact that the scholar of logic ignored these aspects of the question. Frege sees rather clearly that language has different usages. He differentiates the diverse usages by the language's ability, in the case of a given usage, to convey truth. According to this, there exists *serious* and *non-serious* speech, and the question of truth can only be raised in connection with the former. Only the statements of serious speech express *thoughts*, and thus only the thoughts can be true or false. In the case of non-serious speech we state

something only apparently, so such sentences express only *apparent thoughts*. But these are not included "in the concern of logic, as the physicist willing to examine storm, ignores the storm on stage." (Frege 1973 (1897): 44) As our example shows, in Frege's system the *serious* speech includes the utterances of science, while the *non-serious speech* includes the utterances of science, while the *non-serious speech* includes those of poetry.

As is well-known, in Frege's semantic theory both true and false are objects, and the objects as references ("Bedeutungen") are denoted by proper names. Expressions not taking this role, are merely quasi-proper names ("Scheineigennamen"). The quasi-proper names and the class of proper names still have a common feature: images are linked to the expressions belonging to them. Yet the images are always of a subjective nature because in every case they are someone's images, and because two people can never possess the same image. According to Frege, the duty of poetry is to produce precisely especially strong images. Beauty is the characteristic of images and the quasi-proper names precisely evoke particularly coloured images. Eventually, Frege's ideas on the difference of literature and science can be concluded as follows: science strives for the true, whereas poetry strives for the beautiful and only the beautiful. The true is objective and, as a consequence of this, is the common property of many people. The beautiful is subjective, thus it can be the content of only one mind. So it is impossible to imagine for Frege a discipline, the object of which is the literary work: "Every enjoyer of art has his own work of art, so between judgements referring to beauty there can be contradiction by no means" (Frege 1973 (1897): 47). If we were still to insist on the scientific study of poetry, we could then do it only in the domain of psychology.

The possible confusion of *serious* and *non-serious* speech reveals that the expressions - at least in some cases

- do not bear the sign of being proper names or just quasi-proper names. That speech is serious or non-serious must be decided separately. If we wish to work out a suitable procedure of decision within the scope of Frege's conceptual system, then we come up against the following insurmountable difficulty: Frege deduces the concepts of semantic theory from the definition of the *object*. The *reference* ("Bedeutung") is the object, *sense* ("Sinn") is the way the object is given to us. An expression denoting object is considered a *proper name*. For Frege, however, - as is well-known - not only those things are objects which can be recognized in the physical world with our organs of sense, but also the numbers - like number "7" -, geometrical forms - like the "triangle" and, moreover, truth-values themselves.

So the following question is inevitable: Why does "7" denote an object in mathematics, and why does "William Tell" not denote an object in Schiller's William Tell? Furthermore, why is the expression " $3 + 4 = 7$ " true, and why is the expression "Tell shot an apple from his son's head" not true? Nor can the latter expression be false for Frege, since it is from a literary work.

The logicians adhering to the conception of Frege will not find it strange, of course, that objects cannot be rendered into statements of literary works. So they can answer our questions thus: That there existed a William Tell, and whether he shot an apple from his son's head or not, must be determined by the same methods as the questions: did Alexander the Great ever exist and did he have a horse called Bucephalus? By no means do we proceed in the same way when deciding that the expression " $3 + 4 = 7$ " is true.

However, this answer cannot be satisfying for the school scholars of literary theory. Since, if we want to clarify the William Tell problem using the methods of the *historian*, then we are *historians* and not *literary theorists*.



Our reflection can also support an argument for literature being unable to constitute the subject of a special literary science differing from history. And if our researches result in the fact that William Tell does not really exist, or, in reference to Frege, we postulate it in advance, then evidently we do not have the opportunity of admitting or negating some characteristics of William Tell. If the science of literature with its own cognitive interest and method, cannot be studied, then we also must have a negative answer to the question as to whether literary texts as literature have any role in cognition. The inevitably negative answer, however, contradicts our intuition. There exists a literary science institutionally studied, and its history shows that its cognitive interest and methodology at least partly differs from those of the history. Already Aristotle tried to work out such a literary theory in which "poetry tells the universal while history the individual cases" (Cf. Poetics, Ch. 9).

### 3. *The problem of the reference of literary characters*<sup>2</sup>

We would like to demonstrate our observations concerning the reference of literary characters with the help of an analogy. The subject matter of the analogy - adhering to a former example of ours - is constituted by natural numbers.

In our opinion the natural numbers, concepts of second order also in Frege's system, express something general. The *general* in this context means that connections or systems of connections expressed by natural numbers may be valid not only on one subject but on a whole range of subjects. On the other hand, the truth of statements coming from operations with natural numbers depends on whether we keep the rules on the basis of which the operations are performable, and which secure that the reference of expressions does not change

without marking that change. If a "sentence" resulting from an operation with natural numbers, e.g.: " $3 + 4 = 7$ " is true - and it is true according to Frege because the expressions on both sides of an equation denote the same object -, then the connection expressed by the "sentence" is generally true. That is, it can be valid in different subject matters. We want to stress two elements of the foregoing considerations. On the one hand, the "existence" of natural numbers depends on whether they are the members of a well-formed system. On the other hand, the generality of natural numbers and the expressions resulting from operations with them depends on whether or not their validity range is confined to one subject matter. We can also note that the number theories constitute those systems of rules which determine the inner structures of various numerical systems and the operations that can be performed with their members. The task of the single branches of applied mathematics, then, is to elaborate the possible ways of reference of the different numerical systems to one another or to spheres beyond numerical systems. In other words, to determine the exploration of the less abstract images or models of the more abstract connections indicated above. So we must take into account that the systems of rules are of a formal nature and are always given by the theory, that is, they are human constructions.

In one respect, there is a similar situation with literary characters. Their existence also depends on the existence of a system. This system which, for instance, appears as the structure of events in a work describing events, is given neither in advance nor explicitly but must be discovered by the scholar of "applied literary theory", the analyst of the work in question. He must reveal that the composition of events follows that of a more abstract sequence of events. This more abstract sequence of events is one realization of possible formations according to a

system of rules, that is, a well-formed sequence of events. Let us call this abstract, well-formed sequence of events *action* from here on, or in other words *action-structure*. Consequently, we attribute existence conditionally to the characters of literary works describing a sequence of events only until we can explore or establish the systems of rules, according to which the action-model defining the composition of the sequence of events in the given literary work can be constructed. The more abstract equivalents of *characters* in the sequence of events in a work will be called *figures* in the action-structure. The attributes (=properties and relations) of figures are consequently prescribed by the system of rules. So the characters of the classes of literary works in question can be considered existent inasmuch as they correspond to a figure, and they are general because it is not necessary that one figure should have only one corresponding character. All those structured sets of states of affairs can be mapped onto the action containing the figures, and which can be generated with the help of the system of rules underlying the model. At the same time, if we cannot strengthen our previous hypothesis that sequences of events of a particular text-world imitate a well-formed action-model in their composition, while its characters imitate that of their attributes, then we are forced to regard the sequences of events as disordered and the characters as non-existent.

What emerges from these in relation to the cognitive role and subject of literary works? We think that if the science of literature wishes to attribute a role in cognition to the class of literary works taken here as an example, then it must elaborate or find those systems of rules which determine the action-model of the single works or a whole series of them. If the analyst's work has succeeded, he can then try to expand the composition of the sequence of events, and the range of validity pertaining to the

features and systems of relations of the characters' attributes: while he takes the role of the historian, the sociologist or the moral-philosopher, the analyst can judge where and when similar systems of rules operated in the world not necessarily available through texts, that is, in the *real world*. Besides, he can set requirements for the agents of the real world, for men of action, and he can set tasks and aims to be accomplished according to the explored system of rules.

This latter observation, however, indicates the limits of the analogy that is set up. No doubt, there is a similarity between the numbers and characters, the numerical systems and the action-structures from the analysed point of view, nevertheless we have to admit that the role of literary works played in cognition cannot be deduced solely with an analogy available in the subject of mathematics and literary science. The orderedness of text-worlds is not only of a syntactic-semantic nature, but of a pragmatic nature as well. In literary works the syntactic-semantic component always bears ethical values. Eventually that is the way literary works could and can become *action-orienting systems*. In this context can we speak of the cognitive role of literature, and can clarify more closely the question of what the knowledge, delivered by the given literary work, means.

#### 4. *Major concepts of "possible world" in logic*

The next task is to find a semantic theory suitable for our purposes: a theory with the help of which the semantic aspects of the foregoing considerations can be described systematically. In dealing with literary characters, we have already introduced some concepts the usefulness of which becomes apparent now. The expressions "real world", "possible range of reference", almost suggest that for the clarification of the above problems, it is advisable to rely on the

*possible-worlds semantics*. This semantics has been elaborated by various modal and philosophical logics in the course of time, but above all in the last two decades. Using the possible-worlds semantics in literary theory is a tempting experiment for the very reason because it would mean the revival of an old thought under new conditions, when the devices of logic and the literary theory have been refined considerably since the first explicit experiment. The old thought referred to is the theory of Bodmer and Breitinger who tried to apply the Leibnizian concept of possible worlds directly to literature<sup>3</sup>.

Studying the recent logical literature dealing with this question in mind, we find that the concept of possible world occurs in very different systems, and that these systems define its content rather loosely and diversely<sup>4</sup>. Essentially, however, two basic types of opinions can be isolated.

(1.a) According to one kind of thinking, possible worlds are that kind of abstract models of set theory which represent definite states. These theories are characterized mainly by the fact that, when giving the truth-conditions of propositions they fix formal and not material conditions<sup>5</sup>.

(1.b) The constructivistic concept<sup>6</sup> does not regard the possible worlds as given, but establishes them from the propositions in the light of certain conditions. That is, this kind of theory does not simply assume, but gradually builds up, that is, materially defines the possible worlds.

If asking what standpoints the theories represent concerning the relationship between the real world and possible worlds, then again the opinions form two major groups.

(2.a) Some logicians and philosophers think that possible worlds are autonomous entities, and can be reduced to nothing else. According to them, these worlds must be understood in the same way as our own world, that is, the differ-

ence between the possible worlds and the real world cannot be ascribed to type-difference. The only point is that the events happening in the real world are different from those taking place in the various possible worlds.

(2.b) Several philosophers, however, state that possible worlds are theoretical constructs, intellectual projections the basis of which is the actual world. So possible worlds, through some vehicles, can be deduced from the real world. The construction of possibilities, in accordance with this, can happen by means of transformations of different complexity. The transformations operate on the population of individuals, the descriptive make-ups and on the really operative laws of nature<sup>7</sup>.

##### 5. *The concept of possible world in literary theory*

In the first approach it seems that out of the different logical concepts (1.b) and (2.b) promise the most for literary theory. That is to say, those logical ideas which expound the content of the concept of possible world. When, in principle, we also believe that possible worlds are functions of the real world, we want to further stress, however, that this close dependence only occurs *in the course of construction*, or it is relevant only in that process, since if the establishment of the possible world is finished, we can blow up the bridge over which we crossed from the real world to the given possible world. Let us imagine, for example, that we want to look for all those possible worlds which can be constructed with respect to a given possible world. In this case we need not return to that real world from which the possible world in question was deduced. It is enough to regard the already-constructed possible world hypothetically as a real world from which further possible worlds can be derived<sup>9</sup>. The above procedure guarantees that concepts of possible worlds shown in

(1.a) and (2.a) can also be used in cases of *reconstruction* of possible worlds. The great necessity of this opportunity for the interpretation of literary works will be easier to see, if we define the concept of possible world in literary theory more closely.

First, however, we want to clear up the connections between the *text-worlds*, *possible worlds* and *the real world*.

The practice of interpretations of literary works discloses that the reconstruction of text-worlds of literary texts and the explanation of their structure is not possible on the basis of only one actual state of the real world. Even if it were possible, that explanation would be irrelevant from the specific cognitive point of view of literary science. This, in the first place, is related partly to the reference and truth problem already dealt with. Since no one can seriously doubt the fact that a lot of literary characters cannot by any means be referred directly to flesh-and-blood persons of the real world, or at least not in a relevant way. It is conceivable in principle that none of the states of affairs in a literary text-world has an equivalent in the real world, and therefore all the statements which express and denote the state of affairs of a text-world are false. Moreover we can postulate, as many have, that every statement, which occurs in a literary work, independent of the fact whether the state of affairs drawn by the statement has an equivalent in the real world or not, is necessarily false. We can represent that opinion, too - Frege's studies are good examples for this - that literary works do not contain statements in advance, so the question of truth-value cannot even be raised. No matter how we think of the sentences of the literary texts, we never regret acknowledging that the characters and the states of affairs described by these sentences, play or can play a constructive role in establishing a specifically autonomous world that will be defined more clearly in the following.

Discussing the analogy of numbers and literary characters, we have already referred to the fact that the characters of literary works, if they are to be considered existent, can be referred to the figures of a more abstract action-model. We noted though, that, on the one hand, the number of characters and figures is not necessarily the same, while on the other hand, that the action-model itself is an abstraction, so its extension is smaller than that of the concrete text-worlds. But the analyst of the work must give the reference of all characters, that is, the significatum of every sign in principle. Furthermore, he must decide on the truth-value of all states of affairs in the text-world. As a consequence of this, in spite of the obligatory correspondence-relations, there is no such action-model possible which forms the entire reference range of a given text-world. We also noted that all those structured sets of states of affairs can serve as a possible reference range for a text-world, the structure of which can be mapped to the action-model containing the figures and abstract events. The sets of states of affairs fulfilling the above conditions may be regarded as the *possible worlds of literary works*, and we suppose that characters in the text-worlds refer to the individuals of possible worlds. The true and false truth-values can be rendered to the sentences expressing and denoting the states of affairs also according to the connection between the single states of affairs of the text-world and the possible world. Though it can hardly be doubted after the above, we still stress the following: the possible worlds as the referential ranges of the text-worlds are not metaphysical entities. Possible worlds are essentially the referential ranges of the text-worlds structured, or to put it in another way, explicated with the help of the action-models. They are constructs in which the arbitrariness of the states of affairs and their connections composing the text-world ceases. We can say figuratively



that possible worlds are the 'images' of action-models constructed on the basis of the systems of rules, inasmuch as we approach the analysed class of literary texts from the recipient. The metaphoric expression relates to the fact that the abstract actions can be realized in very different 'surface structures'. It is said in this connection that the extension of the possible world of a text can be considerably greater than that of its text-world. This information-enrichment, not irrelevant from the aesthetic point of view, is related to the role of the action-model: the action-model as an abstract structure, and, consequently, a structure of more general force can 'open' several (similarly structured) referential ranges for the text-world in question, which the text-world as such can never achieve. It is time to draw the conclusion already evident by now: text-worlds, possible worlds and action-models are situated on different levels of abstraction, therefore the methods for approaching and reconstructing them are also different. The text-worlds are mainly available through text-linguistical operations, the action-models through logical-epistemological and the possible worlds through text-linguistical and logical-epistemological. Thus is the cognitive function and value of literary texts related to the hypothesis of possible worlds, on the one hand, while, on the other, it is related to the comparison of structures of the possible worlds and the real world, a question to be dealt with later in more detail.

As we have seen, the action-model plays a distinguished part in relation to the possible worlds. Among other things, it is so because the existence of literary works as possible worlds is attached to these models, and is determined by the models and by the rules generating those models, respectively. This fact definitely excludes the possibility of metaphysical interpretations of the possible-world concept used

here. When we stated that the literary characters refer partly to the figures of the action-models, partly to the individuals of a possible world, we then tried to give an explanation to the following facts. At least one part of the characters, determined by the model, possesses characteristics of general force, that is, shares the 'number'-nature of figures. At the same time, all characters in the works, also those being directly attached to figures, preserve their individual nature, accidental-contingent characteristic, and in this way they contribute to the creation of the 'specialness' of the possible worlds. They cannot lose their contingent features for the action-models wish and are able to explain the text-world as a possible world only in a certain respect and do not explore all possible structures in it.

The foregoing passages proved that the reference of figures, and generally the truth-value of the statements of a text is closely related to our interpretational and pragmatic standpoint. It is related to the way we read a text and to what kind of text we consider it to be from the beginning. We tried to argue in the above that we handle literary texts as vehicles of possible worlds. In our consideration, concepts like text-world, possible world, action-model, real world, etc. are linked in one consistent conceptual system.

In a given possible world, which can be mapped to a literary text, truths and demandable norms derived from the base action-model and system of rules, also valid in the real world, 'reveal themselves' in a specific way by methodically reforming the real world.

The literary characters as possible individuals, the extension of the reference-range of the text-world, and thus the growth of information-richness of the possible world, the possible world as the 'showing up' of action-models in the sphere of the 'specific', that is, the realization of

abstract structures through specific surface structures, and other similar connections demonstrate convincingly that the introduced conceptual system can connect and explain the *cognitive function* of literary works, the *knowledge* delivered by them and the *aesthetic quality* of that knowledge in a consistent and natural way.

Before finishing this phase of our discussion, we return briefly to the question, how the concept of 'possible world' in literary theory, drawn before, relates to the 'possible world' concepts in logic.

We have already referred to the following: to (re)construct the structure serving as the basis of a possible world, we must start from the supposition that the text-world to be analyzed is a possible world. That is, in the first approach, like the formal conceptions of (1.a) and (2.a), we postulate it as a possible world. To strengthen this hypothesis, we can try then to define those rules which materially determine and explain the possible world formally postulated in the sense of (1.b) and (2.b). The strong necessity of such a connection derives from the following consideration: the reader of literary texts cannot suppose that there is a world available, independent from the world of the read text, with the help of which he could determine the truth-value of the statements in the text, and through which he could explain the composition of the text-world with the 'mapping' operation. He can attempt, however, - and in so doing he does the job of a literary theorist - the systematic construction of a model which seems to be relevant from the point of view of the text-world's composition: its constructing rules prevail in the text-world, they make it true and understandable from the viewpoint in question, that is, to change it to a possible world.

The realization of our objective raises the following methodological problem: if we do not want to make in advance the laws and norms prevailing in the given state of real

world the system of rules in the model to be set up - for, in doing so, every possible world would be an image of a given state of real world - then we have to elaborate the procedure for disclosing the systems of rules underlying the various possible worlds.

6. *A theoretical example for the literary explanation of text-worlds operating with possible worlds*

First we would like to explain more precisely the principle of possible world in the sense of (1.a).

To understand a modal notion is to understand a certain relation. This is the 'alternativeness relation', which is defined on a given set of possible worlds. According to Hintikka, the alternatives to a world  $W$  may be thought of as those possible worlds which could be realised instead of  $W$ . In connection with this, a proposition  $p$  is *possibly* true in  $W$ , if and only if  $p$  is true in at least one alternative possible world of  $W$ . That  $p$  be *necessarily* true in  $W$  requires the condition that  $p$  should be true in every alternative possible world of  $W$ .

Let us take now the finite set of the propositions  $p, q, r, \dots, z$  the extension of which is the sequence of events of text-world  $W_t$ . In the following we consider this sequence of events as identical with  $W_t$ . In our assumption  $W_t$  is the distinguished possible world  $W^+$  of the real world  $W_r$ . 'Distinguished' in this context means that  $W^+$  is exactly that possible world from among the alternatives of  $W_r$  in which  $p, q, r, \dots, z$  are true. In Hintikka's semantic theory this ensures the possible truth of  $p, q, r, \dots, z$  in  $W_r$ . We must mention two more preconditions of the text-world interpretation:

- (i)  $p, q, r, \dots, z$  neither belong only nor in the first place to the worlds of characters of  $W_t$ ;

(ii)  $W_r$  is not directly relevant from the viewpoint of text-world interpretation.

The text-world  $W_t$ , which as opposed to the possible world  $W^+$ , can be characterised as the choice and construction of the sequence of events  $p, q, r \dots z$ , is not justified. At the same time  $W^+$ , unlike  $W_t$ , is not given in a way available simply by linguistic devices, and we can regard it as existent only if conditions ensuring the truth of  $p, q, r \dots z$  are given. The elaboration of a system  $M$  for fulfilling the truth-conditions of  $p, q, r \dots z$ , however, will not mean any more that we *postulate* the propositions *true*, but that we have *made* them *true* by means of  $M$ . The system  $M$  in question, identical with the action-model in this case, gives the material explanatory principle of  $W_t$  demanded by Rescher, and thus, in fact, the composition of  $W^+$ .

But we have not yet reached the end of our investigations. We can take a step further with the method of modal semantics, inasmuch as we now regard the possible world  $W^+$  as a hypothetically real world. So in the next phase we search for alternative possible worlds for  $W^+$ , and try to find at least one in which  $M(p, q, r \dots z)$  propositions of  $W^+$  are true. That is, now we do not seek the truth of the single propositions, but rather a possible world in which the structure of propositions determined by  $M$  is true. Suppose that we should find such a world  $W^{++}$ , and  $W^{++}$  coincides with a clearly limited fraction of  $W_t$ . Since the mapping refers to the structure in question,  $W^{++}$  fulfills the truth-conditions also, if the propositions  $p, q, r \dots z$  are replaced by other propositions or real sets of affairs. Our sole requirement is that the new propositions, or real sets of affairs should have a structure  $M'$ , either isomorphic or homomorphic with respect to  $M$ .

The problem that the structure  $M$  itself can be multi-dimensional in the case of literary narratives will not be

dealt with here. It is more important to observe that our method based on possible worlds comes full circle: in the example, starting from the real world  $W_r$  through the text-worlds  $W_t$  and the possible worlds  $W^+$  we reached the real world  $W_r$  again. More precisely: the range of  $W_r$  coinciding with the possible worlds  $W^{++}$  structured by  $M'$ . We stress, however, that our process, in spite of all appearances, is not tautologic, for there is a hierarchical difference between the start and the end of the route virtually made. From an epistemological point of view, the  $W_r$  chosen for the start, is evidently not the  $W_r$  of the end. We wanted to make the difference in the abstractional degree of levels clear with the introduction of the marking  $W^{++}$ . Out of the grades connecting the starting point  $W_r$  and the end  $W^{++}$ , the text-world  $W_t$  is realized on the level of *comprehension*, while the possible worlds  $W^+$  on that of *explanation*. From the viewpoint of cognition,  $W^+$  can be attributed the following value:  $W^+$  represents possible truths, inasmuch as in the real world  $W_r$   $W_t$  possessed an alternative  $W^{++}$  in the treated sense. But if in  $W_r$  or in  $W_t'$ , that is, in the real world and other text-worlds, respectively, there are more alternative worlds (e.g.:  $W^{+++}$ ,  $W^{++++}$  etc.) of  $W^+$ , then the general validity force of truths represented by  $W^+$  actually increases parallel to their cognitive value. With regard to the fact that the scientific research making this circle is of an empirical nature, there is no way to establish logically necessary truths.

In the end, we must make another mention in connection with the 'choice' of propositions structured by  $M$ . We cannot declare that the real world  $W_r$  always possesses such fractions that are characterized by  $M'$ -structures, that is, which qualify the possible world  $W^+$  as a possibly true world on the basis of the correspondance principle. There are, or at least can be imagined, such literary world whose

possible worlds do not have alternatives in the real world. The alternatives of the possible worlds of a certain work of art must be sought in many cases in the various modalities of  $W_r$ . Literary works try to influence and orient their readers, and with the help of their possible world  $W^+$  they 'show' what the real world  $W_r$  should look like, must have looked like, could have looked like, etc.. It is evident that the possible truths become relativized in such cases. It is a more extreme example when the possible world of a literary work can be reconstructed, but no alternatives can be found for the model either in the real world or among its modalities. Until it can no longer be decided whether or not it is the invention of new truths not yet seen, it is more suitable to act in accordance with the coherence principle of truth. If the statements in question can be deduced relying on the constructed model without contradiction, then we consider them valid statements. And valid statements in this system are true statements. Naturally as far as the action-model has no alternatives on the basis of the correspondence principle, we can speak of non-actualized possible truths.

#### *7. Concluding remarks*

If we assert the epistemological question raised in the beginning of the study, then we also must declare that the cognitive function of poetry must be registered among the essential functions that can be performed by literary works. But the acceptance of such a standpoint has far-reaching consequences for literary theory: we must require, for example, that such a semantic theory should form a part of literary theory with the help of which into the statements of literary texts truth-values can be rendered. In this connection, the first problem is that exactly that semantic school which elaborated the semantics operating with truth-

values, denies in advance the mapping of truth-values to the statements in literary texts. To be more precise, it does not even allow that the thoughts expressed by assertive sentences can be regarded as statements. Thus, in fact, it denies that literary works can have any part in cognition, that is - apart from psychologocal knowledge - we can learn nothing through them. The above negative answer is derived from the conception that exclusively the real world can be regarded as the referential range of literary text-worlds, and so the basis of truth-value mapping as well. In this study we have argued that the truth-value of statements of literary texts can be decided with the construction of different possible referential ranges. To form our conception into a theory, the possible-worlds semantics can offer a suitable basis and frame. We have reached this conviction but by starting to study the different modal logic systems or philosophical logic but on the basis of practical experiments in text-world interpretation. Thus the presented literary theory conception is independent of the semantic model that serves as the interpretent of the metatheory of text-world interpretation. Though we took the stand that the truth-value of statements in literary texts cannot be determined by *direct* reference to the real world, we by no means want to deny that the possibility of this procedure exists, and acknowledge that the realization of this possibility is necessary in certain methods of literary text analyses. Therefore, literary theory cannot ignore this circular of question. We stress, however, that resulting from the nature of literary work, the *indirect* connection between text-world and real world, the systematic establishment of which is a scientific task, is more important. This is the reason for the more detailed treatment of the possibilities of the indirect, systematic connection in this study. To enlighten the problems, we introduced the concept of text-world, possible world, real world and action-model. As a suggestion



for solving the question, we formed the following relationships between them: the text-world represented by linguistic devices can be declared a possible world with the help of an explanatory action-model constructed on the basis of a system of rules. The possible worlds as structured and so explained text-worlds can be compared through the action-model functioning as the basis to the range or ranges of the real world similarly structured, or to their different modalities as alternative possible worlds. For determining the alternatives the procedures used in modal logic can serve as models.

In finalizing, we are of the conviction that all questions dealt with must play a central role in every such semantic theory that lays claim to the description and explanation of literary texts. At the same time, we see clearly that we had to ignore several factors in this study without which the problems raised cannot be solved satisfactorily. We hope that our work, in this restricted sense, contributes to a research not yet finished.

#### Notes

<sup>+</sup> This study is the revised version of our earlier work entitled "*Mögliche Welten*" unter literaturtheoretischem Aspekt. The original one was lectured on the II. International Congress of Semiotics (Vienna) in 1979.

<sup>1</sup> Frege described his semantic theory in several studies, in a form modified several times.

<sup>2</sup> For the discussion of these question see *Poetics* 1979, Vol. 8, No. 1/2.

- 3 Cf. Breitingger 1966 (1740).
- 4 At our statements we relied mainly on the works of Link 1976 and Rescher 1975.
- 5 Cf. Rescher 1975: p. 4.
- 6 This concept is mainly represented by Rescher 1975.
- 7 Rescher 1975: p. 92 and 193.
- 8 Rescher 1975: p. 92.
- 9 Rescher 1975: p. 84.
- 10 Hintikka 1975: p. 160.



## II. · FICTIONALITY AND NARRATOLOGY



QUESTIONS OF REFERENCE IN WRITTEN NARRATIVES

Hans-Heinrich Lieb  
Freie Universität Berlin

1. *Introduction*

/1/ Strether's first question, when he reached the hotel, was about his friend; yet on his learning that Waymarsh was apparently not to arrive till evening he was not wholly disconcerted.

This is the beginning of a novel. Suppose this is the only thing we know about the text. We also know English, have some general knowledge of the world, and have some idea as to what a novel is. How will the text be understood? After very little deliberation we will come up with a hypothesis such as:

- /2/ Allowing for the fact that this is to be just a novel, the author wants us to believe that
- a. a man (or a boy) who, according to the author, is called Strether [probably by his second name], reached a hotel (the author believes that we are familiar with the man and the hotel);
  - b. immediately after reaching the hotel the man asked a question of somebody [perhaps the receptionist];
  - c. the question was about a friend of the man (and the author believes that we know whom he has in mind);
  - d. the man learned from somebody [probably from the person of whom he asked the question, and through an answer to his question] that another man (or boy), called Waymarsh, was apparently [as seemed likely to Strether on the basis of what he learned] not to

arrive till evening [till the evening of the day of Strether's own arrival] (the author again believes that we are familiar with the person called Waymarsh [who very likely is to be the same person as Strether's friend]);

- e. the man called Strether was not wholly disconcerted by the fact that the man called Waymarsh [his friend] was apparently not to arrive till evening.

Understanding the text along these lines will be almost instantaneous with an experienced reader even if he starts reading *The Ambassadors* by Henry James for the first time in his life. Ease of understanding is deceptive, though, when we try to establish how understanding is achieved.

In the present paper I will be concerned with one particular aspect of this problem: the correct understanding of referential expressions in /l/, generally, of referential expressions in written narratives. The qualification "written" is used as a mark of caution; I am analysing an example from a printed text and wish to leave it undecided to what extent my results carry over to arbitrary narratives.

Questions of reference have been a standard topic in text linguistics ever since its inception, as any introductory text to the field will show. At the same time reference has proved one of the most recalcitrant problems in generative grammar both from a syntactic and a semantic point of view; recent developments such as 'trace theory' seem to be partly motivated by the continuing struggle with 'anaphora' and 'coreference'.

In this paper I cannot even begin to review the extensive literature on questions of reference in linguistics, the theory of literature, the philosophy of language, experimental psychology, and artificial intelligence research. Even so it should be safe to claim that the understanding of reference in real life situations, including the interpretation of literary texts, remains ill-understood. Using

the beginning of *The Ambassadors* as a sample text, I will study some of the general considerations that a reader may have to apply for correctly understanding referential expressions in a written narrative. I will concentrate on two problems: reference and fictionality, and reference and the narrator.

Naturally, *some* theoretical framework is needed. I shall here adopt the proposals made in Lieb (1979), (1980a) for the semantics of referential expressions and for sentence meanings in general.

## 2. *Reference, fictionality, and the narrator*

### 2.1. *General approach*

Consider, once again, hypothesis /2/. The initial proviso, "allowing for the fact that this is to be just a novel", is meant to take care of fictionality: James does not *really* want us to believe that ...; rather, he *pretends* that he wants us to believe that ... I shall not here be concerned with the problem of precisely how "pretends" is to be understood (but see fn. 8, below). Nor will I elaborate on "wants us to believe". It should be kept in mind, though, that all of /2a/ to /2e/ is the content of a *reader-oriented propositional attitude* that the author pretends to have. Only the type of attitude ("want - believe") has been indicated. The account of the attitude may certainly be improved.

As it stands, hypothesis /2/ does not allow for a narrator different from the author. A narrator (or a series of narrators) can be accommodated in such cases by the following modification:

/3/ The author pretends that there is a person who ... and who is the author of [the given text] and who wants us to believe that ...



The dots after "who" indicate the properties with which the author explicitly or implicitly endows the narrator. Note that the modification must follow the fictionality requirement and precede the specification of the basic propositional attitude, which is pretended (by the author) to be an attitude of the narrator: the *author pretends* that there is a *person* who ... and *who wants us to believe* that ... (where all references to the author in /2/ are replaced by references to the narrator). The modification can be extended, in an obvious way, to cover a whole series of narrators.

For a more precise account we informally characterize a number of auxiliary notions.

## 2.2. Auxiliary concepts

First, consider the word sequence of text /2/ (of the text quoted in /1/), i.e. the sequence of English words used in the text such that sequential order mirrors left-to-right arrangement in /1/:

/4/ The word sequence of /1/ = *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> *first*<sub>2</sub> *question*<sub>3</sub>  
*when*<sub>4</sub> *he*<sub>5</sub> *reached*<sub>6</sub> *the*<sub>7</sub> *hotel*<sub>8</sub> *was*<sub>9</sub> *about*<sub>10</sub> *his*<sub>11</sub>  
*friend*<sub>12</sub> *yet*<sub>13</sub> *on*<sub>14</sub> *his*<sub>15</sub> *learning*<sub>16</sub> *that*<sub>17</sub> *Waymarsh*<sub>18</sub>  
*was*<sub>19</sub> *apparently*<sub>20</sub> *not*<sub>21</sub> *to*<sub>22</sub> *arrive*<sub>23</sub> *till*<sub>24</sub> *evening*<sub>25</sub>  
*he*<sub>26</sub> *was*<sub>27</sub> *not*<sub>28</sub> *wholly*<sub>29</sub> *disconcerted*<sub>30</sub>.

The word sequence is abstract, a sequence of English words.<sup>1</sup> The text /1/ - the text quoted in /1/ - also contains a concrete realization, say, the corresponding part of the original copy of *The Ambassadors* as produced by Henry James.<sup>2</sup>

We define a *referential expression* of a text as any part of the word sequence of the text such that reference conditions are associated with the part. For instance, *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> may be taken as a referential expression of text /1/. As part of a reference condition associated with

*Strether's*<sub>1</sub> we may assume:

/5/ There is exactly one  $x$  such that the speaker is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> to  $x$ .

*Strether's*<sub>1</sub> is a referential expression independently of whether any associated reference condition is actually satisfied with respect to Henry James. Referential expressions in the sense defined can be identified solely on the basis of the syntax and the semantics of the text as determined by 'English grammar'.

As soon as the speaker is identified with Henry James, the fictionality proviso must also cover the reference conditions associated with referential expressions. Thus, hypothesis /2/ should be modified to read:

/6/ Henry James pretends that

- there is exactly one  $x$  such that he is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> to  $x$ , and that he believes that we are familiar with any  $x$  to which he is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> and ...;

.  
. .  
.

and [Henry James pretends] that he wants us to believe that

- for all  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  such that he is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> to  $x_1$  and by *the*<sub>7</sub> *hotel*<sub>8</sub> to  $x_2$ ,  $x_1$  reached  $x_2$ ;

.  
. .  
.

The two parts of /6/, which are collapsed in the original formulation /2/, are to characterize the two parts of the meaning of the text. The first part of the meaning is its *thematic part*; it essentially consists of the reference conditions and other conditions associated with the referential expressions of the text. The second part of the

meaning is its *rhetic part*; it essentially consists of conditions specifying 'what is said' of anything that satisfies the thematic part (' $x_1$  reached  $x_2$ ' etc.), and 'how it is to be taken' by the addressee ('wants us to believe'). Both parts are subject to the fictionality proviso.<sup>3</sup>

Inclusion of a narrator would be as in /3/. If a narrator is included, "he" is /6/ must be understood to refer back to the narrator not the author throughout.

What is formulated by /6/ is *the content of a hypothesis* on the meaning of text /1/. If the hypothesis is correct, /6/ also is a formulation of the meaning. We shall not discuss the hypothesis any further but concentrate on a more restricted question: provided the hypothesis is correct, what are the meanings that the referential expressions of text /1/ have in the text?

### 3. Textual meanings of referential expressions

#### 3.1. Author-independent meanings of referential expressions

The following expressions are assumed to be the referential expressions of the text quoted in /1/:

- /7/ a. Strether's<sub>1</sub>  
b. Strether's<sub>1</sub> first<sub>2</sub> question<sub>3</sub>  
c. he<sub>5</sub>  
d. the<sub>7</sub> hotel<sub>8</sub>  
e. his<sub>11</sub>  
f. his<sub>11</sub> friend<sub>12</sub>  
g. his<sub>15</sub>  
h. his<sub>15</sub> learning<sub>16</sub> ... till<sub>24</sub> evening<sub>25</sub>  
i. Waymarsh<sub>18</sub>  
j. evening<sub>25</sub>  
k. he<sub>24</sub><sup>4</sup>

All referential expressions happen to be *definite singular nouns* or noun phrases or definite singular pronouns. In Lieb (1979) I have proposed a semantic analysis of such nouns and noun phrases which, suitably extended to cover proper names and pronouns, will here serve as my theoretical background.

Take an expression of the form Definite Article + Singular Noun, such as *the<sub>7</sub> hotel<sub>8</sub>*. Such expressions always are referential ones in the sense that reference conditions can be associated with them. Various meanings of the expressions can be distinguished. We may here restrict ourselves to a single type, *referential-doxastic meanings*. Very informally these may be characterized as follows.

/8/ For any expression of the form Def Art + Sg N, a *referential-doxastic meaning* of the expression is any meaning that imposes the following conditions on the normal use of the expression in utterances:

- a. There is exactly one object to which the speaker is referring by the expression in the utterance.
- b. Whatever the speaker is referring to by the expression in the utterance belongs to the 'reference basis' for the head of the expression (the noun) relative to the speaker, the utterance, and some lexical meaning of the head.
- c. The speaker assumes that any addressee has some knowledge of what the speaker is referring to.
- d. The speaker presupposes that whatever he is referring to has the properties specified by the lexical meaning of the head.

Suppose that the expression is *the<sub>7</sub> hotel<sub>8</sub>*, and a certain concept, 'hotel<sub>1</sub>', is taken as the lexical meaning of *hotel<sub>8</sub>*, the head of the expression. <sup>5</sup> /8/ then applies as follows (*English* =df the English used by Henry James in text (1)):

- /9/ The referential-doxastic meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  relative to  $'hotel_1'$  and with respect to word sequence /4/, an appropriate syntactic analysis of /4/, and *English* = the relation between utterances and speakers such that:
- a. There is exactly one  $x$  to which the speaker is referring by  $the_7 hotel_8$  in the utterance.
  - b. For all  $x$ , if the speaker is referring to  $x$  by  $the_7 hotel_8$  in the utterance, then  $x$  is in the reference basis for  $hotel_8$  relative to the speaker, the utterance, and  $'hotel_1'$ .
  - c. The speaker assumes that, for all  $x$ , if he is referring to  $x$  by  $the_7 hotel_8$  in the utterance, then any addressee of the utterance has some knowledge of  $x$ .
  - d. The speaker presupposes that, for all  $x$ , if he is referring to  $x$  by  $the_7 hotel_8$  in the utterance, then  $x$  is in the extension of  $'hotel_1'$ .<sup>6</sup>

Conditions /9a/ to /9c/ form a *reference condition* that can be associated with  $the_7 hotel_8$ . The meaning is called *referential* because the reference condition requires existence of *exactly one referent* (exactly one object the speaker is referring to); cf. (9a). The meaning is called *doxastic* because the referent must satisfy a speaker assumption (concerning the addressee's familiarity with the referent); cf. /9c/. Condition /9b/ requires that the referent be selected from the reference basis, that is from the 'set of relevant objects': at the time of uttering  $the_7 hotel_8$ , the speaker is willing to consider certain objects only as to whether they are or are not in the extension of  $'hotel_1'$ .

Condition /9d/ is a *presupposition condition*. There may be successful reference even if the speaker is mistaken in his belief that the referent is in the extension of  $'hotel_1'$ .

3.2. *Author-restricted meanings of referential expressions*  
(*textual meanings*)

In /9/ we have identified a meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  that is independent of any specific speaker or utterance. We are, however, interested in the meaning that  $the_7 hotel_8$  has in the text quoted in /1/, a meaning that depends on Henry James. On our conception of a text (cf. Lieb (1980c)), a text has an abstract part and a concrete part. In /9/ it is only the abstract part of text /1/ that has been taken into account. The concrete part comprises an appropriate portion of the original copy of *The Ambassadors*, for which we arbitrarily introduce the following name:

/10/  $A^*$  = df the smallest part of the original copy of *The Ambassadors* that contains a realization of word sequence /2/.

We wish to speak of a meaning that  $the_7 hotel_8$  has in text /1/ with respect to  $A^*$ , Henry James, and *English*, i.e. the the English used by Henry James in text /1/. Such a meaning will be taken as an entity of the same type as an author-independent meaning, i.e. as a relation  $u$  between utterances  $V$  and speakers  $V_1$ . We introduce the following concept: " $u$  is a meaning of  $f$  in  $t$  with respect to  $V$ ,  $V_1$ , and  $S$ ", where " $f$ " stands for any part of a word sequence of a text, " $t$ " for any text, and " $S$ " for any 'language system' (in particular, a system of a language variety, such as a dialect). The following implication is assumed to hold by definition:

/11/ For all  $u$ ,  $f$ ,  $t$ ,  $V$ ,  $V_1$ ,  $S$ , if  $u$  is a meaning of  $f$  in  $t$  with respect to  $V$ ,  $V_1$ , and  $S$ , then  $u$  holds between  $V$  and  $V_1$ .

As a first hypothesis we might simply identify the meanings of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in text /1/ with the referential-doxastic meaning:

/12/ Hypothesis.

- a. There is exactly one  $u$  such that  $u$  is a meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in text /1/ with respect to  $A^*$ , Henry James and *English*.
- b. For all  $u$ , if  $u$  is a meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in text /1/ with respect to  $A^*$ , Henry James, and *English*, then  $u$  = the referential-doxastic meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  relative to 'hotel<sub>1</sub>' and with respect to ... [cf. /9/].

Because of /11/, the relation  $u$  that is the only textual meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  must actually hold between  $A^*$  and Henry James, that is there must be exactly one  $x$  such that Henry James is referring by  $the_7 hotel_8$  in  $A^*$  to  $x$  etc., cf. /9a/ to /9d/.

Hypothesis /12/ could be wrong in a number of ways. First,  $the_7 hotel_8$  could have several meanings in the text. Second, the textual meanings might be *modifications* of author-independent meanings by which a narrator is taken into account. Third, the author-independent meanings might not be referential-doxastic ones but meanings of other types. Fourth, they might be meanings not relative to the concept 'hotel<sub>1</sub>' but relative to some other concept (we could have gotten the word meaning wrong).

More fundamentally, all meanings have to be modified by the fictionality proviso: A meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  relative to  $A^*$  and Henry James is not a referential-doxastic meaning but is the *pretending* of a referential-doxastic meaning. In other words:

- /13/ a. Henry James pretends of  $A^*$  and himself the relation /9/ - pretends that this relation holds between  $A^*$  and himself.
- b. The pretending of relation /9/ = the relation between any (utterance)  $V$  and (speaker)  $V_1$  such that  $V_1$  pretends relation /9/ of  $V$  and  $V_1$ .

The relation specified in /13b/ replaces relation /9/ as the meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in text /1/:

/14/ Revised hypothesis.

- a. There is exactly one  $u$  such that  $u$  is a meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in text /1/ with respect to  $A^*$ , Henry James, and English. [= /12a/]
- b. For all  $u$ , if  $u$  is a meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in text /1/ with respect to  $A^*$ , Henry James, and English, then  $u$  = the pretending of the referential-doxastic meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  relative to 'hotel<sub>1</sub>' and with respect to ... [cf. /9/].

The essential features of /14/ are as follows.

The (only) meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in the text is obtained as a function of an author-independent meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$ , which itself is a relation between possible utterances and speakers (authors). The function, pretending, applies to the meaning and replaces it by a new relation between possible utterances and speakers that no longer involves actual references. By /11/, this relation holds between  $A^*$  and Henry James.

In the case of a fictitious narrator a second function intervenes between pretending and the author-independent meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$ ; assumption /11/ again establishes the necessary link to  $A^*$  and Henry James. The nature of the new function can only be determined after the account of the narrator that was suggested in /3/ has been made more precise.

#### 4. Reference involving a narrator

##### 4.1. The place of the narrator

For the *Ambassadors* a first-person narrator must indeed be assumed. This 'I-narrator' must be a person satisfying the following requirements: Text /1/ - as part of *The Ambassadors* - is a text by the person;  $A^*$  is the form of a realization of text /1/ by the person.<sup>7</sup> The author of any



text may pretend or claim that a narrator is or is not identical with the author and has a number of other properties; in the case of a first-person narrator, identity is claimed or pretended. For dealing with the narrator of the *Ambassadors*, we introduce a relation defined as follows:

/15/  $u = \text{df}$  the relation between any  $V_1$  and  $V_2$  such that

$$V_1 = V_2 \text{ and } \dots V_1 V_2 \dots$$

where  $\dots V_1 V_2 \dots$  is a formula whose free variables are at least " $V_2$ " and at most " $V_1$ " and " $V_2$ " and that formulates for  $V_2$  the assumptions made by Henry James concerning a narrator of the *Ambassadors*. We may then suggest that hypothesis /6/ on the meaning of text /1/ be replaced as follows:

/16/ Henry James pretends of  $A^*$  and himself the relation defined for any  $V$  and  $V_1$  as follows.

There is a  $V_2$  such that:  $u$  holds between  $V_1$  and  $V_2$  (i.e.  $V_1 = V_2$  and  $\dots V_1 V_2 \dots$ ), and text /1/ is a text by  $V_2$ , and  $V$  is the form of a realization of text /1/ by  $V_2$ , and

- there is exactly one  $x$  such that  $V_2$  is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in  $V$  to  $x$ , and ...;

The new hypothesis applies the general idea formulated in /3/ for taking a narrator into account: "The author pretends that there is a person who ... and who is the author of the given text and who wants us to believe that ...". Still, hypothesis /16/ has an important flaw: the reference conditions for *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> and the other referential expressions should be relativized not just to *some* narrator  $V_2$  but to *any* narrator  $V_2$  independently of the number of persons that satisfy the conditions for  $V_2$ . This is taken into account by the following modification of /16/:

/17/ Henry James pretends of  $A^*$  and himself the relation defined for any  $V$  and  $V_1$  as follows:

- a. There is a  $V_2$  such that:  $u$  holds between  $V_1$  and  $V_2$ , and text /1/ is a text by  $V_2$ , and  $V$  is the form of a realization of text /1/ by  $V_2$ .
- b. For any such  $V_2$ ,
  - there is exactly one  $x$  such that  $V_2$  is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in  $V$  to  $x$ , and ...;

"There is a  $V_2$ " in /17a/ may be strengthened to read "there is exactly one  $V_2$ ", which yields the case of a single narrator. The relation  $u$  as defined in /15/ involves identity; hypothesis /17/ therefore covers the case of a narrator fictitiously identical with the author.  $u$  may be replaced by a relation of non-identity to yield the case of a narrator fictitiously different from the author.

Assuming that /17/ is correct as a hypothesis on the meaning of text /1/, what are the meanings of referential expressions like *the*<sub>7</sub> *hotel*<sub>8</sub> in the text, and how are the meanings obtained?

#### 4.2. *Textual meanings of referential expressions that involve a narrator*

The single meaning of *the*<sub>7</sub> *hotel*<sub>8</sub> in text /1/ is built up in two steps. As before, we start with the referential-doxastic meaning of *the*<sub>7</sub> *hotel*<sub>8</sub> relative to 'hotel'<sub>1</sub> and with respect to ... (cf. /9/). A certain function that remains to be determined applies to this meaning and yields the relation  $\bar{u}$  defined as follows:

/18/  $u = \text{df}$  the relation between any  $V$  and  $V_1$  such that:

- a. There is a  $V_2$  as required in /17a/, i.e.  $u$  as defined in /15/ holds between  $V_1$  and  $V_2$ , and text /1/ is a text by  $V_2$ , and  $V$  is the form of a realization of text /1/ by  $V_2$ .

- b. For any such  $V_2$ , the referential-doxastic meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  relative to 'hotel<sub>1</sub>' and with respect to ... holds between  $V$  and  $V_2$ .

To  $\bar{u}$  we apply the function of pretending and obtain

/19/  $\bar{u} = \text{df}$  the relation between any  $V$  and  $V_1$  such that  $V_1$  pretends  $\bar{u}$  of  $V$  and  $V_1$ .

The function that directly applies to the referential-doxastic meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  is defined as follows (" $V$ ", " $V_1$ ", " $V_2$ " range over arbitrary events or objects in space-time, such as speakers and speech objects or events; " $u$ ", " $u_1$ " range over relations between entities  $V$  and  $V_1$ ; " $t$ " stands for any text):

/20/ The  $u$ -narrator-of- $t$  version of  $u_1 = \text{df}$  the relation between any  $V$  and  $V_1$  such that:

- a. There is a  $V_2$  such that  $u$  holds between  $V_1$  and  $V_2$ , and  $t$  is a text by  $V_2$ , and  $V$  is the form of a realization of  $t$  by  $V_2$ .
- b. For any such  $V_2$ ,  $u_1$  holds between  $V$  and  $V_2$ .

Having the two functions of narrator version and pretending at our disposal, we identify the meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in text /1/ by the following hypothesis that takes the place of the first revised hypothesis /14/:

/21/ *Second revised hypothesis.*

- a. There is exactly one  $u$  such that  $u$  is a meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in text /1/ with respect to  $A^*$ , Henry James, and *English*. [Same as /12a/ and /14a/.]
- b. For all  $u$ , if  $u$  is a meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in text /1/ with respect to  $A^*$ , Henry James, and *English*, then  $u =$  the pretending of the  $u$ -narrator-of-text- /1/ version of the referential-doxastic meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  relative to 'hotel<sub>1</sub>' and with respect to ... [cf. /9/].

By the original hypothesis /12/ the meaning of  $the_7 hotel_8$  in the text was simply the referential-doxastic meaning. By the first revised hypothesis /14/ it was a func-

tion (pretending) of the meaning. By /21/ it now is a function (pretending) of a function (narrator version) of the referential-doxastic meaning. This mirrors the growing distance from 'real-life reference' introduced first by fictionality and then by narrator insertion.

Our account avoids a major mistake in construing 'reference through a narrator': By setting up the function of narrator version as in /20/ and using it as in /21/, it construes 'reference through a narrator' without falling into the trap of hypostatizing a fictitious narrator into a real person. The only spatio-temporal entities to whose existence we remain committed are  $\Lambda^*$  and Henry James.

There are many questions that our account of reference and fictionality and reference and the narrator does not yet answer, or even fails to raise. For instance, what is an adequate interpretation of "pretends"?<sup>8</sup> For what texts is it correct to assume fictionality in the sense of pretending?<sup>9</sup> What is the role of pretending, or analogous propositional attitudes, for defining literary genres?<sup>10</sup> I will pick out just one among the unsettled problems: giving a satisfactory analysis of proper names in fiction. In particular, how are we to deal with proper names that appear in a novel but seem to involve reference to real-world entities such as places or persons? After all, this is a case typical of so-called historical novels.<sup>11</sup> In the remaining part of this paper I shall outline my answer to this question.

## 5. *Dealing with proper names*

### 5.1. *General framework*

There is a vast literature on the semantics of proper names, especially in the philosophy of language. I shall presuppose familiarity with the main types of analyses proposed in the literature and will not, in the present context,

relate my own account to existing proposals. Novel features of my approach will be easily recognized, just as partial agreement with previous accounts.

Proper names, more specifically, singular forms of proper names, will be treated as a special subcase of defined singular nouns. What, then, is an author-independent meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub>, in particular, what is a referential-doxastic meaning?

For identifying a referential-doxastic meaning of *the*<sub>7</sub> *hotel*<sub>8</sub> we had to assume a certain concept, 'hotel'<sub>1</sub>, as a lexical meaning of *hotel*<sub>8</sub>. It has been a much debated question in the literature whether lexical meanings may or may not be assumed for proper names. I will posit such meanings, proceeding from the following idea: a lexical meaning of a proper name is a concept whose intension consists of the property of 'being called by that name'.

As an example of such a concept consider /22/ 'Strether'<sub>1</sub> = the concept whose intension is the set {St}, where St = df the property of being an *x* such that *x* is called *Strether*<sup>P</sup> in English.

English is a system of a certain variety of English (possibly, only an idiolect of Henry James); *Strether*<sup>P</sup> is a word paradigm of that system (having at least two different forms, represented by the nominative and the Saxon genitive; paradigm status is indicated by the P-superscript).<sup>12</sup> The notion of concept again is understood as in Lieb (1979). The main difference between 'Strether'<sub>1</sub> and a concept such as 'hotel'<sub>1</sub> consists in the fact that the intension of the former is language dependent (involves a property that presupposes a system of a certain language variety or an idiolect), while the latter is not. The key term in the definiens of "St", ".. is called..in..", stands in need of explication but will here be left undiscussed.

Given the concept 'Strether'<sub>1</sub>, a referential-doxastic

meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> is obtained in strict analogy to the corresponding meaning of *the*<sub>7</sub> *hotel*<sub>8</sub>, cf. /9/:

/23/ The referential-doxastic meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> relative to 'Strether'<sub>1</sub> and with respect to word sequence /4/, an appropriate syntactic analysis of /4/, and *English* = the relation between utterances and speakers *V*<sub>1</sub> such that:

- a. There is exactly one *x* to which *V*<sub>1</sub> is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in *V*.
- b. For all *x*, if *V*<sub>1</sub> is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in *V* to *x*, then *x* is in the reference basis for *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> relative to *V*, *V*<sub>1</sub>, and 'Strether'<sub>1</sub>.
- c. *V*<sub>1</sub> assumes that, for all *x*, if *V*<sub>1</sub> is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in *V* to *x*, then any addressee of *V* has some knowledge of *x*.
- d. *V*<sub>1</sub> presupposes that, for all *x*, if *V*<sub>1</sub> is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in *V* to *x*, then *x* is in the extension of 'Strether'<sub>1</sub>.

The meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in text /1/ is obtained exactly as before by applying the relevant functions to the referential-doxastic meaning. The following hypothesis corresponds to the second revised hypothesis for the meaning of *the*<sub>7</sub> *hotel*<sub>8</sub>, cf. /21/:

/24/ Hypothesis.

- a. There is exactly one *u* such that *u* is a meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in text /1/ with respect to *A\**, Henry James, and *English*.
- b. For all *u*, if *u* is a meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in text /1/ with respect to *A\**, Henry James, and *English*, then *u* = the pretending of the *u*-narrator-of-text-/1/ version of the referential-doxastic meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> relative to 'Strether'<sub>1</sub> and with respect to word sequence /4/, an appropriate syntactic analysis of /4/, and *English*.

Spelled out in detail the meaning  $u$  is /25/ the relation between any  $V$  and  $V_1$  such that  $V_1$  pretends that

- a. there is a  $V_2$  such that
  - ( $\alpha$ )  $V_1 = V_2$ ;
  - ( $\beta$ )  $\dots V_1 V_2 \dots$  (informally:  $V_2$  satisfies the conditions specified explicitly or implicitly by Henry James for a narrator of the *Ambassadors*);
  - ( $\gamma$ ) text /1/ is a text by  $V_2$ ;
  - ( $\delta$ )  $V$  is the form of a realization of the text /1/ by  $V_2$ ;
- b. for any  $V_2$ , if  $V_2$  satisfies ( $\alpha$ ) to ( $\delta$ ), then  $V$  and  $V_2$  satisfy /23a/ to /23d/, i.e.
  - ( $\alpha$ ) there is exactly one  $x$  to which  $V_2$  is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in  $V$ ;[etc., cf. /23/].

By /11/ and /24/ relation /25/ holds between  $A^*$  and Henry James.

## 5.2. Discussion

Hypothesis /24/ is sound only if the referential-doxastic meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> relative to 'Strether<sub>1</sub>' has been correctly specified, and this meaning depends on the way in which the concept 'Strether<sub>1</sub>' was set up. With respect to this concept we took the rather radical position that the only thing necessarily shared by all 'Strethers' is the fact that they are called this way. It may be argued, however, that we have failed to take account of certain semantic aspects either by the lexical meaning or by the referential-doxastic meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub>. For instance, according to the initial hypothesis /2/, 'Strether' was to be a man or a boy.

We may argue for this assumption as follows  $he_5$  is

obviously 'coreferential' with *Strether's*<sub>1</sub>.<sup>13</sup> Assuming a normal use of the pronoun, actual reference by a form of *he*<sup>P</sup> must be to a male human past the earliest infant stage or to a male animal such as a dog or, possibly, to some kind of a robot, disregarding a few other, even more marginal possibilities. In a 'realistic' novel pretended reference also satisfies these conditions, which is not necessarily true of a fairy-tale. Since the pretended referent of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> is to be able to ask questions and robots have to be ruled out for a realistic novel in 1903, a man or a boy is most likely as the pretended referent of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub>.

It is quite sufficient for this argumentation to assume the lexical meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> to be as in /22/ and the referential-doxastic meaning as in /23/. On the other hand it certainly is compatible with the argumentation to introduce the property of being a male human directly into one of the meanings of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub>. This may be done in either of two ways.

First, '*Strether*<sub>1</sub>' as a lexical meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> could be replaced by the following concept:

/26/ '*Strether*<sub>2</sub>' = the concept whose intension is the set {Str}, where Str = df the property of being an *x* such that *x* is a male human and is called *Strether*<sup>P</sup> in English.

Or else, we could add a presupposition condition to the referential-doxastic meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub>, that is, a different referential-doxastic meaning would be assumed:

/27/ *V*<sub>1</sub> presupposes that, for all *x*, if *V*<sub>1</sub> is referring by *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> in *V* to *x*, then *x* is a male human.

For other proper names femaleness would have to be presupposed, or being a location, or still other properties. It would be theoretically awkward to assume different types of referential-doxastic meanings for different types of proper names. To avoid this, a function operating on the origi-



nal referential-doxastic meanings could be assumed that assigns to meaning /25/ the relation between utterances  $V$  and speakers  $V_1$  that consists in  $V$  and  $V_1$  satisfying both the referential-doxastic meaning /25/ and the additional presupposition condition /27/. Still, different functions would be needed for different types of proper names.

Neither the first nor the second solution has to be chosen if we fall back on the reference basis for an occurrence of a proper name (cf. /23b/); conditions such as maleness can possibly be treated as restrictions on the reference basis when the referential-doxastic meaning is restricted to an utterance and a speaker.

The entire question may seem irrelevant for a name such as *Strether*<sup>P</sup>, which is a family name rather than a Christian name, but cannot be shunned for names like *Ann*<sup>P</sup> or *John*<sup>P</sup>. I leave it undecided which solution should eventually be preferred.

On our analysis, reference by means of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub> is entirely covered by the fictionality proviso, and rightly so. Such an analysis may seem inappropriate in the cases that will now be discussed.

#### 6. *Proper names and the actual world*

Adding the second sentence of *The Ambassadors*, we consider the following text:

/28/ *Strether's first question, when he reached the hotel, was about his friend; yet on his learning that Waymarsh was apparently not to arrive till evening he was not wholly disconcerted. A telegram from him bespeaking a room "only if not noisy," with the answer paid, was produced for the inquirer at the office, so that the understanding that they should meet at Chester rather than at Liverpool remained to that extent sound.*

Chester and Liverpool are cities in the actual world. On a correct understanding of *The Ambassadors* it is at Chester rather than at Liverpool, both in the actual world, 'that Waymarsh and Strether had the understanding to meet'. It appears, then, that there must be reference to cities in the real world by means of the two place names. On the other hand, fictitious characters don't meet in such places.

Put in a nutshell our solution to the problem is as follows: Henry James pretends that the narrator believes that he is referring to a place *that is identical with the real Chester* (with the real Liverpool); we are confronted with the fiction of a narrator who identifies a place he is referring to with Chester in the actual world. How may this be construed formally?

We begin by introducing *the word sequence of /28/* (of the text quoted in /28\*) as the sequence *Strether's*<sub>1</sub>...*Chester*<sub>63</sub>...*Liverpool*<sub>67</sub>...*sound*<sub>72</sub>, in analogy to /4/. Discussion will be restricted to *Chester*<sub>63</sub>.

As a lexical meaning of *Chester*<sub>63</sub> we take a concept 'Chester<sub>1</sub>' defined in strict analogy to 'Strether<sub>1</sub>' in /22/. The referential-doxastic meaning of *Chester*<sub>63</sub> is determined in strict analogy to /23/, which specified the corresponding meaning of *Strether's*<sub>1</sub>:<sup>14</sup>

/29/ The referential-doxastic meaning of *Chester*<sub>63</sub> relative to 'Chester<sub>1</sub>' and with respect to word sequence /28/, and appropriate syntactic analysis of /28/, and the English used by Henry James in text /28/ (assumed to be identical with the English used in text /1/, hence, with *English*) = the relation between utterances *V* and speakers *V*<sub>1</sub> such that:

- a. There is exactly one *x* to which *V*<sub>1</sub> is referring by *Chester*<sub>63</sub> in *V*.
- b. For all *x*, if *V*<sub>1</sub> is referring by *Chester*<sub>63</sub> in *V* to *x*, then *x* is in the reference basis for *Chester*<sub>63</sub> relative to *V*, *V*<sub>1</sub>, and 'Chester<sub>1</sub>'.

- c.  $V_1$  assumes that, for all  $x$ , if  $V_1$  is referring by  $Chester_{63}$  in  $V$  to  $x$ , then any addressee of  $V$  has some knowledge of  $x$ .
- d.  $V_1$  presupposes that, for all  $x$ , if  $V_1$  is referring by  $Chester_{63}$  in  $V$  to  $x$ , then  $x$  is in the extension of  $Chester_1$ .<sup>15</sup>

No real-world Chester figures in the referential-doxastic meaning of  $Chester_{63}$ . Such a Chester is brought in by a modification of /29/: in addition to what is specified by /29/, the speaker  $V_1$  also believes that whatever he is referring to is identical with Chester in England. For a proper formulation two additional constants are required in our semantic metalanguage:

/30/ "Chester-in-England", a constant of the same type as the variable " $x$ " and interpreted to denote a certain city in the actual world, located in England close to Liverpool,

and a functor "application", defined as follows:

- /31/ The application to  $x$  of  $f$  given  $u = df$  the relation between any  $V$  and  $V_1$  such that
- a.  $u$  holds between  $V$  and  $V_1$ ;
  - b.  $V_1$  believes that, for all  $x_1$ , if  $V_1$  is referring by  $f$  in  $V$  to  $x_1$ , then  $x_1 = x$ ,

where " $f$ " stands for any part of a word sequence. In particular,

/32/ the application to Chester-in-England of  $Chester_{63}$  given the referential-doxastic meaning of  $Chester_{63}$  relative to  $Chester_1$  and ... [cf. /29/] = the relation between any  $V$  and  $V_1$  such that:

- a.  $V$  and  $V_1$  satisfy /29a/ to /29d/.
- b.  $V_1$  believes that, for all  $x$ , if  $V_1$  is referring by  $Chester_{63}$  in  $V$  to  $x$ , then  $x = \text{Chester-in-England}$ .

The meaning of  $Chester_{63}$  in text /28/ is now obtained by applying the functions of narrator version and pretending

( $B^*$  = the smallest part of the original copy of *The Ambassadors* that contains a realization of the word sequence of the text quoted in /28/):

/33/ Hypothesis.

- a. There is exactly one  $u$  such that  $u$  is a meaning of  $Chester_{63}$  in text /1/ with respect to  $B^*$ , Henry James, and *English*.
- b. For all  $u$ , if  $u$  is a meaning of  $Chester_{63}$  in text /28/ with respect to  $B^*$ , Henry James and *English*, then  $u$  = the pretending of the  $u$ -narrator-of-text-/28/ version of the application to Chester-in-England of  $Chester_{63}$  given the referential-doxastic meaning of  $Chester_{63}$  relative to 'Chester<sub>1</sub>' and ... [cf. /29/].

On this hypothesis the textual meaning  $u$  of  $Chester_{63}$  is a function (pretending) of a function (narrator version) of a function (application) of the referential-doxastic meaning of  $Chester_{63}$ . Spelt out in detail the meaning is /34/ the relation between any  $V$  and  $V_1$  such that  $V_1$  pretends that

- a. there is a  $V_2$  such that
  - ( $\alpha$ )  $V_1 = V_2$ ;
  - ( $\beta$ ) ... $V_1V_2$ ... (informally:  $V_2$  satisfies the conditions specified explicitly or implicitly by Henry James for a narrator of *The Ambassadors*);
  - ( $\gamma$ ) text /28/ is a text by  $V_2$ ;
  - ( $\delta$ )  $V$  is the form of a realization of text /28/ by  $V_2$ ;
- b. for any  $V_2$ , if  $V_2$  satisfies ( $\alpha$ ) to ( $\delta$ ), then
  - ( $\alpha$ )  $V$  and  $V_2$  satisfy /29a/ to /29d/;
  - ( $\beta$ )  $V_2$  believes that, for all  $x$ , if  $V_2$  is referring by  $Chester_{63}$  in  $V$  to  $x$ , then  $x$  = Chester-in-England.

By /11/ and /33/, relation /34/ holds between  $B^*$  and Henry James. This does *not* imply that Henry James *refer* to Chester in England by *Chester*<sub>63</sub> in  $B^*$ . At the same time a complex semantic relation to Chester in England is indeed established; this relation involves both the reference relation and the fictionality proviso.

The meanings that expressions like *Chester*<sub>63</sub> have in fictional texts with a fictitious narrator may well be among the most complex cases of 'referential meaning' anywhere.<sup>16</sup> We have isolated a semantic relation between such expressions and objects in the actual world that involves, but is different from, a reference relation. There are other semantic relations of this type, for example, the relation that holds in a roman a clef between a name of a character and its intended counterpart in the real world, but these cannot here be discussed any further.

The present paper has been exploratory. We stayed as close to an actual example as possible, gradually disengaging the outlines of a more general picture. Formal rigour was used only when it was forced upon us (which was increasingly the case). Hopefully, the results of this paper will seem encouraging enough to go on with a precisely formulated general theory.

#### Notes

- \* Sections 1 to 3 of this paper are largely identical with a paper read at *The International Conference on the Structure of Narrative*, University of Szeged (Hungary), Sept. 11-13, 1980, and at *The International Semiotic Symposium "Theoretical Semiotics: Verbal Signs - Visual Signs"*, University of Warsaw (Poland), Sept. 22-24, 1980

The present complete version has profited a great deal from discussions during the two conferences. I am particularly indebted to Manfred Bierwisch for extensive comments.

- 1 A sequence is taken as a relation (a set of ordered pairs) that assigns exactly one object to each of the integers  $1, \dots, n$ , for some  $n$ . Thus, the word sequence of /1/ is the set of pairs  $\{(1, \text{Strether's}), \dots, (30, \text{disconcerted})\}$ , abbreviated as above. Note that the abbreviation also applies to parts of the sequence, for instance,  $\text{the}_7 \text{hotel}_8 = \{(7, \text{the}), (8, \text{hotel})\}$ .
- 2 There are problems with 'the original copy' of *The Ambassadors* (cf. Stallmann 1960: 381f), which will here be disregarded.
- 3 In Lieb (1980a), "thematic part" and "rhematic part" are introduced with respect to sentence meanings. They are here applied to the meaning of a text that has a single complex sentence, in a very preliminary way. As a reformulation of (2), (6) does not yet provide a final version even for the parts of (2) that are directly represented.
- 4 The underlying syntactic-semantic theory of English allows *only* for nouns and noun phrases (including pronouns and proper names) as referring expressions. - The *when*-clause in (1) has been interpreted in the sense of "When he reached the hotel, Strether's first question ...", i.e. *not* in the sense of "Strether's first question when ..." (cf. the comma in front of *when*).
- 5 Word meanings are taken as concepts in a psychological sense, as explained in Lieb (1979: Sec. 2) and defended in Lieb (1980b).

- 6 Being a concept, 'hotel<sub>1</sub>' has an intension (a set of properties, in this case) and an extension: the set of objects that have all the properties in the intension.
- 7 By a *realization* of a text we understand an n-tuple consisting of a speech object or event, a 'meaning' of the object or event, and possibly certain other entities; the speech object or event is the *form* of the realization; cf. Lieb (1980c)
- 8 I would suggest an interpretation along the following lines. In pretending  $u$  of  $V$  and  $V_1$ ,  $V_1$  believes that  $u$  does not hold between  $V$  and  $V_1$ , and does not want that any addressee should believe it does; at the same time  $V_1$  wants that no addressee of  $V$  should act on the assumption that  $u$  does not hold between  $V$  and  $V_1$  (pretending implies a wish for the suspension of disbelief).
- 9 For example, a text in which a myth is told by somebody who believes in it is not a fictional text if pretending is explicated as above, fn. 8. I suggest that this case may be covered by assuming a propositional attitude of the author that is different from but analogous to pretending. There may well be a number of different propositional attitudes each of which may take the place of pretending.
- 10 I suggest that propositional attitudes as criteria of classification cut right across literary genres: 'fiction', if meant to cover all fictional texts, should not be set up as a genre.
- 11 The question was brought up repeatedly in the discussions following the Szeged and Warsaw presentations of the shorter version of this paper.

- 12 In view of well-known examples such as *the king of England's son* it may be more adequate to analyse Strether's into *Strether<sub>1</sub> s<sub>2</sub>* and exclude all Saxon genitives as *forms* of nouns; this is immaterial though to our present discussion.
- 13 Coreference is one of the problems that are *not* discussed in this paper.
- 14 Note that discussion in Sec. 5.2 carries over in its entirety to the lexical and referential-doxastic meanings of *Chester*<sub>63</sub>.
- 15 According to my atlas of the world, there are several *x* in the extension of '*Chester*<sub>1</sub>', one in England and four in the United States.
- 16 Even in a novel proper names may occur outside the fictionality proviso (the pretending operator); for instance, documentary material may be included without really being 'worked into' the novel. As a rule, though, it should be the analysis in Secs 5 and 6 that applies.

#### References

- James, H. 1960 [1903]: *The Ambassadors*, edited, and with an afterword, by R. W. Stallmann, New York: The New American Library. (Signet Classics).
- Lieb, H. 1979: "Principles of semantics", in; F. W. Heny, H. Schnelle (eds), *Syntax and semantics, vol. 10: Selections from the Third Groningen Round Table*, New York etc.: Academic Press, 353-378.



- Lieb, H. 1980a: "Syntactic meanings", in: J. R. Searle, F. Kiefer, M. Bierwisch (eds), *Speech act theory and pragmatics*, Dordrecht etc.: Reidel, 121-153. (Synthese Language Library, 10.)
- Lieb, H. 1980b: "Probleme der Wortbedeutung: Argumente für einen psychologischen Bedeutungsbegriff", in: *LAB (Linguistische Arbeiten und Berichte) Berlin (West)* 14, 1-67; Berlin: Freie Universität, Fachbereich Germanistik.
- Lieb, H. 1980c: "A text: what is it? A neglected question in text linguistics", in: J. S. Petöfi (ed), *Text vs. sentence continued*. Basic questions of text linguistics, Hamburg: Buske, 134-158.
- Stallmann, R. W. 1960: "Afterword", in: James 1960, 377-382.

TEMPORAL RELATIONS IN INTENSIONAL SEMANTICS

Anita Steube

Karl Marx University, Leipzig

In speaking about temporal relations, we would like to distinguish at least three levels of description:

1<sup>st</sup> level: level of objects in the outer world

2<sup>nd</sup> level: level of mental representation of these objects and their relations and properties

3<sup>rd</sup> level: level of the structure of natural language with the level of the semantic structure of the verbal expressions as one of its parts.

Linguists are aware of the close relations between levels two and three as far as the meaning of the verbal expressions is concerned. On level three, it is necessary to distinguish further between meaning structures as ideal objects and the form in which they are objectified, that is the linguistic description of meaning structures which of course is dependent from the concept of grammar and meaning the linguist makes use of. We will try to use intensional semantics and ignore the difference between the objects and their descriptions on level three here.

If time (level one) is conceived of as a property of matter, man is included in the course of time. So, if he wants to give order to the continuum of time in his mind he has to divide it at fixed points. One of the most suitable divisions is the so-called 'moment of actual experience' which of course constantly changes in time as man's experience changes.

If man abstracts in his mind from those movements of matter which - from a certain point of view - are not relevant for him at a time, he creates the concept of 'space of time' (level two). One of the those spaces of time is

'Present'. It includes the moment of actual experience. Other relevant spaces of time are 'Past' and 'Future'.

When Reichenbach introduced the reference point into logic<sup>1</sup> he found not only a wonderful means for handling temporal structures, but - as I see it - also a candidate for psychological verification (on level two), that is, something man makes use of in giving order to the continuum of time. We are of the opinion that every space of time has a reference point. This is meant as the point from which that space of time is regarded by the speaker of the corresponding expression. Those spaces of time regarded from their beginning (such as expressed by 'since') have their reference point at their point of beginning, those regarded from their end have their reference point at their end point (such as those expressed by Past Perfect, 'up to'). The other spaces of time take a certain point in the space of time for their reference point (i.e. Future, Past). We have to add that a space of time (on level three) is defined as an uninterrupted ordered set of points of time. Having come so far, we can define what Present, Past or Future are going to mean: Present is a space of time comprising the moment of actual experience ( $t_0$ ) as its reference point ( $t_R$ ). Past is a space of time ending before the moment of actual experience. Future is a space of time beginning after the moment of actual experience. We use an elaborated predicate calculation to formulate the semantic structures for the spaces of time.

Present:  $T_i \subset T_0$  &  $t_{Ri} = t_0$   
Past :  $T_i < t_0$  &  $t_{Ri} \in T_i$   
Future :  $T_i > t_0$  &  $t_{Ri} \in T_i^2$

As mentioned above, Past, and Future have their own reference points, they are defined in relation to the moment of actual experience which is really the main reference point. So all the reference points form a system of relations.

I think that the spaces of time Past, Present, and Future have been exhaustively defined according to their place in the German tense system in this way because they cannot be objectified without knowledge of the context: If we use the expression 'heute' - in contrast to 'gestern' - Present comprises one day only. But if we use the expression 'wohnen' Present may comprise - dependent on the context 'X wohnt in Y' - several years<sup>3</sup>. If we speak about the so-called complex tenses or 'resultative Tempora' in German (they are Present perfect, Past perfect, Future perfect if we use the English names for the German forms) 'perfect' or 'resultative' doesn't mean the same as it means with aspects or, to be more precise, Aktionsarten. For tense forms do not express the result of an action. 'Resultative' means that these tenses mark the end (the maximum) of the relevant space of time. The maximum for Past perfect is at a point of time before a contextually fixed point in the past. The maximum for Present perfect is either at or shortly before the point of actual experience. The maximum for Future perfect is at a point of time before a contextually fixed point in the future. These end points are at the same time the reference points of these spaces of time.

Perfect :  $t_i = \max T_i$  &  $t_i = t_{Ri}$  &  $t_{Ri} = t_0$   
Past Perfect :  $t_i = \max T_i$  &  $t_i = t_{Ri}$  &  $t_i < t_0$   
Future Perfect:  $t_i = \max T_i$  &  $t_i = t_{Ri}$  &  $t_i > t_0$ <sup>4</sup>

In German there is no one to one relation between tense forms and the corresponding temporal meaning. Abstracting from the genre-dependency of tense forms and from the influence of text formation on tense relations, we can make up Table one showing the most important German tenses<sup>5</sup>.

Table 1:

temporal meaning	tense form
Present (aktuelle Gegenwart)	Präsens
Past (Vergangenheit)	Präteritum, Perfekt
Future (Zukunft)	Futur I, Präsens
Present perfect (resultative Gegenwart)	Perfekt
Past perfect (resultative Vergangenheit)	Plusquamperfekt
Future perfect (resultative Zukunft)	Futur II, Perfekt

Defining the main reference point as the point of actual experience means that it is of a deictic nature. The consequence is that each tense form can be interpreted only when we know who uttered it and which time it refers to. That means, temporal semantics has to be based on utterance meaning rather than on sentence meaning. In a communicational process.  $t_0$  is defined as the point of common actual experience of the partners. If one of the partners quotes somebody else's speech (let as for simplicity think that the quoted person does not belong to that party) he must know that he cannot refer the temporally fixed proposition in someone else's utterance to this own reference point but only to that of the former speaker. But at the same time it is clear that man can give order to time only in accordance with *one* scheme. So the reporting partner has to bring the former speaker's reference point into relation to his own. We know how this is done: The reporting partner announces the reported utterance by saying who made it and when (in relation to  $t_0$ ). Let us take the announcement *Peter said* and the quoted utterance *I will come tomorrow*.

Indirect speech : *Peter said, he would come the following day*

spaces of time :  $T_i$   $T_j$   
reference points:  $t_{R_i} < t_0$   $t_{R_j} > t_{R_i}$   
(derived from the definition of Past) (derived from the definition of posteriority)

relation between the spaces of time  $T_i$  and  $T_j$ : posteriority. Should the reference point in the former utterance not differ from  $t_{R_i}$  the temporal relation between the two spaces of time is simultaneity: with  $t_{R_j} < t_{R_i}$  you have anteriority. Thus the reference point of the reported utterance is indirectly related- via that of the announcement - to  $t_0$ .

As already mentioned, intensional semantics makes it possible and necessary to interpret the reference point by means of the context. Hence it should remain unspecified in the tense meaning itself. The semantic structures should be reformulated, comprising the main reference point as a variable (say  $t_{R_k}$ ). If we know from the context, that  $t_{R_i} = t_0$  we get Present, Past or Future ( $t_0$ -based tenses are called absolute tenses), if it remains  $t_{R_j}$ , as in indirect speech, we get Simultaneity, Anteriority or Posteriority ( $t_{R_i}$ -based tenses are called relative tenses). If we take the reference point in the tense meaning to be a variable, we easily understand how it is possible to use the same tense forms in absolute as well as in relative usage. The context-dependent interpretation of the tense form Present Tense as either Present or Simultaneity in German points to an ambiguity in tense meaning. Let us explain this by comparing tenses with temporal adverbs.

There are adverbs which - like the tenses - have a variable reference point:

*bald, gleich - soon*

*bald danach, gleich danach - soon after*

and there are others which are only related to  $t_0$ : *heute, demnächst, vorhin*.  $t_0$ -related adverbs have to be replaced in reported speech: *am gleichen Tag, bald, kurz vorher*.

The tense forms and the adverbs with the variable reference point need not be replaced.

There are slight differences between the occurring tense forms in direct and reported speech, only when we use the subjunctive mood in German reported speech. There are two types of subjunctives, one formed from the stem of the present tense form and the other formed from the stem of the past tense form. But the two types do not differ in tense meaning but only in what we would call the speaker's attitude towards what is expressed by the reported utterance. When there are no longer temporal differences between Present Tense and Past Tense in the subjunctive mood the relation between form and meaning changes in comparison with table one<sup>6</sup>:

Table 2:

temporal meaning	tense form
Simultaneity (Gleichzeitigkeit)	Konjunktiv Präsens, Konjunktiv Präteritum
Anteriority (Vorzeitigkeit)	Konjunktiv Perfekt, Konjunktiv Plusquamperfekt
Posteriority (Nachzeitigkeit)	Konjunktive Präsens, Konjunktiv Präteritum, Konjunktiv Futur I, würde + Infinitiv
Posteriority Perfekt (resultative Nachzeitigkeit)	Konj. Perfekt, Konj. Plusquamperfekt, Konj. Futur II., würde + Part, Perf.+ Inf.

Simultaneity Subjunctive I:

$T_j \subseteq T_i$  &  $t_{R_j} = t_{R_i}$  & CLAIM (reporting speaker, SAY (reported speaker,  $p_j$ ))

Simultaneity Suggestive II:

- a)  $T_j \subseteq T_i$  &  $t_{R_j} = t_{R_i}$  & CLAIM (reporting speaker, SAY (reported speaker,  $p_j$ )) & THINK (reporting speaker, MÖGLICH ( $\neg p_j$ ))
- b)  $T_j \subseteq T_i$  &  $t_{R_j} = t_{R_i}$  & CLAIM (reporting speaker, SAY (reported speaker,  $p_j$ )) & THINK (reporting speaker,  $\neg$ MÖGLICH ( $p_j$ ))

The differences a) and b) in the meaning of subjunctive II are differences in the reporting speaker's increasing degrees of doubt concerning the truth of proposition<sub>j</sub> expressed by the reported utterance.<sup>7</sup>

If sentences contain temporal expressions apart from tense forms, these are related to each other and to the temporal meaning by means of the reference point and by a specification of the simultaneity relation. In a simple sentence, all the spaces of time have the same reference point. And the space of time immediately to the right is a proper subset of the space of time immediately to the left in linear ordering from left to right. This concerns the temporal interrelation of the adverbials. *Yesterday morning at 9 o'clock.*

The space of time expressed by the meaning of the verb (often called action time) must be a proper or improper subset of the narrowest space of time expressed in the temporal frame which the tenses and the adverbials form together (often called valuation time). *Yesterday morning at 9 o'clock Peter posted the letter.*

In temporally complex sentences the action time expressed in the subclause becomes the temporal frame for the space of time expressed in the main clause. In durationally



complex sentences the action time in the subclause is equivalent in time to the space of time expressed in the main clause. This meets the above mentioned simultaneity relation. In sentences with the conjunctions *nachdem* or *bevor* there are two spaces of time ordered by the temporal relation 'before'. Both spaces of time however must be within the same temporal level (Zeitstufe). A temporal level is the intersection of sets of the comparative temporal meanings. Thus Present and Present Perfect belong to PRESENT, Past and Past Perfect to PAST, Future and Future Perfect to FUTURE.<sup>8</sup>

These findings allow us to explain text coherence. Propositions that are directly or indirectly related to the same reference point are interpreted by means of the same world-time points or - in other words - are in the same world. They can be temporally ordered by the relation 'before' when there are sufficient additional reference points which allow all the suborderings required. Spaces of time that are not in relation to the main reference point can not be temporally interpreted or understood. This is already seen from the simple example of a complex sentence.

<sup>x</sup>*After I got the second edition of Longman's dictionary at a second-hand bookseller's my sister had asked for it several times in vain before.*

The great majority of texts deal with objects and relations which are related to each other in *one* world. But when we come to literary fiction this does not suffice to fix the reference point. We must know in which world the moment of actual experience is. I.e. in science fiction, the temporal relations do not differ from those in the real world, they refer to  $t_0$  and are ordered by means of the relation 'before'. It is only our knowledge of the real world that tells us that a fictitious world is being spoken about, that the fictitious  $t_0$  has been used for a point of time which - according to our knowledge of the laws of development in the

real world - could possibly be there after  $t_0$  but certainly not in  $t_0$  or even before. That means that the temporal relations remain the same as in the real world only the axis, the main reference point has been replaced.

If one text speaks about events that have to be interpreted in different worlds it is homogeneous if the world-time points of both can be related to each other. Each set of world-time points has its own main reference point by means of which you can divide the text into subtexts. If there is no possible relation - such as for instance, when one has a dream - textual connection has to be achieved by other than temporal means.

But there are other cases where only part of the objects and relations are placed in another world: Historical Present, for example, places part of the objects that in the actual world have the world-time points  $t_{R_i} < t_0$  in an individual view with the reference point  $t_{R_i} = t_0$ . The relevant objects are described as if they were experienced at the time of speaking about them. So the speaker for a time identifies two different points of reference, the actual  $t_0$  with the non-actual, but actualized one. But this identification is not supported by the adverbial temporal means. So that his partners' view of the actual world is maintained with the aid of linguistic means too and not only through their knowledge of the actual world:

*Da gehe ich doch gestern nichtsahnend über die Strasse.*

These forms are often used in every-day German as well as in literature. If the adverbial frame changed too, the hearers would not notice the transpositional effect of the Historical Present so well, they could even take the speaker for a liar if they knew the facts. Using the Historical Present in fiction changes the main reference point once more from the real and non-actual but actualized world to a fictitious non-actual world.

Intensional semantics also helps to solve the long-lasting dispute about the temporal value of the German Preterite in Fiction. It was initiated by Käthe Hamburger<sup>9</sup> who deprived the epic preterite of any temporal meaning. The scholars taking part in the discussion afterwards expressed the most varied views. Leaving aside the interior monologue as an additional complication, intensional semantics meets K. Hamburger half-way: It was expressly said above that only the interpretation of  $t_{R_1} < t_0$  is accepted as Past, and we have to add now that  $t_0$  must be the point of actual experience in the real and actual world. This automatically leads us to the decision that in fiction the semantic structure of the epic preterite is a function selecting a space of time (level one, in a fictitious outer world) before a fictitious moment of actual experience. It is not the temporal value (expressed by the relation 'before' and the fact that the maximum of the space of time is not marked) of the tense that proves to be different in fiction, but that it is referring to a different world<sup>10</sup>. What is kept in fiction is the system of temporal relations in general and the classification of German tenses in temporal relations in general and the classification of German tenses in temporal levels.

In what has been said so far we have given no new data. The intention was to show that new theoretical insights may help to explain old problems in an easy and natural way and may also help to avoid mistakes like those made in the past. At the same time we warn against the overestimating of intensional semantics. It cannot be used to explain the sequence of tenses in texts because these are so extensively influenced by non-linguistic factors such as, among other things, the reader's and/or hearer's knowledge of the sequence of events in the outer world or the linear ordering of text-production and - perception. Here are two examples by way of illustration:

1. Sentences following each other in a coherent text written in Präsens or Präteritum may be interpreted as expressing successive events if this accords with the semantics of the non-temporal nucleus of the propositions. On a strictly linguistic basis we could only interpret them all as belonging to the given temporal frame.

2. The textinitial and/or - concluding function of German Perfekt and Plusquamperfekt<sup>11</sup> - often listed among the so-called 'stylistic' functions of these tenses -

*Mein Grossvater ist bis in sein hohes Alter viel gereist. Hinmal fuhr er durch Ungarn, eigentlich aus keinem endern Grunde, als um das Land kennenzulernen, in welchem sein verstrobener Bruder 1849 gefochten hatte. Auf einer kleinen Station stieg ein Mann von reichlicher Körperfülle zu ihm ins Coupe. ... Unnötig zu sagen, dass der Wein pünktlich eintraf. Mein Grossvater legte bei seinen Freunden Ehre mit ihm ein. Später hat er sich noch manche Sendung kommen lassen. Als er starb, schon in unserem Jahrhundert, fand sich noch ein beträchtlicher Rest vor. Ich habe mich seiner mit Vergnügen angenommen.*<sup>12</sup>

is of course, related to the temporal meaning of these tenses and to the fact mentioned above that action time can function as a temporal frame relative to which other propositions are temporally ordered (in temporally complex sentences as well as in successive sentences in texts). But this is not enough for text formation. Different genres have different structuring principles. German Perfekt and Plusquamperfekt would certainly not be used in the same way in strictly descriptive texts and not every content can be fitted into such a frame.

Notes

- <sup>1</sup> H. Reichenbach 1947: Elements of Symbolic Logic. New York, London
- <sup>2</sup> <: before;  $T_i < t_0$ : all points of time belonging to the space of time  $T_i$  are before  $t_0$   
>: after:  $t_i > t_j = \text{def } t_j > t_i$   
Given that each space of time has its own reference point and that this is never outside the corresponding space of time the last conjunct in the formulas above can be left out as redundant.
- <sup>3</sup> compare p. 6 for the interrelationship between the adverbial frame and action time.
- <sup>4</sup> max  $T_i$  is the marked end of the space of time  $T_i$ .
- <sup>5</sup> A. Steube 1980 a): Temporale Bedeutung im Deutschen, in: Studia grammatica 20. Berlin, 18-21.
- <sup>6</sup> A. Steube 1980 b): Die consecutio temporum in Deutschen als Ausdruck eines komplexen Zuordnungsverhältnisses von Zeichenfolge und Bedeutungsstruktur, in: Linguistische Arbeitsberichte 26, Leipzig. The sequence-of-tense rules were formulated as a recursive mechanism for the first time in E. Hajicová, J. Panevová, P. Sgall 1971: The meaning of tense and its recursive properties, in: Philologica pragensia, vol. 14, Nr. 1; vol. 14, Nr. 2. in a formal way. I want to thank P. Sgall for a helpful discussion of this paper.
- <sup>7</sup> For a more detailed discussion see A. Steube (to appear): Indirecte Rede und Zeitverlauf, in: Studia grammatica, Berlin

- <sup>8</sup> A. Steube 1980 a): chapters 4, 6.
- <sup>9</sup> K. Hamburger 1951: Zum Strukturprinzip der epischen und dramatischen Dichtung. in: DVjS für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 25. Jg., Nr. 1, 1-26;  
K. Hamburger 1953: Das epische Präteritum, in: DVjS für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 37, Jg., Nr. 3, 329-357.
- <sup>10</sup> In model-theoretic semantics a 'world' is mostly considered as a set theoretical structure, which can be regarded as the structure of the real world (level one, cf. M.J. Cresswell 1973: Logics and Languages, London). A proposal by M. Bierwisch 1980 (Semantic Structure and Illocutionary Force, in: J.R. Searle, F. Kiefer eds: Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics. Dordrecht, 1-35) to take a 'world' as the structure of the internal, cognitive representation of a person's experience (level two) is of greater significance for our purposes: Man's experience may be based on his adequate reflection of the states of affairs in the outer world (leading to the real world - level two). But there may also be cognitive operations transforming the experience and creating imaginary structures for certain purposes. Our fictitious worlds in literary art belong to the latter category.
- <sup>11</sup> This concerns the beginning and end of paragraphs, subtexts, and whole stories.
- <sup>12</sup> W. Bergengruen 1965: Die Charakterprobe, in: W. Fehse ed.: Deutsche Erzähler der Gegenwart - eine Antologie. Stuttgart; 68, 70. Perfect Tense forms emphasized by A. St.



MODEL-STRUCTURES AND POSSIBLE WORLDS

/A LITERARY THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE BORCHERT-STORY: DIE KÜCHENUHR/

Károly Csúri

A. József University, Szeged

1. GENERAL LITERARY SEMIOTIC FRAMEWORK

1.1 Semiotic poetics versus linguistic poetics

In a critical survey of linguistic poetics Roland Posner concludes that, as with linguistics, it cannot solve its task satisfactorily<sup>1</sup>. Posner considers namely the systematic description and explication of the properties of verbal communication the task of linguistics; while those of literary communication are the task of poetics. Literary communication is nothing but a verbal communication with an aesthetic function.

According to him generative linguistics has studied mainly the abstract regularities of the language system and the conditions of well-formedness of verbal utterances in written texts. And though there is no successful communication possible without this knowledge, neither is there any doubt that research of this kind is necessary but not sufficient condition for the explicit description of verbal communication. In this latter case one cannot neglect the conventions determining the use of rules, the requirements of speech acts and the elements of the concrete speech situation either. For the solution of the emerging linguistic and poetical difficulties Posner considers the most suitable those systems which have been worked out by research in communication theory and semiotics<sup>2</sup>.

It is well-known that in the communicative process through a certain channel the sender sends the recipient a



message which refers to definite designates, i.e. states of affairs and contexts on the basis of a code. The sign-material is made up of elements passing physically through the channel, while the sign-vehicle is made up of the semiotically relevant parts of the sign-material. The receptive activity is influenced mainly by the structurization of the sign-material, the possession of the appropriate channel and code, and by the reception ability of the recipient. These factors determine the experiences and information the recipient must use to understand the message; or which he must deliberately ignore from his previous knowledge, or other sources at his disposal.

Relying on the conceptions of the Russian formalists and the Prague structuralists, Posner distinguishes literary and non-literary communication by means of contrasting *single, individual* and *common, frequent* actions. In this sense, communication itself is a complex action, too. The frequent communicative actions that occur in the same way automatize the connection between the partners and their relationship to the world. The use of constant codes fixes the structure of designates and that of the fraction of reality in question and so the relation of the participants in the communication to the world narrows down and remains on one single level. As a contrast, the literary communication tries to change the fixed verbal and cultural codes. It deprives actions that have become ordinary in a given context of their automatic nature, and so, indirectly, it fosters the adaptability of the society to possible events which happen in a form not coded in advance.

How can literary communication fulfil this essential role? According to Posner, it can do so by putting the ordinary actions into new, unusual contexts. That is, it does not need a new language but a new use of language, The presentation of the world in a new context. In contrast with every other kind of communication, in literary communica-

tion the entire sign-material acts as a potential sign-vehicle. Besides, the different levels of the original sign-vehicles contain not only characteristics coded in advance but also such features that, otherwise, in the case of common use, do not carry information. So it seems expedient to differentiate between the reception strategies of a semiotic process with and without an aesthetic function. Supposing we are the recipients of an aesthetic semiotic process, then we try to discover connections between the characteristics of the sign-material not coded in advance, and later to relate these to the characteristics coded in advance. We attribute informative value to these new connections which cannot be revealed directly by the codes known so far. The new context de-automatizes the codes of the elements coded in advance that otherwise work automatically. The elimination, the modification or the total reconstruction of the usual automatisms make the comprehension of the aesthetic message considerably more difficult, or course.

Posner explains the specific nature of the literary communication by the following hypothesis: on reception of the artistic message a special, so-called *aesthetic code* operates in the recipient besides the verbal and other socio-cultural codes in general force. This enables the recipient to interpret both the characteristics of the sign-material not coded in advance and the level-specific information as a sign-vehicle. That is, the aesthetic code operates partly on the elements of the sign-material, partly on those ingredients of the message which are determined by the verbal, rhetorical and other socio-cultural codes.

Two conclusions at least, also very essential from the interpretation-theoretical point of view, must be drawn from the foregoing:

- (i) the aesthetic code as a whole is never given in advance, the recipient reconstructs it in every case;
- (ii) the aesthetic code, i.e. the aesthetic information of

the analysed sign-vehicle is not or only partly accessible for a recipient who has no appropriate experiences concerning the socio-cultural sign-systems and codes in question.

### 1.2 Abstract rule systems in linguistics and poetics

Posner's study is a critical summary of the results of linguistic and semiotic poetics, and it argues convincingly for one of the possible directions for scientific advance: the construction of a semiotic literary science. But the survey of his thoughts is not intended to support this consideration only. However, it serves the purpose of proving that our interpretation-theoretical considerations on literary narratives are compatible with the general theses of literary semiotics as background-theory in every essential respect. In this sense, the reception of literary narratives is interpreted as a specific sub-class of the reception of semiotic processes carrying an aesthetic value. The narrative sign-processes must have an independent theory, methodology and terminology that are compatible with and consistently adaptable to a more comprehensive and general literary semiotic theory, methodology and terminology.

Posner's parallel between the limited potential of the generative linguistics and the structural or generative-linguistic poetics is completely reasonable from a theoretical point of view. At the same time, we must see that the scientific level and results of the latest linguistic research and those in poetics using linguistics as a starting-point or model differ basically from one another. Despite the fact that the variety of trends sometimes seems chaotic, linguistics has created the scientific basis providing a legitimate demand for advance: how can the abstract regularities, the well-formed utterances be integrated into the structure of the verbal communication? How can grammatical theory in the wide sense and communication theory be related

to one another?

This linguistically real demand seems illusory and unfounded with respect to the current poetic theories: we do not know a poetics - also relevant from a literary point of view - that is able to set up rule systems which generate literary narrative text-structures and operate with linguistic precision in the former sense. So besides admitting that the detailed description and explication of the properties of literary communication is a basic poetical task, it also has to be stressed that the scientific preconditions for such kinds of analyses are to a large extent lacking or are imperfectly elaborated. Thus our study is intended to contribute not so much to the clarification of the general literary communication as to that of the basis of the communicative process. We try to describe a system of abstract regularities, a model-structure defining the composition of a Borchert-story in an explicit way. The model-structure on the one hand ensures the intersubjective control of the explication of the story, and on the other hand it can provide data for the elaboration of a further typology, comparative and literary communication theory.

## 2 SOME INTERPRETATION-THEORETICAL QUESTIONS OF LITERARY NARRATIVES<sup>3</sup>

### 2.1 Problem of reference

In the first phase of the text-analysis the recipient renders one (or more) text-world(s) to the text. Yet this operation does not suspend for him the *arbitrariness* of the composition of the text-world. This arbitrariness, of course, characterizes the composition of both literary and non-literary text-worlds, and the recipient/reader must be able to suspend the arbitrariness of both types. The most natural and effective process for the suspension of the arbitrariness

iness of non-literary text-worlds is to try to make the states of affairs of the text-world correspond with those of a fraction of reality actually existing. To put it in order words: we explain the composition of the text-world by that of the real world that is usually coded in a familiar way. Many readers try to suspend the arbitrariness of the literary text-worlds with a similar reception strategy. It may be true - as we have already mentioned - that literary works for the most part do not dispense with the use of language and other socio-cultural codes, however, the mechanism that was valid for the suspension of arbitrariness in non-literary texts is misleading here. We must make the recipients realise again and again that the ordinary codes operate in a new, unusual context, in different ways and with different purposes when they establish literary text-worlds. Among other things the semantic-pragmatic problem of the reference and the truth-value of literary texts reminds us of this.

The literary text-worlds usually operate with fictitious persons, and so their *primary* range of reference is not the real world. But if the reference of the individuals in the propositions cannot be given in the real world, then the truth-value of the propositions cannot be decided on the basis of the real world either. Let us take the introductory sentence of the Borchert-story as an example: "*Sie sahen ihn schon von weitem auf sich zukommen, denn er fiel auf.*" (They saw him approaching them from afar because he was remarkable.)

The reception strategy of non-literary text-reading stimulates us to try to identify the persons referred to by individuals represented verbally by the above pronominal forms. However, the lack of a pragmatical context destroys the possibility of identification in the real world. As a consequence of this, the supposed complex contact ('to see', 'to approach') between the individuals, unidentified ref-

erentially, that is the truth-value of the whole proposition cannot be judged. We do not know for sure whether the claimed state of affairs exists/existed in the real world or not.

In spite of the problems mentioned there is no doubt that the natural intuition of the reader, apart from the failure of the attempt at identification, will not deny the existence (in some sense) of the individuals denoted by "he" and "they", and that of the contact declared concerning them. The recipient has namely no ground for the negation of the proposition, there is no real world here behind the text-world from whose viewpoint he can seriously claim: 'They can't have seen him approaching them because he was not remarkable at all'. The absurd consequences of utterances of this kind for literature are not difficult to see. The reader almost instinctively corrects his reception strategy and - in contrast with several logicians - supposes a reference-relation here, irrespective of the real world. While doing so he also admits that the states of affairs in the text-world exist irrespective of the real world, too, that is, the propositions about them that assert the states of affairs in question and that are not directly linked to the characters possess true truth-value.<sup>4</sup>

In the following we try to define what in fact the range of reference of the fictitious persons is, and how this range, which ensures the existence of the fictitious persons (in some sense), can be explicated theoretically.

## 2.2 Model-structures as explications of literary text-worlds

To answer the question of reference we choose an approach which attributes semiotic relevance to those elements and relations that are not coded in the usual verbal and other socio-cultural systems of signs in advance, and so cannot be directly interpreted within them. Hence we must

construct a code that is built partly upon the codes used and partly upon their systematic negation, and that can explicate the sign-material, with the created rules, which is not able to be interpreted in the usual way. This process can also be expressed in a system of interpretation operating with truth-values: apart from the states of affairs of the real world we accept here hypothetically that the propositions of the analyzed text (not directly linked to characters) are true; that is, the states of affairs of the text-world expressed by them obtain in the given form. In the course of the explication suspending arbitrariness we try to establish a model-structure (=code of the text-world) which *makes the hypothetically true propositions* - about, or more precisely, making up the text-world - *true* on the basis of the model-structure resulting only from its composition.

How can the principles sketched here be applied in the explication of literary narratives? We can start by saying that the states of affairs (= sequences of states, events and actions etc.) in the text-world of literary narratives are also ordered partly by properties coded in advance; that is, the time-, space-, logical and value-connections the recipient knows from the real world. We know, however, that any element of the sign-material or the connection of the elements that are not coded in advance or are coded in an unusual or superficial way can modify the automatic application and enforcement of the codes mentioned in the text-world explication. To prove our theoretical presuppositions we take a short, preliminary and only partly analysed example from the Borchert-story which will be discussed later in a more detailed and somewhat altered form.

For the reader the decisive majority of the states of affairs are structured by seemingly usual, automatically operating codes. For the understanding of strange, unusual events, actions and states we also have our automatic codes: when the people sitting on the bench ask the young man who

is clutching the wall-clock about the loss of his parents and home, he answers in the affirmative and he "smiles" or "laughs" "heartily" in the meantime. The upset of the natural order of values to this extent can be judged by the reader, who relies on his experiences of the real world, as the young man became 'demented' *in his pain*; and this explanation is also inspired by the behaviour of those sitting on the bench. No matter how much truth there is in this statement finally, the reader who suspends the arbitrariness of the composition of the text-world with this interpretation undoubtedly misunderstands the essence of the aesthetic code ordering the text-world, the whole strategy of literary text-reception. The tested evaluation mechanism that is able to characterize similar *real* situations satisfactorily cannot be used automatically here. It is not possible because the very characteristics of *this possible world* is that *pain* appears here as *happiness*, *dementia* caused by *pain* as *clear and unified value-consciousness determined by happiness*. The people on the bench express their *pity* and *sympathy* not in the conventional way of verbal and non-verbal acts but by *turning away, making the establishment of contract impossible*, by their *seemingly hostile attitude*. Showing up the traditional, the mostly ineffective feelings and values in such a new context in an unexpected way queries and makes uncertain the automatism of the usual, habitual reactions. When, however, we find the new ordering principles, the aesthetic code, in other words when we can construct a world where the ambivalence of feelings and values is not arbitrary any more, then *pain* and *dementia* affect the recipient with their 'original' force or in an intensified form since the explored explanatory system makes all the states of affairs of the text-world function in favour of this. Let us see, however, what the exact situation is in the Borchert-story.



The mother and the home, and the events of the past connected with them become real values for the young man in the moment of their loss and only through their loss. This value is preserved and projected to the present by the wall-clock that remained outwardly intact. Strangely enough, the death of the mother, the destruction of the home means not value-loss but value-recognition in the young man's life: his daily meetings with his mother, almost indifferent in the past, suddenly go through a meta-morphosis and become the symbols of the "paradisical" state of love and protection. The young man "laughs" and "smiles" "heartily" for he is happy: after his mother's death and the loss of his home he possesses in the wall-clock an object of incomparably greater value than he could feel in his mother's life and in the natural security of home. So the world of the young man and the people on the bench is determined by an ambivalent order of values: what is 'past' for the people on the bench is 'present' for the young man, what is 'value-loss' for the people on the bench is 'value-preservation' for the young man, what is only an 'imaginary world' for the people on the bench is 'reality' for the young man, etc. Not only the codes of values but also those of causal relations operate differently from the usual principles: while the people on the bench attribute the fact that the clock stopped at "half past two" to the effect of the bomb hitting the house, the young man suspects a symbolic-mystical connection between the time shown on the clock and the time of meetings in the kitchen which nearly always took place "half past two" in the morning.

At this point it is not necessary to continue the analysis. What we have said so far is enough to demonstrate the validity of the statement in the introduction: in the case of literary works the code of ordering can never be given totally in advance, and the *automatic* adoption and application of codes from the real world or works of similar type - that can be profitably used there - may easily be mis-

leading. On taking into consideration the entire sign-material the recipient must find/establish those abstract regularities which determine the model-structure of the text-worlds. The model-structure, since it can be generated on the basis of a system of rules, is a well-formed, abstract sequence of events/actions with value-assignments.<sup>5</sup> The sequences of events/actions of the actualized text-worlds follow this abstract and well-formed sequence of events/actions in their composition, and hence their composition is not arbitrary. The regularities set up re-organize, re-structure the text-world on an epistemological level.

The *text-world* explicated with the help of the *model-structure*, which in this sense is the *model* or *interpretation* of the abstract model-structure, will henceforth be called the *literary possible world*.

So the primary task of the explication of literary narratives is to elaborate a model-structure. The model-structure in accordance with the coherence-principle ensures those truth-conditions under which the hypothetically true propositions asserting the states of affairs in the text-world receive an actually true truth-value in relation to the states of affairs in the possible world. But we also stress that the task of literary explication (in the above narrow sense) is not confined to the construction of model-structures only; since several literary possible worlds can belong to one model-structure only as a consequence of its abstract and general nature.<sup>6</sup> That is why we must also give the distinctive features which, in contrast to the essential common characteristics represented by the model-structure, ensure the individuality, the peculiarity of the particular possible worlds.

We must note a possible misunderstanding here. The model-structure cannot be identified with formal mathematical models in spite of certain similarities concerning the level of abstraction. There always exists at least one basic

difference: in contrast to mathematical models, literary model-structures are *value-carrying/value-forming* systems in every case. At the same time this fact explains also the possible *action-influencing* or *action-orientating* role of literary works.<sup>7</sup>

To go back to the literary-semiotic framework-theory, we can re-formulate Posner's general theses for ourselves as follows: the *possible worlds* in the above sense constitute those *new contexts* where the usual, frequent actions of the real world are de-automatized, and become single and individual actions. After a certain time in the real world more and more fixed and automatic codes operate. In contrast, the code of a literary possible world - apart from the problem of epigon works etc. -, however much it may be built on codes valid in the real world, is not fixed or much less so, since it exists in itself only potentially. Actually it is produced in the process of a reception of a creative nature on the basis of the possibilities ensured by the text-world as an individual version of general regularities. An actually non-existent world becomes a possible world only and exclusively by the help of the recognized and explored code, the explicative model-structure.

'Presenting' the possible against the real, the actualized, 'displaying' the usual in an unusual context; all this claims that our relation to the world should not become fixed.

It does not follow from this however, that in this way the literary text-worlds, in a word, literature should lose its contact with the real world. The reverse is true: on the one hand, one can only reasonably speak of possible worlds as dependent on the real world. On the other hand, and the plots as well-formed sequences of events serve this purpose, already in Aristotle's conception, the literary possible worlds display, change or re-create not the accidental, contingent connections but the more profound, over-

all value-structures of the real world. This is valid for every significant work, even if these general value-structures - for the very sake of ensuring the individual, particular nature that is specially important aesthetically - can be obtained only through seemingly accidental, contingent sequences of events.

3. ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE MODEL-STRUCTURE

*/Wolfgang Borchert: Die Küchenuhr/*

3.1 General remarks on the internal hierarchy of the model-structure

Within the model-structure we distinguish between action-logical, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic components. Here we deal in detail only with the description of the first three ingredients. Pragmatic references will be included only in the final chapter of the study: in the text-world interpretation of the model-structure.

It is also customary - as is proved by the enormous special literature - to examine the listed components of the model-structure one by one. This process is simpler inasmuch as in the formulation of the particular levels of structure one can disregard the compositions of others, the coherence and consistency between them. We, for our part, try to sum up the components mentioned in one, hierarchically organized model-structure. The hierarchy is not from a specifically narrative point of view, instead, it is built up according to the different degrees of abstraction. The hierarchically organized model-structure cannot exaggerate the importance of the particular levels resulting from mutual dependence, as is possible in the separate analysis of the levels. In this way we can perform a more complex analysis and we can separate the transformational operations of the different structural levels better, and also those ele-

ments and relations on which the transformations in question operate. Prospectively the model-structure can serve as an efficient means in the typological systematization of the Borchert-stories.

The most abstract level of the model-structure represents a change of state in an action-logical sense. This is followed by the syntactic structure which assigns abstract, non-interpreted narrative categories and relations to the above change of state. The least abstract level is constituted by the semantic component that provides thematic value-markers for the syntactic categories and relations. The term 'thematic value-marker' is not used by chance: it expresses the fact that in the interpretation of syntax thematic and value problems are often mixed, they sometimes fuse inseparably. The methodological difficulties resulting from this will not be discussed here since they do not affect our purpose: the possible generalization of the semantic component with regard to the Borchert-stories and the unambiguous separation of semantics from the action-logical and syntactic components. At the same time, we also stress that the positive and negative values - independently from the semantic level of structure - will also be marked on the action-logical and syntactic components of the model-structure. The unmarkedness or the "+" sign expresses the positive, while the "-" sign or the unmarked symbol, or the verbal negation of the thematic value-marker expresses the negative value.

A final methodological remark: the model-structure can be established only with full knowledge of the result of empirical text-analysis performed previously, succeeding it in time. However, the procedure whereby explicit structure *logically precedes* text-analysis has strict methodological consequences. The explicit formulation of the model-structure contains the possibility of supervision or denial from two points of view. On the one hand, if it seems reasonable,

we can *theoretically* doubt its overall nature, simplicity, function ability, consistency, coherence etc. On the other hand, we can *empirically* check if the model-structure is actually able to account for every relevant connection of the states of affairs in the text-world. If we find certain states of affairs or their connections which the model-structure cannot explain satisfactorily within its own system, within the theoretical requirements raised against itself we can query its validity. This, however, can be reliably solved methodologically only if we regard the text-world of the story as a model, the interpretation of the model-structure; that is, we accept that the former logically precedes the latter.

### 3.2 The action-logical component of the model-structure

We describe the composition of the text-world of the story on this abstract level as a process-structure. The process means the transformation of an initial state into a final state. The transformation itself is the result of activity, in our case, it is closely related to the activity and intentions of the 'agents' who participate in the process. For the sake of simplification, in the formal explication we adopt not an action-logical but a so-called change-logical notation.<sup>8</sup> So we interpret the change as action or system of actions but we will note only the fact and direction of the activity. The relevant aspect of the action-logical structure can be determined without the explicit introduction of the 'agents'.

From the general process-function  $(-(pT)-)p$  the following four actual processes can be derived:  $pTp$ ,  $-pT-p$ ,  $-pTp$  and  $pT-p$ . Now we are going to construct from these four elementary processes the process-structure that is 'imitated' by the composition of the text-world of the Borchert-story on this level.

Let the initial state of the text-world (in the domain of empirical text-analysis) be of negative (-p), and its final state of positive value (p), so the transformation (T) produces a change-process (v). This change-process takes place only if certain conditions (Q) prevail. It cannot happen if those conditions are missing (-Q):

$v_1$ : -pTp , if Q and

$v_2$ : -pT-p , if -Q.

So on an action-logical level, depending on the presence of the conditions, there is one *change-* ( $v_1$ ), or one *preserving-* process ( $v_2$ ).

Two remarks must be added to the stated formula:

- (i) We made a restriction concerning the state-variables as opposed to the usual action-logical state-transformation. In the text-world of the Borchert-story it is not that an optional initial state  $p_i$  is followed by an optional final state  $p_j$ , but that a state -p is replaced by a contrasted state p. Or, if the conditions are missing, T preserves the same initial state -p. The transformation T appears on this level of structure in the usual temporal-logical sense "and then".
- (ii) The given formulae are, of course, only possible structures; to get an actual structure we must know whether the conditions are met or not. On the basis of empirical text-analysis, the type of structure the Borchert-story realises can be characterized from an action-logical point of view mainly by the particularities of the final state.

After these preliminary remarks we give the process-structure which contains the most important regularities determining the text-world of the story.

(a) *Initial state*

v: -pT\_

In our view the action-logical structure itself is also of a hierarchical composition. The components (states, processes, acts, actions) of the particular levels are defined by the different connections of functors and arguments.<sup>9</sup> That is, -p can be considered an abstract state such as is determined by the complex structure of the components of the levels. However, from the viewpoint of our objective such a detailed decomposition carries no importance.

(b) *The process of transformation*

v: \_T\_

The detailed exposition of the transformation T is not necessary either. T is namely a time-functor, the change marked by it does not influence the quality, the value of the states. Formally, on this level, the states, more exactly the process v;\_T\_ can be characterized only as a sequence of time-states. But in the present context the Borchert-story interests us mainly as a sequence of events expressing value-state change. It is not unessential, though less important, whether the change takes place 'continuously' or 'suddenly', 'quickly' or 'slowly', etc.

(c) *Final state*

v: \_T-p.p, for both -Q and Q are met;  
/ " . " = "and"/

So the global action-logical component of the model-structure can be put down in the following simple pattern.

v<sub>1,2</sub>: -pT-p.p.

The final state contains an action-logical contradiction. Since T is only a time-functor, the transformational process does not explain the contradiction. The simultaneous realisation of -p and p is, however, the result of an operation not permitted in action-logics only. The existence



of the text-world of the Borchert-story does not depend on whether its state-changes satisfy the requirement of logical consistency or not. From the viewpoint of the literary explication of the text-world there is no need to release the established contradiction. Moreover, as permitted by the former examples, we have reason to suppose that one determining feature of the possible worlds of Borchert lies just in this contradiction. It is quite another matter that the syntactic and semantic specification of the conditions  $Q$  can reduce the action-logical contradiction to oppositions in the components mentioned.

### 3.3 The syntactic component of the model-structure

Now we will examine what narrative categories and relations can be translated into the action-logical process-formula.

Let the initial and final states consist of complex states of affairs that contain the abstract figures  $F_a$  and  $F_b$ . The two states are determined by the distinguished relation  $R$  between  $F_a$  and  $F_b$ . The opposition of  $p$  and  $\neg p$  is interpreted by the states of affairs  $+R(F_a, F_b)$  and  $-R(F_a, F_b)$ . The realisation or non-realisation of the given conditions ( $Q$ ) or ( $\neg Q$ ) can be expressed by a relation  $S$ .  $S$  denotes the connection not between  $F_a$  and  $F_b$  but between  $F_a$  and  $F_c$ , and  $F_b$  and  $F_c$ .  $F_c$  stands in the hierarchy of figures under  $F_a$  and  $F_b$  since the obtaining relation  $S$  is only a condition for the realisation of relation  $R$ . We mention - but will later expound - that essentially  $F_c$  serves to shorten the existing relation between  $F_a$  and  $F_b$ . We introduce  $v_s$  to denote the syntactic process, and the symbol  $\_T^+$  to mark the transformations operating here.

Now let us see how the possible structure of the narrative syntax can be written down.



$$v_{s1}: -R(F_a, F_b) \text{ T}^+ +R(F_a, F_b), \text{ if } \begin{array}{l} 1. +S(F_b, F_c), \\ 2. +S(F_a, F_c); \end{array}$$

and

$$v_{s2}: -R(F_a, F_b) \text{ T}^+ -R(F_a, F_b), \text{ if } \begin{array}{l} 1. -S(F_b, F_c), \\ 2. \overset{\pm}{S}(F_a, F_c) \text{ (=fac-} \\ \text{ultative)}; \end{array}$$

We know from the analysis of the story that in the final state of the text-world the 'majority of the people on the bench' ( $F_b$ ) except 'one man' ( $F_b$ ) do not establish contact with the 'young man' ( $F_a$ ). In addition, in the initial state of the text-world the 'young man' regards the clock in his hands as valueless and valuable at the same time:  $-S(F_a, F_c)$  and  $+S(F_a, F_c)$ . So in the syntactic structure where we operate not only with abstract states but also figures, it is expedient to denote the marked duality of the 'people on the bench' and the 'young man' symbolically also: instead of  $F_a$  we use  $F_{a1}, F_{a2}$ , instead of  $F_b$  we use  $F_{b1}, F_{b2}$ . Where the difference carries no importance, we will keep the original signs  $F_a$  and  $F_b$ . The figure  $F_c$ , which is interpreted in the text-world as the series of happenings occurring between the 'wall-clock' or between the 'young man' ( $F_a$ ) and the young man's 'mother' ( $F_d$ ) in the presence of the 'wall-clock', necessarily possesses such properties that, according to the viewpoint of  $F_a$  and  $F_b$ , permit a contrasting interpretation ( $\overset{\pm}{S}$ ).  $F_c$ , however, cannot be substituted by figures  $F_{c1}$  and  $F_{c2}$  because  $F_c$  is characterized by duality not in itself but only as an interpretation possible from the viewpoint of the other figures. So that whether  $F_{a1}, F_{a2}, F_{b1}$  or  $F_{b2}$  is linked to  $F_c$  determines the nature of the relation  $S$ , too; that is the positive or negative evaluation of the attributes of  $F_c$ .

(a) *Initial state*

$v_s$ :  $-R(F_a, F_b) T^+$ , because

1.  $-S(F_b, F_c)$
2.  $+S(F_{a1}, F_c)$
3.  $-S(F_{a2}, F_c)$

Before dealing with the transformational component  $T^+$  in more detail, we give the final state  $T^+$  turns the initial state into.

(c) *Final state*

$v_s$ :  $T^+ -R(F_a, F_{b1}) . +R(F_a, F_{b2})$ , because

1.  $-S(F_{b1}, F_c)$ ,
2.  $+S(F_a, F_c)$ ;

and, because

1.  $+S(F_{b2}, F_c)$ ,
2.  $+S(F_a, F_c)$ .

(b) *The process of transformation*

$v_s$ :  $T^+$

The final state clearly outlines the possibilities of  $T^+$ , we know from what initial state what final state we must reach with the help of the transformations. We also know the conditions under which  $T^+$  transforms the initial state postulated in the model-structure into the final state.

The introduction of  $F_{a1}$  and  $F_{a2}$  as well as  $F_{b1}$  and  $F_{b2}$  makes it possible to differentiate within the transformational component  $T^+$  between the classes of preserving- ( $T_p^+$ ) and change-transformations ( $T_u^+$ ). But the action-logical contradiction does not appear here because  $T_p^+$  preserves the initial connection of  $F_a$  and  $F_b$  with reference to  $F_a$  and  $F_{b1}$ .  $T_u^+$  changes the same initial connection with reference to  $F_a$  and  $F_{b2}$ .

The preserving- and change-transformations of syntax differ from the preserving- and change-processes of the action-logical level. Preserving the initial state does not

mean that the degree of opposition between the figures remains the same in the final state. The change-transformations do not result in the total negation of the initial state, the establishment of its exact contrast either.

In the following through some examples we show how the preserving-transformations can contribute to the explication of the basically semantic concepts: 'gradation' and 'graduality'.

The operation of  $\_T\_P^+$  transformations is restricted by a necessary condition:  $-S(F_b, F_c)$ . That is,  $\_T\_P^+$  may not produce a state which cannot be reconciled with the given condition. At the same time, the facultative condition  $+S(F_a, F_c)$  can be freely combined with the transitory states  $-R(F_a, F_b)_1 \dots -R(F_a, F_b)_n$  produced from the initial state with transformations of a finite number  $\_T\_P^+ \dots \_T\_P^+$ . The succession of transformations expressed the 'graduality'. The 'gradation' is the result of connecting several operations. On the one hand, we connect the transitory states created with the first members of the sequence of preserving-transformations to the simultaneous presence of the facultative conditions  $+S(F_a, F_c)$  and  $-S(F_a, F_c)$ . On the other hand, in the case of further transitory states the condition  $-S(F_a, F_c)$  is eliminated, and only the realization of  $+S(F_a, F_c)$  is required. So the negative connection of the figures  $F_b$  and  $F_c$  remains, but the initial bivalent connection of  $F_a$  and  $F_c$  releases in a positive direction: that is why the opposition of  $F_a$  and  $F_b$  'increases' through  $F_c$ . The climax of the contrast is reached when, simultaneously with the last, negative transformation  $\_T\_P^+$  preserving the  $F_a, F_b$  relation, the  $F_a-F_c$ -connection gradually acquiring a positive value perfects itself in the equivalence of the two figures ( $F_a \equiv F_c$ ). (In the text-world: the young man identifies himself with the clock, then with the value-state of the past preserved in the clock.) Thus, when  $F_b$  rejects  $F_c$  for ever it denies also  $F_a$  ir-

revocably through the equivalence relation.

The structure of 'gradation' can be further refined:  $F_a$  and  $F_b$  do not only reject each other more and more sharply through  $F_c$  but prior to this rejection each tried to win the other over to its own standpoint.  $F_a$  and  $F_b$  with the creation of every  $+S(F_a, F_c)$  and  $-S(F_b, F_c)$ , respectively, give to  $F_b$  and  $F_a$  the possibility of building a positive or negative connection with  $F_c$ . But in the case of  $F_b$  throughout, in the case of  $F_a$  in the second part of the sequence of transformations this possibility is blocked by the prescribed necessary and facultative conditions. The 'gradation' appears here in the fact that, though the possibility for the elimination of the contrast comes about it is only so that we may realize directly: the opposition can still not be eliminated. The 'gradual' nature is shown in that for example, the final state of the  $F_a$ -structure in the above sense is at the same time the initial state of the successive  $F_b$ -structure. Formally:

$\dots +S(F_a, F_c) - (M(+S(F_b, F_c))) - S(F_b, F_c) - (M(-S(F_a, F_c))) + S(F_a, F_c) \rightarrow$

where " $\rightarrow$ " stands for implication and "M" is the sign of the modal operator 'possible'. The underlined formulae represent the simultaneous initial and final states. The principally infinite sequence is restricted by the finite number of the attributes of  $F_c$ , since the creation of connections  $+S$  or  $-S$  is based on the interpretation of these attributes.

We will not go into details concerning the transformations that result in change. It is enough to mention that their operation is the function of the preserving-transformations; a change can take place only on completion of the opposition existing with the preserving-transformations.

The composition of the syntactic level of structure is characterized by symmetrical order: the decomposition of  $F_b$  into  $F_{b1}$  and  $F_{b2}$ , their positive or negative relation to  $F_c$  in the final state exactly correspond to the initial

revocably through the equivalence relation.

The structure of 'gradation' can be further refined;  $F_a$  and  $F_b$  do not only reject each other more and more sharply through  $F_c$  but prior to this rejection each tried to win the other over to its own standpoint.  $F_a$  and  $F_b$  with the creation of every  $+S(F_a, F_c)$  and  $-S(F_b, F_c)$ , respectively, give to  $F_b$  and  $F_a$  the possibility of building a positive or negative connection with  $F_c$ . But in the case of  $F_b$  throughout, in the case of  $F_a$  in the second part of the sequence of transformations this possibility is blocked by the prescribed necessary and facultative conditions. The 'gradation' appears here in the fact that, though the possibility for the elimination of the contrast comes about. It is only so that we may realize it directly: the opposition can still not be eliminated. The 'gradual' nature is shown in that for example, the final state of the  $F_a$ -structure in the above sense is at the same time the initial state of the successive  $F_b$ -structure. Formally:

$..+S/F_a, F_c / \rightarrow (M/+S/F_b, F_c // -S/F_b, F_c /) - (M/-S/F_a, F_c // +S/F_a, F_c /) \rightarrow ..$

where " $\rightarrow$ " stands for implication and "M" is the sign of the modal operator 'possible'. The underlined formulae represent the simultaneous initial and final states. The principally infinite sequence is restricted by the finite number of the attributes of  $F_c$ , since the creation of connections  $+S$  or  $-S$  is based on the interpretation of these attributes.

We will not go into details concerning the transformations that result in change. It is enough to mention that their operation is the function of the preserving-transformations: a change can take place only on completion of the opposition existing with the preserving-transformations.

The composition of the syntactic level of structure is characterized by symmetrical order: the decomposition of  $F_b$  into  $F_{b1}$  and  $F_{b2}$ , their positive or negative relation to  $F_c$  in the final state exactly correspond to the initial

$F_{a1}$  and  $F_{a2}$  duality of  $F_a$  and its bivalent relation to  $F_c$ . The final state, however, as we have mentioned, repeats the structure of the initial state to a greater degree. This is supported also by the text-world interpretation of the figures: while the 'young man' interprets both  $F_{a1}$  and  $F_{a2}$ , 'the majority of people on the bench' correspond to  $F_{b1}$  and 'one man' to  $F_{b2}$ . That is, in the initial state the 'duality' was restricted only to one person, in the final state already a group of people 'come into conflict' with themselves.

### 3.4 The semantic component of the model-structure

#### 3.4.1 *The interpretation of the syntactic relations $\overset{\pm}{R}$ and $\overset{\pm}{S}$*

Let us interpret  $\overset{\pm}{R}$  with the binary sign of ( $\overset{\pm}{\text{contact-establishment}}$ ) and  $\overset{\pm}{S}$  with that of ( $\overset{\pm}{\text{value-recognition}}$ ).

Since  $\overset{\pm}{S}$  was the condition of  $\overset{\pm}{R}$  in the syntax, it is obvious that among the figures of the model-structure only those relations are ( $\overset{\pm}{\text{contact-establishment}}$ ) which refer to communication, comprehension, acceptance of values, that is the establishment of *value-contacts*, *value-actions*.

This interpretation provides reason also for the specifically paradoxical nature of Borchert's space-structures, space-movements. We feel intuitively that in the text-world 'approach' (between the persons interpreting the figures  $F_a$  and  $F_b$ ) always involves some 'moving off', while the 'increase of distance' involves some kind of 'approach' as well. And though the view oriented on the real world instinctively interprets the 'approach' as ( $\text{contact-establishment}$ ), the 'moving off' as ( $-\text{contact-establishment}$ ), the formal 'approach' does not necessarily become ( $+\text{contact-establishment}$ ), and the formal 'moving off' does not lead automatically to ( $-\text{contact-establishment}$ ) because of the in-

serted condition of ( $\overset{+}{-}$ value recognition). In the Borchert stories several combinations occur, the states of affairs of the particular text-worlds interpret most frequently the versions mentioned. A specifically Borchertian stylistical feature is the fact that the actions of seemingly least significance, being very frequent and automatized in the real world, interpret the marked versions (contact-establishment) and (value-recognition): 'to speak to somebody', 'to approach somebody', 'to look at somebody' etc. If these actions are bound by the ( $\overset{-}{-}$ value-recognition) condition, then the possible world in question is built up in a way where 'to look at somebody', 'to approach somebody', 'to speak to somebody' entails the self-contrasting functions 'not to see', 'not to reach' and 'not to understand', respectively. This process means the de-automatization of the usual actions, too. As we have mentioned, the opposite is also true. The 'turning away', 'the cessation of talk', 'the different view' can only be interpreted as 'moving off' if they are accompanied by ( $\overset{-}{-}$ value-recognition), otherwise they are more intimate, personal forms of 'approach' like 'pity', 'sympathy' etc. In the relation of  $F_b$  and  $F_a$  actual and apparent 'moving off' is mixed.

3.4.2 *The thematic interpretations of the figures*  
 $F_{a1}$ ,  $F_{a2}$ ,  $F_{b1}$ ,  $F_{b2}$  and  $F_c$

So far we have interpreted in general the relations  $\overset{+}{-}R$  and  $\overset{+}{-}S$  as ( $\overset{+}{-}$ contact-establishment) and ( $\overset{+}{-}$ value-recognition), respectively, now we must find an answer to what concrete values one has to recognize or not to recognize as the precondition of successful or unsuccessful (contact-establishment).

In the light of the empirical text-analysis we must attribute decisive roles to the following thematic value-pairs in the composition/explication of the text-world of



the "Küchenuhr": /protection/vs/expulsion/, /love/vs/indifference/, /life/vs/death/, /present/vs/past/, /material/vs/spiritual/-value approach, /eternal/vs/transitory/, /real/vs/imaginary/, /human/vs/object/.

In organizing the thematic value-structure the figure  $F_c$  is given a distinguished role. We already mentioned that  $F_c$  possesses such attributes which permit a binary, contrasting interpretation in every case. The binary interpretations always spring from the opposition of figures  $F_a$  and  $F_b$ , or  $F_{a1}$ - $F_{a2}$  and  $F_{b1}$ - $F_{b2}$  respectively.

Let us take again the example of the analysed story. If in the initial state of the model-structure  $F_c$  ('kitchen wall-clock') possesses an optional complex attribute  $A_1$  (= e.g.: 'the outwardly intact but inwardly ruined clock stopped at half past two'), then  $A_1$  can be reconciled both with the interpretation of  $F_b$  of (material-value-approach), that renders (death), (past), (transience), (object), (reality) values to  $F_c$ , and also with the value-combinative interpretation of (spiritual value-approach), (life), (present), (eternal), (human), (imaginary) of  $F_{a1}$ . Simultaneously,  $F_{a2}$  also interprets  $F_c$ : this essentially corresponds with the view of  $F_b$ . All this is reversed in the final state of the model-structure where the place and the view of  $F_{a2}$  is taken by  $F_{b2}$ . The relation of  $F_{b2}$  to  $F_c$  is, however, equivalent to the relation of  $F_a$  and  $F_c$ .

We have already said that  $F_c$ , as distinct from the figures  $F_a$  and  $F_b$ , corresponds directly not to a person but to the object in the title; the 'kitchen wall-clock' in the text-world. Besides this,  $F_c$  is interpreted by every state of affairs of this type, i.e. persons and objects with different properties and relations which are connected with the story of the 'kitchen wall-clock' in the text-world. When  $F_a$  explores the attributes of the 'kitchen wall-clock', then he tells this story and tries to make its 'message'

comprehensible, sensible for  $F_b$ .  $F_c$  is nothing but the story of  $F_a$  ('the young man') and  $F_d$  ('his mother'). Since in the beginning the relation of  $F_a$  and  $F_d$  is determined also by an unsuccessful, then a specifically successful (value-recognition) and (contact-establishment), the  $F_a, F_d$ -story can be regarded essentially as a variant of the  $F_a, F_b$ -story. Its syntactic structure can be characterized as follows:

$v'_s: -R'(F_a, F_d) T^+ +R'(F_a, F_d)$ , because  $+S'(F_a, F'_c)$ ,

where " , " denotes the 'variant' and  $F'_c$  is interpreted by the 'meetings between the young man and his mother that occurred every day in the past at half past two in the morning' - state of affairs of the text-world. The specific nature of the relation is given by the fact that though the formal conditions of 'approach' and 'meeting' are ensured in the initial state, (real) (contact-establishment) i.e. based on (value-recognition) does not take place. In the final state, however, where the formal conditions are missing -  $F_a$ : ((present) (life));  $F_d$ : ((past) (death)) - the contact-establishment takes place on an (imaginary) level through the figures  $F'_c$  and  $F_c$ . The contact-establishment of  $F_a$  and  $F_b$  is structured similarly, with the difference that here the attempt, though it meets the formal conditions, has only a partial result even in the second phase.

If, later on, we handle  $F_c$  as the  $F_a, F_d$ -story embedded in the  $F_a, F_b$ -story, and interpret it with thematic value-markers, then it is easy to show the way  $F_a$  can create positive contact with the same figure of  $F_c$  the values of which  $F_b$  does not recognize.

We know that the (+contact-establishment) between  $F_a$  and  $F_b$ , and  $F_a$  and  $F_d$  presupposes (+value-recognition). But this value-recognition is bound to thematic value-markers contrasting and excluding each other in the two cases. For  $F_a$  the (death) of  $F_d$  makes the (+value-recognition) possible, for  $F_b$  the (death) of  $F_d$  excludes

(+value-recognition)  $F_c$ , of which  $F_d$ , and so the (death) thematic value-marker is just one ingredient, is a part not only of (past) but also of (present). Its ambivalent attributes bear not only (mortality), decay, but also survival, i.e. (death) as well as (life). The (life)- and (death)-interpretation of  $F_c$  depends above all on the (material)- or (spiritual value-approach).  $F_b$ , since he himself is not a part of the  $F_c$ -story, interprets the 'outwardly intact but inwardly ruined clock' that contains the story in a condensed form from the viewpoint of the material value-loss exclusively. The approach of  $F_a$  is (spiritual), for him the 'outward intactness', as we have already mentioned, means (life), it preserves the (past) in the (present). The 'ruined mechanism of the clock' is not of (death)-value either. On the contrary: it is the (eternalizing) of the values of the (past) recognized in the (present), raising them out of the (transitory). In the course of the (contact-establishment) attempts which seem more and more unsuccessful  $F_a$  turns from  $F_b$  gradually towards  $F_c$ . The identification of  $F_a$  with  $F_c$  to an increasing extent, the 'wall-clock' of the text-world, is not surprising any more since  $F_a$  unites in  $F_c$  actually with the  $F_a, F_d$ -story, that is: the recognized positive value-state of his owns (past). So the 'clock having originally an (object) marker becomes (human) for him, and he himself plays the role of (object) in the view of  $F_{b1}$ : the 'people on the bench' turn away, the communication becomes formal.  $F_a$ , despite his initial intention, loses his connection with the (present) and through the  $F_c$ -equivalence he identifies himself with his own (past). This identification also carries a double value. As we have seen, for  $F_a$  the (past) is positive, it means (life), an (eternal) state preventing mortality, it ensures (protection) opposed to the (expulsion) of those returning from the war; it provides the "paradisical" harmony of home, 'motherly' (love) opposed to

the (indifference), the chaotic disharmony of the outside world. For  $F_b$  (past) has the value of (death), (mortality), while (present) represents survival, (life).

In the model-structure  $F_a$  is the active 'agent-figure', he attempts contact-establishment, demonstrating the recognized value through the narrated  $F_a, F_d$ -story. His dominant role is counterbalanced by the fact that while in his (spiritual) approach the positive values are parts only of his (imaginary) world, the negative values of the (material) approach of  $F_b$  are the elements of the actual, (real) world of the story.

In presenting the thematic value-component we have departed from the processes we used at the action-logical and syntactic levels of the model-structure. We did not discuss in detail what kind of  $\underline{T}^{++}$  transformations take place between the same and different thematic value-markers in relation to the initial and final states of the structure. We have not made up a constructional system capable of giving the combinative possibilities and conditions of the introduced thematic value-markers clearly. For the sake of lucidity we have tried rather to demonstrate with some examples what states of affairs in the text-world interpret the thematic value-marker in the Borchert story. It has to be stressed, however, as the concept of model-structure is understood here, that the combinational possibilities of the thematic value-markers depend on the action-logical and syntactic level of structure that are higher in hierarchy and are qualified by positive or negative value-pairs from the beginning. That is, the thematic value-marker transformations  $\underline{T}^{++}$  are always determined by  $\underline{T}^+$  or  $\underline{T}_-$ , depending on whether they are in a position of  $\underline{T}^+$  and  $\underline{T}_-$ , or  $\underline{T}^+$  and  $\underline{T}_-$ . We have shown in a concrete example: if we employ an optional transformation in the  $\underline{T}^+$  position, i.e. in the initial state, then only a combination of the thematic value-markers that excludes the realiza-

tion of  $+R(F_a, F_b)$   $T^+$  in relation to  $F_a$  and  $F_b$  is possible. That is, it does not make the realization of  $+S(F_b, F_c)$  possible but permits a facultative choice in the  $^+S$  -relation of  $F_a$  and  $F_c$ .

To the semantic explication of 'gradation' and 'graduality' we would add two short remarks only: (i) In this respect, the 'activity' of  $F_a$  and the thematic value-combinations linked to further and further degrees of 'activity' play a basic role. The 'activity' aiming at contact-establishment demands that the value-approach of the figures, uncertain or not expounded at the start, achieve an increasingly clear formulation that results in the increase of opposition ( $F_{b1}$ ) or identificational possibility ( $F_{b2}$ ). (ii) At the same time, the validity of the value-order already constructed can be queried or even decreased by the addition of an appropriate thematic value-marker (e.g.: (imaginary)), say, in the case of  $F_a$ .


In demonstrating the semantic component of the model-structure, we laid stress on showing the structure-properties which were considered the most important also on this level. The attributes of  $F_c$  permitting bivalent interpretation express the same contradiction in the end-state of the semantic structure that the process-formula  $_T$ -p.p of the action-logical level, or the simultaneously valid relation  $^+S$  of the narrative-syntactic level expressed. In this phase the thematic markers taken originally as opposition-pairs are subject to obligatory transformations which abolish and preserve the opposition. The established values become relativized in the moment of their creation. The possible world to which the Borchert story according to its semantic-structreal component refers is a *schizophrenic world* because in it the evaluation of the same attributes at the same time opposes and excludes each other. As a further step, in order to show the connection between literature and reality, those areas of reality should be

'selected' by means of the constructed model-structure which are similarly composed to the semantic ingredient of the model-structure, i.e. which are in keeping with the given structurization.

So far we have emphasized the dependency, the hierarchical order of the components in the model-structure. The obligatory subordination referring to the initial and final states, however, *does not determine the internal hierarchical structure of the individual components*. The syntactic level fixes the steps of exposition, and in this sense every moment becomes relevant with reference to the (contact-establishment) and to its condition, the (value-recognition); that is, relation  $\overset{+}{R}$  and  $\overset{+}{S}$  play a syntactically distinguished role. On the semantic level, however, the values 'delivered' by the syntactic relations become determinative. In the case of the Borchert story, the value-pair structuring the thematic level is linked to the embedded  $F_a, F_d^-$  (later on  $F_c^-$ ) -story that is of syntactically subordinated importance. Its distinguished position is shown by one of the several facts, viz. that every further thematic value-pair is its partial and special interpretation with respect to  $F_a$  or  $F_b$ . The thematic value-pairs (protection)vs(expulsion) and (love)vs(indifference) of the same level of relevance fix the further (life)vs(death), (eternal)vs(transitory), (human)vs(object) value-judgements which, in this way, can be considered coordinates of each other. These latter are the interpretations of the (present)vs(past) theme with an (imaginary) or (real) basis obtained by a (material) or a (spiritual) value-approach. The drafted hierarchy can mean a certain orientational point of the more exact description of the thematic value-markers. A decisively *thematic* stress is given to the (present)vs(past) opposition-pair, the interpretations of which are constituted by the partial value-pairs of (life)vs(death) the (eternal)vs(transitory), the

(*human*)vs(*object*), relatively near to the concrete theme. The way in which the *partial value-pairs* come from the thematic opposition-pairs, in which the *main value-pairs* of the story like (*protection*)vs(*expulsion*) and (*love*)vs(*indifference*) come from the partial values can be best characterized by the contrast-pair of the (*material*)vs(*spiritual*) value-approach. The way and the basis of existence of the partial and main values are determined by the ontic contrast of the 'believed' or 'actual' (*real*)vs(*imaginary*). The theme, the way and the basis of existence, the partial values are states of affairs connected to (contact-establishment) from a syntactical point of view. But the range of the main values basically attaches to the condition of (value-recognition).

In patterns:



We note that certain pragmatic references which will be touched upon later can cause shifts in stress, modifications the abstract thematic value-component of the model-structure.

4 THE TEXT-WORLD-INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL-STRUCTURE

4.1 On the relation between the levels of structure and the text-world

According to the interpretation-theoretical principles already exposed the arbitrariness of the text-world is released by the model-structure as an explanatory system. The model-structure contains those regularities on the basis of which the text-world can be considered a possible world, and not an unordered, chaotic set of states of affairs. But, since we have differentiated several levels in the model-structure, the question arises which level(s) of the model-structure is(are) interpreted by the text-world.

In principle any level can be projected onto the text-world. In this case, according to the level of abstraction, we learn only some global features about the text-world interpreting the action-logical contradiction: the structure of the state-change refers to the fact that the world where the mentioned change actually happens 'splits' as regards its basic relation.

If we examine merely the states of affairs interpreting the syntactic structure, we trace the development in the relation of the two groups of characters, not defined more closely, the way of state-change, the formal combinatorics of relations, the structure of the transformational steps from the beginning towards the final state.

If the text-world interprets only the semantic structure, then we can get information concerning the thematic



particularities, the decisive values, the ambivalent nature of value and, through this latter, indirectly the 'split' of the world in question again.

The isolated text-world-interpretations of the levels can play a very important role - as mentioned before - in the expounded typological and comparative analyses concerning several works or authors. In this context, however, text-world-interpretation means the *complex* explication of the model-structure where the single levels are not separated. So far we have demonstrated using several examples how the characters/persons and states of affairs of the text-world interpret the abstract categories and relations of the different levels of the model-structure. Therefore, mainly for reasons of space, we only show some syntactic and semantic-thematic mapping. The elements and formulae of the model-structure will be put in brackets.

4.2 "The Kitchen Wall-Clock". The Borchert-story as a literary possible world

The start of the text-world is outlined only very generally in time and space. Somewhere people ( $F_b$ ) sit on a bench and they see a man ( $F_a$ ) approaching them. The man holds a kitchen wall-clock ( $F_c$ ) in his hands. The characteristics of the man and the clock show a similar duality. Both seem outwardly intact: the man's gait is youthful, the face, the hands, the painted numbers of the clock are undamaged (life). But both are "ruined" inwardly: the young man's face, the mirror of his inward state is "rather old"; the clock does not work, it has stopped for ever (death). The young man sits down beside the others (=formal contact-establishment) and starts telling the characteristics of the clock and then the events connected with it. He cannot, however, convince the others of the value of the decayed clock ( $-S/F_b, F_c/$ ), sometimes not even himself ( $-S/F_{a2}, F_c/$ ). His

arguments meet with incomprehension, moreover symbolic refusal (cf. the sequence of preserving-transformations  $\text{-T}_{\text{R-}}^+$ ). The conversation gradually ceases and the clock takes over the role of the people on the bench. The 'moving off' from the people on the bench and the 'approach' to the clock makes it more possible for the similarity of the young man and the clock not to be a contingent feature. The latter gradually loses its objective-material characteristics and restrictions. Its "face" ('wie ein Teller') becomes a real "face" ("Gesicht"), and the young man talks to this "face" (for  $F_a$  the clock is: Object ( $F_c/T^{++}$ Object/ $F_c$ ). Human ( $F_c$ )). Later the clock is reduced to a single point of time, to "half past two", to the meeting that means the most important event in the young man's past ( $F_c'$ ). Through the stages of mere *surface similarity* ('intact exterior'), *formal identification* ("face") and *direct contact-establishment* ('clock=communicational partner') the young man identifies himself first with the *clock*, then the *time* shown on it, and eventually with the *value-state* denoted by the point of time ( $(F_a=F_c)$ , (protection), (love)). He searched for contact with the present ( $F_b$ ) but his attempts were unsuccessful. So he finds an ever stronger and more natural contact with his own part, with his earlier life expressed in and by the clock, preserved and recognized in the stopped time: "Then he said softly to the whitish-blue face of the clock: Now, now I know that it was Paradise. The real Paradise."

His recognition expressed and told also in words results in another 'approach - moving off' - type movement, change in the text-world. The group of people on the bench, unified towards the young man until then, 'splits' with itself. The man beside him ( $F_{b2}$ ) who meditates over the meaning of the word "Paradise" departs from the others ( $F_{b1}$ ). Though all this happens on a speculative level, his act ( $+S(F_{b2}, F_c)$ ) links him symbolically already to the young

man (+R(F<sub>a</sub>,F<sub>b2</sub>)). This change is also the final state of affairs of the text-world: "*And the man who sat beside him looked at his shoes.* But he did not see them. He always thought of the world Paradise." Apart from this a motif-connection also proves the conversion of contacts.<sup>10</sup> The man's seemingly insignificant action happens not for the first time. He also looked at his shoes when the young man spoke first of the salvaged clock and waited to see how the others, the people on the bench would react to the story. This time in the initial state of the text-world the reaction of the people on the bench is still unified: "*Those who sat on the bench in the sunshine did not look at him. One looked at his shoes, the woman looked into the pram.*" In the first case the man beside him, like the others, avoids contact-establishment. However, after learning the whole history of the clock, he loses the contact with his own earlier (real) (object-world): "... But he did not see them (the shoes).", and he feels a liking for the young man's (imaginary) reality, for the state of "real Paradise"; yet uncertain in meaning but having positive value for him. His 'object-seeing' (material) value-approach is replaced by a (spiritual) viewpoint rising above the material. The motif-relation of 'looking at the shoes' between the initial and final states well displays the importance of the transformation connecting the two states, the change of value-sight and also the possibility of establishing the contact totally missing at the start.

We know that the young man as well as the people on the bench belong to the 'survivors' of the war, to those who escaped. Nevertheless, while the latter judge everything from the viewpoint of 'loss', decay, destruction of material goods, the young man lays stress on the "survival" of the clock: "You lost everything, didn't you?~ "This has remained". In this world the survival of the clock seems able to counterbalance the loss of his mother and his home

in itself, since he "laughs" or "smiles" "heartily" when being asked about his bombed home. These facts indicate that the "kitchen wall-clock" of the title possesses a decisive significance in the young man's value-world. As we have already dealt with the symbolic meaning of the clock on several occasions, now we only complete and systematize what was told before.

The once so "natural", obvious daily meetings at night, the preparation of supper, the attentative love outgrow their routine and insignificance when they suddenly ceased, passed irrevocably. The reason and also the precondition of the young man's altered standpoint, of the revaluation of the earlier meetings is the destruction of war, his mother's death: "*Now, now I know already that it was Paradise...*". So destruction becomes bivalent for him: he loses his mother and home but through the loss he recognizes the value and importance of them which he had never seen until then. This moment is a tragic discord as well: the young man recognizes the value when he loses it in the real world for ever. The fact that the precondition of value-recognition is the war, death has a very essential role. As a contrast to the background bringing destruction and wrenching man out of his place of protection the everyday motherly care, the security of home become a "real", earthly "Paradise".

The *kitchen* wall-clock, the only 'witness' of the meetings between mother and son gains its real significance in this context. The ruined mechanism is of symbolic value: it shows not the passing of time but its preservation, the "half past two" point of time releases the Transience/, the time itself. Its outward intactness, the recognisability of 'half past two' are a condition for the identifiability of the former state, for the preservation of /past/ in the /present/. To sum up the *positive aspect* of the clock we say: the stopped mechanism, the show time make the recognition of the values of the past possible; the outward in-

tactness ensures the preservation of the recognized value from the past into the present, from decay into survival. By possessing it the young man, even in the actual /expulsion/ of his present can feel himself in the 'paradisical' state of /protection/ and /love/. The purpose of his attempt at contact-establishment is to make this value-state giving /protection/ recognized, and to deliver it.

The identification of the young man and the clock, however, has a distinctly *negative value-aspect* since the stopping of the clock actually means the cessation of his 'metabolism', his death. The young man's 'survival' is just formal: he establishes a real contact with the past, with the world of the dead; the present, the majority of survivors turn away from him. It is not inessential that when the only man on the bench finds contact with him, it is not the young man who joins the present, the real world of the 'survivors' but rather the man who accepts the imaginary world and position turning to the past. So what was positive value-change on the abstract level of the model-structure (+R(F<sub>a</sub>, F<sub>b2</sub>)) must be judged much more carefully from the pragmatic viewpoint of the movement-direction. This is also true for the increased preservation of the negative contact (-R(F<sub>a</sub>, F<sub>b1</sub>)): there is no sharp contrast between the young man and the people on the bench. There opposition is only a difference in degree between the two groups of 'survivors': standing closer to the *present world of life* or the *past world of death*. Returning to the pragmatic context of the text-world we can say: the *people on the bench* exemplify a possible defensive attitude-model of the 'survivors *mining at home*', the young man exemplifies that of the '*homecoming survivors*' against the 'split', self-destructive world. The former who experienced bombings, the destruction of their homes, the death of their relatives directly accept the more (material) but also more realistic standpoint of value-loss as resumption of the present

world. The 'home-coming' young man who did not experience the destruction of war, his mother's death directly and faces the terrors just now cannot comprehend and accept the facts as irreversible reality. He can exist in the present, he can 'survive' his tragic losses only if he somehow succeeds in exploring and preserving the values of the lost past. So as a starting-point of his present world - opposed to those 'remaining at home' - he chooses the more (spiritual) and, in this way, more cut off from reality, standpoint of value-preservation. Only this behaviour makes it possible for him that his 'outward intactness' will sometimes be joined by 'inward mental survival'. Both those 'remaining at home' who vegetate and the 'home-coming' who actively turn to the past are 'dead-alive', their difference is only a shifting of stress: in the case of the former already the 'living', in the case of the latter still the 'dead' characteristic dominates. This difference clarifies best the specific nature of the opposition of the people on the bench and the young man: those who approach the present, life necessarily refuse the way to the past, death. Their 'mute turning away' is the expression of 'pity' as well since they know that the young man's 'discord' - which is the only tolerable way of 'mental survival' for him - leads just to this fateful direction they refuse.

##### 5. CLOSING REMARKS

Instead of a summary we shall mention some of those important problems which we were unable to deal with in detail.

- (a) The model-structure is an idealized theoretical construction to which several text-worlds can be rendered in principle. As a consequence of this, the model-structure

- may be either less or more than its current text-world-interpretant: not all of its components have an exact equivalent in a concrete text-world, and it is not necessary either that every state of affairs in the text-world should be linked clearly to a certain element or relation of the model-structure.
- (b) Concerning its linear order and quantitative rates, the composition of the text-worlds does not depend or very indirectly depends on that of the model-structure. The question is directly related to the problem of 'gradation' and 'graduality'.
- (c) We did not explicate the concept of 'repetition' and did not define its place in the model-structure though its significance was clearly shown by the examples of the text-analysis. It is important to realize that the 'repetitions' of seemingly equal value in the homogeneous medium of the text or the text-world /can/ belong to quite different, more, or less overall levels of the model-structure.
- (d) There was only a brief reference to the question of the model-structure and its verbal realization. One type of the Borchert-stories, including the one analysed in the study, is characterized by the fact that there is a sharp opposition between the very simple, everyday language and the system of values borne by it with the interposition of the text-world/ possible world. The words/actions/events playing insignificant roles in the usual socio-cultural codes cause or influence basic value-changes in these worlds.

*Examples from the analysed story*

- (a) The unambiguous text-world realization of the initial state -pT\_ would mean that the 'people on the bench' and the 'young man' appear independently, separately in

the text-world. But the text-world introduces the 'young man' from the perspective of the 'people on the bench' ("They saw him approaching them.."). That is, the idealized (-contact)-state expressed in  $-T_1$  is realized as the first 'unsuccessful attempt at contact -establishment'.

- (b) The component  $-p$  in the final state  $T-p.p$ , since it is the result of a preserving-transformation, can be separated from the initial state  $-pT_1$  only at the creation of the component  $p$  of the final state. The problem is that the state  $-p$  of equal value, that can and must be clearly differentiated in principle, fuses in the states of affairs of the text-world.

The text-world size of the component  $p$  of the final state  $T-p.p$  is only three states of affairs, that is insignificant in relation to the entire size of the text-world. At the same time, concerning its structuralizing role it is equal with the component  $-p$  of the states  $-pT_1$  and  $T-p.p$  in the model-structure, and so in the text-world interpretation.

- (c) The repeated state of affairs of 'looking at shoes' has the most comprehensive role: it is decisive in structuring the action-logical level, in establishing the component  $p$  of the final state  $T-p.p$ . The embedded story  $F_c$  as a 'repetition' or something to be repeated (depending on whether we take the time of its happening or its telling as starting point) ought to be denoted on the syntactic level. The 'young man's' ever returning thoughts, words have another theoretical status, with which he partly tries to prove and fortify his opinion even to himself, and partly, with the varied and completed forms of structure he ensures and increases the 'retardation' and 'graduality', i.e. the tension-creating force of the exposition.



(d) We gave some demonstrative examples under 3.4.1 in connection with this, further details cannot be dealt with here.

Finally we should like to add the titles of some Borchert-stories which, in our view, may be explicated with certain modifications by the help of the model-structure elaborated in the present paper: Stimmen sind da - in der Luft - in der Nacht<sup>11</sup>, Blieb doch, Giraffe, Vier Soldaten, Der viele viele Schnee, Die Katzer war im Schnee erfroren, Das Brot etc.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Posner 1973

<sup>2</sup> Posner's study appeared in 1973 and so his objections refer to the generative linguistic trends of the late '60s, up to the early '70s. The validity of his critique is shown by the very fact that mainly linguistics of pragmatic orientation, researches centering on speech-act and communication, text-theory have developed enormously since 1973.

<sup>3</sup> The interpretational theory represented here was first exposed by Bernáth 1978a and 1978b. Its version connected to the 'possible worlds', see in Bernáth/Csuri 1980 and in this volume. The present paper tries to embed the interpretation-theoretical principles into a general literary semiotic framework.

<sup>4</sup> A more detailed discussion is provided in Bernáth/Csuri 1980 and the paper involved in this volume. There can be a counter-argument to our view: we can and often do possess pieces of information which make the ex-

act explication of the reference of fictitious persons possible in the real world. It is evident e.g. in the case of characters who bear the names of actually existing historical persons. Since the question has an essential philosophical-logical aspect and, consequently, a wide logical literature, we stress that our simplified answer will be literature-centered. We will show later in the paper that the characters of literary works are the individuals of that possible world that can be established by the appropriate explication of the text-world. The characters bearing the names of historical persons are the members of the same possible world, with the difference that their secondary reference relating to the real world can give a several implicit pieces of information that the text-world does not contain. However, the hierarchy is essential: the quantity and application of the information of the real world is judged by the composition of the possible world in question, and not the other way round. We can explicate references of this kind as emblematic or text-external repetitions (cf. Bernát/Csuri 1978).

- <sup>5</sup> The *model-structure* is represented here by 'sequence of events' since we examine literary narratives. Bernát 1978a used the term *plot-model* in a very similar sense. In our view, however, the label *model-structure* is more adequate than the concept of *plot-model* from two points of view. On the one hand, it corresponds more exactly to the terminology of model-theoretical semantics; on the other hand, if used in the explication of literary narrative texts, it is not restricted to marking the plot-structure which is built up from events. More precisely: it expresses better the analysing practice which does not obtain information necessary to the entire explication of the work only from the events in the case of narratives,

but also from every connection and element of the text-world that ensures the 'well-formedness' of the 'sequence of events'.

- <sup>6</sup> Cf. Bernáth/Csúri 1980 and its English version in this volume. We stress that the concept of *literary possible world* used here is not equal with the *possible world* conception in *modal* and *philosophical logics*, even though it is derived from it and can be defined exactly. The transmission of the term is not a mere metaphor in this sense and its introduction to the conceptual apparatus of literary theory is reasonable because we can take the particularities of literature into account when applying it in the given modified form. On the question of the *logical possible world* cf. e.g. Hintikka 1975, Moravcsik 1975, Rescher 1975, Link 1976, Schnelle 1973 etc.
- <sup>7</sup> Cf. Bernáth/Csúri 1980 and the paper in this volume.
- <sup>8</sup> In the action-logical notation we basically rely on the system of Sladek 1977.
- <sup>9</sup> Cf. Sladek 1977: p. 8.
- <sup>10</sup> We consider 'motif-connections' those text-internal semantic equivalence-relations which have a relevant function in the model-structure explicating the text-world as a literary possible world. Cf. Bernáth/Csúri 1978.
- <sup>11</sup> Cf. my Borchert-paper in Bernáth/Csúri/Kanyó 1975. It is a first attempt in the same theoretical line without the explicit introduction of the model-structure used here.

References

- Althaus, H.P. /Henne, H./ Wiegand, H.E. /eds/ 1973.  
Lexikon der germanistischen Linguistic, Tü-  
bingen.
- Bernáth, Árpád, 1978a. Heinrich Böll regényei mint cselek-  
ménymodellek interpretációi /= The novels of  
H. Böll as interpretations of plot-models; in  
Hungarian/, Szeged /manuscript/.
- Bernáth, Árpád, 1978b. Narratív szövegek irodalmi magyará-  
zata /Explication of narrative texts from a  
literary point of view, in Hungarian/, In:  
Literature 3-4, 191-196.
- Bernáth, Árpád and Csúri, Károly 1978. Zur Theorie lite-  
rarisch relevanter Wiederholungstypen in nar-  
rativen Textstrukturen. In: Dressler, W.U.  
/Meid, W. /eds./ 1978, 643-646
- Bernát, Árpád and Csúri, Károly 1980. "Mögliche Welten" un-  
ter literatur-theoretischem Aspekt. In: Csuri,  
K. /ed./ 1980. 44-62.
- Bernáth, Árpád, and Csúri, Károly /Kanyó, Zoltán/, 1975.  
Texttheorie und Interpretation. Untersuchungen  
zu Gryphius, Borchert und Böll, Kronberg/Ts.
- Csúri, Károly, 1975. Über einige Regelmässigkeiten eines  
Kurzgeschichtentyps. /W. Borchert: Stimmen sind  
da - in der Luft - in der Nacht/. In: Bernáth,  
Árpád - Csúri, Károly - Kanyó, Zoltán, 1975.  
175-223.
- Csúri, Károly /ed./ 1980. Literary Semantics and Possible  
Worlds/ Literatursemantik und mögliche Welten  
/=Studia Poetica 2/, Szeged

- Dressler, W.U. and Meid, W. /eds./ 1978. Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress of Linguists /Vienna, August 28-September 2, 1977/, Innsbruck
- Hintikka, J. 1975. The intentions of intentionality of other new models for modalities, Dordrecht-Holland
- Link, G. 1976, Intensionale Semantik, München
- Moravcsik, J.M.E. 1975. Understanding Language. A study of theories of languages in linguistics and philosophy, The Hague - Paris
- Posner, R. 1973. Linguistische Poetik. In: Althaus, H.P./Henne, H./Wiegand, H.E. /eds./ 1973, 513-522.
- Rescher, N. 1975. A theory of possibility. A constructivistic and conceptualistic account of possible individuals and possible worlds, Oxford.
- Schnelle, H. 1973. Sprachphilosophie und Linguistik, Reinbek.
- Sladek, A. 1977. Aktionslogik un Erzähllogik, Tübingen.

NARRATOLOGY = THE THEORY OF THE EPIC?

Árpád Bernáth

A. József University, Szeged

In literary theoretical studies on the whole the theory of the novel and the epic is gradually being replaced by narratology. It seems expedient to more and more researchers to start from the postulation that the *sine qua non* of the epic is the narrator: he is the mythical creator of epic works, and so the task of the theory of the epic is to explore the characteristic features of narration as a way of presentation.

Certainly, the analysis of the features of the epic must inevitably include the discussion of the problems of narration as well: it is one possible ingredient of the text of an epic work. It is nevertheless evident that the investigations - even if we start from the narration - cannot be restricted only to the narration or only to the text. They must also include the answer to the question of what the text of an epic work represents, that is, they *must* deal with the characteristics of the text-world. For scholars of the epic, for researchers into narratology the basic "immanent" question is precisely what the relationship is between the two levels of literary works: the text and the text-world.

From the viewpoint of the theory of genres the relationship between the two levels can be defined by telling which level of the epic work bears genre-constituent markers.

According to the great majority of scholars dealing with the characteristics of epic works, as we have already

said, the class of works, analysed by them, have the *narration* as the determinative feature, narration being the most important component of the epic text; moreover, for some the whole epic text is a monologue, that is, purely narration where the linguistic manifestations of the figures are just quotations.

We, however, share the opinion of those who find the abolition of the genre-constitutive role of narration a more fertile solution. In this conception the works, the analysis and the theory with which narratology deals, are not necessarily results of narration but simply of speech, writing, printing. The "novelty", the 'novel', as this genre is called, appears *as writing on the wall* like 'mene, tekal, ufar-sin' on the wall of the palace of the Babylonian Belshazzar; thus we could call it the writing of a spiritual hand, of the spirit of the novel.

We seem to know the extent to which this standpoint can be attacked, which can be from at least two directions. Those who are willing to go along with our argument expressed in a rather mystical image can rightly ask: does not our opinion lead to the undesirable consequence that the possibility of classifying literature according to genres ceases to exist. Whether every form of manifestation of lyric, dramatic and epic poetry does not turn into 'novelty', 'novel'? Those who will not even take the first step with us obviously say: why should those things always be doubted that have seemed to be the most certain among the various suggestions? Since there is no other statement which arises more naturally than that the works constituting the class of epic literature be the expressions of some closed process by way of narration; that is, that narration is genre-constitutive feature.

Before showing what other possibilities the rejection of the genre-constituent function of narration opens for the classification of literary works from an essential aspect,

we must look to why the majority of scholars regard narration as an obvious genre-determinative feature.

In our view this opinion results from the following train of thought. Employing language for the creation of literary works is inevitably secondary i.e. posterior, as the false use of a statement is posterior and, in this sense, secondary, opposed to its true use. Since we can only speak of a lie if we know under what circumstances the statement would be true. Thus literary communication, that is, communication by literary works is in a general sense, and each class of work in the communication can be derived from non-literary communication. Thus epic poetry can be derived from a certain communicative situation, the so-called narrative situation, where the narration is the most important element.

The constituents of the narrative situation - as it is found in many theoretical works - are the following: the narrating person, the process forming the object of the narration, already enclosed in the moment of narration, the process of narration and the public listening to the narration. This communicative process becomes secondary, i.e. literary, when at least one of the four elements is modified. According to scholars, who regard narration as a genre-constituent element, it is the series of events forming the object of narration or the narration itself. The process narrated in an epic work differs from the object of ordinary narration in that a part of it (or the whole) may be virtual, without the narration itself becoming a lie. As a consequence of this (or distinct from this) the general rules referring to narration may also change. (With respect to the fact that opinions about the nature of this change are very diverse even in the case of scholars starting from the narrative situation, we must make do with this general remark in this connection.)



The deduction of the characteristic features of the epic from the ordinary narrative situation - in spite of appearances - is, in essence, the result of a historical approach: in spite of appearances the primacy of ordinary narrative situation is only temporal and not logical. Though we must know the historical connections these are, however, not enough to introduce the concept of narrative situation into theories the validity circle of which is not confined to the age of the emergence of the genre in question. Instead of a lengthy exposition on the theory of science, we would like to show the difference between the historical and the theoretical definition of a concept with the help of an analogous example; so much the more because the example to be quoted helps us in the establishment of our own standpoint.

In his *Poetics* Aristotle compares mimesis as a characteristic activity of poetry to ordinary mimesis, to imitation (of a child). This does not mean, however, that the artistic activity could be deduced from ordinary mimesis in Aristotelian poetics. Mimesis as a literary theoretical concept can no longer be identified with mimesis which is one of the natural reasons underlying the development of art. The difference between the two concepts of mimesis can be demonstrated, in the first approach, by saying that while mimesis in the earlier and ordinary usage supposes the existence of the imitated, in literary theory we also speak about Aristotelian imitation in the sense that the imitated only virtually exists.

The example, as we can see and as we promised, is not distant since (there is a similar difference) between the mimesis of art and ordinary mimesis there is a similar difference as between the object of literary narration and that of primary narration. Not the similarity but the possible virtuality of the imitated and the narrated process is essential from the viewpoint of literary theory. While the liter-

ary quality of the narrative situation comes from the fact that its narrator can also narrate virtual series of events, this circumstance in mimesis-theory is significant from another point of view. According to Aristotle a work of artistic value is attained if the *imitated* satisfies certain conditions, and it is another matter that the required conditions can be achieved more easily by imitating real or virtual events.

With this comparison of mimesis and the narrative situation we hope that we have argued convincingly that the historical approach cannot always substitute for the theoretical, and that the narration is not necessarily and self-evidently a genre-constituent feature. But we have not yet pointed to the undesirable consequences that can follow from the likely theoretical definitions of the narrative situation and the narration. We would like to cover these questions also, though within the present scope we can touch upon the problem from one point of view only, and referentially. But before this we must also reply to the objections which maintain that precisely the rejection of the favoured role of narration is followed by undesirable consequences: among other things the classification of literary works from the essential point of view becomes impossible.

Maybe many would not bother about this objection. There are theories which consider the classification of literary works a totally insignificant activity. For these, the value of a literary work lies only in its individuality. Such theories, however, over-emphasize the individuality of single works. It could be shown that a merely individual work of art would not be able to perform any function connected with cognition.

Anyway; if we think about the rationality of the classification of literary works, we must take into account the fact that it can be carried out basically from the follow-

ing points of view: rhetorical and hermeneutical. The importance of setting norms of genres is different for the writer - that is, from the theoretical point of view - and for the recipient - that is, from the hermeneutical point of view. The characteristics of genres determine strategies of creation and reception. Or conversely: the fact that the strategies of creation and reception serving the creation and the cognition of works, respectively have common characteristics can prove that there are genres and groups of genres.

In this conception the purpose of theories of genre, and so the criticism of their judgment is eventually to what extent they serve creation and reception.

(Intermediate summary: thus the two theories of genres - i.e. operation with rhetorical and hermeneutical viewpoints - must be well separated. But this does not mean that they cannot have an identical component: the form-aspects of genres, that is, the features of genres formally manageable are indifferent with regard to the rhetorical and hermeneutical viewpoints.)

When now presenting a classic example for the classification of the arts and, within it, that of literary works, we want to show, on the one hand, that relevant classification is also possible without the introduction of the narrative situation, while, on the other hand, this kind of classification is sensitive to the differentiation between rhetorical and hermeneutical viewpoints.

We turn again to Aristotle who, after separating 'the art of words' from other branches of art, classified literary works on the basis of the subject of imitation. He systematized those works explicitly which depict acting persons. Aristotle thought that the acting persons should be judged from an ethical point of view, namely, in their relation to men outside the text-world. In this way he saw the possibility of three judgements: characters may be bet-

ter, worse or similar to those existing independently of the text-world. And also on this basis works depicting acting persons can be divided into three classes.

If we take into account the social function of works depicting acting persons, - that they display the functioning of value-systems determining the action in a possible world, and so can orientate the recipients' action - it is easy to see that this classification is relevant from the viewpoints of both creation and reception. It is evident at the same time that the basis of comparison permitting the classification: i.e. persons that can be known independently of the text-world and *the ethics of measurements*, may be different for the creator and the recipient; and if we could exclude this discrepancy only then should we say that Aristotelian genres are forms of works of art.

Some may say we have been rash to use the expression 'Aristotelian genres'. Defenders of the narrative situation certainly will not hesitate to remark: it is true that Aristotle placed epic and tragedy in one class, for both imitate very worthy people. But did he not differentiate them as epos and tragedy on no other basis than that of presentation?

The question is more complicated than it appears. When Aristotle, independent of the classification mentioned before, classifies literary works according to the *law* of description, he relies on an already existing arrangement, that of Gorgius and Plato. Nevertheless, in this way three classes should be distinguished, too.

Works where the poet speaks himself and makes others speak belong to the first class. Those where only the poet speaks and does not make others speak belong to the second class. Those where the poet does not speak and makes only others speak belong to the third one.

So this classification also differs from the one which at present recognizes lyric, epic and drama. From our par-

ticular point of view the following is essential: even if we conceived that in the former arrangement the third class is 'pure drama', while the first two are epic, and within this, the first class is nothing but 'pure epic', we must realize that Aristotle does not prefer the first class which seems to realize the 'classic narrative situation', but he considers the mixture of 'pure epic' and 'pure drama' as the ideal epic, namely - if we can put it this way - few parts of 'pure epic' to many parts of 'pure drama'. Homer is a paragon for him because he seems to know that the poet is allowed to speak little for he is not an imitator in that sense! We admit that the characteristics of Greek culture, the almost total interpenetration of drama and stage, etc. may have contributed to the fact that Aristotelian poetics, to a certain extent, could become a source for the classification of literature as lyric epic and dramatic poetry where narration has become the major problem of epic. That this has not happened in the spirit of Aristotle may have appeared indirectly through the two - we stress, independently of each other - classifications already presented.

To sum up the lessons of examples from the *Poetics*: we must return to the Aristotelian programme which does not recognize the dominant role of narration. A theory of genres must be worked out which - at least from the hermeneutical point of view - attributed secondary importance to the differentiation between drama and epic, possible on the basis of the method of representation. The theory of the epic thus conceived must be less concerned with the technical questions of narration and more with what Aristotle deals with in the core of this *Poetics*: myth /series of events and actions/ which appears in works imitating a /praxis abstract, well-formed structure of the plot/ to be defined. Thus the theory of event or action becomes the central ques-

tion of the theory of the epic, namely the theory of a good or bad action leading to catharsis. For this reason the theory of the epic cannot be equated with narratology, in our opinion, which is just a non-central part of the former; the theory of the epic is, in the first place, a theory of science dealing with the explanation of series of events represented by devices of linguistic systems.

The realization of the Aristotelian programme, drafted before, has already begun. It is enough to refer to the activity of V. J. Propp, M.M Bahtin, C. Bremond and T. Todorov.

We cannot conclude our discussion at this point. There is still a question to be raised: is it not possible to connect the programme here called 'Aristotelian' with the theory of narration starting from the narrative situation? We ourselves have stated that the studies concerning the characteristic features of epic, even if they start from narration, cannot be restricted only to the narration or only to the text: they must cover the text-world, too. Moreover, it is also evident that the Aristotelian distinction between the methods of presentation, that can be traced back to Gorgias, may be considered exploded now. The secondariness of the literary narrative situation - according to relevant theoretical works - may start not only from the virtuality of the series of events to be narrated: other elements in the narrative situation may become virtual as well. So beside the actual narrator, the writer, a fictitious narrator, and beside the actual recipient, the existing reader, the work-immanent 'gentle reader', should be considered. Consequently the fictitious narrator, the fictitious process and the fictitious 'gentle reader' become the elements which determine the literary narrative situation. Now it is easy to see that narration as a form of communication is also fictitious, i.e. created. The fictitious narration is thus one possible, but not an exclusive, form of

information-relationship between the writer and the existing reader, and it would be impractical to restrict the epic to classes of those works where both the fictitious narrator and the 'gentle reader' appear. It may be true that scholars working with the narrative situation do not consider this restriction, but it is precisely this which leads them to find the narrator where no traces of him are found.

In any case, the reduction of the theory of the epic to narratology has more far-reaching consequences than we would imagine. In the following - which is also at the same time a conclusion - we cover only one of the most important problems.

If we turn from the analysis of narration to that of the narrated, i.e. the series of events in the text-world, there is the important question of what to analyse, what to explain. Which are the facts making up the text-world? And is the text-world homogenous, or does it have levels? If so, what is the relation between the levels? These questions can be answered if we give the truth-criteria referring to the statements of literary works that present series of events.

The question of truth-criteria, since it was not raised in this context, was rejected earlier, while it has achieved enormous popularity recently. To answer it, however, is impossible, or at least very difficult, if we start from the fiction of the literary narrative situation. This hypothesis forces solutions which are not proved by the practice of literary science. We would like to affirm our assertion with the help of an example again, this time from a more recent work. We are thinking of L. Dolezel's *Truth and Authenticity in Narrative*. His study is significant also because Dolezel intended to summarise the research made in this field. He considers here a so-called binary model as the simplest model of the narrative /epic?/ text. The tex-

ture performing the binary model results from the operation of two kinds of speech act, the speech acts of the anonymous Er-form narrator and the personalized narrative agents /characters/. So the binary model is a refined version of a classic type of presentation - the poet speaks himself and makes others speak - and it is based on the concepts of the theory of the speech-act. The improvement, - in our opinion - however, has no advantages concerning the determination of truth-criterium. Since, when Dolezel wants to make use of the statement of the theory of speech-acts that certain linguistic actions, performative speech-acts, can only be performed by authentic persons, empowered to produce the given linguistic action, then he is forced to accept the standpoint in the spirit of the theory of narrative situation that only those motifs /thematic units/ are authentic which are represented by way of speech-acts performed by the anonymous Er-form narrator, and thus the 'motifs' narrated by the characters are not. Only the anonymous narrator is empowered to tell the truth, the characters can only imitate truth-telling.

If we confront this opinion with the analysing practice, its problematic nature is apparent at once. There are only few works that can be assigned to the binary model where the series of events in the text-world can only be reconstructed on the basis of the manifestations of the anonymous Er-form narrator.

Of course, Dolezel is also aware of some inconsistencies in his starting-point. In spite of this he does not deny his starting hypothesis, only limits its validity and this leads to a very complicated, but what we consider in the end not satisfactory, system of suppositions.

We think that the abandonment of the binary model deduced from the narrative situation is a simpler solution and it corresponds better to the analysing, text-world explaining practice, too. In our opinion the anonymous Er-form



narrator must be cancelled and replaced by the text not attached to a character. Besides the text not attached to a character, the utterances of persons represented in the text-world may be also a text-constitutive part. The texts not attached to a character are the utterances not of a fictitious, hidden subject favoured by anonymity but *the linguistic images of sets of affairs belonging to a certain world*. The statements of the characters speak either about these very sets of affairs or about other sets of affairs in that world. But they can speak - if the text-world has levels - about sets of affairs belonging to another world /another level of world/, and in this case, but only in this one, the relationship between the worlds actually the levels of worlds is questionable.

This is a significant modification in contrast to the theory based on the narrative situation, since in this way the statements of a character can also be authentic and, in this sense, true and the statements not defined by a character can also be false, at least at one level of the text-world. The truth-criteria can be given not by the status of the statement deduced from the narrative situation but only by a theory establishing the coherence of the text-world elaborated by the recipient.

UNDERSTANDING AS CREATING NARRATIVE STRUCTURES

(THE CONCEPT OF "WORLD" IN A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION)

Antal Bókay

Janus Pannonius University, Pécs

Introduction

It is natural that the researcher of the narrative tries to define first what it is he is interested in. But the concept of narrative in the semiotic and literary sciences is hopelessly vague and confused. The theories springing from different aspects have arrived at different basic concepts on such a wide scale that integration between them is impossible. The traditional aspect of "Literaturwissenschaft" treats the concept as a particular aspect of the theory of genre, and leaves it on a rather abstract, non-operative level. This means that instead of a theory, a critical survey of the epic, or more generally the novel is produced (Lubbock, 1921; Forster, 1927; Scholes-Kellog, 1966). Leaving aside this trend in research, there are probably two aspects of investigation left. The first takes the narrative as a special communication about reality, as a fiction that represents possible actions in human life. The linguistical form for this approach bears no central importance. In this group there can be found as different works as the structuralist study of Propp (1928) and the aesthetic approach of G. Lukács (1947).

According to the other tendency the narrative is a linguistic form, a very complex organization of the action discourse and its basic definitions can be given by logic and linguistics (for fictional vs, linguistic definitions see: Gray, 1975).

It seems to me that in consequence of the development of textlinguistics and other disciplines (semantics, logic, psycholinguistics etc.) in the study of semiotic objects it is possible to unite the two approaches of the fictional and linguistical definitions. In my paper - with a starting-point of the study of literature - I shall try to show some possible features of this model of narrative or, more generally speaking, of literary text theory. From the short history of the science of literature (if such exists at all) it is clear that metatheoretical orientations must be given more importance than anywhere else in the social sciences. These *a priori* assumptions are definitive and by leaving them unconscious the framework of investigation is limited (see: Schmidt, 1973; Dijk, 1979). This is the reason why I shall first try to give the metatheoretical assumptions of my study, and deduce the model of investigation only after that.

#### Aspects of investigation

It was stated first in semiotics, in the most general science of signs and sign systems that its object of inquiry can be investigated from three different aspects (Morris, 1938, 77-137.). The well-known aspects were summarised by Montague according to the following definition: "syntax is concerned solely with relations between linguistic expressions; semantics with relations between expressions and the objects to which they refer; and pragmatics with relations among expressions, the object to which they refer and the users or contexts of use of the expressions (Montague, 1968, 102. and Petőfi, 1977, 122.) Because of some categories gaining in importance later in this paper I would add one more original definition to the concept of pragmatics: "By pragmatics is designated the science of the relations of signs to their interpreters" (Morris, 1938, 108). The definition of Montague is acceptable only as a starting point,

bearing in mind the problems Petőfi has shown (1977, 119-149.). Montague's definition and Petőfi's treatment deals with the "syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects as always interwoven with each other" (Petőfi, 1977. 127.). In the original definitions however it is also easy to find a hierarchy of the three. According to Carnap in the same volume "pragmatical observations are the basis of all linguistic research" (Carnap, 1938, 147.). The hierarchy ordered according to a scheme where the first and basic element is the pragmatic, semantics comes next, and the last one syntax. Together they comprise the totality of the study of semiosis.

The sequence of the three aspects has shown the reverse order in the course of development in linguistics. The three categories - after the early abstract conception - represent the development of the science of linguistics, those paradigms (Kuhn, 1962) that were used by researchers to treat a part of human reality. The aspects of investigation of semiotic objects represent important metatheoretical phases according to the process by which they have become the definitive aspects of an empirical science. The three phases seem to me to show a line of development in the social sciences as well. W. Iser has provided a framework for this with the discussion of three categories of structure, function and communication (Iser, 1979). The investigator of the structure starts from a given whole, tries to analyse the elements of this totality and that system of rules that organizes them (the binary oppositions for example). In the case of a functionalist approach the structure loses its priority and is defined by its role in the context. The primary extratextual relation of the semiotic object is the meaning, the relation of the structure to the referred. The "function concept designates the relationship between text and extratextual realities and the meaning of the structures

within the text is revealed through their intended application" (Iser, 1979, 12.). We can find some parallel in the development of paradigms in the linguistics and the trend shown by Iser. The definition of semantics by Morris is clearly parallel with the function concept in that both take as central the intensional reference of the structure to something other. Linguistical semantics - as opposed to the syntactical-structuralist period - put the formal theory of meaning in the centre. The limitation of the semantical aspect lies in the fact that it fixes, and objectivates the text function into the sign object. It explains only the production of the meaning which is understood as a static property of the sign object. The semantical aspects explains the moment of the *genesis* of meaning but cannot give an explanation about the continuous *validity* of it (the two terms are from Iser, 1979.). The category of validity is clearly a pragmatical concept, it shows the point of view of realization, the use of the text. So as a summary, the syntactical aspect concentrates on the taxonomical, inner system, its paradigm was the first step of the systematic understanding of the semiotic process in linguistics. The semantical aspect deals with the expression-referent, the text/world relation. At last the pragmatic aspect integrates the other two into the text/reader relation. I would only note now the hierarchical system of the three paradigms is very close to the theory of Jürgen Habermas. According to him the human understanding of the world is directed by three research motivating interests. These are basic epistemological orientations as well. The three interests are the *technical*, that tries to understand the inner mechanism of the object of knowledge, the *hermeneutical* investigates the meaning, the genesis and the *emancipatorical* that is the role of understanding in human progress, the validity of knowledge for us (Habermas, 1968. Radnitzky, 1968; Wellmer, 1976).

Metatheoretical Problems of Pragmatical Theory of Narrative

If our aim is to understand narrative texts it is clear that we should choose the pragmatic approach, because this is the only one that can integrate the other two. The concept of pragmatics however, in its practical use, has not been converted into a unified aspect such as can be shown by the metatheoretical conception. In most cases- for the sake of formal treatment - The pragmatic aspect is reduced, the instrument of the scientific explanation (the formal apparatus) reduces the scope and content of the explanation (see Ferrara, 1977. on Montague and Bar-Hillel). The most general and widely accepted definition of this kind is stated by Stalnaker: "pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed" (1972, 383.). But the theory of the context and of speech acts makes up only a part of pragmatics. It interprets the productive forces of language use but it can give only abstract maxims for the understanding process, it is limited to the definition of the text/world level.

The autonomous text however in an ontological sense. has two extratextual constituents: its producer and its receiver. An essential characteristic feature of the two constituents is their definite inequality: the production is always momentary, objectivated, genetical, the subjective element is limited. These features enable the student to use formal means of description. The other constituent, the receiving and understanding, is always a process, organised around the validity and the subjective element plays an important role in this part of the ontological position. In this case where the repeated act of understanding is the central element there is only one possible basic category of pragmatics that is *interpretation*.

The proposed metatheoretical construction of the theory of narrative can be built up from the following ordered problems:

- *pragmatical level* - its basic problem is the interpretation of the narrative, the theory of validity based on the relation between text/reader
- deduced from the previous level, the next thing is the *semantical*, describing the general problems of text/world relation, the fictionality and the reference
- the next step in the deduction is the *syntactical* level, that produces the theory of the relations of the constitutive elements of the narrative.


The hierarchical construction of the levels together with their interwovenness are the basic feature of the system. The relative ineffectuality in linguistic methods in the theory of literature - compared to their empirical, scientific value - seems to me to result from the fact that a linguistic theory of pragmatics in this widest interpretative sense is still missing. The semantic and syntactic methods in themselves seem to be "imported methodologies" (Petőfi, 1980.) for the related fields in the semiotic studies.

It is clear that with the question of interpretation in the centre the minimal linguistic utterance investigated is the *text*. In the case of the syntactical or semantical aspects it is possible to investigate separated sequences. The relation between the reader and text however can be realized only in the case of whole, complete utterances. In defining the theory of interpretation we must start from this maximally complex semiotic object.

*A Model for Investigating Narrative - the Concept of World*

Based on the metatheoretical considerations we can state the model of investigation of the narrative. This seemingly very simple model fixes the mode of being, the basic ontological system of complex texts. All those texts

are produced and understood by somebody. They are intentional, that is they refer to something that is called here, for the sake of simplicity, reality.



The elements are in a reflexive relationship with each other, that is they mutually define each other. The investigation of the semiotic object often leaves aside one or other of the elements in this system. This can be accepted only as a provisional abstraction of the scientific research. The three aspects reviewed in the previous parts appear in this model with some simplification in the following from: The syntactical aspect gives the analysis of the delimited TEXT; the semantical interpretes the AUTHOR—TEXT—REALITY system; and the pragmatial starts from the READER—TEXT—REALITY relations. The last one necessarily takes the other two as its elements. The whole system can be defined - with the help of philosophical terms - as the ontological starting point for the epistemology of semiotic objects.

According to our pragmatial point of view we should build up our theory of narrative on the problem of interpretation. It is a consequence of the model that we assume that the reader projects a special reality based on the text. The text is an intentional structure produced by the author. The question is whether there is any general structure of understanding that is common to the reader and the text and defines their encounter. Several disciplines of the social sciences have recently defined this phenomenon. Behind the terms like "frame", "science", "world", "schemata", there is a common principle that our mental apparatus uses a technique of perception that evaluates the data from the outside world not as simple facts but according to a prior, inter-



pretative mental structure. It is also clear that the text or a special group of texts, where we can find the narratives as well, take the same principle as the inner organization of their structure.

The earliest conception of this thought was given by Gregory Bateson (1955). Bateson, realizing the independent feature of some forms of communication, tried to describe the logic of the metacommunicative process that was in charge with the independency from the actual world. He showed that the frame is a complex communicative technique that is a special mode of storing and activating information about the world. Its function is that it separates from the very complex and hardly understandable processes of the world those phenomenon, those situations that are important to be understood or imitated. The social psychological elaboration of Bateson's theory was developed by E. Goffman (1974). According to him, the frame can be defined as the 'principles of organization which govern events and our subjective involvement' (Goffman, 1974. 10.). Fillmore summarizes the frame concept of Bateson and Goffman as they "refer to an analytical framework within which human experience can be made intelligible" (Fillmore, 197 , 130).

World theories - Subjectivity of the Self-sufficient Text

It seems to me that the theories that can be used in the study of a literary work can be divided into three groups; the logical-semantical, the semiotical and the cognitive science theories. Without any detailed presentation or discussion I would like to emphasize only those points which may have decisive importance in a theory of narrative from a pragmatic aspect.

A trend around the term "possible world" investigated the phenomenon from a logical-semantical point of view. Its primary aim has been to give an adequate logical representa-

tion of the propositional attitudes, the counterfactuals and the impersonal intensional contexts. Most of the formulations do not give more than a logical instrument: "the semantic theory treats the spaces of entities and possible worlds as bare undifferentiated sets having no structure whatever" (Thomason, 1974, 50.). The undoubtedly most important theory world born of logical-semantic orientation is the work of Hintikka (1969; 1973; 1975). It is very important in the sense that he tried to give a consistent philosophical and epistemological definition of the possible world concept. Besides analyzing the mechanism of meaning production he sketches the general philosophical consequences giving the bases of a now non-positivistic theory of representation. He also introduces those results that were provided by cognitive psychology in the study of perception. The simplified essence of his system is that the "concepts, as meaning, are according to possible world semantics functions from possible worlds to references (extensions)" (Hintikka, 1975, 207.). The possible world is a mental system that mediates the reality reference of the meaning and so puts an end to the immediate connection of the meaning and reference. The basic element, the "raw material" of human meaning production processes is the possible world. The intentionality and intentionality are also connected by the principle of possible world such as the idea that intentionality is an intensional, inner conceptual construction of the mental arrangement of the extensional reality. Compared with phenomenology this new solution of the category of intention leads to the explanation of an important problem in epistemology. The principle of intentionality as intensionality, that is a "concept is intentional if and only if it involves the simultaneous consideration of several possible states of affairs or courses of events" (Hintikka, 1975, 195.), gives a semantical-epistemological explanation for the fact of how the human being

is capable of departing from the immediate, actual reality and able to think about it by the help of the modalities of real-possible. Hintikka - according to his aims - investigates two basic problems in connection with the possible worlds: firstly the relation of individuals and the world, where he proves the world to be primary to individuals. Secondly, he investigates the problem of the relations between worlds, the problem of the identifiable individuals in different possible worlds. He has not dealt with the inner construction of the worlds because according to his epistemological conception he tries to clarify the general principles of meaning production and reference. He has not dealt with the mechanism of interpretation. the analysis of the linguistically presented world. However from the point of view of narrative this can also be necessary so it would be useful to deduce the problem of world in such a reversed way even if it were strange from the point of view of logical semantics. So now I would like to move to a special narrativical, textlinguistical pragmatics based on the general thesis of Hintikka...

The reason why he has not dealt with the inner structure of the world can possibly be twofold. Firstly because he "brackets" it as a mental phenomenon that has been proved by psychology and tries to give the explanation of the logical relations of the individuals in a given arrangement. Secondly because the expressions analysed have an elementary nature and render it possible to restrict the analysis to the attitude and the possible world. It is probable, however, that the attitude has not only a mental representation, but that this subjective relation organises the system of relation of individuals delimited. This is a problem of the inner construction of the possible world. Even a simple belief utterance must be coherent in some way if it wants to be possible and so to be a world. If we start from the point of view of interpretation it is clear that the differ-

ent text-types and the different speakers create the possible world in different ways. According to my hypothesis the difference lies in the textual or other objectification of the intentionality, of the subjective organizing factor. Hintikka has shown that, although the possible worlds are not "natural things", "they may be as solidly objective as houses or books, but they are as certainly as these created by man (however unwittingly) for the purpose of facilitating their transactions with the reality they have to face" (Hintikka, The characteristic features of objectivation in the case of different texts can be very different. Certain texts are connected strongly with the situation of the creation, because to source of intentionality is a subject in a special situation. It is possible that the situation and the subject are not objectivated linguistically and the utterance, or the written text, while departing from the situations, loses its possible-world feature and the reader is not able to give it reality reference. On the other hand there are utterances that are able to fix linguistically these relations which objectivate the possible world needed for the understanding of the different elements or individuals. The characteristic feature of these texts is that they are self-sufficient. So we can speak of the *extrinsical* and *intrinsical* organization of the text-world. In the first case the world is organised upon a social or personal communicative situation. The adequate interpretation of the text is possible only in this situation and we need extratextual knowledge for the understanding. According to Paul Ricoeur these texts are organised in the *Umwelt* and not in the *Welt* and they have only ostensive reference (Ricoeur, 1973). By intrinsical textorganisation I mean that the world is inherent in the text, its reference understandable in itself. This is the principle of intentionality as intensionality projected to the whole text. The linguistic utterance in this case is

generally longer than the sentence and always functions as a text. The fact however that an utterance may consist of several sentences and so is a text would not mean that it has a world with an intrinsic organization (Eco, 1978. 29.).

Cognitive Science and the Narrative World - a Metatheoretical Note

Although the extension of the possible world concept to the text, the introduction of the interpretative aspect and the concept of an interpreter would not lead to the reduction of the world concept to mere analogy, it is clear that in this direction the strict logical development of the concept is not possible. There is no such logical theory at hand that would explain the macrostructures of complex texts and no such formalizable theory of language which can account for the ability of the speaker/hearer to produce and understand text. Another branch of the social sciences nevertheless puts this feature in the centre of interest.

Cognitive psychology and research in artificial intelligence are trying to investigate the process of *understanding* from the point of view of cognitive factors, contextual parameters, and the formation of algorithmically explicit programmes respectively (Dijk, 1980, 3.).

In the theory of narrative text both can be used only indirectly. Cognitive psychology has given new insights about the macro-systems of the mental processes of representation and memory. At this point text theory can go on showing how these phenomena are represented in the text, in its inner structure, in the mechanism of reference and interpretation. In the opposite way the research into artificial intelligence has given new information about the analysis and processing of texts. Here the task of a text theory is to make general the consequences deriving from particular aspects.

To go back to my earlier methateoretical thoughts I there is a clear difference between the concept of *structure* and *world*.

The "frame" or "world" is not the objective inner system of relations of a phenomenon, it is not a static taxonomically once-and-for all describable structure but a relational concept. Its existence is based on a relation, it is constituted in the relation of an interpreter subject and a verbal object. To refer back to Iser's proposal (Iser, 1979.) in a somewhat modified manner, the special category of the third phase in the scientific development will be the *world* and the *frame*. The structure concept explains a phenomenon as an objective inner system of relations; the function concept defines the relations of this intrinsical object to its context; the world explains the mutuality of the existence of the context and the intrinsic structure as a subject/object reflective relation. In the case of this category the linguistic set of elements is *structured*, has a *function*, and is *acquired* by an interpreter. These relational features introduced by this category can clearly work only in the actual text production and understanding processes. Scientific explanation disrupts this unity, because in the case of the interpretative process the objective linguistical facts and structures appear first. These can be the bases for deducing the meaning, and finally for building up the abstract general system, the world.

From the point of view of interpretation the text world is antecedent and consequent at the same time. It means that in the spontaneous understanding of the text the encounter of the whole text and the readers' frames (expectations, conventions etc.) defines the important structure and meaning elements. These in turn can help the thorough explanation of the abstract text world. Kuipers for example differentiates between the "global nature of description" and the "local nature of observation" (Kuipers, 1975, 156.) in the case of

text-frames. The first is the explanation of the text according to its world, the second is the description of the objective structure of elements.

As a summary of this part we can state that the *world* is a category of interpretation, an abstract system that comes from the rewriting of the concrete text in the proper subject/object relation.

### Explanation

Before analysing the inner structure of the text world, I would like to indicate some problems arising from our definition.

The first is noted by Fillmore in the following way: "What is needed in discourse analysis is a way of discussing the development, on the part of the interpreter, of an image, or scene or picture of the world as that gets built up and filled out between the beginning and the end of the text-interpretation experience" (Fillmore, 197, 125). This is the question of *explanation* of the abstract system in the case of a concrete text, or to put it another way: the problem of the possible ways of explication of the implicit text worlds. It seems that there are two general possibilities available. The first can be called *inductive*, the second *deductive*. The world can be separated from the text in that I describe the linear connections of the elements in the text. I assign a basic element- say the sentence - and try to find longer segments consisting of these elementary units. At last I arrive at the whole text. This is a very frequent way among theories of interpretation, but it has several problems. First the assignment of the basic units is always arbitrary and exterior to the text world. The individuals in the analysis are defined according to objective rules of a science, generally of logic, action theory or linguistics. This is a step back to the structuralist attitude because it tries to find the construc-

tion of the world in the objective phenomenon, the world is purely a consequence of the process, and the individuals in the world are primary to the world structure. The frame is specified in this way by Schank-Abelson (1977) and Schank Lebowitz (1980).

The other possible way of specification of the world is the construction of its parts from the whole. The starting point is the spontaneous understanding of the whole text. The specification of the individuals, the relations in the world and the explicit world structure is based on this process. The concrete process of understanding is always centered on the possible outcome, because it always assumes a possible world from the data received up to that moment. This expectation is continuously corrected in the course of reading and understanding. The explicit world of the text is an outcome of a matching process between the knowledge frames, the expectations of the reader and the objective relation-possibilities in the text. In the cognitive process research this phenomenon is called the "principle of continually available output" (Kuipers, 1975, 179).

### Translation

The other problem concerning the description of the abstract structure is the question of translation, or re-writing. The world appears in the text in concrete, united images. In the process of interpretation we have to translate these forms into another language according to the following minimal requirements:

- the translated and the translation should represent different levels of abstraction
- the outcome of the translation should be more abstract, or should have a conceptual nature (opposed to imagery)



- the outcome of the translation and the original is a one-many relationship
- the outcome of the translation is more systematical, more manageable and more operative
- the outcome of the translation is functionally preserving, that is it preserves every functionally important element from the original.

Translation is probably the most important and most complex problem of the theory of interpretation. In reality every semiotic theory, and this includes linguistic theory, contains an implicit theory of translation without the explicit analysis of its translation-nature. The syntactical use of the rewriting rule, or the system of semantic markers, is just as much translation as Fillmore's "case frame"-s (Fillmore, 1968; 197) or Dijk's macrostructures (Dijk, 1972). The translations can have a *formal* or *non-formal* nature. The first is developed by linguistics and logic in the syntactical and semantical treatment of semiotical objects. The second is the very old method of hermeneutics, the history of literature and philosophy, where the central interest is in the abstract structure of the content of the text, that objectivates human values, possible ways of life, etc. It can be hoped that pragmatics in the sense we have proposed would be wide enough to integrate the two approaches in a complex scientific processing of the texts.

#### Metaphorisation

I would like to make only a brief reference to a problem which is surely too important to be discussed in a short paper. This is a hypothesis that we can talk about text reference or a special type of it, that operates on a different route than the reference of the utterances describing simple states. In the case of the "story" or a fictional text it is really very hard to apply the traditional

theory of reference. An interesting novelty in cognitive psychology nevertheless can be connected with our problem. According to this there are two types of memory: *remembering in imagery* and *remembering in propositions*. The first means that "some central mechanisms are generating a (probably sequential) pattern of information which corresponds more or less to the structural information in the original perception" (Bower, 1972, 58.). This special connection based on structural isomorphism is the principle of imitation. The text enables the interpretator to take its image content as structurally isomorphic with his own world, specifying some "frames" of his life. In the process the text-world becomes significant for the interpreter. The text-objectivating frame or world is able to produce some imagery or appearance and can give information without transforming it into a propositional type. If somebody interpreted the text, and shows the world inherent in the text for himself, than he would change the imagery information into a propositional kind. The two kinds of information cannot be completely translated into the propositional. The two kinds of information cannot be completely translated into each other - a well-known fact is that there is always something left after the translation (interpretation) of a literary text. A part of the above hypothesis is that the relation between the reader's frame and the concrete text, the one which produces the abstract world, is also considerably different from the usual text/reality relation in a *hic et nunc* situation. This connection can probably be investigated by elaborating the logic of *analogy*. The two types of remembering and the problem of analogy is explicitly connected by a pair of categories in Bobrow (1975, 31.). He uses the terms *analogical* versus *propositional representation*. Others have also shown these two knowledge types as *contingency shaped* and *rule-governed* (Baldwin-Baldwin, 1978.).

I have to mention another characteristic feature. The remembering in imagery is considerably *indefinite*, there are only some figures defined, all the others are indefinite background (Bower, 1972, 57.). The indefiniteness is a characteristic feature of the world as well, because the closed intensional text gives just as much information in the explanation as there is in the text. In the case of a normal reality reference there would be an immeasurable amount of information that can be gained to explain the given utterance. This seemingly insufficient feature frees the text from being fixed to the immediate empirical reality and enables many interpretators to connect many subjective frames to it. Here we find a strange situation: that it can be general without using abstract terms. This text seems to have a double meaning level. Firstly the utterances used refer to an immediate element of reality, secondly they take part in the construction of a general, abstract world that becomes explicit after interpretation. Certainly in the text not all the linguistic elements are capable of this. There are some central individuals that convey the world. These elements that were called "slots" by Minsky (1975) or IMPS by Winograd (1975) have a special position. From the point of view of literature we can say that they are special metaphors. The specialness comes from the fact that they show a metaphorizing process where in the tenor part of the metaphor is an abstract position, an element of the world, and the vehicle part is a concrete individual of an image. In the text they appear as descriptions of states and events, and their metaphorical character is not clear. Obviously they are not really metaphors, they are not a transference of names but the text has the extra task of representing a world. We are close here to the famous thesis of Roman Jakobson, that the poetic function is the shifting of the principle of selection to the axis of combination (Jakobson, 1960, 358.). The text-world uses this technique similar to

metaphorisation to separate its individuals from those elements of the text which are used only for giving background to the imagery. Of course this distinction depends on the interpretator as well, according to our principle of a pragmatic subject - object relation.

Text-types — the Concept of the Story

In particular these last thoughts refer only to a special class of texts: those that are highly organised and completely self-sufficient. In this group we can find all literary texts, but there are many texts in everyday life that show this level of complexity. The group of complex texts can be called stories, taking the term in a rather wider sense, and including lyrical poetry as well. The "story" is a linguistic utterance on the text level that has a world defining its coherence. Fillmore has shown the connection of coherence and world: "a text is coherent to the extent that its successive parts contribute to the construction of a single (possibly quite complex) scene" (Fillmore, 197, 127.). In this sense in the case of a text we can speak of one world that can be divided into sub-worlds with relative independence. The organization of a world like this shows an order of "nearly decomposable systems", where the subsystems in their immediate existence are relatively free, but they are built into the whole system indirectly (Simon, 1969, 100.; Winograd, 1975, 191.).

Another important feature of the story is mentioned by Dijk (1980, 13.). According to him the story is special in the sense that it has a "point" that is, after reading it we know why it has written. This psychological feature shows that the interpretator has recognized a text that is intrinsic, where there is no need of any situative, extensive reference for its understanding. The "point" is the core of the principle of world production, a spontaneously

felt unity, that unites the different elements and is used as a subjective organizing principle. This means that the text has come to be significant in the reader-text relation. Rumelhart refers to the same abstract core in texts when defines the story as a summarizable text (Rumelhart, 1975.).

The World philosophy

Such features of the story throw light on the basic interpretative constituents of the text world. If we define the world as an *intensional system of relations that defines individuals as its elements*, then the "point" mentioned above seems to be a central constituent. The system of relations is primary in existence to the individuals. This is the force that takes the individuals as a unity, carries the principle of identity (that the individuals are the individuals of the same world) and gives the proper functions in the identity.

Philosophically it is a subjective phenomenon, a mental system that selects all the elements and gives special interpretation to them. In this sense Eco called the possible world "rational construct", and in a similar way Hintikka stresses the principle of intentionality as intensionality, the Kantian features of his theory, and the ideological feature of the the possible world (Hintikka, 1969.). As a constituent, I call this subjective core *world-philosophy*. It is a non-formal abstraction, the content producing the text coherence. This is the pure essence of the relations and the abstract common principle of these relations. The phenomena of the actual world can be ordered into levels of abstractness, because in any two phenomena there is an abstract identity common to both. The world philosophy is always that level of abstractness that is characteristic of the given text-world, but the most general one. Its description can be

adequately given with the help of the categories of philosophy. It always depends on the interpretator, first of all on the matching process between the mental frame and the text, and on the features of the reader's frame. It exists between the textual and extratextual just because it is only indirectly in the text and can be made explicit only with the help of interpretation. And because the individuals are possible concretizations of this abstract world-philosophy they take this abstractness in their concrete existence, the world-philosophy is the source of indefiniteness as well.

The world-philosophy works like the attitude part of the propositional attitude sentences, it defines the system of relations of the individuals. This system - in the case of stories - is always a complex organization on two levels of organization, *linear* and *non-linear*. This distinction can be found in several world theories. Saarinen refines, for example, the theory of Hintikka, differentiating between the possible state of affairs and the possible course of events. The second "is a class of linearly ordered states of events" the first is a "temporal slice in several different courses of events" and they have no future and no history (Saarinen, 1979, 191.). The role of this difference in Saarinen is that with its help is easier to show the two different ways of cross-identification based on continuity and similarity. Østen Dahl shows the same phenomenon from a model-theoretical aspect, differentiating between static and dynamic organization. "An ideal narrative discourse consists of two parts: a set of instructions for performing successive changes in that situation" (Dahl, 1977, 154.). The first means a static and spatial, the second a dynamic and temporal organization. In our system we shall call the linear organization *world-process*, the non-linear *world-structure*. The second is more basic, it shows the hierarchical

order of the individuals. Certain texts can exist without a world-process, without a temporal moment (such is lyrical poetry in literature). Of course the text is not able to state the world structure at once, so the text decomposes the simultaneous system into a linear string. The world-structure is a level of organization which is not as abstract as the world philosophy but it is not the linear order of concrete constituents. It is the world-philosophy realised in a concrete relation system. The world process has a linear organization, and refers to the functioning of the world. It shows those forms of movements which are the results of the dynamics of the individuals. The steps of the world process are always causal, they represent the abstract action structure of the narrative text.

### Individuals

According to our earlier definitions the elements of the text-world are the individuals. The expression should not be understood in its logical sense. Here the term individual means that the world philosophy and the world-structure-world-process are realized in concrete elements which are realized in concrete elements which are acceptable even in actual, empirical reality. The *individuals* are *those elements of the narrative, in which the world creating the text is manifested on the phenomenon level of the text*. The first problem is that in a narrative text a lot of constituents can appear which - from a logical point of view - can be the individuals in a proposition. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the narrative world they are not individuals. The theory of narrative would be hopelessly complex if it attempted to explain all the elements with linguistic objectivation. It is also clear that in the different text types the proportion of individuals and non-individuals is different. Moreover it is also clear that the non-individual

elements are necessary constituents of the text as well, because without them the individuals would be abstract figures without a background.

I take as individuals only those elements which fill in the empty spaces of the world structure. It is characteristic of their quality that they are always metaphorical in the earlier sense, they convey double information, an abstract content and an immediate appearance. The more general constituents of the text-world - analysed earlier - import the structure of reality into the text, and they give rewrite rules which change the empirical element to the position of an individual of the world. The indefiniteness mentioned earlier is the consequence of this rewrite process. In the process of abstraction such definitions, features of the individual which can be important in the actual world situation are often deleted.

If we consider the nature of the individuals in the narrative, an interesting analogy appears. According to this the individual is the morphological level of the narrative, the word of the sentence of the whole text. Eco for example analysed the individuals of the text as meaning units. It is definitive, however, what kind of semantic analysis we use for the description of the inner structure. In the case of an individual Eco collects those features which operate in it. The most important of these are the so-called diagnostic properties "allowing me to single out without ambiguity the class of individuals I am referring to within a contextual world" (Eco, 1978, 34.). Eco produces the feature elements inductively from the encyclopedic meaning and inserts these artificially produced elements into the system of the text. Our conception, however, says that the meaning assignment would not come from the construction of an artificially-produced encyclopedic meaning but from the constituents of the world. This process would be *deductive* because a general definition would get concrete groups of features. Without



trying to describe such a process I would like to show an alternative method of semantic description. Fillmore gives the semantic notion of *prototype* based on the results of cognitive psychology. The prototype theory of meaning presumes that "the understanding of meaning requires, at least for the great many cases, an appeal to an exemplar or prototype - this prototype being possibly something which, instead of being analysed, needs to be presented or demonstrated or manipulated". The alternative, widely used, theory of meaning is the "checklist theory" according to which 'the meaning of a linguistic form is represented in terms of a checklist of conditions that have to be satisfied' (Fillmore, 197 , 123.). It seems to me that the basic difference between the two types of theory is that the checklist theory renders the meaning independent from the user of the text and takes them as objective elements of the construction. The prototype theory defines the objective sign as the creative and created element of the subjectively-produced frame of the user.

If we try to use the prototype interpretation then in the case of the individuals in the text, the relations of the world structure, their abstract content would assign a prototype as the most general content of the individual. The text completes this general content with a minimal set of features for making the world appearing in its concrete form coherent on the level of imagery. It is probable that this complement is needed in the case of stories and literary works to give a sense of life to the text world.

To summarize: every individual has two groups of components: its *relations* and its *features*, where the first is definitive. The *features* are series of inherent, inner characteristics they are objectively given. At the genesis of the world these features present the individual as a possible alternative. At the same time they do not limit the

individual, because the features can be multiplied (infinitely). The features can be defined in the case of an individual as those definitions according to which the individual functions in the different worlds (actual and possible). The relation is external compared to the individual, and is not objectivated in it. It shows the prototype as the part of the system in a possible world. The features are potential, the relations are actual and realised. However the realations in the case of a given world actualize the features from the potential pool of features.

The conception about the inner structure of the world is a pragmatic conception, that is part of an interpretative process. This means that the listing of the constituents would not mean a narrative syntax, but some syntactical consequences of the theory of understanding.

#### References

- Bach, E. and Harms, R. (eds.) 1968. *Universals in Linguistic Theory*. Holt, Rinehart, New York
- Baldwin, I.D. and Baldwin, I.I. 1978. Behaviorism on Verstehen and Erklären. *Am Soc. Rev.* 1978: vol. 43. 335-347.
- Bateson, G. 1955. *A Theory of Play and Phantasy*. In: *Steps to an Ecology of Human Mind*. 1973. Paladin, New York, 150-166.
- Bobrow, D. G. 1975. Dimensions of Representation. In: *Dobrow-Collins 1975: (eds.): 1-34*.
- Bower, G. H. 1972. Mental Imagery and Associative Learning In: *Gregg, 1972. 51-88*.

- Carnap, R. 1938. Foundations of Logic and Mathematics. In: Neurath-Carnap-Morris (eds.) 1938: 139-214.
- Cogen, C., Thompson, H., Thurgood, G., Whistler, K. and Wright, J. (eds.) 1965. Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics society. Univ. of California, Berkeley.
- Dahl, Ö. (ed.) 1977. Logic, Pragmatics and Grammar. Univ. of Göteborg.
- Dijk, T. A. van, 1972. Some Aspects of Text Grammars. The Hague: Mouton.
- Dijk, T. A. van, 1979. Advice on Theoretical Poetics. Poetics, vol. 8. no. 6. 569-608.
- Dijk, T. A. van, 1980. Story Comprehension: An Introduction Poetics, 9, 1980: 1-21.
- Eco, U. 1978. Possible Worlds and Text Pragmatics, Versus, 1978. 19/20.
- Eco, U. 1979. The Role of the Reader. Indiana Univ. Bloomington.
- Ferrara, A. 1977. A Few Considerations on a Pragmatic Component. Versus 16/3. 49-70.
- Fillmore, Ch. 1968. The Case for Case. In: Bach-Harms, 1968: 1-90.
- Fillmore, Ch. 1965. An Alternative to Checklist Theories of Meaning. In; Cogen et al. (eds.)
- Forster, E. M. 1927. Aspects of the Novel. Penguin, Middlesex 1970.
- Gibson, I.I. 1966. The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Houghton Mifflin, Boston
- Goffman, E. 1974. Frame Analysis. Peregrine Book, Penguin 1975.

- Gray, B. 1975. *The Phenomenon of Literature*. Mouton, The Hague.
- Gregg, L. W. (ed.) 1972. *Cognition in Learning and Memory*. Wiley, New York.
- Habermas, I. 1968. *Knowledge and Human Interest*. Beacon Press, N.Y.
- Hintikka, J. 1969. *Models for Modalities*. Reidel, Dordrecht
- Hintikka, J. 1973. *Logic, Language-Games and Information*. Oxford Univ. London.
- Hintikka, J. 1974. *The Intentions of Intentionality*. D. Reidel, Dordrecht
- Iser, W. 1979. *The Current Situation in Literary Theory*. *New Literary History* vol. IX. No. 1. 1-21.
- Jakobson, R. 1960. *Concluding Statement in Linguistics and Poetics*. In: *Style in Language* (ed.) Th. Sebeok the M. I. T. Press 350-377.
- Kuhn, Th. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago
- Kuipers, B. I. 1975. *A Frame for Frame*. In: *Bobrow-Collins, 1975: (eds.) 151-184*.
- Lubbock, P. 1921. *The Craft of Fiction*. Jonathan Cape, London.
- Lukács, G. 1947. *The Historical Novel*. London, Merlin Press
- Minsky, M. 1975. *A Framework for Representing Knowledge*. In: *Winston, 1975*.
- Montague, R. 1968. *Pragmatics*. In: R. Klibensky (ed.): *La philosophie contemporaine I*. Firenze, La Nuova Italia
- Morris, Ch. 1938. *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*. In: *Neurath-Carnap-Morris, 1938: 77-138*.

- Neurath, O., Carnap, R. and Morris, Ch. 1938. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science vol. 1. The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago
- Petöfi, J. S. 1977. Semantics, Pragmatics, Text Theory. PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature, vol. 2. 119-149.
- Propp, V. 1928. Morphology of the Folktale. Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Press
- Radnitzky, G. 1968. Contemporary Schools of Metascience Akademiförlaget, Göteborg
- Rantala, V. 1979. Possible Worlds and Formal Semantics. In: Saarinen et al 1979: (eds.) 177-188.
- Ricoeur, P. 1973. The Model of the Text. New Literary History vol. V. no. 1. 91-117.
- Rumelhart, D.E. 1975. Notes on a Schema for Stories. In: Bobrow-Collins, 1975: 211-236.
- Saarinen, E. 1979. Continuity and Similarity in Cross-Identification. In: Saarinen et al. 1979. (eds.)
- Saarinen et al (eds.) 1979. Essays in Honour of J. Hintikka D. Reidel, Dordrecht
- Schank-Abelson. 1977: Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding Hillsdale, N.I.: Erlbaum
- Schank-Lebowitz. 1980. Levels of Understanding in Computers and People. Poetics, 9. 1980: 251-273.
- Schmidt, S. I. 1973. On the Foundation and Research Strategies of a Science of Literary Communication. Poetics, 7., 7-35.
- Scholes, R. and Kellogg, R. 1966. The Nature of Narrative Oxford Univ. Press

- Simon, H. 1969. *The Sciences of the Artificial*. M.I.T. Press.
- Stalnaker, R. 1972. Pragmatics. In: Davidson, D. and Harman, G.: *Semantics of Natural Language*. 380-397. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland.
- Thomason, R. 1974. Introduction. In: Montague, 1974. *Formal Philosophy*. Yale Univ. New Haven.
- Winograd, T. 1975. Frame Representation. In: Bobrow-Collins 1975. (eds.) 185-210.
- Winston, P. (ed.) 1975. *The Psychology of Computer Vision* McGraw Hill, New York.
- Wellmer, A. 1976. Communications and Emancipation. In: O'Neill, J. (ed.) *On Critical Theory*, Heinemann, 1976.



NARRATIVE STRUCTURE AND NARRATIVE STYLE

Lubomir Dolezel  
University of Toronto

The impressive progress of narrative theory in the past two decades has been, undoubtedly, connected with the elaboration of models of narrative structures, i.e. of invariant narrative systems defined on various levels of abstractness. Inspired by Propp's discovery of a common scheme underlying a variety of particular stories, French Structuralists have devised various "narrative grammars" for the description of narrative invariants. Quite recently, Lévi-Strauss has given a cogent summary of this approach: "Probably there is nothing more than that in the structuralist approach; it is the quest for the invariant elements among superficial differences." (Lévi-Strauss, 1978, 8; cf. already Piaget, 1972, 6). "Narrative grammars" have become a favourite and commonly used theoretical tool of folklorists, cultural anthropologists, text theoreticians and other specialists of narratology.

However, a literary scholar working in the domain of modern narrative theory has been faced with a painful dilemma: While recognizing that "narrative grammars" are a powerful explanation of the concept of "narrativity", he is forced to admit that these grammars generate structures which are aesthetically "barren", that is, lacking in aesthetic significance or effect. A sequence or a matrix of functions, motifs, mythemes, etc. appears as an organizing principle of narratives, but it is aesthetically neutral, or, perhaps, irrelevant. It has not been observed too often that Propp was already aware of this limitation of "narrative grammars": If we are interested in those features which "provide the tale with its expressivity, its beauty and enchantment", we



have to go beyond the invariant structures and focus on the "variable properties of the tale" (Propp, 1969<sup>2</sup>, 79). Obviously, aesthetic effects are somehow associated with variability, singularity of texts, with properties which are by definition outside the scope of models of invariant structures.

If our localization of aesthetic qualities is correct, modern study of literature requires a narrative theory which will achieve almost the impossible: It should describe how both the invariant and the variable properties of narrative texts are organized and, moreover, it should establish explicit links between these two levels of organization. In order to make some progress in this task, I propose to revitalize the very old concept of style in terms which, at first sight, might seem contradictory: *Style is the global regularity of idiosyncrasy*<sup>2</sup>. In a comprehensive narrative theory, stylistics, describing the variability of narrative texts, could become a useful partner of narrative grammar, studying models of invariant narrative structures. Needless to say, such a narrative theory should also provide means for describing explicitly the links leading from structures to styles and vice versa.

In what follows, I intend to demonstrate briefly and without any claims to exhaustiveness how such a comprehensive narrative theory could be pursued. In keeping with the predominant trend in contemporary narratology, I will remain within the framework of semantics. This focus is not fortuitous; in the domain of narrative texts, more than in any other domain of text theory, semantics necessarily represents the core of theoretical enquiry.

1. *Extensional and intensional semantics.* In view of the fact that aesthetic effects seem to be carried by variable, often "minute" textual properties, our search for an ade-

quate semantics of literature has to be guided by the principle that any reductionism, i.e. any loss of meaning, is inadmissible. Specifically, any semantic theory or model which reduces complex meanings of literary texts to invariant semantic representations is just a partial theory or model for literary semantics.

Two semantic systems are worthy of note in our search for an adequate literary semantics: Frege's semantics - proposed in the domain of the philosophy of language (see especially Frege, 1892), and Prague school semantics - developed for the specific purpose of poetics (see Mukarovsky, 1928). There are, in my opinion, many similarities between Frege's and the Prague school's ideas about language and literature, although there was probably no connection or influence between the two sources of modern semantics.<sup>3</sup> Their union *post festum* would be, in my opinion, beneficial to both: It would place the Prague school system into a broader theoretical development of 20th century semantics and, on the other hand, would provide Fregean semantics with a necessary vital link to empirical semantic problems in language and literature.

It is commonly known that Frege's semantics is based on the differentiation between *Sinn* (sense) and *Bedeutung* (reference). In Mukarovsky's system, the corresponding components of meaning are called *vyznamova struktura* (semantic structure) and *tematicka struktura* (thematic structure). In this paper, I will follow the already well-established practice of referring to *Sinn* as *intension* and to *Bedeutung* as *extension*.

Efforts to apply Fregean semantics as an adequate semantics of literature are hampered by the fact that the most developed accounts of intensions have followed reductionist models, in translating intensions into purely extensional languages. Such translating procedures seem to be typical of contemporary logical semantics and of linguistic semantics based on logico-semantic cate-

gories. At present, the most popular version of this procedure derives its inspiration from possible-world semantics. Intensions are defined as functions from possible worlds to extensions. Such functions pick out from every possible world exactly those elements of the world which represent the extension of the given expression in that world. While such attempts to express intensions in an extensional language are understandable and even necessary in logical semantics, - with its goal of formulating truth-conditions in intensional contexts - they seem to be unproductive in literary semantics, precisely because intensions are reduced to extensions. We have to repeat again that an adequate intensional semantics of literature has to give a non-reductionist, "autonomous" account of intensions. All experience, past and present, indicates that a non-reductionist theory of intensions is the most difficult (some would say, impossible) task of semantical theory.

All extensional accounts of intensions disregard the essential link between intensional meaning and its corresponding verbal expression. With respect to the theory of intensions using the framework of possible-world semantics, this deficiency has been pointed out: "This analysis of intension has made the concept essentially language-independent. An intension has extralinguistic entities both as its domain (possible worlds) and as its range (objects and truth values)" (Allwood-Andersson-Dahl, 1977, 129). This disregard of linguistic expression is, in my opinion, in clear contrast with Frege's original notion. For Frege, *Sinn* was "the mode of presentation" of the reference (op. cit., 119) and this mode is necessarily given by the form in which the language expresses the reference<sup>4</sup>. In accordance with Frege's original notion, intensions should be defined as those components of meaning which are necessarily and fully determined by the form of their expression. Obviously, intensions are generated only in languages which are not governed by a simple, one-to-

-one correspondence between expressions and referents.

While such an account of intension should satisfy a student of literature, it will make the task of intensional semantics even more difficult. If intensions are bound to the corresponding forms of expression, then they are altered or destroyed by any, even the slightest, change of expression. This means that there is no possibility of describing intensions in any kind of paraphrase (rewording) of the original expression. The basic method of capturing meaning, the method of "interpretants", seems to be closed. It is impossible to represent the intension of an expression (sign) by another (synonymous) expression (sign).

The insistence on a necessary and unalterable correlation between intensions and forms of expression seems to be driving us into the same dead-end, where those afraid of the "heresy of paraphrase" have been resting<sup>5</sup>. However, rejecting paraphrase as a tool for describing intensions does not prevent us from seeking other, theoretically more satisfactory, versions of intensional semantics. If intensions cannot be described directly, procedures of *indirect* description have to be formulated.

In this respect, the necessary bond between intension and form of expression becomes a blessing. If intensions are determined and structured by the form of their expression, then they can be described indirectly through the structure or organization of verbal expression. Such a direction has been, in fact, pursued for some time in structural linguistics and poetics, although the concept of intension has not been generally used.

In spite of this opening, intensional semantics remains a formidable task. In the domain of narrative texts, it should be developed on two levels: 1. *Intensional micro-semantics* will investigate the intensions of linguistic units, such as words, phrases, sentences, in terms of the "inner form" of their expression. Intension of a higher unit will

be interpreted as an integration of intensions of its componential expressions.<sup>6</sup> In this approach, verbal context appears as a form of expression and, as such, has been referred to in many accounts of intensional meanings (see, for example, contextual theories of metaphor). 2. *Intensional macrosemantics* will investigate theories and methods for describing intensional meaning of whole texts, or, at least, of some aspects of this intensional totality. Again, it will approach this task through the study of the organization of the text's expression (its texture). The unity of the concept of intension on the micro- and the macro-level of organization is ensured: the global regularities of texture correspond to the "inner form" of the micro-expressions, while the intensional structuring of the narrative world corresponds to the structuring of the micro-intension given by the integration of its componential parts.

In this paper, intensional microsemantics will be left aside. I will concentrate on proposing and demonstrating one possibility of investigating intensional macro-organization in narrative texts.

2. *The concept of intensional function.* The fundamental concept of narrative macrosemantics is the concept of *narrative world*. Narrative world is a set of individuals, objects, properties, events and actions, which is constructed by the narrative text.<sup>7</sup> Narrative worlds are not formless entities. They are shaped in many different ways. The macro-restrictions operating on the set of elements forming the world are either extensional, or intensional. Extensional restrictions specify those conditions of admissibility in the world which are totally independent of the designations, names and descriptions of the elements. A purely quantitative restriction, for example the number of narrative agents, is the simplest example of an extensional restriction, generating one-agent, two-agent and multi-agent worlds. A narrative world formed

by extensional restrictions has a shape, a structure, but - as has already been mentioned - this structure is totally independent of any possible expressions which will be used to verbalize the world. Of course, we have to talk about the extensional world, its elements and its structuring, for this purpose, we have to construct a purely extensional language, i.e. an artificial system of signs governed by the principles of one-to-one correspondence between elements of the world and elements of the sign system. The construction of such a language has been an urgent task of semantics at least since Frege. At present, I believe, the most promising development in this direction is the elaboration of a system of semantic representations. However, for our present purpose, we do not have to go into details.

Intensional macro-restrictions affecting the shape of the narrative world will be defined - in accordance with our overall conception of intensional meaning - as such regularities which operate through the forms of expression of the world. Since the possibilities of expressing a world are extremely varied, we have, necessarily, a rich variety of intensional world structures. Obviously, one and the same extensional world can be transformed by various forms of expression into many different intensional world structures<sup>8</sup>. The study of the possible intensional world structures and of their relationship to the possible extensional world structures, is, in my opinion, the most important task of contemporary narrative semantics<sup>9</sup>.

In a relatively short contribution, it is impossible to discuss all the important problems connected with intensional world structuring. I will concentrate on the possibility of making the concept of intensional restrictions more specific and explicit. In order to give a sharp focus to the discussion, I shall deal only with the so-called *domain* of the world, i.e. with the set of its individuals, "inhabitants". In the case of narrative worlds, the domain is given by the

set of agents acting in the world. Narrative agents (traditionally called characters or *dramatis personae*) are distinguished from other objects in the world precisely by their ability to perform actions.

As extensional entities, the individuals-agents will be designated and referred to by a conventional set of symbols, for example by the lower-case letters of the alphabet: a, b, c... In order to ensure the extensional character of this sign system, we will require that it follows the principle of one-to-one correspondence: each individual will be designated by one and only one letter. The domain of the narrative world will then be represented as set  $D = \{a, b, c, \dots\}$ .

In particular narrative texts, agents will be "named" by the various expressions of natural language, serving in the function of singular terms. It is commonly known that two distinct categories of expressions are available for this purpose: *proper names* and *definite descriptions*. Without going into the controversy concerning the relationship of these categories of singular terms, I will state my agreement with those semanticians who claim that proper names and definite descriptions differ fundamentally in intensional meanings. Such a view can be defended especially within the framework of the well-known theory of proper names as "rigid designators"<sup>10</sup>. In the framework of our intensional semantics, "rigid" designation can be interpreted as intension because a proper name thus provides a special mode of presenting the individual. There is no doubt that every definite description carries an intensional meaning given by its form of expression. In other words, we claim that the proper name *Odysseus* carries an intension different from the intension of the definite description *the king of Ithaca* and the latter, in turn, differs in intension from *the hero of Homer's poem "The Odyssey"*.

If we accept this idea, then we can say that natural

language provides at least two intensionally different alternative forms of expressing singular reference; any given individual of the narrative world (that is any member of set D) can be assigned in every act of "naming" either a proper name or a definite description. In certain narrative texts, the selection of these alternatives can be governed by regular preferences, i.e. by stylistic regularities<sup>11</sup>. Formally speaking, in such texts the assignment of singular terms to narrative agents is governed by a two-value function which assigns either a proper name or a definite description to each individual in the domain D. Any function which provides a mapping of extensional symbols into intensional expressions will be called *intensional function*. Our function which will replace extensional symbols a, b, c... by either proper names or definite descriptions shall be called *intensional function of naming*. The operation of this function can be observed in Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*. The regularity of naming in this novel is given by the fact that only three agents of its world, *Robinson*, *Xury* and *Friday*, are assigned proper names, while all other agents are consistently expressed by definite descriptions; *my father*, *the Portuguese captain*, *the English captain's widow*, *Friday's father*, etc.

The concept of intensional function, as defined, could become, in my opinion, a very important theoretical tool for describing the organization of intensional meaning in literary texts. Every intensional function generates a stylistic regularity of texture by controlling the selection of alternative expressions or categories of expressions. In fact, a stylistic regularity is *empirical evidence* of the operation of an intensional function in a text. On the other hand, intensional function is responsible for the intensional structuring of the narrative world, by splitting the extensional world into a set of intensionally defined "sub-worlds". In such a way, the concept of intensional function



provides the vital linkage between *regularities of texture* (i.e. the form of the text's expression) and *macrostructuring of intensional meaning*.

In the case of the intensional function of naming, which has been used as our concrete example, the domain of the narrative world (D) is split into two subsets: the set of agents named by a proper name and the set of agents named by a definite description. The extensional macrostructure (domain) is transformed into an intensional macrostructure (picture of the domain). The resulting macrostructure is intensional in character, precisely because its existence and shape are dependent on and fully determined by the regularity in the form of expression, in texture. If such a regularity did not exist, if, for example, all agents of D were expressed by proper names only, this particular intensional structuring would not come into existence. This statement should not be construed in such a way as to imply that without the intensional function of naming, *no* intensional structuring of the narrative world would be possible. Our theory assumes that there are many different intensional functions, and, consequently, many different ways of structuring narrative worlds intensionally. Narrative macrosemantics should specify the particular intensional functions and describe their contribution to the overall intensional structuring of narrative worlds.

Two-value functions are the simplest form of intensional functions. Higher-value intensional functions are obviously possible, since natural language quite often offers more than two alternative forms of expression for one and the same extensional meaning. In fact, such is even the case with singular terms, if we inspect them more closely. While logical semantics has been satisfied with distinguishing proper names and definite descriptions, linguistic semantics has to take account of the fact that within both categories, there exist subcategories with substantial differences in inten-

sional meaning<sup>12</sup>. We can say, for example, that there exists a significant intensional difference between calling somebody by his surname and calling him by his first name.

Without going into a systematic theory of singular terms in natural language, I propose to use the following preliminary categories in our study of the intensional structuring of the domain of narrative worlds:

I. Proper name: 1) surname: a) without "inner form":

*Nixon;*

b) with "inner form":

*Baker,*

*Black;*

2) given names: *John, Petrovic;*

3) nicknames: *Caddy;*

4) abbreviations: *X.Y.*

II. Definite descriptions: 1. fixed (i.e. stable throughout the whole text): *my*

*father (in Robinson*

*Crusoe);*

2. contextual/unstable (i.e. changing according to context): *the last customer in the store.*

In different narrative texts, the intensional function of naming can operate over any set of these alternatives, that is the author may select the expressions for naming his agents from any one of these categories or any one of their combinations. In other words, intensional function of naming, if present in the text production, will operate as a two-, three-...n-value function, depending on the number of categories which enter the selection process. In order to demonstrate the operation of intensional function of naming and its contribution to the intensional structuring of the narrative world, I want to examine a text which certainly represents a challenge to semantic analysis, *The Trial* by

Franz Kafka.

3. *Intensional structuring in The Trial*. A modern narrative text, exemplified by Kafka's novels and short stories, has often been characterized as semantically multivalent, i.e. open to a multitude of semantic interpretations. This undeniable property of modern literature has often been taken as an excuse for interpretative anarchy: Since a modern text can mean anything, every reader or critic is allowed to construct his own "meaning". Instead of undertaking the difficult and laborious analysis of the semantic structure of modern texts, literary criticism has taken the easy route: bypassing the text and formulating "meanings" which are nothing more than slightly adjusted versions of the critic's preconceived ideology. This characterization of contemporary "interpretative" criticism might seem too harsh and too general. However, it certainly applies to the many critical "readings" of Kafka. They express the religious, political, social, psychological, etc. position of the critic, rather than Kafka's own semantics.

Narrative semantics, which, at present, is the most active part of structural poetics, operates in a direct contrast to this kind of "interpretative" criticism. In a meticulous analysis, based on a comprehensive semantic theory, the text inherent regularities of the organization of meaning are revealed. There is no denying the fact that the final recovery of meaning from a literary text is accomplished in the act of reading, i.e. in the interplay of the text and (a) reader. However, the acts of reading and interpretation are to be controlled by the semantic structuring of the text; if this control is disregarded, the "readings" and "interpretations" offer subjective guesses, in the best case, and misrepresentations, in the worst case.

In spite of an abundance of critical literature on Kafka<sup>13</sup>, little has been done to understand his work in the

light of narrative semantics. My modest excursion into Kafka criticism serves no other purpose than to demonstrate that: a) even the most "mysterious" texts generate meaning by regular processes and devices of meaning production; b) consequently, the structuring of meaning in these texts is no less susceptible to theoretical analysis than it is in the "simple" and "non-ambiguous" texts of classical literature.

One of the interesting factors of semantic structuring in Kafka's *The Trial*<sup>14</sup> is the operation of the intensional function of naming (as defined in part 2). This function assigns terms of singular reference to all the agents of the novel in a surprisingly regular and consistent way. Rare "exceptions" can be accounted for as manifestations of competing regularities. The scope of the intensional function extends to both the narrator's texts and the characters' speeches; as a rule, agents are "called" by the same designation in both textual planes. For example, *Fräulein Bürstner* is the regular designation of this agent used both by the narrator and by *Fräulein Bürstner's* co-agents. Exceptions arise in such cases when an "intimate" way of designation, usually first name, is used in conversations between the agents: *Josef K.* is called *Josef* by his uncle and by *Leni*.

The intensional function of naming in *The Trial* operates over the following set of categories:

- I. Proper name; 1. surname: *Block*,  
2. given (first) name: *Leni*;  
3. abbreviation: *K.*
- II. Definite description: 1. fixed: *der Prügler* (the whipper);  
2. contextual (unstable): *ein junger Bursche* (a young boy) - *der Bursche* (the boy) - *der Sohn des Haus-*

*meisters* (the son of the housekeeper).

It seems to me that the distinction of surnames with or without "inner form" is irrelevant for this novel; nicknames do not occur.

As a result of the application of the intensional function of naming, the set of agents of *The Trial* is split into the following, intensionally defined subsets:

1. The protagonist forms a one-member subset, singled out from the set of agents by his exclusive proper name abbreviation. The standard form of the name is *Josef K.* with the variant *K.* and with contextual variants (used only in allocutions) *Herr K.* (in Mrs. Grubach's speech) and *Josef* (used by his "intimates", the uncle and Leni). It is noteworthy that the priest (in chapter IX) addresses the protagonist *Josef K.* (152), a quite unusual form of address in German, even if full family name was used<sup>15</sup>. While all the above given forms are variants of the abbreviation, there is an alternative mode of naming the protagonist, namely by fixed definite descriptions. This aspect of the protagonist's naming will be dealt with later.

2. There is a group of agents whose standard name is a surname, in two different forms: a) The surname alone is assigned, as in the case of *Huld*, *Tittorelli*, *Block*. Three minor characters are named in the same way: *Rabendsteiner*, *Kullich*, *Kaminer*; in this case, the mode of naming is exceptional, as will become clear later. b) The second variant of the surname, its polite form, is restricted to three agents: *Fräulein Bürstner*, *Frau Gruber* and *Fräulein Montag*. In the case of *Fräulein Bürstner*, an occasional variant *das Fräulein* can be found in characters' speech, indicating her exceptional position in this set; the other two female characters are episodic. An interesting detail should be mentioned here: In their most intimate moment (end of chapter I), Joseph K. wants to call *Fräulein Bürstner* by her first

name, but he realizes that he does not know it (27). This lack of first name is no less significant for the expression of the intensional meaning than the polite surname under which this female agent is known.

3. The agents assigned first names only are, at first sight, a rather mixed set: *Elsa*, *Leni* (K's mistresses), *Anna* (the cook) and *Franz* and *Willem* (the wardens). What is significant in the case of this set is that it can be defined by an extensional property: all characters in this group are of "low status" socially or professionally (*Franz* and *Willem* are described as "niedrige Angestellte" (10), low clerks). We have here a case where intensional splitting of the domain coincides with its extensional subdivision, reinforcing its significance for the semantic structure of the novel.

4. The possibility of naming agents by the assignment of contextual, unstable, changing definite description will concern us here from a purely formal aspect only. Unstable definite description is a transitory stage in the process of naming. It leads either to the assignment of a proper name, or to the selection of a permanent, fixed definite description. The introduction of one of the wardens in Chapter I can be used as an example of both outcomes; the chain of naming proceeds as follows: *ein Mann* (a man) + *der Mann* (the man) + *der fremde Mann* (the strange man) + *der Fremde* (the stranger) + *Franz* (in *Willem's* allocution) / *der Wächter* (the warden) (in narrator's text). The agent will be known thereafter under the proper name or the fixed definite description. This process does not apply to a group of minor or episodic characters who do not rise above the level of anonymity signified by the unstable definite description. Their role in the semantic structure of the novel will not be discussed, with the exception of one specific case (see below).

5. A very prominent specific feature of the naming of agents in *The Trial* is the assignment of fixed definite descriptions to a large set of individuals. Both the negative and the positive aspect of this mode of naming is significant: On the negative side, these agents are - similarly as Josef K. - deprived of a standard proper name; their proper names are never given. On the positive side, the *type* of the fixed definite description is most important: the agent is designated by his function or position in the two social institutions represented in *The Trial* - the Bank and the Court. All the employees of the Bank, with the exception already mentioned, are named in this way: *der Diener* (the servant), *der Direktor* (the director), *der Direktor-Stellvertreter* (the vice-director). The group of the representatives of the Court, designated by fixed definite descriptions, is rather large: *der Aufseher* (the supervisor), *der Untersuchungsrichter* (the examining magistrate), *der Student* (the (law) student), *der Gerichtsdienner* (the Court attendant), *der Auskunftgeber* (the informant), *der Prügler* (the whipper), *der Kanzleidirektor* (the director of the bureau), *der Richter* (the judge), *der Dritte Richter* (the Third judge), *der Gefängnis Kaplan* (the prison chaplain), etc. We should add that the designation *der Angeklagte* (the defendant) could be characterized as a fixed definite description expressing a "position" at the Court. It is assigned to minor (anonymous) characters, but in two cases, in the case of Josef K. and Block, it serves as a secondary designation of a major character<sup>16</sup>.

One exception to the exclusive use of the fixed definite description has already been mentioned: Josef K. 's wardens are given proper (first) names (*Franz, Willem*). Another interesting case is the girl in chapter IV, whom Josef K. meets during his visit to the attic offices; she is not assigned a fixed definite description and, therefore, her function at the Court remains unclear. Much more impor-

tant is the case of the two gentlemen in chapter X who arrive to execute Josef K. They are not given a fixed definite description. This exceptional case seems to me so significant that I will return to it in more detail in the conclusion of this paper.

Having established the intensional structure of the domain of the narrative world, that is the subsets of agents defined by the intensional function of naming, we shall proceed to investigate how this structuring generates, or, better to say, contributes to generating the intensional meaning of the novel. Let us recall our claim, according to which an investigation into the intensional structuring of the narrative world by means of intensional functions will give us indirect access to the intensional macro-meaning of the literary text. Specifically, in the case of the intensional function of naming, we hope to have gained an access which will lead us far beyond the traditional intensional semantics of proper names derived from their "inner form" (cf. Eis, 1970)<sup>17</sup>.

In spite of the fact that we have been investigating only one intensional function operating in *The Trial*, we should hope to uncover significant traces of the total intensional macrostructuring of the text. In this first, and, necessarily, partial approach, I want to suggest that three aspects of the intensional macrostructure of *The Trial* are generated, or, at least, indicated by the intensional function of naming:

1. *Hierarchy of agents and their relationships.* Intensional structuring resulting from the application of the function of naming generates associations of agents in addition, and, sometimes, in contrast to those which are established by extensional criteria. The most obvious feature of this aspect of intensional macrostructure in *The Trial* is the isolation of the hero-protagonist in a one-member class, resulting



from the exclusive use of abbreviation as his name<sup>18</sup>.

As a result, Josef K. is differentiated from all other defendants, especially from Block. The intension of exceptionality, uniqueness which becomes obvious in a systematic study of naming, outweighs the intension of anonymity or loss of identity which the abbreviation evokes in isolation. Kafka's hero is certainly an ordinary man because his fate is the possible fate of anybody. He is, however, unique among the ordinary men because of his insistence on human dignity in the face of an inhuman, inaccessible force.

The hero-protagonist forms the centre of the intensional system and the other agents are grouped around this centre according to their particular relationships to the protagonist. The intensionally generated split in the set of female characters is especially striking. I have in mind the intensional contrast between *Elsa* and *Leni*, on the one hand, and *Fräulein Bürstner*, on the other hand. K.'s mistresses, being named by the first name only (their family name is never given), are linked to other low-status characters. In this case, the intensional feature (name) brings the extensional property of the class (low status) into a sharper focus. The low status of K.'s mistresses<sup>19</sup> is especially significant in contrast to the inaccessible *Fräulein Bürstner*, named consistently by the polite form of surname. The special position of this female character vis-a-vis Josef K. is reinforced by the intensional contrast to the male group of characters around K. who act as his "helpers" or "informers"; these latter agents form a separate intensional class because they are consistently named by surname only (*Huld*, *Tittorelli*, *Block*).

In general, all agents of *The Trial* assigned a proper name (first name, surname, Frau/Fräulein + surname) can be said to form the "private" group of the hero. They enter into clearly specified relations and interactions with the hero, while their association with the institutions of the

world of *The Trial* is vague, indefinite, sometimes mysterious. The case of the minor representatives of the institutions (the three bank employees and the wardens) is typical; they are attracted into the "private" group by their closer association with Josef K.

2. *The intension of the institutions.* Two social institutions, the Court and the Bank, play a fundamental role in the semantic structure of *The Trial*. On the extensional level, these institutions are clearly in contrast: The Bank is a rational, highly-efficient and well-defined form of social organization with clearly determined procedures and goals of operation. The Court's mode of activity is desperately muddled, irrational and chaotic, with no rules of procedure and with absolutely unpredictable results. This extensional contrast, however, is counteracted by a similarity on the intensional level, indicating a deeper connection of these two institutionalized modes of social activity. The intensional similarity is given by the fact that the Bank's and the Court's representatives form one class on the criterion of naming: as we know already, they are named by fixed definite descriptions expressing their function or position in the strict hierarchy of both institutions: *the director* (in the Bank) - *the Bureau director* (in the Court). The semantic significance of this mode of naming is reinforced by a lack of proper names with respect to this set of agents. They are "professionals", not "individuals". It seems to me, however, that at a deeper level, there is a special motivation for withholding the proper name in the case of the Court's officials. The reason is suggested by Titorelli, a very important "informer" about the workings of the Court. When Josef K. asks Titorelli about the name of the judge who is being portrayed by the painter, Titorelli replies: "Das darf ich nicht sagen." (108) ("I am not allowed to tell you"). This answer indicates that the proper names of the Court's officials are *tabu*. This *tabu*-like prohibition of proper names is consist-

ent with the overall intensional character of the Court in *The Trial*: The Court is an alien, separate, unknown and inaccessible *invisible* world<sup>20</sup>.

A minor point should bring us back to the protagonist. His central position in the "private" group has been emphasized. However, Josef K. is exclusive in yet another respect: in the accumulation of names which are assigned to him. Josef K. is an individual who faces his tragic fate alone. At the same time, however, he is a part of the social machinery represented by the institutions. Correspondingly, he is assigned "institutionalized" names in the form of fixed descriptions, being "*Herr Prokurist*" (Herr Assessor) in the system of the Bank and "*der Angeklagte*" (the defendant) in the domain of the Court. In such a way, the one-member set represented by *Josef K.* is the intersection of all three fundamental sets of agents who comprise the domain of *The Trial*: the "private" group, the Bank and the Court. The pivotal position of the tragic hero could not be highlighted in a more emphatic way.

3. While the features of the intensional structure of *The Trial*, just discussed, seem to me quite clearly established, the third feature is controversial. I want to propose it as an hypothesis arising from a thorough examination of the texture of Kafka's novel. In order to become more convincing, the hypothesis requires further evidence.

It is striking that the two men who appear in the last chapter of *The Trial* in order to kill Josef K. are not named in accordance with the intensional function controlling the assignment of names in this novel. If the intensional function were applied in this case, the men, as representatives of the Court, would be assigned (perhaps after a stage of instability) a fixed definite description corresponding to their professional function. If the Court has its *judges*, *magistrates*, *whippers*, etc., it could be expected to have its well-appointed and appropriately named *executioners*. However,

the naming of the two gentlemen remains in the vague mode of the unstable definite descriptions: in the narrator's text, they are called *zwei Herren* (two gentlemen), *die Herren* (the gentlemen) and *seine Begleiter* (his companions); in K.'s inner monologue, they are "*alte untergeordnete Schauspieler*" (old, minor actors) and *vielleicht...Tenöre* (maybe...tenors). (K. even asks one of them in which theater they perform).

This absence of the expected mode of naming would not be striking, if it was clearly established in the text that the gentlemen are representatives of the Court. However, unlike the wardens of chapter I, they do not claim to act according to a commission (*Auftrag*); they make a silent sign in answer to K.'s rather indefinite question (162). In other words, the association of these agents with the Court is expressed neither explicitly, nor by the intensional mark of the name. It is obvious that the identity of K.'s executioners is uncertain. Should we assume then that they are not at all connected with the Court? Should we interpret K.'s execution as an event which was not "ordered" by the Court? A positive answer to these questions would bring a new dimension into the semantic interpretation of *The Trial*. If K.'s execution cannot be traced to the Court, then it is an absolutely random event coming from a different, unknown realm. Such a twist in the semantic structure of the story would indicate that Kafka wrote not only *The Trial*, but also, in the last chapter, a parody of his own novel, specifically, a parody of the rules governing its semantic structure. We know that the Court's proceedings and activities are purely random and arbitrary; consequently, any random and arbitrary event, if its origin is not specified, can be interpreted as originating from the authority of the Court. Because the Court initiates random and arbitrary events, any random and arbitrary event of uncertain origin can be "blamed" on the Court, can be integrated into the chain of the Court's proceedings. With respect to the final act of *The Trial*, such an integration has

been, as a rule, performed by readers and critics. Our minute analysis of modes of naming in the novel suggests that this interpretation is far from self-evident.

--- . ---

Contemporary literary criticism looks more and more like an isolated island of dilettantism in the ocean of theoretically and methodologically advanced anthropological and social sciences. The most obvious consequence of the humanistic preference for speculation, which prevails in literary studies, is the contemptuous attitude towards the literary text. Unable to develop reliable methods for the study of text structuring, literary criticism has abandoned its proper subject and has resorted to guesses about authorial intentions and readers' concretizations<sup>21</sup>. Although these escape manoeuvres are often masked by complicated "theories", they are nothing else than symptoms of the persistent theoretical and methodological feebleness of literary criticism.

Literary texts are complex semiotic objects and, as such, require the development of ingenious methods of investigation. Among the difficult tasks facing literary theory, the problem of intensional meaning is probably the most difficult. In view of our claim that intensions are crucial components of literary meanings, the progress of literary semantics depends on the development of reliable methods for the study of intensions. Our suggestion to link intensional semantics with the traditional concerns of stylistics might be a step on the long road towards a theoretically sound and empirically fruitful intensional semantics of literature.

Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The concept of style has not been accepted as a central concept of literary theory. Most students of literature have treated style as a peripheral, almost accidental property of literary works. In the realm of linguistics, stylistics has not fared much better than in the empire of literary criticism. While many fundamental aspects of language, such as suprasyntactic structures, "deviant" syntax and semantics, pragmatic aspects, etc., have been discussed under the label of (linguo-)stylistics, the discipline has not been recognized as a necessary component of a linguistic theory. Rather, it has been the playground of linguists who, dissatisfied with the rigidity and inflexibility of popular linguistic models, have been trying to cope with the irregular, idiosyncratic, "messy" aspects of verbal communication. When, finally, the emerging text theory pushed some of the traditional concerns of stylistics into the center of theoretical attention, it failed to acknowledge the merits and results of its predecessor. The study of style has not been recognized as one of the most fundamental tasks of text theory.
- <sup>2</sup> For Students of style, this definition will be neither too striking, nor very original. Havranek has already defined style as "the singularized organization of a discourse in its totality" (Havranek, 1963, 64; the quoted paper was originally published in 1942).
- <sup>3</sup> These similarities will be explored in more detail in Dolezel, forthcoming.
- <sup>4</sup> Only in view of this interpretation can we understand why the two sentences of geometry, quoted by Frege, have dif-

ferent intensional meanings. In the rich literature of Frege's interpreters, Walker has come closest to formulating this character of intensional meaning: "Nothing prevents one and the same object from being signified by several different signs. Although the use of different signs is sometimes arbitrary and therefore superfluous, it is sometimes the case that the difference between the signs goes with a difference between the ways each sign presents the object in question, the *Darstellungsweise*" (Walker, 1965, 75).

- 5 The classical formulation of the "heresy of paraphrase" is to be found in Brooks, 1947.
- 6 A study of intensions in terms of "inner form" of expressions will connect intensional semantics with another major representative of the Prague school, V. Mathesius (see, Mathesius, 1947).
- 7 The assumption that literary texts *construct* their own worlds of reference is one of the axioms of structural poetics; both theoretically, and methodologically it is much more stimulating than the traditional axiom of "mimesis". For a preliminary demonstration of certain procedures of world construction, see Doležel, 1980.
- 8 In a less technical discourse, we could simply say that one and the same world can be rendered or verbalized in a variety of world "pictures".
- 9 The most comprehensive account of the present state of narrative semantics can be found in Woods-Pavel, eds., 1979; cf. also Csuri, ed., 1980.
- 10 The theory was proposed and developed in Kripke, 1972 and 1980. Kripke's thesis that proper names lack Fregean sense

(intension) is a necessary corollary of his assumption that intensions should be described in terms of possible-world semantics. I share Linsky's view that this thesis is "incorrect" (Linsky, 1977, 69 ff.). However, even the acceptance of Kripke's view on this matter would not invalidate our main thesis: proper names having "zero" sense would still differ from definite descriptions which carry sense.

- 11 The concept of style as a regulated selection of alternatives has deep roots in stylistics. cf. Dolezel, 1969.
- 12 In the framework of logical semantics, the idea that "every singular term is either a personal proper name or a definite description" has been criticized by Linsky (op. cit., 69). Linsky assumes that "there are many kinds of singular terms which fit neither of these two categories", without proposing any kind of categorization. I prefer deriving the "many kinds of singular terms" by subcategorizing the two basic kinds.
- 13 For a thorough and relatively recent survey of Kafka criticism, see Beicken, 1974.
- 14 I am using the Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag edition of *Der Prozess* (Frankfurt/M., 1960). The English translation by Willa and Edwin Muir (Penguin Books, 1976) has been consulted, but not necessarily followed.
- 15 It is a minor point that the abbreviation is applied also to Josef K.'s uncle. The usage is clearly motivated by the need to protect the hero's mode of naming.
- 16 It is important to note that the fixed definite description is used in all respects as a proper name. Most significantly, the agent is identified by it in the ritual of introduction (55, 78).



- 17 The abbreviation has been treated as a sort of "inner form" and, as such, has been discussed in Kafka criticism. The question whether it does or does not stand for the name of the author has received most of the attention (cf. Jaffe, 1967, 13, 16 f.).
- 18 This isolating semantic effect would become even more obvious if Kafka's intensional system was compared with other systems using abbreviations as names for agents. Zamjatin's novel *My (We)* represents a clear contrast to Kafka's system: While in *The Trial* the abbreviation serves as an intensional mark of the exceptionality of the hero, in Zamjatin's science-fiction novel, the names-abbreviations (given in the form of a combination of letters and numbers) mark the agents as belonging to a "faceless" mass; all the agents of the novel (with the exception of the Benefactor) bear this name, thus forming a large intensionally defined class. Deprived of proper names, they are deprived of their individual identity. The Benefactor stands out in a one-member class, singled out by the fixed definite description. What we have here is a clear reversal of Kafka's intensional structuring with the preservation of its basic components.
- 19 The fact that Josef K. (as well as K. from *The Castle*) has sexual relations with women of low status has been commonly known in Kafka criticism (cf. Jaffe, op. cit., 94).
- 20 For a definition of the concept "invisible world" see Dolezel, 1979.
- 21 While these problems cannot be resolved by abstract speculation, they are legitimate topics of empirical enquiry in the psychology and sociology of literary communication.

References

- Allwood, Jens - Lars-Gunnar Andersson - Østen Dahl, 1977, *Logic in Linguistics*, Cambridge-London-New York-Melbourne: Cambridge University Press
- Beicken, Peter U., 1974, *Franz Kafka. Eine kritische Einführung in die Forschung*, Frankfurt/M.: Athenäum
- Brooks, Cleanth, 1947, *The Well-Wrought Urn*, New York: Reynal and Hitchcock
- Csúri, Karoly, ed., 1980, *Literary Semantics and Possible Worlds*, *Studia Poetica* 2, Szeged
- Doležel, Lubomir, 1969, "A Framework for the statistical Analysis of Style", in: Doležel-Bailey, eds., 1969, 10-25
- Doležel, Lubomir, 1980, "Truth and Authenticity in Narrative", *Poetics Today*, vol. I, 7-25.
- Doležel, Lubomir, forthcoming "Frege and the Idea of Poetic Language"
- Doležel, Lubomir - Richard W. Bailey, eds., 1969, *Statistics and Style*, New York-London-Amsterdam: Elsevier
- Eis, Gerhard, 1970, *Vom Zauber der Namen, Vier Essays*, Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag
- Frege, Gottlob, 1892, "Über Sinn und Bedeutung", *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 100, 25-50 (Engl. trans. quoted from: Zabeeh-Klemke-Jacobson, 1974, 118-140)
- Havranek, Bohuslav, 1963, *Studie o spisovnem jazyce*, Prague: Academia
- Jaffe, Adrian, 1967, *The Process of Kafka's Trial*, Michigan State University Press

- Kripke, Saul A., 1972, "Naming and Necessity", in: D. Davidson - G. Harman, eds., *Semantics of Natural Language*, Dordrecht: Reidel, 253-355.
- Kripke, Saul A., 1980, *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
- Levi-Strauss, Claude, 1978, *Myth and Meaning*, Toronto-Buffalo: University of Toronto Press
- Linksy, Leonard, 1977, *Names and Descriptions*, Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press
- Mathesius, Vilem, 1947, *Cestina a obecny jazykozpyt*, Prague: Melantrich
- Mukarovsky, Jan, 1928, *Machuv Maj. Esteticka studie*, Prague (reprinted in: *Kapitoly z ceske poetiky*, 1948, vol. III)
- Piaget, Jean, 1972, *Le structuralisme*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France
- Propp, V. J., 1969<sup>2</sup>, *Morfologija skaski*, Moscow: Nauka (originally published in 1928)
- Walker, Jerémy D. B., 1965, *A Study of Frege*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
- Woods, John - Thomas G. Pavel, eds., 1979, *Formal Semantics and Literary Theory*. Special issue of *Poetics*, vol. 8, No. 1/2, April 1979
- Zabeeh, Farhang - E.D. Klemke - Arthur Jacobson, eds., 1974, *Readings in Semantics*, Urbana-Chicago-London: University of Illinois Press

### III. STUDIES ON FICTIONALITY



ACQUAINTANCE WITH NON-EXISTING ENTITIES: RUSSELL'S VIEWS  
ON FICTIONALITY<sup>1</sup>

Zoltán Kanyó

A. József University, Szeged

1. Bertrand Russell was one of the most important founders of mathematical logic and he has contributed to the formulation of a modern semiotics over and above his logical studies in a series of different, generally well-known philosophical essays. Therefore if we want to summarize his special conception we must mention repeatedly some ideas and concepts introduced by him which appear today to be basic in semiotic research. Notwithstanding the fact that some of Russell's writings have absolute authority we cannot here speak of any unanimous and adequate interpretation of his philosophical studies; in spite of the rational and linguistic clarity in the formulation of his ideas the literature on Russell is full of misunderstandings and misinterpretations (cf. Russell (1944)). A reason for these errors can be found in the changing of his philosophical ideas which could hardly be considered as true representatives of a nominalistic system: he started out as a monistic philosopher, and even his first logistic work is characterized by a Platonic ontology, although he abandoned this position in his later studies he felt a sort of nostalgia for this view.<sup>2</sup> We do not intend to give an account of Russell's monist papers, even his later Platonic conception will only be mentioned and analysed briefly in order to make understandable the sense of the later changes. We shall have to summarize Russell's classical theory of denotation with all the new results it brought in ontological, epistemological and semantical contexts. Our main aim is, however, to give a

systematic analysis of Russell's views on fictionality. This investigation should be carried out not only because Russell was deeply interested in fictional texts and had an enormously wide literary and cultural education, he formulated from time to time some items of fiction, the number of which should not be limited to the published volumes Russell (1953), (1954) and (1961), but should include many unpublished stories, among others even a novel;<sup>3</sup> our study is moved by the importance of Russell's remarks which seem to bear a paradigmatic character. We find Russell's semantic ideas concerning fictionality with all the dilemmas and open questions very characteristic of the nominalistic point of view even if in the case of a dogmatic standpoint they were not formulated at all or were worded in such a way that the difficulties disappeared. Russell's different attempt at the definition of fictionality give an insight into the problems of interpretation the nominalistically based theory is confronted with, and point consequently to its advantages and to its risks.

1.1. Before dealing with Russell's ideas concerning fictionality we must have a comprehensive view of his conception determining his semantic decisions. His first contribution to modern logic and semiotics was formulated in Russell (1903), in a characteristic work of the transition announcing the new orientation in logic and mathematics and presenting a denotation theory based on Platonic ontology. We are mainly interested in his new ideas as far as they remained decisive in his later development. The Preface to the first edition of this volume speaks of two main objects: the reducibility of all pure mathematics to a very small number of fundamental concepts and the philosophical explanation of these fundamental concepts which mathematics accepts as indefinable (XV.). From our point of view the latter problem is obviously of main importance.

2.1.1. Russell's book opens with a definition of pure mathematics: "PURE Mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form 'p implies q', where p and q are propositions containing one or more variables, the same in the two propositions, and neither p nor q contain any constants except logical constants." (3.) It follows an explication of the term "logical constant" by means of the enumeration of several examples,<sup>4</sup> however, the central concept, the proposition, cannot in this way be elucidated, a full explanation is delivered during the theoretical explanation of logical concepts. Proposition is primarily introduced as a member of a logical metalanguage, and appears in opposition to logical variable, logical constant, propositional function, etc. A logical variable is a very complicated concept, "... a variable is any term *qua* term in a certain propositional function ... variables are distinguished by the propositional functions in which they occur, or, in the case of several variables, by the place they occupy in a given multiple variable propositional function." (107.) We can distinguish *apparent* and *real* variables, the former appear in propositions, "the variable is absorbed ... the proposition does not depend upon the variable; whereas in 'x is a man' there are different propositions for different values of the variable, and the variable is ... *real*". (13) The notion of a propositional function is explained, but not defined in the following way: " $\phi x$  is a propositional function if, for every value of  $x$ ,  $\phi x$  is a proposition, determinate when  $x$  is given". (19) A proposition can be conceived of syntactically in contradistinction to propositional function: "I shall speak of propositions exclusively where there is no real variable: where there are one or more real variables, and for all values of the variables the expression involved is a proposition, I shall call the expression a *propositional function*". (13) The proposition has over and above this characteristic and essential device:



"A proposition, we may say, is anything that is true or that is false." (12-13.) viz. it disposes of truth-value. Russell formulates a definition of proposition by means of a tautology

/1/  $p \supset p$

which holds only for propositions.<sup>5</sup> The logical analysis of proposition by means of the explanation of its further constituents such as material and formal implication, class, etc. is carried out in the way signalized by the quoted definitions which demonstrate Russell's discoveries during his first generalization of modern logic and mathematics, and at the same time the superficiality of some of his theses. As the last ones have been corrected in Principia Mathematica and we do not want to evince the changes which Russell's system underwent during that time we want to disregard an extensive analysis of his logical metalanguage and we want to see briefly how the concept of proposition is embedded in grammatical and semantical contexts.

1.1.2. Russell considers grammar already in this work "as a source of discovery" (42) even if correctness in the use of language must be checked philosophically because the general requirements are not ideally fulfilled in natural language and in its practical use. Therefore he tries to explain the linguistic structure from a philosophic and may we say a general semiotic point of view. At the centre of his investigation again stands the proposition, however, the main difference between the linguistic unit "sentece" and "proposition" is not clearly explicated. In his discussion with Bradley, Russell tries to point out the distinction between proposition and the linguistic unit sentence,<sup>6</sup> however, he cannot elucidate the mutual dependence of the two concepts on each other. In his later studies Russell (1919b) (1940) Russell points to propositions as invariant structure classes underlying declarative sentences formulat-

ed in different languages which have the same meaning, although in the linguistic formulation there exist some rhetorical differences besides the choice of the language; in this way it represents one of the most abstract semiotic structures of a linguistic utterance. As syntactic structures Russell mentions two different sequences:

/2/ a. Subject - verb - predicate

b. Subject - verb - object<sub>1</sub> ... object<sub>n</sub>

/2/ a. can be considered as the classical Aristotelian way of analysis, Russell's contention that relational predicates, i. e. verbs, cannot be reduced to the ancient Subject - copula - predicate formula opens the way to the new mathematical logical analysis of language. However at this stage it is full of difficulties, one of the main problems consists in the fact that syntactical facts, e. g. the existence of various possibilities for the fulfillment of a syntactic function like subject, make a semantic interpretation of these constituents very complicated, even unacceptable. This problem will be solved in Principia Mathematica by means of the introduction of the Theory of Types. At this point the Platonic ontology of this theory clearly manifests itself: the semantic category corresponding to the syntactic category subject is "term": "Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as *one*, I call a *term*. ... I shall use as synonymous with it the words unit, individual, and entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every term is *one*, while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being, i. e. *is* in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimaera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term: and to deny that such and such a thing is a term must always be false.: (43) This is a characteristically Meinongian point of view which has a direct influence on a theory concerning fictionality: it is

quite clear that "the pseudo-existents of a novel" (45) partake in this generally assumed existence of the objects. Terms are distinguished as things - the counterparts of proper names - and concepts which are indicated by all other words. "Among concepts ... two kinds at least must be distinguished, namely those indicated by adjectives and those indicated by verbs." (44) The first class is defined as predicate<sup>7</sup> the second is that of relations.<sup>8</sup> This grammatical conception has without doubt contributed to a new interpretation of the grammatical constituents, however, it does not offer a comprehensive overview of the linguistic system and the principles taken into account stand in contradiction to each other.

1.1.3. This contradictory relationship applies first of all to the semantic part of the theory. On the one hand Russell wants to formulate a correspondence theory based on empirical confrontation of linguistic utterances and the real connexions denoted by them, on the other hand, however, he postulates the Platonic or realistic existence of the objects appearing in texts. "Denoting", "denotation" appear in this theory as a second semantic term beside "meaning". Meaning is defined as a symbolic relation standing between single words and their non-verbal content.<sup>9</sup> The proposition is considered as an objective non-linguistic structure, it consists of the entities indicated by the words,<sup>10</sup> and corresponds with the Fregean "Gedanke" concept together with its truth-value.<sup>11</sup> In this sense "meaning" is irrelevant for proposition and for the semantic analysis of this central unit. "But such concepts as *a man* have meaning in another sense: they are so to speak, symbolic in their own logical nature, because they have the property which I call *denoting*. That is to say, when *a man* occurs in a proposition /e. g. 'I met a man in the street'/, the proposition is not about the concept *a man*, but about something quite different, some actual biped denoted by the concept. Thus concepts of

this kind have meaning in a non-psychological sense. And in this sense, when we say 'this is a man', we are making a proposition in which a concept is in some sense attached to what is not a concept." (47) Denotation is clearly introduced as the determining relation between some definite constituent of the verbal equivalent of the proposition and its non-verbal or even verbal referent, a unit formulated in the sense of the correspondence theory. "A concept *denotes* when, if it occurs in a proposition, the proposition is not *about* the concept, but about a term connected in a certain peculiar way with the concept. If I say 'I met a man', the proposition is not about *a man*: this is a concept which does not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy limbo of the logic-books. What I met was a thing, not a concept, an actual man with a tailor and a bank-account or a public-house and a drunken wife." (53) Denoting can be expressed by predicates and more generally formulated by class-concepts which may appear alone in a simple subject-predicate proposition, but they may also have a great variety of closely allied concepts, i. e. an apparatus for describing the denotation in detail. The examination of denotation is carried out by means of the analysis of these operator concepts which combine predicative concepts in a way to form new denotating concepts. The examples chosen are "*all, every, any, a, some and the.*" (55) Russell's main contribution to denotation in this early work consists in the analysis of the first five mentioned operators by means of propositional logic and the calculus of classes, the definite description *the* had to be separated, because the author had here to be content with some general philosophical remarks concerning the main topic of his later theory of descriptions.

At the beginning of this analysis Russell raises the question: "is there one way of denoting six different kinds of objects, or are the ways of denoting different? And in the latter case, is the object denoted the same in all six

cases, or does the object differ as well as the way of denoting it?" (53) The dilemma spelled out in the first question is the classical problem of reference in medieval logic, i. e. which system should be chosen, the doctrine of distribution or the modes of reference. In the doctrine of distribution the difference of the reference is postulated, however, this solution leads to logical inconsistencies (cf. Geach (1962) 3-46), therefore we accept Geach's conclusion: 'if a theory of common nouns' being logical subjects is to be taken seriously, it must make any (unambiguous) common noun refer in an impartial way to each of the objects that could be so named in a simple act of naming.' (Geach (1962) 46). Russell's conception corresponds to the second theory, but it must be emphasized that this view is historically independent of the medieval approaches, but it agrees with them in pointing out "that denoting itself is the same in all cases" (Russell (1903) 62) and permits or does not exclude the conception of distinctness in the objects denoted by *all men*, *every men*, etc. as various species of reference. (61). The definition of different denoting phrases is given by means of logical operations: "All *a*'s ... denotes a numerical conjunction; it is definite as soon as *a* is given. The concept *all a*'s is a perfectly definite single concept, which denotes the terms of *a* taken all together. ... *Every a*, on the contrary, though it still denotes all the *a*'s, denotes them in a different way, i. e. severally instead of collectively, *Any a* denotes only one *a*- but it is wholly irrelevant which it denotes, and what is said will be equally true whichever it may be. Moreover, *any a* denotes a variable *a*, that is, whatever particular *a* we may fasten upon it, it is certain that *any a* does not denote that one; and yet of that one any proposition is true which is true of any *a*. *An a* denotes a variable disjunction: that is to say, a proposition which holds of *an a* may be false concerning each particular *a*, so that it is not reducible to a disjunction

of propositions ... *some a*, the constant disjunction ... denotes just one term of the class *a*, but the term it denotes may be any term of the class. ... In the case of a class *a* which has a finite number of terms - say  $a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots a_n$ , we can illustrate these various notions as follows:

- /1/ *All a's* denotes  $a_1$  and  $a_2$  and ... and  $a_n$ .
- /2/ *Every a* denotes  $a_1$  and denotes  $a_2$  and ... and denotes  $a_n$ .
- /3/ *Any a* denotes  $a_1$  or  $a_2$  ... or  $a_n$ , where *or* has the meaning that it is irrelevant which we take.
- /4/ *An a* denotes  $a_1$  or  $a_2$  or ... or  $a_n$ , where *or* has the meaning that no one in particular must be taken.
- /5/ *Some a* denotes  $a_1$  or denotes  $a_2$  or ... or denotes  $a_n$ , where it is not irrelevant which is taken, but on the contrary some one particular *a* must be taken." (58-59)

Concerning the definite description *the* we must be content with some general remarks: "The word *the*, in the singular, is correctly employed only in relation to a class-concept of which there is only one instance. We speak of *the King*, *the Prime Minister*, and so on (understanding *at the present time*); and in such cases there is a method of denoting one single definite term by means of a concept, which is not given us by any of our five words. It is owing to his notion that mathematics can give definitions of terms which are not concepts ... An object may be present to the mind, without our knowing any concept of which the said object is *the* instance; and the discovery of such a concept is not a mere improvement in notation. The reason why this appears to be the case is that, as soon as the definition is found, it becomes wholly unnecessary to the reasoning to remember the actual object defined, since only concepts irrelevant to our deductions." (62-63) Russell points out that "the

actual use of identity, though not its meaning, was also found to depend upon this way of denoting a single term." (65)

1.2. We have dealt rather extensively with this Meinongian denotation theory because some of the most essential problems of Russell's later conception are notionally and terminologically prepared in his early views. (cf. Hursthouse (1980)) even if some of his critics (e. g. Geach) are inclined to see in it an erroneous theory that should be distinguished from his later writings. We should like to lay stress equally upon similarity and dissimilarity, therefore we shall compare this starting point with the results of Russell's later development in view of ontological and epistemological determination, and the syntactic-semantic structure of denotation.

1.2.1. The ontological standpoint in Russell's early work is Platonic or realistic, this can be established on the basis of his analysis of the semantic constituents of the proposition: we remember his postulate that the subject of the proposition was a term and this term was conceived as being in each case an existing entity. This is a Meinongian view and its theoretical background should not be explicated within the frame of the present study. However, this work does not appear an orthodox representative of the classical realistic view: with his critic oriented against the Aristotelian Subject-copula-predicate formula presented as the only logic-linguistic structure of our different utterances, Russell proves to be an adversary of the classical substance-attribute conception which is based on the criticized subject-predicate theory.<sup>12</sup> It is highly significant that in the definition of matter Russell does not take the realistic foundation of his theory into account but he tries to give an empiricist characterization of this

entity. "*Material unit* is a class-concept, applicable to whatever has the following characteristics: /1/ A simple material unit occupies a spatial point at any moment; two units cannot occupy the same point at the same moment, and one cannot occupy two points at the same moment. /2/ Every material unit persists through time; its positions in space at any two moments may be the same or different; but if different, the positions at times intermediate between the two chosen must form a continuous series. /3/ Two material units differ in the same immediate manner as two points or two colours; they agree in having the relation of inclusion in a class to the general concept *matter*, or rather to the general concept *material unit*. Matter itself seems to be a collective name for all pieces of matter, as space for all points and time for all instants. It is thus the peculiar relation to space and time which distinguishes matter from other qualities, and not any logical difference such as that of subject and predicate, or substance and attribute." (468). The spatial-temporal determined material units build chains of events underlying physical relations like causality, motion. The non-material particulars are - with the exception of some brief remarks on occupation of time without existence (cf. 471) - not extensively dealt within the frame of this theory so that we do not have the slightest idea the place that chimerae and impossible objects should have in the realm of the being conceived by Russell (cf. Quine (1966) p. 658). Instead of a Meinongian development of this realistic system Russell's main decision in the ontological field consisted in giving up those terms which were not connected with space and time and of whose existence we have no empirical verification through perception, and in confining himself to the study of events and the problems of knowledge, i. e. how do we obtain reliable information about the existing particulars. This turning-point in Russell's ontological conception was a rather complicat-



ed process and if one considers that some constituents of this system were worked out on such a scale as e. g. in the case of the redefinition of matter which was achieved in Russell (1927a) and the theory of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description which goes back to 1902, one may ask whether we can speak about a coherent system or not.<sup>13</sup> We can detect an inner logic between the different constituents the enumeration of which we begin with the earliest theory concerning the different kinds of knowledge of particulars. The sensible and understandable use of language has, over and above grammatical and semiotical rules, some epistemological predispositions concerning our knowledge of constituents spelled out in the following general principle: "Every proposition which we understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted." (Russell (1910-1911) 209. and similarly Russell (1912) 91.) This principle makes grammar dependent on our knowledge of the external world: we can only speak about objects that we know and the meaning of which is familiar to us by means of linguistic items. This means not only that proper names must denote different individuals, but "our bound variables range over known individuals only" and the "quantifiers range over objects of acquaintance only" (Hintikka (1981) 175.)

Russell admits two kinds of objects that correspond to the linguistic constituents: "There are ... at least two sorts of objects of which we are aware, namely, particulars and universals. Among particulars I include all existents, and all complexes of which one or more constituents are existents, such as this-before-that, this-above-that, the-yellowness-of-this. Among universals I include all objects of which no particular is a constituent. Thus the disjunction 'universal-particular' includes all objects." (Russell (1910-1911) 204.) The postulation of existing universals, which applies to the relation (it is supposed that we are

acquainted with the meaning of it and not merely with instances of it), is a characteristically non-nominalistical feature in Russell's system.

Russell argues that there are two essential ways in which we can obtain knowledge of the non-verbal or verbal content of the constituents in our linguistic system: the first consists in acquaintance, i. e. a direct presentation of the particulars to us (cf. Russell (1910-1911) 201f.) the second in a verbal definite description "the so-and-so" having the distinctive features of this formula, namely the existence of a unique object possessing such and such predicates (Ibid, 205.) In this way Russell's theory of knowledge points to the epistemological frame in which the conception of the perception of objects can be formulated and to a new denotation theory based on the principles of Russell (1905b) and of Principia Mathematica.

1.2.2. Epistemological questions are introduced by the relation acquaintance: they can primarily be formulated according to which objects may appear as referents of the dyadic relation "acquaintance", the *relatum* being always "we", i.e. representants of a socio-culturally defined human community. These objects are, as we know, particulars and universals and according to Russell one becomes aware of both of them by means of sense-data (Russell (1910-1911) 201, 203.). After his early works Russell became a consistent follower of British empiricism, he considered that sense-data and perception are the only direct information we acquire from the world of the objects and therefore they are our means of control of our verbal expressions: We have no data at our disposal giving insight into the material structure of physical appearances except our sense-data, which can be considered as mental events. Russell is of the opinion that we may have "some principle *a priori* without the need of empirical verification", however, the main line of defini-

tion lies in another direction: "We may succeed in actually defining the objects of physics as functions of sense-data. Just in so far as physics leads to expectations, this *must* be possible, since we can only *expect* what can be experienced. And in so far as the physical state of affairs is inferred from sense-data it must be capable of expression as a function of sense-data." (Russell (1914b)). Russell explained this special compresence of physical-material structure with perceptive psycho-physiological connexions by the concept of his neutral monism redefining the relationship of mental and material constituents to each other in the structure of the world: "... the view which I am advocating is neither materialism nor mentalism, but what (following the suggestion of Dr. H. M. Sheffer) we call 'neutral monism'. It is monism in the sense that it regards the world as composed of only one *kind* of stuff, namely events; but it is pluralism in the sense that it admits the existence of a great multiplicity of events, each minimal event being a logically self-subsistent entity." (Russell (1927b) 293.) "While, on the question of the stuff of the world, the theory ... has certain affinities with idealism - namely, that mental events are part of that stuff, and that the rest of the stuff resembles them more than it resembles traditional billiard-balls - the position advocated as regards scientific laws has more affinity with materialism than with idealism." (Russell (1927a) 388.) Physics can never be analysed without taking into account the psychological component of the perception of the physical facts, therefore Russell deals intensively with the contemporary development of psycho-physiological sciences. He turned in first decade of this century to the behaviorism which he found a progressive experimental trend in psychophysiology, although he could never agree with its dogmatic antimentalism. He formulated his relationship to behaviorism in the following way: "This philosophy ... holds that every-

thing that can be known about man is discoverable by the method of external observation, i. e. that none of our knowledge depends, essentially and necessarily, upon data in which the observer and the observed are the same person. I do not fundamentally agree with this view, but I think it contains much more truth than most people suppose, and I regard it as desirable to develop the behaviorist method to the fullest possible extent. I believe that the knowledge to be obtained by this method, so long as we take physics for granted, is self-contained, and need not, at any point, appeal to data derived from introspection ... Nevertheless, I hold that there are such observations and there is knowledge which depends upon introspection. What is more, I hold that data of this kind are required for a critical exposition of physics, which behaviorism takes for granted. I shall, therefore, after setting forth the behaviorist view of man, proceed to a scrutiny of our knowledge of physics, returning thence to man, but now as viewed from within". (Russell (1927b) 73-74.) Behaviorism can serve as an auxiliary science and we may achieve by means of it a number of interesting results, however, its conclusions must be queried because of the inadequate foundation of the theory. Russell's attack against behaviorism as a final philosophy formulates the inconsequences following from its theoretical and methodological one-sidedness (cf. Russell (1927b) 135, 139.) As to the material or physical side of the inquiry Russell gave up very slowly the Newtonian concept presented in Russell (1903): after the mainly linguistically-logically oriented logical atomism he turned again to the structures of the external world and after having given an outline in Russell (1924) he formulated an intensive analysis of matter in Russell (1927a) which applied already the results of Einstein's theory. This book is conceived on the basis of an elaborated variant of neutral monism, therefore the investigation ends with a part "in which we endeavour to discover a possible

structure of the physical world which shall at once justify physics and take account of the connection with perception demanded by the necessity for an empirical basis for physics. Here we are concerned first with the construction of points as systems of events which overlap, or are 'conpunctual', in space-time, and then with purely ordinal properties of space-time. ... The conception of one unit of matter - say one electron - as a 'substance', i. e. a single simple entity persisting through time, is not one which we are justified in adopting, since we have no evidence whatever as to whether it is false or true. We define a single material unit as a 'causal line', i. e. as a series of events connected with each other by an intrinsic differential causal law which determines first-order changes, leaving second-order changes to be determined by extrinsic causal laws."

(Russell (1927a) 401.) This special view remained Russell's conception concerning physical structure in his ensuing decisive works (Russell (1940) and (1948)). Structure itself may be defined by several relations. There are abstract, logical and mathematical relationships between the constituents of the structure that may be explained by means of a minimum vocabulary (cf. Russell (1948) 267-283.).

1.2.3. These deep changes in the ontological and epistemological structure of Russell's theory had direct consequences for the formulation of his denotation theory. In the early theory presented in Russell (1903) one may mention different "slips on Russell's part" (Geach (1962) 77.) such as the incorrect translation of the formula "any term of an A", the unsatisfactory distinction between 'any' and 'every' at a certain place (cf. Geach (1962) 76-77.) etc. however the main problem with the whole theory consists in the fact that it fails to take into consideration the question of the scope and therefore it must be held to be radically inconsistent: "With a little ingenuity all the examples that gave plausibility to the distinctions between 'any' and 'every',

between 'some and 'a', can be explained by differences of punctuation or scope." (Geach (1962) 105.) Russell's turning-point with respect to denotation is his classical essay Russell (1905b): here he is compelled to revise the requirement to dispose semantic categories, meaning and denotation, each of them pertaining to different constituents of the proposition. The result of this revision is "that the whole distinction of meaning and denotation has been wrongly conceived." (Russell (1905b) 50.) The central idea of the new theory is formulated so "that denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning." (Russell (1905b) 43.) The terminology is new, Russell does not speak any more about denoting concepts, the denoting phrases correspond to the combination of concepts by means of the six words *all*, *every*, *any*, etc. Besides the denoting phrases there is a simple constituent which has directly to do with denotation: "a name ... directly designating and individual which is its meaning, and having this meaning in its own right, independently of the meanings of all other words" (Russell (1919a) 174.). Names, i. e. proper names have the function of designating particulars and in Russell's different periods the particulars were seen as "terms of relations in atomic facts" (Russell (1918-1919) 199.) or as "assigned to any continuous portion of space-time ... every proper name is the name of a structure, not of something destitute of parts". (Russell (1940) 31.) Independently of the different interpretation of this category there is a constant suspicion concerning proper names used in natural language: "The names that we commonly use, like 'Socrates', are really abbreviations for descriptions; not only that, but what they describe are not particulars but complicated systems of classes or series. A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquaint-

ed..." (Russell (1918-1919) 200, 201.) This view and in general the application of Russell's theory of knowledge to the natural language raise different problems cf. Reeves (1933) and Black (1944). From the vocabulary only egocentric particulars such as "this" may fulfil the strict requirements in designating an object. In contrast to proper names, denoting phrases do not have a constant meaning, it is questionable whether they have significance at all in the concrete proposition. This can be decided by means of a strictly codified translation of the proposition in a logical structure determining its constituents and their relationship to each other. The idea of the reduction of denoting phrases to symbolic logic made most of the distinctions introduced in Russell (1903) outworn concepts: here the scope was fully recognized and differences between the linguistic formulations that cannot be captured in a pure logical system (cf. Lang (1977), Kanyó (1977)) appeared to be of secondary importance. The logical analysis could give a clear logical-semantic interpretation for denoting phrases containing *all, every, no, any, some*, the specific problems of denotation in this case are connected with the use and the semantic sense of variables bound by universal and existential operators. The remaining types of denoting phrases - the first introduced by *the*, the second by *a(n)* - represent highly interesting cases of denotation and are named *descriptions*, i. e. the first *definite*, the second *indefinite description*. It is the definite description that stands at the centre of the theory of description. This formula is formally defined: "a definite description is a phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' (in the singular)". (Russell (1919a) 167.) This definition is unsatisfactory however, - as e. g. Linsky has pointed out in Linsky (1967) 63. the same expression does not refer to a particular in a general statement. In answer to similar criticisms in Moore (1944) 214f Russell deplored his "own carelessness in the use of ordinary lan-

guage. As to this, however, I should say that the whole of my theory of descriptions is contained in the definitions at the beginning of \*14 of *Principia Mathematica*, and that the reason for using an artificial symbolic language was the inevitable vagueness and ambiguity of any language used for every-day purposes". (Russell (1944) 690.) Therefore the resolving of the question "whether a phrase is or is not a definite description (in a given proposition) depends on the logical form of that proposition, on how the proposition is to be analysed". (Linsky (1967) 63.) Definite descriptions are introduced as incomplete symbols. "By an 'incomplete' symbol we mean a symbol which is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation, but is only defined in certain contexts," (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 66.) This means that the apparent grammatical subject expressed by the denoting phrase disappears in the process of the logical analysis and what remains is a complex logical structure of different constituents which have not been transparent in the previous linguistic formulation. In this sense the definite description (e. g. "the author of Waverley") differs from a true proper name i. e. "Scott", being an incomplete symbol it has a meaning in use, but not in isolation. "For 'the author of Waverley- cannot mean the same as 'Scott', or 'Scott is the author of Waverley' would mean the same as 'Scott is Scott', which it plainly does not; nor can 'the author of Waverley' mean anything other than 'Scott', or 'Scott is the author of Waverley' would be false, Hence 'the author of Waverley' means nothing." (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 67.) Therefore there can be no general definition of the meaning of a definite description, but only a definition of the uses of its symbol, i. e. "the propositions in whose symbolic expression it occurs." (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 67.) The definite description itself is formulated as  $(\lambda x)(\phi x)$ , its meaning can, however, be given in respect with a proposition, e. g. 'The author of Waverley was a poet'. "This implies that (1)



Waverley was written, (2) that it was written by one man, and not in collaboration, (3) that the one man who wrote it was a poet. If any one of these fails, the proposition is false. Thus 'the author of "Slawkenburgius on Noses" was a poet' is false, because no such book was ever written: 'the author of "The Maid's Tragedy" was a poet' is false, because this play was written by Beaumont and Fletcher jointly. These two possibilities of falsehood do not arise if we say 'Scott was a poet'. Thus our interpretation of the uses of  $(\iota x)(\phi x)$  must be such as to allow for them. Now taking  $\phi x$  to replace 'x wrote Waverley', it is plain that any statement apparently about  $(\iota x)(\phi x)$  requires (1)  $(\exists x) \cdot (\phi x)$  and (2)  $\phi x \cdot \phi y \supset_{x,y} x=y$ ; here (1) states that *at least* one object satisfies  $\phi x$ , while (2) states that *at most* one object satisfies  $\phi x$ . The two together are equivalent to  $(\exists c) : \phi x \cdot \exists_x \phi x = c$ , which we defined as  $E!(\iota x)(\phi x)$ ". (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 68.)  $E!$  is the secondary predicate existence, the above formalized criterion means that there must exist the unique object referred to by the definite description. Russell's two most important definitions for definite descriptions are:

$$14.01. [(\exists x)(\phi x)] \quad \Psi(\iota x)(\phi x) = (\exists c)(x) \\ [(\phi x) \equiv (x = c) \ \& \ (\psi c)] \quad \text{Df}$$

(Whitehead-Russell (1910) 175. We give the definition in a more easily understandable modern transcription.) This definition expresses the above mentioned criteria: there is at least one object  $c$ , there is at most one object  $c$  that satisfies  $\phi x$  and this object disposes of the predicate  $\psi$  as well. Or in Russell's formulation: "... 'the term satisfying  $\phi x$  satisfies  $\psi x$ ' is defined as meaning: 'There is a term  $c$  such that (1)  $\phi x$  is always equivalent to 'x is c', (2)  $\psi c$  is true'". (Russell (1919a) 178.) The second definition states the existence-criterion:

$$14.02. \quad E! (\iota x)(\phi x) = (\exists c)(x) \quad (\phi x) \equiv (x = c)$$

In Whitehead-Russell (1910) we find, besides this general introduction to definite description, a typology of its forms according to the syntactic category of the predicate determining the argument bound by the iota operator. In the quoted example "author" was reducible to the predicate "write", a transitive verb the grammatical object ("Waverley") of which was given so that the prescriptions applied in general to the argument bound by the iota operator without any distinction with respect to the syntactic role fulfilled by this argument or by the predicate which determines it. If the predicate is a relation, several descriptions may be distinguished. The general case of a descriptive function is  $R'y = (\iota x)(xRy)$  Df. That is, 'R'y' is to mean the term  $x$  which has the relation  $R$  to  $y$ ". (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 232.) The relation itself may be defined as converse of a relation e. g. "less", versus "greater" (cf. 238-241.) or the relative product of two relations e. g. "father" x "father" = "paternal grandfather" (cf. 256-264.). Relations with limited domains and converse domains, e. g. "brother" and "sister" express the same relation (that of a common parentage), with the domain limited in the first case to males, in the second to females" (265. cr. 265-267.). For relations with limited fields cf. (277-278.). Plurality of descriptive functions can be taken into account with respect to the referents and relata of a given relation, thus "e. g.  $R$  is the relation of parent to son,  $\tilde{R}'y =$  the parents of  $y$ ,  $\tilde{R}'x =$  the sons of  $x$ ". (cf. 242-246.) but even a special plural descriptive function " $R''\beta$ " is introduced to mean 'the terms which have the relation  $R$  to members of  $\beta$ '" (279. cr. 279-295.). A number of non-propositional functions existing between two classes, or two relations, or any class and a relation are called double descriptive functions, by means of which new relations and classes can be introduced and lay the foundations for the definition of operation (296-298.) The definition of unit class allows for a new

analysis of definite descriptions. As a new descriptive function we have " $\hat{1}x$ ", meaning 'the class of terms which are identical with  $x$ ', which is the same thing as 'the class whose only member is  $x$ '. We are thus to have " $\hat{1}x = \hat{y}(y=x)$ ". (340.) We can define the number 1 by means of the unit class, it is "defined as the class of unit classes, i. e.

$1 = \alpha \{ (\exists x) \cdot \alpha = \hat{1}x \}$  Df. This leads to

$\vdash : \alpha \in 1. \equiv : (\exists x) : y \in \alpha . \equiv_y . y = x$ . From this it appears further that

$$\vdash : \alpha \in 1. \equiv . E! (\hat{1}x)(x \in \alpha),$$

whence

$$\vdash : \hat{z}(\phi z) \in 1. \equiv . E! (\hat{1}x)(\phi x),$$

i.e. ' $\hat{z}(\phi z)$  is a unit class' is equivalent to 'the  $x$  satisfying  $\phi x$  exists'.

If  $\alpha \in 1$ , ' $\hat{1}\alpha$ ' is the only member of  $\alpha$ , for the only member of  $\alpha$  is the only term to which  $\alpha$  has the relation  $\hat{1}$ . Thus ' $\hat{1}\alpha$ ' takes the place of ' $(\hat{1}x)(\phi x)$ ', if  $\alpha$  stands for ' $\hat{z}(\phi z)$ .' (36.)

As to the indefinite description we have no comparable formal analysis at our disposal. In Russell (1905b) we are told that it does not denote many terms, but it denotes ambiguously, i. e. it denotes an ambiguous term. (cf. Russell (1905b) 41.) He analyses the proposition "I met a man" in the following way: "I met  $x$ , and  $x$  is human" is not always false." Generally, defining the class of men as the class of objects having the predicate *human*, we say that: 'C (a man)' means "' $c(x)$  and  $x$  is human" is not always false. This leaves 'a man', by itself, wholly destitute of meaning, but gives a meaning to every proposition in whose verbal expression 'a man' occurs." (Russell (1905b) 43.) Some further explications are to be found in Russell (1919a). Russell sets out from the same example and begins with the following proposal: "let us assume ... that my assertion is true, and that in fact I met Jones. It is clear that what I assert is *not* 'I met Jones'. I may say 'I met a man, but

it was not Jones'; in that case, though I lie, I do not contradict myself, as I should do if when I say I met a man I really mean that I met Jones. It is clear also that the person to whom I am speaking can understand what I say, even if he is foreigner and has never heard of Jones.

But we may go further: not only Jones, but no actual man, enters into my statement. This becomes obvious when the statement is false, since then there is no more reason why Jones should be supposed to enter into the proposition than why anyone else should. Indeed the statement would remain significant, though it could not possibly be true, even if there were no man at all. 'I met a unicorn' or 'I met a sea-serpent' is a perfectly significant assertion, if we know what it would be to be a unicorn or a sea-serpent, i. e. what is the definition of these fabulous monsters. Thus it is only what we may call the *concept* that enters into the proposition." (Russell (1919a) 167-168.) In a word, the indefinite description is explained by means of an existential operator, the uniqueness is not explicitly claimed but it could be assured with the same syntactic means as in the case of the definite description; as for the semantic interpretation the only criterion consists in the significance of the proposition, the involved relationship is denotational in so far as the semantic role of the existential operator and the uniqueness point to effective connexions, however, the content of the relationship itself remains in the generality of concepts (cf. Quine (1939)). We bring our short overview on Russell's early and later conceptions concerning semantics and denotation to an end here. We aimed at a comprehensive summary of his most important notions and ideas without their deeper critical evaluation, it serves as a necessary background to our inquiry into Russell's views on fictionality.

2. Our overview on descriptions ended with the question concerning reality or non-reality of the objects denoted by indefinite descriptions, the discussion of semantical and denotational problems led to fictionality and this is no mere chance: the formulation of the later, classical variant of the theory of denotation was at the same time a continuous reflection on different aspects of fictionality. The formation of this theory can be understood as a revision of Russell's own realistic conception and one of the aims of this revision was to get rid of fictitious entities by means of an adequate methodology. Some months before the comprehensive study "On Denoting" there appeared another article by Russell in *Mind* (Russell (1905a)) expressing already the new theoretic position in the form of a criticism of MacColl. MacColl formulated in MacColl (1905) a logical theory which according to its ontological position can be considered as a Meinongian variant. MacColl wants namely to incorporate among the individuals of logic not only those which denote real existences, but also those which refer to non-existences, "that is to say, (to) unrealities, such as *centaurs*, *nectar*, *ambrosia*, *fairies*, with self-contradiction, such as *round-squares*, *square circles*, *flat spheres*, etc." (MacColl (1905) 308.) and considers classes consisting of real existences, of unrealities and mixed classes; in this way the single null class of algebra is substituted by an infinitude of pure and mixed classes consisting of fictitious elements which require a special treatment and interpretation. This view challenges Russell's new conception concerning semantics and denotation; on the basis of his logical and theoretical insights he has no longer any understanding for Meinongian solutions, and from this point on the special Russellian theory of denotation conflicts with ideas. This theory of denotation is one of the main sources of Russell's views on fictionality, so we are going to inquire into some of the theses concerning some aspects of fictionality set up

on the basis of this theory of denotation in his works.

2.1. An essential problem of fictionality is the *question of existence*. The critical article (Russell (1905a)), begins also with an investigation of the meaning of "existence". Russell states: "There are two meanings of this word, as distinct as stocks in a flower-garden and stocks on the Stock Exchange, which yet are continually being confused or at least supposed somehow connected. ...

(a) The meaning of *existence* which occurs in philosophy and daily life is the meaning which can be predicated of an individual: the meaning in which we inquire whether God exists, in which we affirm that Socrates existed, and deny that Hamlet existed. The entities dealt with in mathematics do not exist in this sense: the number 2, or the principle of the syllogism, or multiplication are objects which mathematics considers, but which certainly form no part of the world of existent things. This sense of existence lies wholly outside Symbolic Logic, which does not care a pin whether its entities exist in this sense or not.

(b) The sense in which existence is used in symbolic logic is a definable and purely technical sense, namely this: To say that A exists means that A is a class which has at least one member. Thus whatever is not a class (e. g. Socrates) does not exist in this sense; and among classes there is just one which does not exist, namely, the class having no members, which is called the null-class." (Russell (1905a) 98-99.) This conception of confronting syntactically and semantically two meanings of "existence" was, however, only a transitory opinion, it was implied by the realist conviction that numbers are objects differing from realia and their way of existence must be distinguished from the existence of things. This distinction was introduced in order to

prohibit drawing consequences from the realia to the class of numbers but it was not intended to dissolve the unity of objects; quite on the contrary, by means of the principle of extensionality a unique way of explication is given for objects belonging to both ontological classes. "Suppose we say: 'No chimeras exist'. We may mean that the class of chimeras has no members, i. e. does not exist in sense (b), or that nothing that exists in sense (a) is a chimera. These two are equivalent in the present instance, because if there were chimeras, they would be entities of the kind that exist in sense (a). But if we say 'no numbers exist', our statement is true in sense (a) and false in sense (b). It is true that nothing that exists in sense (a) is a number; it is false that the class of numbers has no members. Thus the confusion arises from undue preoccupation with the things that exist in sense (a), which is a bad habit engendered by practical interests." (Russell (1905a) 99.) In this way it is understandable that the logical analysis in *Principia Mathematica* puts an end to the ambiguous explicability of this term and the view summarized in (a) is considered as a current but erroneous conception; the unique explication is based on a developed form of the thesis of extensionality which gets a nominalistically based semantic interpretation in the later philosophical writings. But let us see first the syntactical definition: "When, in ordinary language or in philosophy, something is said to 'exist', it is always something *described*, i.e. it is not something immediately presented, like a taste or a patch of colour, but something like 'matter' or 'mind' or 'Homer' (meaning 'the author of the Homeric poems'), which is known by description as 'the so-and-so', and is thus of the form  $(\exists x)(\phi x)$ . Thus in all such cases, the existence of the (grammatical) subject  $(\exists x)(\phi x)$  can be analytically inferred from any true proposition having this grammatical subject. It would seem that the word 'existence' cannot be significantly applied to

subjects immediately given; i. e. not only does our definition give no meaning to 'E!x', but there is no reason, in philosophy, to suppose that a meaning of existence could be found which would be applicable to immediately given subjects." (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 174-175. A similar explication is to be found in Russell (1919a) 178-179.) The sense of this standpoint is that "exist" may appear as grammatical predicate in connection with an apparent proper name, but this constituent cannot be considered as a logical proper name, but only as a description, and existence is not to be evaluated as a logical first class predicate, but as a second class predicate having a description for its argument. The first part of this thesis is based on Russell's theory of knowledge; he is of the opinion in this case that a direct acquaintance is not expressible. The categorical postulation that the proposition 'This exists' has no significance seems rather doubtful, especially if we take into account the considerations in Moore (1936) 186-188.: it seems to be an artificial decision, the principle of acquaintance cannot convince us of the illegitimacy of the use of "this" or of "exists" in the proposition "This exists" which appears to have significance and consequently a propositional meaning. On the other hand this analysis points to a very important syntactical-semantical distinction: "existence" is to be separated from the attributive first class predicates expressing certain properties, this insight has important philosophical consequences (cf. Kneale (1936)) and this has been observed in modern intensional logic as well (cf. Montague (1974), von Kutschera (1976)).

Existence in Russell's sense was defined by means of the equation 14.02 that has been quoted in part 2.23 above. Russell gives the following verbal explication of this definition: "'the  $x$  satisfying  $\phi x$  exists' is to mean 'there is an object  $c$  such that  $\phi x$  is true when  $x$  is  $c$  but not



otherwise." (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 31.) This definition permits the use of an existence-predicate with a description as an argument in cases in which the description can be analysed as an expression which is bound by a non-negative existential operator, and defines the uniqueness of the bound variable i. e. the secondary predicate "exist" can only in that case significantly be applied to a description if there is an object which this description denotes in reality. This means that the condition of the use of the existence predicate is the applicability of the existential operator to the arguments in an extensional sense, i. e. the predicate "exist" can be used in connection with a description if the latter can be interpreted as a class having only one unique real member. This implies a principle of translation which has to be applied to each grammatical apparent proper name and as a result of the transcription it clearly formulates the extensional relations between a class and its unique member in the positive case. In the case that this logical scheme is not assured, i. e. if there are no objects, we are confronted with descriptions which have significance but are to be considered as false because the bound variables do not denote anything. This class of false descriptions or of descriptions with non-existing denotation involves fictitious objects too. Besides fictionality we ought to mention in this context some other types of utterances as well, such as lies, errors, and different strategies or conventions which may obtain in certain connexions a negative evaluation etc., however this would take us from our semantical point of view. Therefore we do not try to define these pragmatic distinctions and in connection with fictionality we shall refer, without further distinction, to this class defined by a non-existing denotation and we do not want to presuppose any general pragmatological rules e. g. whether the speaker considers the objects as fictitious or not or how the interpreter chooses between different possibilities,

etc. We shall consider for the time being the logical language of the analysis as a sort of ideal language in Russell's sense, a metalanguage revealing the inner structure of natural language. (As to "lie" consider Russell (1940) 194.) We have in this sense a clear program concerning fictionality, we have to rewrite the apparent proper names of natural language as descriptions and if the object denoted by the description cannot be explained as a class that has one member the proper name is to be taken as fictitious. In answer to MacColl's proposal about classes of unrealities, centaurs, round squares, etc. Russell explains his standpoint: "Concerning all these we shall say simply that they are classes which have no members, so that each of them is identical with the null class. There are no Centaurs; ' $x$  is a Centaur' is false whatever value we give to  $x$ , even when we include values which do not exist in sense (a), such as numbers, propositions, etc. Similarly, there are no round squares. The case of nectar and ambrosia is more difficult, since these seem to be individuals, not classes. But here we must presuppose definitions of nectar and ambrosia: they are substances having such and such properties, which, as a matter of fact, no substances do have. We have thus merely a defining concept for each, without any entity to which the concept applies. In this case, the concept is an entity, but it does not denote anything. To take a simpler case: 'The present King of England' is a complex concept denoting an individual; 'the present King of France' is a similar complex denoting nothing. The phrase intends to point out an individual, but fails to do so: it does not point out an unreal individual, but no individual at all. The same explanation applies to mythical personages, Apollo, Priam, etc. These words have a *meaning*, which can be found by looking them up in a classical dictionary; but they have not a *denotation*: there is no entity, real or imaginary, which they point out" (Russell (1905a) 100.) The last remark may be completed by

the following analysis: "A proposition such as 'Apollo exists' is really of the same logical form, although it does not explicitly contain the word *the*. For 'Apollo' means really 'the object having such-and-such properties,' say 'the object having the properties enumerated in the Classical Dictionary.'" (The same principle applies to many uses of the proper names of existent object, e. g. to all uses of proper names for objects known to the speaker only by report, and not by personal acquaintance.) If these properties make up the propositional function  $\phi x$ , then 'Apollo' means  $(\exists x)(\phi x)$ , and 'Apollo exists' means  $\exists! (\exists x)(\phi x):$ " (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 31.)

Although logical analysis is not strictly regulated as, for example, categorial grammar is, the main problems are not raised by it. Our principal concern is to find an adequate test by means of which it can be unambiguously decided to which category an item belongs. We rewrite the proper names of grammar and now we must choose all those which cannot be considered as fictional units. A class of the bound variables which prove to be unique and have certain properties can be put together on the basis that I have direct acquaintance with them. These are particulars perceived in space-time such as "my father", "my son", and if self-awareness is allowed even "myself". As each item depends on my personal perception and my own perspective each is idiosyncratically and specially mine: if I speak of "myself" and you refer to me there is an essential difference in the way I am and you are aware of me as mind and body and as source of perception. But the same difference can be maintained with each object of a direct acquaintance, they are introduced as items of a highly individual perceptual process. (cf. in this connection Russell (1910-1911) 206-208.) "A table viewed from one place presents a different appearance from that which it presents from another place. This is the language of common sense ..." (Russell (1914) 84.) The lan-

guage of common sense is however presupposed to be the basis for natural language: its inner content appears to be determined by the structure of our perception. This is the case not only for objects which I am aware of in a direct process of acquaintance, whenever I know some object, even if my knowledge is mediated by a description given by somebody else, my individual perception takes part in this process and determines its subjective character. But if language is to this extent subjective and exclusively determined by individual perception one may raise the question of why and how a communication or an exchange of these highly individual contents should take place, how we can escape a form of solipsism? As to the last problem Russell's characteristic argumentation is the following: "... we can never *prove* the existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences. No logical absurdity results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy." (Russell (1912) 33.) However, "every principle of simplicity urges us to adopt the natural view, that there really are objects other than ourselves and our sense-data which have an existence not dependent upon our perceiving them." (Russell (1912) 37.) Besides the principle of simplicity there is an instinctive belief and the testimony of physics that speak for a reality of the external world even if there is no complete correspondance between our sense-data and the objects of the external world. This opinion shows clearly the insensitivity that Russell had with respect to the socio-cultural determination in the use of signs. This must be emphasised in spite of Russell's numerous, in some respects very instructive socio-logical, historical, pedagogical and political studies some results of which were taken into account in his last comprehensive work Russell (1948), e. g. in the genealogy of sign use by means of animal inference, analogy,

scientific methods, etc. (Russell ( 1948) 198-210.) But even here his fundamental ideas remained the same: sign and language are primarily defined by perception. If the pragmatism dimension of communication is simply overlooked, if the use of signs is considered in the sense of the empiricist and idealistic tradition of the XVIIIth century with respect to an abstract man appearing only through his psycho-physiological faculties and not as being a representative of a historical, sociological and cultural community, then the use of sign loses its proper sense. Communication can only be understood as an interaction between member of a community, a sort of game in which they take part according to the conventional rules of the community. This insight must be used for the definition of the objects we are speaking of, i. e. the definition of fictional objects and their relation to existence, in this case the conventional element is a corrective factor unifying the ways of perception in a certain community in a certain space-time. We think that if we know an object it is not only important whether we know it by direct acquaintance or by a description, but also which model we follow in the perception or generally in the process of awareness. If I am a soldier in a war I do not perceive "a man" in general, but as enemy or friend or neutral person and I act according to norms which appear in peace time inhuman and abnormal. The object is differently perceived in socially or culturally different situations and this means that we never have the true image of facts, as Russell assumes, in language or in perception, perception and image are always conventionally influenced and manipulated.

The role of social and cultural factors is even more important in cases of acquaintance by description. The perceived communication puts a description at my disposal which I can rewrite in the given logical form. In this case I am not acquainted with the bound variable and it depends

on me whether I ascribe to it an existence on the basis of the speaker's personal acquaintance or on the basis of a direct acquaintance by somebody else to which an unbroken causal chain leads from the speaker. If I accept that in both cases the original proposition becomes involved in my beliefs, i. e. the propositional attitude of the proposition changes, it becomes a belief-proposition, an intensional structure that, according to Russell's correct analysis, cannot be characterized by means of the extensional method. (Russell (1918-1919) 216-228.) However, with the intensionality there appear some other difficulties which have been pointed out by several critics of Russell's denotation theory. (cf. Linsky (1967) 67-84. Hintikka (1981)). From our point of view it is very important to see that the belief-system is organized by conventional norms. There is a well distinguishable difference in readiness to believe the statements of foreigners: there are early centuries full of wonders and miracles, later on as scientific control spreads and achieves universal authority they are limited to social strata which hold out for the old beliefs. Fictionality, fictional objects, fictional existence are conjoined to a socio-cultural game in which there is a convention that the speaker need not refer to real persons and other objects in telling a narrative. The appearance of this fictional narrative is certainly secondary to story-telling in which this possibility was not given, where everything had to be considered as true, e. g. in sagas and in myths.

But how can these ideas be approached from the Russellian theory of fictionality and how can they be explained in a formally correct semantics? Russell uses in fact some generic terms such as narrative, novel, drama, etc, but we cannot state any essential regularity concerning theoretical formulation of genres or other textual units having conventionality as their basis. (cf. below the discussion in 3.2.) However there are some other more or less nominalistically

based - in our terminology "Russellian" - studies on fictionality of which we mention two here: Reichenbach (1947) and Lieb (1981) that may point out a way towards conventionally defined fictionality. Reichenbach appreciated Russell's logical work very highly (cf. Reichenbach (1944) and they influenced each other very directly. In Reichenbach (1947) we have the first comprehensive attempt to explain natural language by means of symbolic logic, in this way fictionality is also dealt with. The main novelty in comparison with Russell consists in qualifying the existence of fictionality, i. e. binding it to a certain type or genre of utterances. There are some remarkable disagreements between this approach and Russell's conception, so the relation between the physical level of language and the level determined by direct perceptions has a different order in Reichenbach than in Russell: Reichenbach thinks that physical existence is introduced by the existential operator, i. e. "the sort of existence applying to concrete objects of our daily environment as well as to the objects discovered by the methods of science" (Reichenbach (1948) 274.) constitutes the primary non-fictitious level in language. The objects of perception counting as primitive elements of language in Russell are considered as the first examples of fictitious existence in Reichenbach. "We speak of seeing an object not only if the object is physically present; we say that we see certain objects also when dreaming, or when looking at physical objects of a different sort ... Such objects are fictitious; but it is convenient to deal with them as though they were real objects. We shall call them *subjective things*. The name *immediate things* will be used ... to include both objective things which are perceived and subjective things; thus if a thing is immediate it is left open whether it is at the same time objective." (Reichenbach (1947) 274.) Russell's primitive objects are immediate things, according to the analysis in 3.2. Let us

enumerate first the different sorts of existence without any deeper analysis of the structures introduced by Reichenbach. After a general characterisation we shall deal more thoroughly with one type of fictitious existence. "A second sort of fictitious existence ... extends the domain of existence much farther than does immediate existence. Following the second conception, we speak of existence whenever the assumption of physical existence is not contradictory. We thus introduce a category of *logical existence* ..." (Reichenbach (1947) 276.) "A third sort of existence appears in statements which refer to ... *propositional attitudes*" (Reichenbach (1947) 277.) The next "form of fictitious existence refers to what may be called intentional objects ... When we conceive terms like 'desire', 'plan', 'attempt', as functions, we ... are compelled to interpret" the principle of existential generalization, "as referring to a fictitious existence." (Reichenbach (1947) 280.) The last form of fictitious existence mentioned by Reichenbach is *literary existence* which is defined with respect to "fictitious objects whose existence is assumed when sentences concerning such objects are stated in a book. The fictitious existence of these objects ... is therefore translatable into the physical existence of sentences in a book." (Reichenbach (1947) 282.)

This typology of different sorts of existence is based on an essentially extensional logic of the Russellian type, however the intention to map all the relevant connections of conversational language on to a logical analysis led to the first formulation of some concepts of intensional logics. The formulation itself remained true to the extensional and the Russellian empiricist and behavioristic ideas. As an example we may consider the existence conjoined with intentional objects in the following sentence:

(3) Peter desires to live in New York



As a first step it is formalised in the following way:

$$(3)' \quad (\exists v)_{in} [f(x_1, y_1)] * (v) . ds(x_1, v)$$

"Here ' $f(x_1, y_1)$ ' means 'Peter lives in New York', and ' $ds$ ' means 'desires'. The particle 'to', in this interpretation, is regarded as introducing event-splitting." (Reichenbach (1947) 281.) In a second step the intentional objects are defined in terms of the psychological notion of fulfillment and (3)' is translated into physical existence:

$$(3)'' \quad (\exists z) bst(x_1, z) . [f(x_1, y_1) \supset ff(z)]$$

"Here ' $bst$ ' means 'bodily state' ... ' $ff$ ' means 'fulfillment' (Reichenbach (1947) 281.) and  $\supset$  means a connective implication. However nowadays the translation is not directed to "bodily state" as in the days of behaviorism but to "logically possible worlds". This new concept has not been without objection. The question is raised whether this notion is well founded ontologically. Before this problem became so hotly debated Russell had touched on this topic several times and developed a rather ambiguous standpoint in this respect. Mainly in connection with physics he liked to formulate his ideas with respect to different possible worlds (cr. Russell (1927a) 89. (1914) 190, in connection with ethic Russell (1910)), but his ideas concerning the perceptual foundation of language led him to a consequent negation of the hypothesis of possible worlds: "Logic, I should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features. To say that unicorns have an existence in heraldy, or in literature, or in imagination, is a most pitiful and paltry evasion. What exists in heraldy is not an animal, made of flesh and blood, moving and breathing of its own initiative. What exists is a picture, or a description in words. Similarly, to maintain that Hamlet, for example, exists in his own world, namely in the world of Shakespeare's imagination, just as truly as (say) Napoleon existed in the ordinary world, is to say something deliberately confusing,

or else confused to a degree which is scarcely credible. There is only one world, the 'real' world: Shakespeare's imagination is part of it, and the thoughts that he had in writing Hamlet are real. So are the thoughts that we have in reading the play. But it is of the very essence of fiction that only the thoughts, feelings, etc. in Shakespeare and in his readers are real, and that there is not, in addition to them, an objective Hamlet. When you have taken account of all the feelings roused by Napoleon in writers and readers of history, you have not touched the actual man; but in the case of Hamlet you have come to the end of him. If no one thought about Hamlet, there would be nothing left of him; if no one had thought about Napoleon, he would soon have seen to it that some one did. The sense of reality is vital in logic, and whoever juggles with it by pretending that Hamlet has another kind of reality is doing a disservice to thought." (Russell (1919a) 169-170.) We think that this last opinion corresponds to the nominalistic standpoint. In this context we do not wish to deal with intentional logic, therefore the inner problems of the different kinds of existence as far as they can be considered topics of different philosophical logics will not be discussed here.

Reichenbach followed Russell in formulating "that fictitious objects cannot be given proper names. They can only be described and therefore are expressed by means or variables bound by qualified existential operators. The word 'Hamlet', therefore, is not a proper name, but an abbreviation standing for the description of a fictitious personality." (Reichenbach (1947) 283.) The last remark - a description of a fictitious personality - proves the novelty of Reichenbach's approach and reveals the essence of the extension of applicability of truth and falsehood. Russell was of the opinion: "We experience 'Hamlet', not Hamlet; but our emotions in reading the play have to do with Hamlet,

not with 'Hamlet'. 'Hamlet' is a word of six letters; whether it should be or not be is a question of little interest, and it certainly could not make its quietus with a bare bodkin. Thus the play 'Hamlet' consists entirely of false propositions, which transcend experience, but which are certainly significant, since they can arouse emotions. When I say that our emotions are about Hamlet, not "Hamlet", I must qualify this statement: they are really not about anything, but we think they are about the man named 'Hamlet'. The propositions in the play are false because there was no such man; they are significant because we know from experience the noise 'Hamlet', the meaning of 'name', and the meaning of 'man'. The fundamental falsehood in the play is the proposition; the noise 'Hamlet' is a name'. (Russell (1940) 277.) Russell's analysis acknowledges only one sort of existence which could be qualified in Reichenbach's terminology as immediate existence and tries to explain the significance of a fictitious and consequently false sentence by means of emotions. But this is a rather dangerous and uncontrollable solution; it is undefined in which cases emotions can win against pure rationality and in this way it may institutionalize irrationality in certain fields of life. Instead of that rather difficult approach Reichenbach's consequent extension of truth and falsehood to these special sorts of existence is very convincing. Certainly we must not confound the languages of the different existences: what may appear as existent on the one level is considered empty on the other. This level-relativity emphasizes the one-sidedness and negativity of the Russellian standpoint: fictional sentences considered from the point of view of physical or immediate existence must be held as false, however they are not conceived of as elements of this language, they belong to the level of fictionality which disposes of special criteria of truth and falsehood.

Reichenbach's proposal for the definition of literary

existence was to use the physical existence of sentences in a book. This is a very essential step; in a fictional text there exists only what is introduced as existent or whose existence can be inferred on the basis of the text. In some respects the definition proves to be too loose: being stated in a book does not guarantee that the text is of a literary character. Therefore Reichenbach admits a definition which translates "literary existence into the existence of images and emotions in the reader. The interpretation will lead to a fictitious existence similar to immediate existence." (Reichenbach (1947) 282.) This is Russell's idea and we shall have to say something about it in 3.2. but we must express already here our conviction that it is an essentially weaker solution than the first one as it does not allow any combination of the structure with socio-cultural convention. The combination did not succeed in this case, Reichenbach had to include, besides the definition, general laws accounting for the psychological authenticity of the work: "The behavior of the fictitious persons in their fictitious environment should be so presented that it satisfies the laws of psychology holding for actual persons; in other words, the *laws* assumed for the behavior of the fictitious persons should be *objectively true*. ... A further requirement is that the laws expressed by the behavior of the fictitious persons play an important role in our own lives and therefore helps us to understand human behavior in general." (Reichenbach (1947) 282.) These requirements are too general and too absolute, it is fallacious if one wants to have a general law for life and all kinds of literature, we must rather admit a great number of different codes for literary genres which need not in each respect correspond to the rules of our life. The aspect of relativity has been increasingly taken into account in those works on fictionality which are based on a Meinongian possible world semantics (cf. Kanyó (1980a)), the importance of

the nominalistic contribution is not less, however we cannot give a systematic picture of the development of this research here. There no special fictional objects are looked for, it is rather the way of the linguistic formulation that is in the centre of scientific reflection; fictionality has to be understood as a consequence of the conventional use of language. As a very impressive example we shall briefly mention Lieb (1981). In this reasonably formulated study Lieb lays the foundations for a formal theory of fictionality. He assumes in accordance with Searle (1975) that the fictional text is embedded in pretence which plays the role of a propositional attitude (cf. Lieb (1981) 552.). He wants to include several propositional attitudes, which would serve as criteria of classification and "cut right across literary genres" (552.). There are different formal definitions, the first determines how the referential constituents have to be understood on the basis of the grammar of the language. As a second step the referential constituents appear as the referential-expressions of concrete texts, they have textual meaning, a referential-doxastic meaning which is defined by means of new definitions. If a narrator is involved in the fictional text then the realization of the fictional text is attributed by the author to him, an appropriate place is assigned to the narrator in the formal system and referential expressions that involve a narrator are also correctly interpreted. The most difficult case is the explication of the case in which there are normal proper names embedded in fictional texts, but Lieb's system can stand up to this challenge as he characterizes this case as a complex semantic relation which "involves both the reference relation and the fictionality proviso." (558.) Thus Lieb's well-founded formal system has enough adaptability to deal with problems like dependence on genre, conventionality and it comes very near to the ideas we have formulated in general terms above.

The Russellian definition of fictional existence leads to these reflections. We can establish that it has a double character: as a formal system it may be considered an influential starting point for semantical considerations of fictionality, but as to the philosophical and epistemological interpretation of this system which appeared in reducing language to immediate objects and in declaring fictional existence for falsehood there is a negativity and an absolutized one-sidedness which do not admit the formulation of a coherent theory. As a matter of fact, there are different possible solutions in Russell's writings, the first is an agnostic one and follows from his theory of knowledge: if there is a fictional entity introduced into the elements which according to our knowledge and our beliefs build up the world we have no method at our disposal to indicate that it has practically no reference. Russell is without doubt right in putting for the idea that in the knowledge of different communities there are undetected fictional entities and if we want to rely on the most secure grounds we must take the language of science - first of all physics and psycho-physiology- into account. This analysis again leaves out of consideration the pragmatic dimension of knowledge and beliefs, the socio-cultural rules which determine the emergence and the development of conventions, their manipulation and all the forms of influencing the community. But Russell can provide us with a positive solution as well, that is worth while to be examining intensively.

2.2. In adapting the perceptual phenomena as a basis for the interpretation of language Russell must have assumed not only the existence of perceptions such as can be verified by means of physics, but also the existence of impressions which occur in dreams, in hallucinations, in the imagination, etc. - as Reichenbach has clearly formulated, immediate existence involves subjective existence. This sphere of sub-

jective existence is named by Russell, according to the philosophical tradition, recapitulatively as *imagination*. In this section we want to summarize Russell's views on imagination with the intention of showing whether they can be connected with the theory of fictionality.

The existence of imagination is not unproblematic in modern psycho-physiology: behaviorism, the trend which Russell highly appreciated because of its experimental methods, was extremely antimentalistic and did not accept introspection as a valid psychological method, therefore it led to the negation of imagination. Russell argues in Russell (1919b) for the existence of images and he does not admit the reducing of these phenomena to the pronunciation of words *sotto voce* as Watson wished to solve this question. An image occurring in visualizing cannot be explained by behaviorist methods, it can at most be rejected, because one can be acquainted with it only through introspection and this method cannot be held for a source of knowledge according to the behaviorists. But Russell sees no principal problem in introspection. Two reasons can be mentioned against this method, one is privacy, the other is the independence of the laws of physics. As for privacy Russell mentions that "we shall have to include among such data" which can be obtained only through introspection "all bodily sensations" (Russell (1919b) 294.), i. e. since there is a class of data that admit by their nature only an introspective observation, introspection cannot be excluded. Much more interesting is the other argument, namely that the data of introspection "do not obey the laws of physics ... I think it will be found that the essential characteristic of introspective data is concerned with *localization*: either they are not localized at all, or they are localized in a place already physically occupied by something which would be inconsistent with them if they were regarded as part of the physical world. In either case, introspective data have to

be regarded as not obeying the laws of physics ..." (294-295). Russell is aware of the challenge and as a reaction he builds up the phantastic idea of a subjective existence which marks a new period in his theoretical interpretation of denotational relations mainly in the years 1914-1927 which can be characterized by Wittgenstein's influence on logical atomism and by the intensive study of behaviorism and psycho-physiological connexions. Russell's main thesis consists of postulating existence for everything insofar as it is built on sensations even if the content of the sensations contradicts the laws of physics. "Phantoms and images do undoubtedly exist in that sense ... if you shut your eyes and imagine some visual scene, the images that are before your mind while you are imagining are undoubtedly there. They are images, something is happening, and what is happening is that images are before your mind, and these images are just as much part of the world as tables and chairs and anything else. They are perfectly decent objects, and you only call them unreal (if you call them so), or treat them as non-existent, because they do not have the usual sort of relations to other objects ... If you imagine a heavy oak table, you can remove it without any muscular effort, which is not the case with oak tables that you actually see. The general correlations of your images are quite different from the correlations of what one chooses to call 'real' objects. But that is not to say images are unreal. It is only to say they are not part of physics. Of course, I know that this belief in the physical world has established a sort of reign of terror ... That sort of attitude is unworthy of a philosopher. We should treat with exactly equal respect the things that do not fit in with the physical world, and images are among them." (Russell (1918-1919) 257.)

The sphere of imagination originally appeared in Russell (1914a) where the external world was interpreted by sense-data and all objects of sense were declared real (cf. 93f.).



In Russell (1914b)) we find the direct connection with the denotation theory: images are here explained as descriptions. Russell expounds in this context that 'illusion' and 'unreality' have to be derived from the fundamental pair 'true' and 'false' which can be applied to propositions and descriptions, "but not to proper names: in other words, they have no application whatever to data, but only to entities or non-entities described in terms of data.

Let us illustrate this by the terms 'existence' and 'non-existence'. Given any datum  $x$ , it is meaningless either to assert or to deny that  $x$  'exists'. We might be tempted to say: 'Of course  $x$  exists, for otherwise it could not be a datum'. But such a statement is really meaningless, although it is significant and true to say, 'My present sense-datum exists', and it may also be true that ' $x$  is my present sense-datum'. The inference from these two propositions to ' $x$  exists' is one which seems irresistible to people unaccustomed to logic; yet the apparent proposition inferred is not merely false, but strictly meaningless. To say 'My present sense-datum exists' is to say (roughly): 'There is an object of which "my present sense-datum" is a description'. But we cannot say: 'There is an object of which " $x$ " is a description', because ' $x$ ' is (in the case we are supposing) a name, not a description." (Russell (1914b) 167-168.) This early contribution to the problem of imagination promises a sort of differentiation of existences in the method of Reichenbach: "Concerning the immediate objects in illusions, hallucinations, and dreams, it is meaningless to ask whether they 'exist' or are 'real'. There they are, and that ends the matter." (168.) This view allows for a positive account of fictionality as it is not to be considered as non-existence but as a particular variant of existence that should be characterized. However Russell who remained true to the notion of imagination did not undertake the systematic discussion of conventional language on a logical

basis and his philosophical interpretation of this problem presents different solutions.

Terminologically we must distinguish between imagination which is applied to the whole mental process and image which represents a constituent of this process. Images are divided according to the fields of sensation into visual, auditory and tactile and we may ignore other kinds of images (Russell (1927b) 184.) Images, imagination should be distinguished from sensations, the differences has been sought generally

"/1/ By the less degree of vividness in images;

/2/ By our absence of belief in their 'physical reality';

---

/3/ By the fact that their causes and effects are different from those of sensations." (Russell (1921) 145.)

But these arguments are not convincing, Russell means "that the test of liveliness, however applicable in ordinary instances, cannot be used to define the differences between sensations and images." (148.) Secondly he points out: "Images cannot be defined by the *feeling* of unreality, because when we falsely believe an image to be a sensation, as in the case of dreams, it *feels* just as real as if it were a sensation." (149.). Therefore the grounds for the distinction are sought in causes and effects, but there are different definitions which try to formulate the essential difference, namely that sensations come through the sense-organs and are connected with the world of physics, while images represent mental processes that are independent from the laws of physics. The multiplicity of definitions shows Russell's inner uncertainty, his first contribution to this topic after its general exposition in two philosophical studies in 1914, Russell (1915), gives two different definitions, and the reader may choose on the basis of his own reflections. The first definition has as its background the

recognition that "Sensation and imagination together ... may be defined as 'acquaintance with particulars not given as earlier than the subject.'" (Russell (1915) 33.) This last definition may be identified with "'particulars given as simultaneous with the subject.'" But such identification presupposes, what must not be assumed without discussion, that an experienced particular must be given as in some temporal relation with the subject. If this can be denied, we may find here an intrinsic difference between sense and imagination. It may be that in the sense the object is given as 'now', i. e. as simultaneous with the subject, whereas in imagination the object is given without any temporal relation to the subject, i. e. to the present time." (Russell (1915) 33.) In this way the following two definitions may be given for imagination and sensation: "'Imagination' is acquaintance with particulars which are not given as having any temporal relation to the subject. 'Sensation' is acquaintance with particulars given as simultaneous with the subject." (Russell (1915) 35.) But Russell is of the opinion that this interpretation may be rejected, the explanation to be substituted here must "allow that imagination and sensation are different relations to objects. ... if images have any given time-relation to the subject, it must be that of simultaneity; hence in this respect they will be indistinguishable from sense-data. We cannot hope ... in this case to explain the 'unreality' of images by the nature of the relation of imagining ... The 'unreality' of images may, on our present hypothesis, be defined as consisting merely in their failure to fulfil the correlations which are fulfilled by sense-data. ... images change in ways which are wholly contrary to the laws of physics; the laws of their changes seem, in fact, to be psychological rather than physical, involving reference to such matters as the subject's thoughts and desires." (42-43.)

After Russell's intensive psycho-physiological studies

this provisory contribution to the theoretical foundations of irrationality was succeeded by a more scientific argumentation: the physiological difference between sensation and image with respect to stimulus that was rejected in Russell (1915) 36. is considered as a possible basis for a definition: "... images have been defined as 'centrally excited sensations', i. e. sensations which have their physiological cause in the brain only ..." (Russell (1921) 150.). They stand clearly in opposition to sensations which are based on the sense-organs and the nerves connecting the sense-organs with the brain. But this explanation does not fit in with Russell's conception, it is replaced by another hypothesis that tries to explain the peculiarity of imagination by means of a special sort of causation which is named mnemonic and is based on mental connections: "... and image is occasioned, through association, by a sensation or another image, in other words that it has a mnemonic cause - which does not prevent it from also having a physical cause. ... Sensations, on the other hand, will only have physical causes." (120-121.) Russell hints at several possible solutions, but his ideas are not satisfactorily expounded in Russell (1921); the most convincing explanation of this topic is to be found in Russell (1927b) which summarizes the different ideas concerning images and generalizes some early conceptions. A central motive of the theory of imagination is that the image depends on earlier sensations, "an image is more or less vague, and has a number of similar sensations as its prototypes." (188.) The similitude and the criteria of resemblance are inquired into and Russell believes that there are "innumerable methods ... by which you can test the likeness of an image to its prototype." (190.) Russell's analysis concludes "that an image is an occurrence having the quality associated with stimulation by some sense-organ, but not due to such stimulation. In human beings, images seem to depend upon past experience, but perhaps in more

instinctive animals they are partly due to innate mechanism. ... an 'image' is an occurrence recognisably visual (or auditory or etc. as the case may be), but not caused by a stimulus which is of the nature of light (or sound or etc., as the case may be), or at any rate only indirectly so caused as a result of association." (192-193.) This conception is practically a generalisation of the theory concerning memory-images discussed in Russell (1921), as images are not only constituents of imagination, but play an important role in memory and in word meaning. As to memory-images they "do not differ in their intrinsic qualities" from imagination-images. "They differ by the fact that the images that constitute memories, unlike those that constitute imagination, are accompanied by a feeling of belief which may be expressed in the words 'this happened'. The mere occurrence of images, without this feeling of belief, constitutes imagination; it is the element of belief that is the distinctive thing in memory." (Russell (1921) 176.) Russell assumes that 'the prototype of our memory-image did fit into a physical context, while our memory-image does not. This causes us to feel that the prototype was 'real', while the image is 'imaginary'. (185). In immediate memory Russell deems to have found something that "bridges the gulf between sensations and the images which are their copies." (175.) It applies to the fading of a sensations: "At the beginning of a stimulus we have a sensation; then a gradual transition; and at the end an image." (175.)

In the complex of meaning and thinking, images again play an important role according to Russell's considerations. One of the main questions is how words or images may occur in the absence of their objects. There is a behavioristic theory with respect to this connection but it is found to be restricted and inadequate, and is replaced by a theoretical approach which is, in spite of its declared anti-conventionalism a pragmatic theory insofar as it arises out of the

use of language and gives definitions with respect to use. After distinguishing the active and passive understanding of a word or image he gives different ways of understanding words:

- "/1/ On suitable occasions you use the word properly.
- /2/ When you hear it, you act appropriately.
- /3/ You associate the word with another word (say in a different language) which has the appropriate effect on behavior.
- /4/ When the word is being first learnt, you associate it with an object, which is what it 'means'; thus the word acquires some of the same causal efficacy as the object." (Russell (1919b) 301.)

The cases apply to a use of language which Russell names 'demonstrative as they point out a feature in the present environment' (301.). However this is not the only use of language, the two sorts of images already mentioned memory-images and imagination-images, lay the ground for other uses of language:

- "/5/ Words may be used to describe or recall a memory-image: to describe it when it already exists, or to recall it where the words exist as a habit and are known to be descriptive of some past experience.
- /6/ Words may be used to describe or create an imagination-image: to describe it, for example, in the case of a poet or novelist, or to create it in the ordinary case of giving information - though in the latter case, it is intended that the imagination-image, when created, shall be accompanied by belief that something of the sort has occurred." (302.)

These two uses are named narrative use and imaginative use, and both of them indicate the use of words in thinking.

"... it is ... the possibility of a memory-image in the speaker "and an imagination-image in the hearer that makes the essence of the narrative 'meaning' of the words." (Russell (1921) 201.) "Images, as contrasted with sensations, are the response expected during a narrative; it is understood that present action is not called for. ... words used demonstratively describe and are intended to lead to sensations, while the same words used in narrative describe and are only intended to lead to images." (202.)

"The 'meaning' of images is the simplest kind of meaning, because images resemble what they mean, whereas words, as a rule, do not." (Russell (1919b) 303.) In this sense images represent a case par excellence for correspondence theory. "That of which an image is a copy is called its 'prototype'; and this, or its parts, ... is always an indispensable part of the cause either of the image, or of its constituents (in the case of complex imagination-image)." (304.) In developing this semantic standpoint Russell speaks of image-proposition and word-proposition and of the possibility of translation from the one formulation into the other, and expounds the thesis that images may apply to particulars and universals as well (cr. 308f. and Russell (1921) 208ff.). In connection with imagination it is the association which plays the determining role. "The essence of imagination ... is the absence of belief together with a novel combination of known elements." (Russell (1927b) 199.) "What causes us, in imagination, to put elements together in a new way? Let us think first of concrete instances. You read that a ship has gone down on a route by which you have lately travelled; very little imagination is needed to generate the thought 'I might have gone down'. What happens here is obvious: the route is associated both with yourself and with shipwreck, and you merely eliminate the middle term. Literary ability is largely an extension of the practice of which the above is a very humble example." (200.)

Another example is a not very impressive Shakespeare-analysis which tries to explain philologically and psychologically the associations involved in the text. "Thus exceptional imaginative gifts appear to depend mainly upon associations that are unusual and have an emotional value owing to the fact that there is a certain uniform emotional tone about them." (201.)

We wished to give a concise summary of Russell's different views on image and imagination without being compelled to deal extensively with his conceptions concerning memory, meaning, belief, truth and falsehood and all the other fields where image and imagination can appear. At the end of this summary we must confess that this picture is rather confused and this is not solely our fault: Russell's theory on image and imagination, this attempt to formulate a positive approach to unreal existences, consists of different proposals which stand ontologically and semantically in contradiction to each other and which, taken individually, prove to be too general and cannot reveal the characteristics of this phenomenon. The problem was originally conceived of on the basis of Principia Mathematica and we find this starting-point very promising in several respects: images are introduced here as descriptions, i. e. expressions denoting one object which must consequently exist. This explanation of images has the sense that images can be presented only as descriptions, everybody taking part in the communication cannot be acquainted with the object of the images, as it is habitually inaccessible for everybody outside of the speaker. Nevertheless the speaker has the possibility of verifying the existence of this object: "... if ... what is given is never the thing, but merely one of the 'sensibilia' which compose the thing, then what we apprehend in a dream is just as much given as what we apprehend in waking life." (Russell (1914) 166-167.) We do not dispose of a register of the real objects, objects are identified by means of sense-data. If



we have sense-data, we must admit that their object exists in the case of dreams, hallucinations, etc. these objects "have their position in the private space of the perspective of the dreamer; where they fail is in their correlation with other private spaces and therefore with perspective space. But in the only sense in which 'there' can be a datum, they are 'there' just as truly as any of the sense-data of waking life." (167.) This analysis is very instructive because it tries to explain a number of idiosyncratic phenomena on the basis of the accepted general solution. This leads, however, to contradictions: it is impossible to allow for the existence of all the objects which can be inferred from our different sense-data, if we want to keep up a coherent view of the world we must reject 'things' which "cannot be combined according to the laws of physics with the 'things' inferred from waking sense-data". (170.) It means that the objects are there and are not there at the same time, the coherence of the system is not satisfactory. There is a positive solution, as we have pointed out in the previous part, where Russell's negative remarks were taken into consideration: on the basis of socio-cultural conventions there may be differentiated several uses of language which, according to the conventions, may have different definitions as to existence. In the number of these different existences there should be included fictionality as well which has primarily a conventional character. However Russell cannot accept this sort of solution as he does not believe in the central importance of conventionality, he believes in a natural process of the development of language and inquires into rather idiosyncratic connections of language which are not primarily communicative and which by their very nature can be systematically accounted for only with difficulty: he deals with private language, the language of dreams, but always in such a way that normality is victorious over excessive deviation and madness. The topics are very difficult and in spite of

Russell's deep insights his treatment remains fragmentary and unsatisfactory. Russell's fundamental methodological problem consists in demonstrating how one and the same thing can be two, i. e. how an image is just the same as a sensation and how they differ from one another. The general answer used to be that image is mental and sensation is material, however this distinction is not important in Russell's philosophy: mind and matter may have the same structure in the sense of neutral monism, therefore some other distinction is needed. An extreme solution is presented in Russell (1915): "If ... imagination involves no time-relation of subject and object, then it is a simpler relation than sensation, being ... merely *acquaintance with particulars*. The object imagined may, on this view, have any position in time or none, so far as the mere fact of its being imagined is concerned. *Sensation*, on the other hand, is a relation to a particular which involves simultaneity between subject and object. Sensation *implies* acquaintance with the object, but is not identical with acquaintance." (43.) The opposition of imagination and sensation goes back to an early reflection: "non-existential occupation of time, if possible at all, is radically different from the existential kind of occupation." (Russell (1903) 472.) The introduction of non-existential occupation of time has the consequence that we must know the objects directly, not by means of sensations, and this conviction should lead us to give up Russell's whole conception with a sensational, interpretational language and to introduce objects on the basis of a realistic ontology and to explore several insights by means of which the objects can be investigated. Therefore we must agree with Russell in rejecting this possibility. But with this proposal he gives up the possibility of introducing arbitrary units as individuals in the language: image or imagination should not be considered as the simplest relation of acquaintance but as a consequence of a sensation-relation.

Therefore image is conceived of as secondary element, namely as a copy of a sensational prototype. This means again a new turning point in the development of the theory: the definition of image in the manner of the word 'meaning' means a break not only with the realistic conception, but with the early ideas expounded on the basis of *Principia Mathematica*; images no longer appear as descriptions considered in the process of presenting and acquiring knowledge, but as vocabulars of a subjective way of expression. Russell presents a theory of meaning new in several respects: he enumerates the different constituents that may have meaning and he considers complex forms such as propositions, beliefs with their objectives, the interrelations of these forms with images, etc. The new element of this theory is that meaning is defined in spite of his anti-conventionalist conviction by features of use, Russell applies here first of all the methods of behaviorism. This meaning conception is not expounded in a formal way comparable to the denotation theory in *Principia Mathematica*, but its main lines are pointed out. The theory is based on the Frege-principle: "The objective reference of a proposition is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the meanings of its component words." (Russell (1921) 371.) Propositions have, however a different dimension which is the characteristic duality of truth and falsehood. This essential semantic duality is inquired into on different levels. Propositions such as linguistic formulations are contrasted with facts. Facts maybe positive and negative (as to negative facts cf. Russell (1918-1919) 211ff; and Oaklander and Miracchi (1980)). Facts can be most simply translated by means of image-propositions "which may be believed or disbelieved, but do not allow any duality of content corresponding to positive and negative facts" (Russell (1921) 276.) The word-propositions represent another level, they "are always positive facts, but are of two kinds: one verified by a positive objective, the other by a nega-

tive objective." (Russell (1921) 277.) Russell introduced facts under Wittgenstein's influence: as Quine points out, facts are "non-linguistic things that are akin to sentences and asserted by them ... His facts are what many of us would have been content to call true propositions" (Quine (1966) 664.) Russell himself called them so in his early writings. This solution did not find Quine's approval: "Russell's predilection for a fact ontology depended, I suggested, on confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise I think Russell would have made short shrift of facts. He would have been put off by what strikes a reader of "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism": how the analysis of facts rests on analysis of language. Anyway Russell does not admit facts as fundamental: atomic facts are atomic as facts go, but they are compound objects. The atoms of Russell's logical atomism are not atomic facts but sense data." (665-666.) We can have no better opinion about the theory of image-propositions: there is no regular structure for this proposition and its constituents given, the terminology worked out for lingual connections which appear according to this theory on another level seem to be metaphorically applied to the visual sphere, and in this way the correlations which surely exist between image and word are put into an unadmittedly close contact. The whole process of translation hinted at several times cannot be discussed with such predispositions. In this way we have different ways of expression which are so complicated that there are no direct connections between them, this applies to the behavioristic relations which try to explain an unconventional subjective form of thinking such as imagination, hallucination, dream, etc. It must be emphasised that these forms are not parts of a socio-cultural communication, nor are they to be considered as a genre of communications, but they are embedded in psycho-physiological processes which have without doubt an important significance in human life, although its characteristics are quite different from

the socio-cultural connection. The relative importance of these elements is different from the point of view of the language system and its use and although it is desirable that all the elements should be taken into account yet they should be given the weight which is their due according to the grammar and the use of language. In this sense the subjective forms chosen by Russell are not to be considered as fundamental linguistic relations; they are, on the contrary, secondary forms belonging to different minimal classes. Therefore we must hold this theory, in spite of the interesting and sometimes even revealing analysis, to be erroneous. If we take one of its most attractive features, the definition of contents of images on the basis of associations, we are aware of the difficulties of the theory. "... a word or image means an object ... when it has the same associations as the object. But this definition must not be interpreted too absolutely: a word or image will not have *all* the same association as the objects which it means." (Russell (1921) 291.) This rather vaguely defined relation is applied on the one hand to explicate consciousness and, generally, the mind: in this connection it is postulated that several images belong to a certain prototype which may be related to each other without the help of the prototype. On the other hand the introduction of the prototype raises the question of whether the mental events are causally dependent upon physical events in a sense in which the converse dependence does not hold. This dependence is the materialistic view of the question, and Russell, who would like to maintain his neutral position, is compelled to declare: "... I think the bulk of the evidence points to the materialistic answer as the more probable." (303.) In this case all that he said about the mnemonic causation as a special cause of images, their mental nature, etc. loses its importance; we believe that the dilemmas can be solved if they are put in the form of an empirically formulated question and we are interested

not in the philosophical but the empirical solution. Associations play an important role in the modern theory of language for instance, Saussure attempts to capture the associations but he takes a conventional system into consideration and he and his followers have incomparably more to say than the philosopher considering expressions. A detailed investigation of Russell's proposals seems to be as devoid of interest in this respect as the analysis of his remarks concerning literary analysis: the research in these fields achieved more valuable results.

And what is the importance of this theory of imagination for fictionality? We must see that imagination can only account for the psychological ability of the narratives, but not for their conventional rules. Therefore a particular uncertainty in evaluating fictional narrative exists: although a special use of the words evoking images in the narrative has been introduced Russell speaks of "a consistent whole composed partly or wholly of false propositions, as in a novel." (Russell (1921) 268.) In this sense the theory of imagination is an unsuccessful attempt to complete the classical denotation theory with a positive approach to unreal existences. The cause of the failure consists in choosing the subjective psycho-physiological elements to interpret language and to postulate a unique homonymous system for language itself. Nevertheless, with the requirement of conventional use of the words there appears the possibility of the delimitation of a genre as a special way of communication. We appreciate this attempt to define these uses of meaning, however we would not like to put these special images - these rather questionable units - at the centre of the definitions, we are convinced that the genre is not determined by the direction towards one or other image, but by socio-cultural conventions that can be mapped into the language by means of different language systems in competition with each other.

3. At the end of our discussion we have to raise the question of how far this conception, which has proved to be in some formal respect very important, in other connections of the interpretation however, erroneous can be considered as characteristic of the nominalistic systems of fictionality, i. e. of the Russellian systems. During the analysis we have had the chance to be convinced that Russell's system cannot be held to be nominalistic in every respect: he postulates universals, and the ontological basis of some of his terms such as negative fact and even fact etc. may be queried. His way of interpreting language with respect to sense-data which are considered as the building stones of material and mental structures of the universe in the sense of neutral monism is not commonly widespread among the nominalists of logico-linguistic semantics. At the same time we must be conscious of the fact that through his theory of description Russell exerted an influence in the interest of nominalism and against Meinongian conceptions and his conception of the imaginary belongs to the same approach. However we do not want to give an appreciation of his role in the history of philosophy, and our points of view have been methodological ones: we pointed out the double approach to fictionality which has the specific appearance of denotation theory and the theory of imagination and which expresses the dilemma to give either a totally negative or a positive solution to fictionality. We have evaluated Russell's denotation theory which corresponds to the negative answer, however we have tried to show that Russell's formulation should be completed in such a way that fictionality could be dealt with, and only Russell's positive solution was rejected, not the positive solution as such. These contradictory impulses stem from the acknowledgement of two principles at the same time, the first is that objects should not be multiplied, consequently we need not assign existence to objects which have been invented; the second is that if something is there

it must be acknowledged, this principle can be fully satisfied in a stratified language system. The problem is that the severe nominalistic methodology prohibits the accepting of some appearances as existents which we believe to know on the basis of our native language and our conventions. What is the way out: criticizing natural language in the name of science and an ideal language or in proving it to be considerate to the naivities of language and conventions? There is no general answer. What we have tried to make understandable in connection with fictionality is that existence should not be sought only in the physical or psycho-physiological sphere but in socio-cultural contexts, in conventions and in different pragmatic factors. These social elements should not appear foreign to nominalism, a nominalist treatment of their complex structures would contribute to their better and simpler understanding. The same applies to fictionality: we are acquainted with these (physically) non-existent figures, and we should give an account of the nature of our acquaintance.

#### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> This study was formulated for the "Semantics of Fiction" - number of Poetics, 11 (1982). editor: Prof. Dr. Hannes Rieser, however, it could not be published because of its length. It represents at the same time a part of my investigations concerning fictionality, as to the central ideas of my conception cf. my study: The Main Views on Fictionality in the Logico-Semantic Tradition, *Studia poetica* 3, pp. 115-124. and another long study about the Meinongian semantics in correspondance with fictionality: *Semantik für*



heimatlose Gegenstände. Die Bedeutung von Meinongs Gegenstandstheorie für die Theorie der Fiktionalität, *Studia poetica* 3, pp. 3-114. The present study should not be considered as a finished work about nominalistic semantics, not even the whole part of the Russellian semantics could be dealt with, the most important failures are Russell's critic on Leibniz and the late development of the interpretation of his logical analysis. These parts will be finished later on, for the time being it appears in this form.

- 2 "My intellectual journeys have been, in some respects, disappointing. When I was young I hoped to find religious satisfaction in philosophy; even after I had abandoned Hegel, the eternal Platonic world gave me something nonhuman to admire. I thought of mathematics with reverence, and suffered when Wittgenstein led me to regard it as nothing but tautologies. I have always ardently desired to find some justification outside human life and to deserve feelings of awe. I am thinking in part of very obvious things, such as the starry heavens and a stormy sea on a rocky coast; in part of the vastness of the scientific universe, both in space and time, as compared to the life of mankind; in part of the edifice of impersonal truth, especially truth which, like that of mathematics, does not merely describe the world that happens to exist. Those who attempt to make a religion of humanism, which recognizes nothing greater than man, do not satisfy my emotions. And yet I am unable to believe that, in the world as known, there is anything that I can value outside human beings, and, to a much lesser extent, animals. Not the starry heavens, but their effects on human percipients, have excellence; to admire the universe for its size is slavish and absurd; impersonal non-human truth appears to be a delusion. And so my intellect goes with the humanists, though my emotions violently rebel." Russell (1944a) 19-20.

- 3 "... in the beginning of the century, I had composed various stories and, later, I made up stories to while away the tedious climb from the beach to our house in Cornwall. Some of the latter have since been written down, though never published. In about 1912, I had written a novel, in the manner of Mallock's *New Republic*, called *The Perplexities of John Forstice*. Though the first half of it I still think is not bad, the latter half seems very dull to me, and I have never made any attempt to publish it. I also invented a story that I never published."  
Russell (1969) 34.
- 4 "... logical constants are all notions definable in terms of the following: Implication, the relation of a term to a class of which it is a member, the notion of *such that*, the notion of relation, and such further notions ..."  
(Russell (1903/3.)
- 5 "It may be observed that, although implication is undefinable, *proposition* can be defined. Every proposition implies itself, and whatever is not a proposition implies nothing. Hence to say '*p* is a proposition' is equivalent to saying '*p* implies *p*'; and this equivalence may be used to define propositions." (15.)
- 6 "But a proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain words: it contains the entities indicated by words." (47)
- 7 "Predicates ... are concepts, other than verbs, which occur in propositions having only one term or subject."  
(45.)
- 8 "Every verb, in the logical sense of the word, may be regarded as a relation; when it occurs as verb, it actually relates, but when it occurs as verbal noun it is the bare relation considered independently of the terms which it relates." (52.)

- 9 "Worlds all have meaning, in the simple sense that they stand for something other than themselves." (47.)
- 10 "But a proposition unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain words: it contains the entities indicated by words." (47.)
- 11 "Here the *Gedanke* is what I have called an unasserted proposition - or rather, what I called by this name covers both the *Gedanke* alone and the *Gedanke* together with its truth-value. It will be will to have names for these two distinct notions; I shall call the the *Gedanke* alone a *propositional concept*; the truth-value of a *Gedanke* I shall call an *assumption*." (503.) The last remark is completed by the following erroneous note:  
"Fege, like, Meinong, calls this an *Annahme*: FuB. p. 21."  
As to *Annahme* cf. Kanyó (1980)a. 'Assumption' was not used later in this sense in the Russellian system.
- 12 cf. "Matter, we are told, is a substance, a thing, a subject, of which secondary qualities are the predicates. But this traditional answer cannot content us. The whole doctrine of subject and predicate ... is radically false, and must be abandoned." (Russell (1903) 466.)
- 13 "Coffa (1980) demonstrates an essential differences between the theory of knowledge by acquaintance and Russell's ideas explained in "On Denoting".
- 14 A typical evaluation of it by Quine goes as follows:  
"Now here, in contrast to the class matter, I think Russell even concedes the Platonists too much; retention of the two-place predicate 'is similar to' is no evidence of assuming a corresponding abstract entity, the similarity relation, as long as that relation is not invoked as a value of a bound variable. A moral of all this is that in attention to referential semantics works two ways,

obscuring some ontological assumptions and creating an illusion of others." (Quine (1966) 662.)

<sup>15</sup> cf. "God and immortality, the central dogmas of the Christian religion, find no support in science. It cannot be said that either doctrine is essential to religion, since neither is found in Buddhism... But we in the West have come to think of them as the irreducible minimum of theology. No doubt people will continue to entertain these beliefs, because they are pleasant, just as it is pleasant to think ourselves virtuous and our enemies wicked. But for my part I cannot see any ground for either. I do not pretend to be able to prove that there is no God. I equally cannot prove that Satan is a fiction. The Christian God may exist; so may the Gods of Olympus, or of ancient Egypt, or of Babylon. But no one of these hypotheses is more probable than any other; they lie outside the region, of even probable knowledge, and therefore there is no reason to consider any of them." (Russell (1925) 13-14.)

<sup>16</sup> cf. "... the basis of a language is not conventional, either from the point of view of the individual or from that of the community. A child learning to speak is learning habits and associations which are just as much determined by the environment as the habit of expecting dogs to bark and cocks to crow. ... a conventional origin is clearly just as mythical as the social contract by which Hobbes and Rousseau supposed civil government to have been established. We can hardly suppose a parliament of hitherto speechless elders meeting together and agreeing to call a cow a cow and a wolf a wolf. The association of words with their meanings must have grown up by some natural process, though at present the nature of the process is unknown." (Russell (1921) 189-190.)

Russell's arguments against conventionalism have been definitely refuted in Lewis (1969).

#### References

- Black, Max. 1944. 'Russell's Philosophy of Language'. In: P. A. Schilpp, ed. 1944: 229-255.
- Castaneda, Hector-Neri. 1979. 'Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections'. *Poetics* 8: 31-62.
- Coffa, J. Alberto. 1980. Russell as a Platonic Dialogue: The Matter of Denoting. *Synthese* 45: 43-70.
- Geach, Peter Thomas, 1962. Reference and Generality. An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1970<sup>2</sup>.
- Hintikka, Jaakko 1981. On Denoting What? *Synthese* 46: 167-183.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1980. Denoting in the Principles of Mathematics. *Synthese* 45: 33-42.
- Ingarden, Roman, 1931. Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie. Logik und Literaturwissenschaft. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. 1960.
- Kanyó, Zoltán. 1977. 'Kriterien der Fortsetzbarkeit in monologischen konjunktiv verbundenen Ketten. (Dargestellt an Hand von Strittmatters Kalendergeschichte "Der Spuk")', In: F. Daneš and D. Viehweger, eds., *Probleme der Textgrammatik II. Studia grammatica* 18. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 33-72.

- Kanyó, Zoltán. 1980a. 'Semantik für heimatlose Gegenstände. Die Bedeutung von Meinongs Gegenstandstheorie für die Theorie der Fiktionalität. In: Z. Kanyó, ed. *Studies in the Semantics of Narrative/ Beiträge zur Semantik der Erzählung. Studia poetica* 3. Szeged: A. József University. 3-144.
- Kanyó, Zoltán, 1980b. 'The Main Views on Fictionality in the Logico-semantic Tradition'. In: Z. Kanyó, ed. *Studies in the Semantics of Narrative /Beiträge zur Semantik der Erzählung. Studia poetica* 3. Szeged: A. József University. 115-124.
- Kneale, William. 1936. 'Symposium: Is existence a Predicate?' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl.* 15: 154-174.
- Kutschera, Franz von. 1976. *Einführung in die intensionale Semantik*. Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Lang, Ewald. 1977. *Semantik der koordinativen Verknüpfung. Studia grammatica* 14. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
- Lewis, David. 1969. *Konventionen. Eine sprachphilosophische Abhandlung*. Translated by R. Posner and D. Wenzel. Berlin - New York: Walter der Gruyter 1975.
- Lieb, Hans-Heinrich. 1981. 'Questions of reference in written narratives'. *Poetics* 10: 541-559.
- Linsky, Leonard. 1967. *Referring*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press 1973.
- MacCall, Hugh. 1905. 'Symbolic Reasoning'. In: Russell: 1973; 308-316.
- Montague, Richard, 1974. *Formal Philosophy. Selected Papers of Richard Montague*. (edited by R. H. Thomason.) New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Oaklander, I. Nathan and Miracchi, Silvano. 1980. Russell, Negative Facts, and Ontology. *Philosophy of Science* 47: 434-455.

- Moore, G. E. 1936. 'Symposium: Is Existence a Predicate?'  
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl.  
15: 175-188.
- Moore, G. E. 1944. 'Russell's "Theory of Descriptions"'. in:  
P. A. Schilpp, ed. 1944: 177-225.
- Quine, Willard V. 1939. 'Designation and Existence'. The  
Journal of Philosophy 36: 701-709.
- Quine, Willard V. 1966. 'Symposium: The Philosophy of  
Bertrand Russell. Russell's Ontological Develop-  
ment'. The Journal of Philosophy 63: 657-667.
- Reeves, J. W. 1932-33. 'The Origin and Consequences of the  
Theory of Descriptions', Proceedings of the  
Aristotelian Society 34: 211-230.
- Reichenbach, Hans. 1944. 'Bertrand Russell's Logic'. In:  
P. A. Schilpp, ed. 1944: 23-54.
- Reichenbach, Hans. 1947. Elements of Symbolic Logic. New  
York: Free Press; London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd.  
1966.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1903. The Principles of Mathematics. Lon-  
don: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1937<sup>2</sup>.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1905a. 'The Existential Import of Pro-  
position'. In: B. Russell. 1973: 98-102.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1905b. 'On Denoting'. In: B. Russell,  
1956: 41-56.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1910. 'The Elements of Ethics'. In: B.  
Russell, 1910. Philosophical Essays. London:  
George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1966: 13-59.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1910-1911. 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and  
Knowledge by Description: In: B. Russell. 1918.  
A Free Man's Worship and other essays. London:  
George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1976: 200-221.

- Russell, Bertrand. 1912. *The Problems of Philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt and Company; London: Williams and Norgate.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1914a. *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1926.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1914b. 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'. In: B. Russell, 1918. *A Free Man's Worship and other Essays*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1976: 140-172.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1915. 'Sensation and Imagination, . The *Monist* 25: 28-44.
- Russell, Bertrand 1918-1919. 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'. In: B. Russell. 1956: 177-281.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1919a. *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1967<sup>12</sup>.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1919b. 'On Propositions: What They are and How They Mean'. In: B. Russell. 1956: 285-320.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1921. *The Analysis of Mind*. London: George Allen und Unwin Ltd. 1924.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1924. 'Logical Atomism'. In: B. Russell. 1956: 323-343.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1925. *What I Believe*. London: Kegan Paul; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.
- Russell, Bertrand 1927a. *The Analysis of Matter*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1959.
- Russell, Bertrand 1927b. *An Outline of Philosophy*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.



- Russell, Bertrand. 1940. *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd. 1967.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1944a. 'My Mental Development'. In: P.A. Schilpp, ed. 1944: 3-20.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1944b. 'Reply to Criticism'. In: P.A. Schilpp, ed. 1944: 681-741.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1948. *Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.; New York: Humanities Press. 1966.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1953. *Satan in the Suburbs and Other Stories*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1954. *Nightmares of Eminent Persons and Other Stories*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd. 1962.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1956. *Logic and Knowledge. Essays 1901-1950*. Edited by R. Ch. Marsch. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd; New York: The MacMillan Company.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1961. *Fact and Fiction*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1969. *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*. Vol. III. 1944-1967. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1973. *Essays in Analysis*. Edited by D. Lackey. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
- Searle, John. R. 1974-1975. 'The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse'. *New Literary History* 6: 319-332.
- Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. 1944. *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*. Vol. 1-2. New York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row.

Whitehead, Alfred North and Russell, Bertrand. 1910. *Principia Mathematica*. Vol. I. Cambridge: University Press. 1925.

## Index

acquaintance see knowledge  
association 347-348, 351, 356, 357  
behaviorism 314-315, 336, 342, 343, 348, 354, 355  
belief 333, 354  
communication game 332, 355, 357  
convention 328, 333, 339-341, 352, 357, 359  
correspondance theory 350  
denotation, denoting 306-310, 316-325, 328, 329, 343,  
357, 358 *see* also reference  
denoting concept 307, 317  
denoting phrase 308, 317, 319  
description 312-321, 327-329, 344-358  
  definite ~ 307, 309, 313, 318-320, 322, 323  
  existence-criterion of the ~ ~ 320  
  uniqueness-criterion of the ~ ~ 320, 323  
  false ~ 328  
  indefinite ~ 318, 322-323  
  relational ~ 321  
  *see* also knowledge  
doctrine of distribution 308  
emotion 338-339, 351  
empiricism 313  
existence 325-328, 358  
  fictitious ~ 334-335, 339  
  immediate ~ 338-339, 342

- literary ~ 335, 338-339
- logical ~ 335
- physical ~ 334, 335, 338-339
- subjective ~ 334, 341-343
- extensionality
  - principle of ~ 326
- fact 354-355, 358
  - negative ~ 354, 358
- fictionality
  - pragmatic of ~ 328
    - Meinongian Formula 310, 324
    - Model-theoretic Intensional Logic 336-339
    - Russellian Formula 303, 333, 358
- Frege-principle 354
- Frege-Strawson Position *see* fictionality semantical paradigms of ~
- genre 333, 339-340, 357
- ideal language *see* language
- image 342-351, 353-354, 356, 357
  - imagination- ~ 348-350
  - memory- ~ 348-350
- imagination 342-351, 353-355, 357, 358
- imaginative use of language *see* language
- incomplete symbol 319
- individual
  - known ~ 312
- introspection 342
- knowledge
  - by acquaintance 312-313, 327, 331-333, 346, 353, 362
  - by description 312, 326, 332
- language
  - ideal ~ 329, 359
  - use of ~ 349
    - imaginative ~ 349
    - narrative ~ 349

logic

- extensional ~ 326, 333, 335
- intensional ~ 327, 335
- philosophical ~ 337
- logical atomism 315, 343, 355
- material unit 311, 316
- meaning 306, 317, 329, 348, 350, 354
- Meinong Formula *see* fictionality, semantical paradigms of ~
- memory-image *see* image
- minimum vocabulary 316
- mnemic cause 347, 356
- Model-theoretic Intensional Logic *see* fictionality, semantical paradigms of ~
- modes of reference *see* reference
- narrative 333, 350, 357
- narrative use of language *see* language
- neutral monism 314, 315, 353, 358
- nominalism *see* ontology
- object 305, 308, 309, 311, 312, 314, 318, 320-321, 324-326, 328-336, 340, 343, 344, 346, 349, 351, 352, 356 *see also* individual, material unit, particular, term, thing and universal
- objective 354
- ontology
  - nominalistic 301, 302, 326, 333, 337, 358-359
  - Platonic ~ *see* realistic ~
  - realistic ~ 301, 302, 305, 306, 310, 313, 324
- operator 307
- particular 311-313, 317, 346, 353
  - egocentric ~ 318
- perception 313, 314, 332-334, 341
- Platonism . ontology
- possible worlds 335, 336, 339
- pretence 339

proper name 312, 317, 319, 329, 330, 337, 340  
  ~ in fictional text 340  
proposition 307, 310, 312, 319, 320, 327, 354, 357  
  image- ~ 350, 354, 355  
  word ~ 350, 354  
propositional attitude 333, 335, 340  
realism *see* ontology  
reference 308, 340, 341, 354  
  modes of ~ 308  
Russellian Formula *see* fictionality, semantical para-  
  digma of ~  
scope 317  
sensation 342, 346-348, 350, 353  
sentence 304, 338, 339  
socio-cultural game 333  
solipsism 331  
thing  
  immediate ~ 334  
term 305, 308-311, 317, 320, 322  
universal 312-313, 358  
unreality 324, 344, 346

"PRETENDS", LINGUISTICS, AND GAME-THEORY  
/A PARADIGM CASE OF GENERATING FICTION/

László Tarnay

A. József University, Szeged

*O. Introductory Remarks*

It seems to be a common assumption among scholars that the verb "to pretend" plays a significant role in generating fiction. It has been equally taken up by such different approaches as the strict logical-linguistic analysis, the speech act theory, the possible world semantics and ontological philosophy of literature.<sup>1</sup> It has gradually become a common practice unduly to impose burdens on a single predicate, while the fictional interpretation of the word went uncontested. So, the question whether there is any ambiguity hidden in its semantical representation has not been raised. On the forthcoming pages our concern will be to give an analysis of what such a representation may look like. This we do in two major stages: first, by drawing a detailed picture of the different uses of our word we touch on some problems of multiple interpretation and assert how fiction can be generated, and secondly we hint at a game-theoretical framework in which our previous assessments could be reformulated. But in order to clear the ground for our task we should make some preliminary statements.

The basic difference between our approach and the attitude generally accepted is, as we see it, that the latter is towards giving some consistent system in which the claims of a descriptive study of fictional phenomena are met in order that the question how fictional interpretations are possible, rather than whence such a possibility may come,

may be properly answered. To accomplish this aim "pretends" is introduced into the analysis as a primitive term which is supposed *eo ipso* to account for the usual real/fictional ambiguity. Whereas our approach is focused on what "pretends" means and on how it is used in different contexts; It turns out that it has a multiplicity of independent readings and an intricate web of presuppositions, so much so, that no onesided application of it in the field of literary semantics seems to be forthcoming. It follows then that "pretends" is by no means primitive but should be traced back to the concept of identity. A corollary of our approach to the semantics of "pretends" will be an argument on the need to distinguish two kinds of identity: metaphysical and epistemological.<sup>2</sup> Evidence for this distinction will be extensively given on examining linguistic data for our term; yet, some independent clarification may be in order. We call methaphysical any identity (or concept whatsoever) that can be established on the basis of our linguistic and logical capacity alone, whereas we call it epistemological if it is established on our assessment of what the world looks like and of what may contribute to confirming our knowledge of it. To see this distinction work we may give some examples where the two interpretations are conflicting: e.g. consider of there being some competing candidates who, say, have written a test; then uttering the sentence "I could be the winner" will be metaphysically or epistemologically biased depending on whether I am excluded from the class of the participants or form part of it. Or the sentence "I could be your father" is viewed differently if it is the product of pure fantasy or a topic introduced in court. To put it in a general way, the multiplicity of possible routes that events may have taken is a merit of our conceptual system in the first case, while, in the second it is the result of our trying to cope with how things really are, and hence it reflects our lack of knowledge. Although

this distinction is not one of possible worlds (for both seem to allow them), a difference in the assessment of identities is generated: a metaphysical identity is a kind of trans-world identity based on some logical-linguistic criteria and hence calling for an answer to the problem of essential and contingent attribution of predicates, whereas an epistemological identity is a kind of trans-world identity - if any - for which the much-debated essential/ contingent ambiguity may not arise, as we have seen in our second example: having a certain father is usually esteemed to be an essential property, it can rationally be questioned in some circumstances without its having the least bearing on the identity of him for whom this property is predicated. An epistemological identity is then not only any continuity in time-and-space but as the second part of our definition above puts it, it is any assessment on sameness that may prove useful in understanding how things are. What are now the criteria of this latter identity? It is this question which a proper analysis of "pretends" must raise and try to answer. What may seriously hinder such an attempt is the fact that the meaning of "pretends" is contaminated by the interference of the two identities, so much so that a multiplicity of readings is generated. In order to entangle them we should embark on a systematic study of its possible occurrences.

1. *An Attempt to Locate the Meaning of "Pretends"*

This part is devoted to giving a diagnostic treatment of the meaning of "pretends": it should reveal the basic problems in understanding the word and give some tenets for asserting the ambiguities in its interpretation. To prove our hypothesis we first have to clarify, what constraints seem to be imposed on the use of "pretends" in linguistics; whether they are valid should bear heavily on what inter-



pretations are assigned to the given grammatical structure it happens to be embedded in. Two such constraints seem to be in the offing: one comes from Searle who says that "one cannot truly be said to have pretended to do something unless one intended to do it".<sup>3</sup> "Pretends" then should "contain the conception of intention built into it."<sup>4</sup> The other goes back to G. Lakoff: it says that the use of this word always presupposes the truth of the negation of its sentence-complement.<sup>5</sup> Let us examine them briefly.

The first constraint by Searle is stated in the pragmatics of speech acts: it is part of the essential condition of "pretends". Yet, it seems to be dubious whether it can qualify as such in the form cited above. Consider the following short dialogue uttered in court:

A: The accused pretends to be innocent. But he is guilty.  
B: He does not pretend to be innocent, for innocent he is.

Both interlocutors can be rational in arguing for the particular positions they hold. If so, then the use of "pretends" is supposed to be neutral as regards whether the accused has had any intention whatsoever. This boils down to the fact that a statement of the form:

/1/ He pretends to be so-and-so although he has no intention of doing so.

need not be paradoxical. One may be unaware of playing off a belief of being so-and-so. A proper example for /1/ can be somebody who is considered mad, although less sophisticated cases would do as well. On the other hand, the use of "pretends" seems to affect what people believe about the person of whom it is predicated. Bearing this in mind we may try to replace /1/ by the stronger form:

/2/ He pretends to be so-and-so although he cannot be said to be playing off a belief of being so-and-so which is indeed paradoxical. Now, we can formulate a more palatable condition on the illocutionary force of "pretends":

/C/ One cannot be truly said to have pretended to do something unless he can be said to be playing off a similar belief

Instead of "playing off a belief" we might have said "making others believe accordingly" as well. The reason why there seems to be a difference between what the audience conceives to be like an illocutionary act and the performance of such an act simpliciter, in our opinion, resides in the fact that "pretends" is not a performative verb. One cannot say: I hereby pretend...<sup>6</sup> We can only describe an act of pretending, i.e. we can assign a similar force to utterances which we esteem to convey such a force in advance. But then it loses its explanatory power and is reduced to being a proxy for a previously accepted distinction. It is this fallacy that is often committed when "pretends" is claimed to account for fictional phenomena: it seems to state that fiction is what is intended as such whereas it should state rather that fiction is what is supposed to be intended as such. It will turn out later that to amend this characterization we should conceive fiction as a particular game in which players aim at an agreement other than in normal communication. But for the time being we remain with the idea that there is a methodological difference between illocutionary forces assigned on the basis of the performative character or on the lack of it.

By blurring this distinction Searle is led to the confrontation of two different senses of "pretends": one being an intention to deceive, i.e. "to pretend to be or to do something that one is not doing", the other referring to a performance "which is *as if* one were doing or being the thing" but this time without any intention to deceive.<sup>7</sup> He claims that fiction can be predicated in the latter sense. Although his further analysis of the role of pretending in fiction involves the same fallacy we hinted at above: in order to assign the illocutionary force of pretending to

utterances one should not only presuppose the real/fictional ambiguity but be aware of how it is already distributed over the utterances, this postulation of different senses stands in need of an adequate justification. For, what could be the difference between the concept of deception and that of "as if"? For one thing, it cannot lie in the lack of intention because it would violate the essential condition of "pretends" and we cannot speak of two different senses of the same word any more. If so, then the lack of intention to deceive with "as if " cannot mean a lack of intention simpliciter. And indeed, Searle is ready with the answer: if we take "pretends" in this second sense, the speaker's intention is aimed at suspending the requirements that are to obtain when the speech act of assertion is performed. If I pretend to be Nixon in this sense, then I could only pretend to refer to Nixon as myself, i.e. reference is suspended. Searle's example here is misleading; for he mentions only fictional individuals as cases of suspended reference, while with existing individuals like London, Napoleon, Nixon, etc. reference is claimed to be successful. This is again due to the hidden assessment about what can count as real/fictional before we embark on our analysis. But as we can see in the case of my pretending to be Nixon, reference to an existing individual can equally be suspended if the problem is formulated in this way. So, suspension is rather a general criterion. In order for an utterance to be fictional a proper act of pretending of reference should be enhanced. But what happens if I state that I am Nixon so as to be let into the White House? Does referring apply then? We might feel prone to answer in the affirmative provided that the deception was successful. But soon it is realized that such a use of "pretends" equally violates the essential and also the sincerity condition of assertion in that the speaker does not believe in what has been uttered and that it does not rep-

resent an actual state of affairs. Yet, it could be argued that the suspension of these conditions is not intended - although it is dubious whether someone could lie without the slightest intention of suspending being sincere! - but what is really intended is a successful reference. But what does it mean to refer successfully in this case? Does it mean that I refer to Nixon? Clearly not. For on the basis of a casual reference to the president I would never be admitted into the White House. Such an approach will then misplace any idea of rigid reference. Does it then mean that I refer to myself? Clearly not. For referring successfully to myself would again be inadequate for entering the building. It will misplace any idea of a speaker-oriented reference as well. So, if there is any reference intended in this case, it must be of a queer sort. Rather, it is the supposed identity of Nixon with myself that is intended in order to be let in.

If we want to keep up the difference between the two senses of "pretends", we have to allow that there is an intention to play off an identity belief in the first case while it is lacking or suspended in the second. But is this so? If I state that I am Nixon on the stage, is there no, however vague, idea of a similar belief being played off? A negative answer would undoubtedly render stage-roles meaningless. Of course, there is a sense in which no complete identification is possible, but no more can we speak of complete identification in the case of deception there is a clear sense in which I could not be one with Nixon however I strived.

To sum up, the difference between the two uses of "pretends" cannot be located in having some intention of playing off a belief, for in both senses there is a similar intention; it cannot be put into the kinds of belief that are being played off, for they equally involve identity. It must lie then in the belief-contents to be appropriated. If so,

then we must speak of different meanings of "pretends" but not of different senses. To account for the complexities of these belief-contents will be the task of the semantics of our term: ambiguities are generated as a result of different identity beliefs which are to be played off.

The constraint that G. Lakoff seems to impose on "pretends" apparently belongs to its semantics. It is tantamount to saying that a sentence like

/3/ John pretends to be a caesar  
seems to depend on another:

/4/ John is not a caesar

If we look upon the relation between /1/ and /2/ and state it to be presuppositional, we are drawn to the peculiar character of this verb in that it cannot be tucked into any of Karttunen's three categories: I plugs, II epistemic verbs, III holes, for either it is a plug since it blocks the truth of its sentence complement or it is a hole since it filters the negation of the very same clause.<sup>8</sup> To put it in another way, the role of "pretends" is then to express or rather to conjoin the contradiction of "x is an F" and "x is not an F" in a non-contradictory way. This idea is emphasized by the somewhat taunting

\*/5/ John pretends himself to be a caesar

which can have the following logical form underlying:

/6/ x pretends x is an F

If we take further the unnegated complement of "pretends" as the proper belief-content that is played off when an utterance like /3/ is put forward, we immediately see why Searle's examples were misleading: he considered sentences which had the structure of /7/ rather than /6/:

/7/ x pretends y is an F

The asymmetry of /6/ and /7/ seems to have justified the difference between the two senses of "pretends". We have witnessed that a form like /6/ can equally well be used to generate fictional interpretation. There seems to be nothing

in /6/ and /7/ that would call for one or another meaning (or sense). But then corresponding surface forms should inevitably be ambiguous, for apparently /6/ and /7/ are not the same. To bring their difference home we have to refine them to a considerable degree along the lines we have been arguing for the belief of identity. Then the relevant readings of contexts with "pretends" will soon yield to analysis.

## 2. *The Ambiguities of "Pretends": Fundamental Cases*

An independent motivation for our claim can be given by investigating pronominalization in constructions like /3/ with respect to /5/ and /8/ on the basis of /6/ and /7/. A similar argument has already been given by Barbara H. Partee<sup>9</sup>: the core of her argument is aimed at showing that surface forms like /3/ and /5/ go back to a structure of /6/ while surface forms like /8/ go back to /7/:

/8/ John pretends John to be a caesar

/5/ resulted from the variable reading of pronouns whereas /8/ by a corresponding pronominalization of laziness should yield /9/:

\*/9/ John pretends him to be a caesar

The acceptance of /9/ may be doubted, although similar constructions with "believes", "imagines", etc. are readily available. The reason why /9/ seems to be felt incorrect lies in the fact that there is a residual claim of identity in it, which is absent from contexts with e.g. "believes":

/10/ John believes him to be a caesar.

where there is no relation whatsoever between John and the referent of "him". According to Partee there are some other examples which suffer from the same fault as /9/, i.e. which do not allow a corresponding laziness-reading; they are so-called psychological verbs like "feels good", in which a prohibition to substitute the same referring expression into independent variables can be motivated by the fact

that one is unable to have the same sensory feeling as another, and hence, to use an idea of Castañeda<sup>10</sup>, one cannot feel self-identified except with himself. To account for a residual identity claim with respect to /9/ we now have to bring up evidence for /8/ and show therewith that this residual identity is different from self-identity that has a structure like /6/ and hence gives way to reflexivation. In this way we can reinstate the distinction between /6/ and /7/ by saying that they convey different identity claims. Let us consider constructions with "only" by means of which ambiguities like that of /6/ and /7/ are usually tested:

/11/ Only John pretends himself to be a caesar

/12/ Only John pretends John to be a caesar

The meaning of /11/ is clear, but we may feel embarrassed by /12/. Yet, we would like to argue that we can think of a situation when /12/ is true while /11/ false. Consider a masquerade to which people are admitted only if they are disguised as one of the others /also present/ in order for him to be caricatured. If now, by some acid self-irony, John thinks of spoiling the party by making a mockery of himself, and if being a caesar is not a unique way of caricaturing, then /11/ says something about each individual's self-identity while /12/ is concerned with their supposed identity with John. The rule of equi-deletion would then delete "himself" in /11/ and pronominalization-of-laziness lead to /9/ in /12/. Such an idea can be made more blatant by paraphrasing our construction slightly:

/13/ Is is a pretense for John for him to be a caesar but  
it is a reality for Jack

/14/ It is a pretense for John to be a caesar but it is a  
reality for Jack

/13/, which comes from constructions like /12/ and /9/, becomes a natural way to express the difference between Jack's and John's judgments about John's being a caesar; while in /14/ it is a difference between Jack's and John's claim for

the throne which is judged. In /14/, which involves each individual's self-identity equi-deletion was obligatory. The correct semantical representations of /13/ and /14/ are respectively:

/15/ It is a pretense for x for y to VP but it is a reality for z for y to VP

/16/ It is a pretense for x for x to VP but it is a reality for z for z to VP

/15/ and /16/ may be looked upon as the first result to amend the original /6/ and /7/. The use of identical variables in both conjuncts stand for our residual identity claim, while self-identity is safeguarded by the use of distinct variables in each. However, on closer inspection, they will turn out to be still inadequate to apply to cases put forward along the Searlian argument of "pretends". Take his first sense: /15/ may partly explicate what is happening when "I am Nixon" is uttered with the force of pretending; substituting "to be Nixon" for "to VP" we will have:

/17/ It is pretense for x for y to be Nixon but it is reality for z for y to be Nixon

If the variable "y" is used to bring home a residual claim of identity and if our argument about there being such an identity in any fictional representation in order for the idea of role to be realized is sound, then /17/ will equally represent the second sense of "pretends", and hence the difference has again been lost. The reason for this is that we have only tried to represent the two identity claims in two separate sentences and disregarded the possibility of conjoining them into one. Yet, fiction seems to be the result of such a conjunction of identity beliefs: for, what is lacking to disambiguate /17/ is the idea that in the case of deception the individual to be substituted into "z" takes his belief-content "for y to be Nixon" to convey a self-identity for him with respect to "y", while in the case of fictional representation he takes it to convey the residual identity claim but not the former, which can be duly said to be sus-



pended. To account for this and similar amendments we have to formulate the corresponding semantic representations so that they make clear not only which of the two identities should figure in the relevant belief-contents that are being played off but - as we shall see - also to which the individual who is playing them off is committed.

But before laying down these representations we would like to produce some independent motivations for making our distinctions.

### 3. *A Pragmatical Paradox in a Semantical Vein*

Consider a case described in Johnson-Laird /1982/ after Bas C. van Fraassen:<sup>11</sup> the king's son is thrown into prison and is forced to wear an iron mask. Although the king believes that the is dead, he should appear before him but he is looked upon as a common criminal. However, had the king's son endeavoured in vain to be recognized by his father, the following problem may be easily raised: How can we sincerely report the effort of the son? We cannot say that he claimed simply to be the son of the king for his father believes him to be dead and naturally would not trust a common criminal. Neither can he have claimed not to be a common criminal because people in iron masks are generally considered to be criminals. And neither can he have claimed not to be a man in iron mask for no-one realizes that he is wearing a mask, and hence, it would amount to saying that he is not identical with himself, which is absurd. We think this the proper place to use "pretends"; what he can do is try to play off the least obtrusive belief about himself. As he cannot take off his mask or assert absurdities, we may report his intention as

/18/ The son of the king pretends that the man in the iron mask is not a common criminal

The peculiarity of /18/ is that identities are expressed via definite descriptions, yet the meaning of "pretends"

does not seem to have changed: the same multiplicity of interpretations can be correlated with the different contexts /18/ may occur in (e.g. release from prison, being locked up again, or mutual recognition) depending on how identities are taken to figure in the corresponding belief-content that is part of the meaning of an act of pretending. But we do not enlist these possibilities here since they flow easily from the various semantical representations we are going to define next.

#### 4. *A Semantical Paradox in a Pragmatical Vein*

An independant motivation of distinguishing between different concepts of identity results from an investigation into the semantic principles of introducing definition or meaning postulates into one's language. Suppose we define "mad" as "having a wrong idea of oneself" which should be tantamount to an incorrect predicate-attribution. But what happens if we apply "mad" to its own definiens; for clearly, mad is a property and hence can be assigned to any individual. Yet, if one incorrectly attributes "mad" to himself, he is supposed to be mad by definition; then however, he cannot have attributed it incorrectly to himself since he is already in possession of it. And if, in turn, he is right in attributing it to himself, he cannot be supposed to be mad again by definition. But then he should be attributing it incorrectly and a vicious circle is established.<sup>13</sup>

To realize that semantic paradoxes inherent in any vocabulary run on parallel lines with our previous example where we can speak of a so-called deictic paradox, and that they are solved if the two concepts of identity are taken into consideration, we may re-formulate the present case by using "pretends"; we do not think that there is anything wrong with this, for, how else could we sincerely report one's serious misconception about himself than making use

of "pretends"? Not for example by "imagines" since to imagine oneself to be so-and-so has clearly nothing to do with what others should believe of him but in order for one to be considered as mad this latter condition is necessary. /19/ can then be a neat approximation:

/19/ John pretends to be mad

If the semantical representation of /19/ is taken to be similar to /6/, the vicious circle argument is introduced. Yet, if we apply our ideas on identity, the paradox is dissolved: John not only believes himself to be mad but rather he self-identifies himself with someone who is mad. Then his madness results from a misconception of self-identity rather than an incorrect attribution of a predicate, although the latter is part and parcel of the former /see below/.<sup>13</sup>

5. *An Attempt to Formulate Ambiguities in the Traditional Framework*

On the basis of the foregoing discussion we may try to re-assess the semantical importance of the different contexts "pretends" is allowed to occur in; the only problem arising from this claim is the lack of a proper transcript for the two kinds of identity. As a loose approximation we may try to express self-identity by a formula common in the epistemic logic of Hintikka to represent identification of referents:  $(x = a)$ ; while we may indicate by another formula  $(x = y)$  identity simpliciter. The meaning of "pretends" then results as ambiguous in six ways:

/20/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /x = a/ and F/a//

/21/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /x = a/ and /y = b/  
and F/b//

/22/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and F/y//

/23/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /y = b/ and F/b//

/24/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = a/ and F/a//

/25/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = a/ and /a = b/ and F/b//

Possible paraphrases of /20/-/25/ can be given as follows:

/26/ John is considered mad because he self-identifies himself as a caesar

/27/ John is considered mad because he self-identifies himself with no-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar

/28/ John is an actor: he tries to play off the belief that he is a caesar

/29/ John is an actor: he tries to play off the belief that he is no-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar

/30/ John is being hypnotized: he behaves as if he were a caesar

/31/ John is being hypnotized: he behaves as if he were no-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar

Applying "only" as a test, we see that the contexts which contain a self-identity claim do not give way to nominalization-of-laziness:

/32/ Only John is hypnotized in order for him to behave as if he were no-one else but Napoleon

/33/ Only John is hypnotized in order for John to behave as if he were no-one else but Napoleon

While /32/ is understandable as what makes a restriction on who is to be hypnotized to behave as if he were Napoleon, /33/ amounts to the same, or else it is an obvious nonsense: for, there can by no means be anybody the hypnotizing of whom would result in somebody else's, say John's, behaviour as Napoleon. If there is self-identity involved, then only a variable-reading of pronouns is possible.<sup>14</sup>

The tackle Fraassen's example, however, we have further to refine our formulation. For, there are cases (our case of being let into the White House included) in which to understand the meaning of "pretends" we have to define not only what the corresponding belief-contents are but also what

the epistemic attitude of the audience is like. What we are implying here are examples like:

/34/ John unaware arouses the suspicion in others that he is a caesar

/35/ John unaware arouses the suspicion in others that he is no-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar

which can have the structures:

/36/  $/Ex//Ey// / \neg /x = y/ \text{ and } \neg /x = a// \text{ and } /Ez/ B_z//x=y/$   
and  $/x = a/ \text{ and } F/a// \supset /x \text{ pretends } F/a//$

/37/  $/Ex//Ey// / \neg /x = y/ \text{ and } \neg /x = a// \text{ and } /Ez/ B_z//x=y/$   
and  $/x = a/ \text{ and } /y = b/ \text{ and } F/b// \supset /x \text{ pretends } //y=b/$   
and  $F/b//$

Of course, our intuition about the acceptance of these formulas should be checked: it might be thought illicit to predicate "pretends" of somebody who would not be prone to admit that he has done so. Yet, we claim that we do use this word not only to highlight the difference between what one intends to make us believe he is doing and what he is really doing but to attribute a similar difference between what one is said to be trying to make us believe and what he is said to do. We can think of the whole history of madness and how "mad" is attributed: as we may put it, what we have previously explained as cases of being mad are the clinical cases whereas these new forms can be looked upon as the non-clinical. Apart from any consideration of whether they are acceptable, an important conclusion should follow independently: the use of "pretends" is motivated by any difference in the epistemic attitude of the speaker (or the subject of the sentence) and the audience either with respect to how things are or how they (the speaker or the audience) are supposed to conceive of them. From this it results that the truth of the negation of the complement is only optional and hence the presupposition could easily be suspended provided a difference in the relevant epistemic attitudes makes

up for it. I may be truly said to pretend to be the president even if unbeknown to me I have already been elected for some time and try to be let in the White House if no-one around should happen to have learnt about my being president /Lakoff's presupposition cancelled/. But I may be equally said to pretend to be the president if by some foul deed unbeknown to me I have already been deposed for some time and try to be let in if every-one around should happen to have learnt of my misfortune (Searle's condition cancelled). It can be seen then that no easy transcription of a proper semantical representation of some occurrences of "pretends" is easily forthcoming. There are some serious demands on the contexts of its use which lead to a multiplicity of readings as to how the relationship between beliefs, iterated beliefs and reality should be construed. For instance, a possible reading of our original White House case is the following:

/38/ /Ex//Ey// / — /x = y/ and — /x = a/ and x pretends//x = y/ and /y = b/ and F/b/  $\supset$  /Ez/ B<sub>z</sub>//x = y/ and /x = a/ and /y = b/ and F/b///

To arrive at Searle's second sense of "as if", we should omit the second occurrence of the formula /x = a/ from /38/, thus giving our last amendment to /23/. We shall not reproduce here all the amended versions as they can be calculated on the basis of /38/. We give, however, a formula for the paradoxical case of B. van Fraassen to show the neat resemblances between the semantical reasons of "pretends" and its pragmatical motivations, both of which should be as proper contextual extension of its occurrence. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the son of the king is John while the man in the iron mask is called Jack. Then the interpretations of /x = y/ and /x = a/ and /y = b/ are forthcoming if John = a and Jack = b. Indicate the corresponding predicates by capital M/ask/, S/on/ and C/riminal/. Disregarding here the inner structure of definite description as irrelevant to the point we are making, we arrive at

the following formula:

/39/ /Ex///M/x/ and /x = a/ and S/a// and /Ey// —/x=y/ and  
/C/y///  $\supset$  /x pretends///y = b/ and M/b/  $\supset$  — C/b//  $\supset$   
/Ez/ B<sub>z</sub>///x = b/ and M/b//  $\supset$  — C/b/////

The complexity of /39/ is due to the surplus difference of belief contexts and reality. It is entirely different from either of the previous forms, and this is as it should be: for, John cannot be taken as a fool or an actor since the audience have no idea of his being a son of the king or of his being disguised. Yet, John's supposed act is an act of pretending because he intends the audience to take a reasoned step from what he knows to be an acting in disguise to a purported fact about his self-identity with the person behind the mask. It is as if from one's playing a part on the stage, there were something to be inferred about his identity outside the stage. No wonder then that the effort of the king's son fails. This is a step which requires thinking in the metalanguage. A premature conclusion might be that from something fictional no judgement on how things are in reality can follow.

A final comment on the formulae conceived in the traditional framework should still be made. It might be suggested that they are based on scope distinctions, so much so, that "pretends" appears to be functioning as an operator. If so, we must have committed the very fallacy we wanted to avoid: the assumption that it is primitive. This idea, however, would be based on the fact that our formulae are sound; yet they suffer from a serious drawback: the different identity claims they seem to raise can in no sense be said to be pretended by the speaker (or the subject of the sentence). What then can be the reason for their being embedded in its scope? In accordance with what we have said about the general character of its illocutionary force, a reason may be put forward in the form of an assumption like the abstract performative hypothesis. It would entail there still being a

unique sense in which the semantics of "pretends" can contribute to the analysis of the sentences. Ambiguities could not arise; for, in how many senses can I perform an act of asking or threatening or boasting, etc? Apparently in one, otherwise the concept of illocutionary force itself would be ambiguous, and we would have to introduce some other hypothesis or an element playing the part of disambiguation. Yet, we have seen that already Searle accepted at least two different senses of "pretends" and we argued that the difference between them can only be accommodated as a difference in meaning. If identities are a semantical fact, then where does our knowledge of fiction come from when we are present at a performance on the stage? A pragmatically-biased answer would run as saying that it is not the meaning but the use of sentences: how language is used - that yields this information. So far so good. But this pragmatical fact cuts deeper into the meaning of terms: not in that it assigns referents to them but in that it gives criteria for establishing new identities between individuals, and this is already a semantical result. To describe what is at work here theoreticians introduced possible world models which generated the same problem as is at stake here: how can identities across worlds be constructed? And so, the problem was given purely semantical twist. Our approach ventures to pass in between: identities are a result of strategical moves of the participants in a language game; in that they are yielded by moves, they are semantical facts, but in that the corresponding moves are made in a language game the playing of which is motivated by some pragmatical fact outside the game, they are pragmatically related. On starting to play a game players have to decide how to interpret individual terms; but why they interpret them as they do cannot be justified within the game. A major merit of such an approach is that it enables players to pass from one game to another almost in-



perceptibly by reinterpreting their terms. Such a possibility may be indicated by a game rule correlated to the use of "pretends". Another advantage of the strategical characterization of identities is that it explains away the difference between what we called epistemological and metaphysical modalities. The use of identical terms or terms which stand for identical variables in two different language games can only be metaphysically grounded: residual claims of identity always refer to such possibilities: they relate two different variables from different worlds under some description like "x playing the part of y" that might or might not equal alternativeness in a possible world theory (see below). Self-identities, on the other hand, are a restriction on using the same variable all through a given a language game. As such they express epistemological attitudes with respect to a world. The two Searlian senses of "pretends" can be thought of as initiating different language games. When formulating the meaning of "pretends" it is not enough to say that an act was performed but we have to lay down what game the players seem to be starting on; the proper criteria, however, cannot be given within the terms of the game, as an actor cannot say to the audience that he is acting. They abide by the rules, the acceptance of which is a contingent fact on the part of the players.

A strange but well-founded conclusion to the discussion above can be added to the effect that, since "pretends" is considered a game-initiator rule and it is up to the players to start playing or not, there are no truth-conditions to be correlated with the use of "pretends". For I may at any time turn my back on the stage or take an utterance as part of a similar move at face value, i.e. as a move in the original game. It follows rightly from the fact that no act of pretending can be explicitly performed, rather such acts are so described. Hence, this is our solution to the problem of assigning a force of pretending to an utterance in a non-

explanatory manner.

6. *A Further Evidence of the New Identity Claim*

Independant evidence for the need to explain identities can be recovered from the classical problem of systematic ambiguity of predication. To put it clearly, we may recur to an example by Reichenbach: scarfs can be used either as turbans or as slings. However, objects individuated as turbans cannot be identical with objects individuated as slings, unless the property "scarf" is predicated of both of them. But then, we create systematic ambiguity by assigning to a predicate "turban" an argument, the value of which could be either objects originally made as turbans or objects originally made to be scarfs but eventually used as turbans. In the latter case, to avoid ambiguity, the function "being scarf" can be introduced as an argument of a higher type. To apply our device to the case, consider the following example:

/40/ Mary was wearing a turban but she unfurled it for Peter to wear it round his neck

/40/ enables us to re-formulate our ideas in terms of pronouns; how should "it" be interpreted? To take it to be bound by some antecedent like "a turban" and "a sling" will lead to the absurdity that the two occurances of "it" do not refer to the same individual. /40/ then expresses a nonsense situation by conjoining two entirely different clauses. But we can equally take "it" to stand for that common aspect (being a scarf) under which turbans and slings are associated: it then expresses some residual claim of identity between some object which is a turban or a sling and one which is a scarf. Putting it in the traditional way we can represent the core of /40/ as:

/41/  $/z//Ex//Ew///x = z/$  and  $G/x/$  and  $W/w,x/$  and  
 $UF/w,x// \supset /Ey//Ev///y = z/$  and  $\neg T/y/$  and  $S/y/$  and

W/v,y///

where the capitals T/urban/, U/n/F/urls/, S/ling/, and W/ears/ stand for the corresponding predicates and the variables z, x, and y range over objects of which "scarf", "turban" and "sling" can be predicated respectively.

Examples like /40/ testify that identities of variables may in the last resort be epistemologically based and hence be part of the same language game. So, we should revise our ideas on this. To accomplish this aim we should consider a related example.

### 7. Fiction vs "Pretends"

On the basis of our argument about /40/ we may feel entitled to substitute "pretends" for "was" in it;  
/42/ Mary pretended to be wearing a turban but she unfurled it for Peter to wear it round his neck

Yet, /42/ is different from /40/ as can be seen from a closer scrutiny of the structure of the first clause. It duly gives way to the presupposition that results from negating the complement of "pretends"; but because of the scope ambiguity of negation there are three distinct outcomes:

/43/ — /Ex///x is a turban/ and /Mary is wearing x//

/44/ /Ex///x is a turban/ and — /Mary is wearing x//

/45/ /Ex// — /x is a turban/ and /Mary is wearing x//

/43/ is clearly unacceptable for it makes pronominalization impossible in the next clause; /44/ is unacceptable for the same reason; so, there remains /45/. It says that there is nothing as a turban: there is no object which is a turban; while /40/ asserted that there was something as a turban only it was unfurled. Formulating the core of /42/ alongside with /41/ we have:

/46/ /Ex//Ey//Ew//Ev/// w pretends //x = y/ and T/x/  
and W/w,x// and UF/w,y//  $\supset$  /S/y/ and W/v,y///

By /46/ we have returned to our original /x = y/ formula, which indicates that there is an optional move to initiate a new game. Since it is optional, it may or may not be respected in the next moves. If it is, then what follows the complement of "pretends" will pertain to fiction and /46/ has to be re-written accordingly. If it is not, then /46/ applies, i.e. "pretends" is only used as a garden variety of one of its presuppositions, this time /45/ to secure pronominalization. This kind of use of "pretends" is quite common in forms like "He pretended to be happy" for "He was not happy" or rather for "He tried to be happy", "They pretended to have built a nice house" for "They built an ugly house", etc. This use of "pretends" is parasitic on negation: in our example, it turns on whether or not what Mary was wearing can be considered to be a turban; it is a purely epistemologically-biased question. Hence, the only thing that counts is that the presupposition-filtering be such that it allow further play, this time pronominalization. To secure it, the use of /42/ should intend some function like "x consists of y", "x is a long strip of cloth" or simply "x is a scarf". These functions are means of ensuring play in the original game: they are based on the epistemology of the situation in which the sentence is uttered. They are what associate /42/ with /40/; yet, it is important to keep in mind that sentences like /42/ are parasitic on negation, for, it is this fact which the other use of "pretends" takes advantage of. It initiates a new game which in some sense conjoins /40/ and /42/: as /42/ is parasitic on negation this new use is grounded in the fact that something is not as it is perceived or known of. But it does not aim at enhancing this default in our epistemology as we indicated above, for then it would mean continuing the original game;

but it tries, so-to-say, to perpetuate this default by simply taking it for granted and hence assembling /42/ together with /40/ but from the standpoint of a new game; note that if it were the original game to be played, it would amount to cancelling the awareness of an error and to perpetuating a misplaced awareness of its opposite. Players who miss this game-initiating use of "pretends" simply fall into the state of illusion or deceit. But by enhancing the principles of a new game the meaning of /42/ is raised in the form of /40/ onto a higher metaphysical level. Normal language games are epistemological games: they are played so as to further the knowledge of the participants. Games initiated by "pretends" are metaphysical games: they are played so as to give the participants some hindsight about how things could have been. This is the reason why "pretends" is not performative, why /40/ can equally be taken as a move in a game initiated by "pretends": what is sure is that some or all proper parts (let alone "presuppositions") are parasitic on negation. "Pretends", then, cannot be made part of some particular sentence structure for it could be part of any. But it cannot have an illocutionary force simpliciter for it entails semantical principles of playing a new game, which we examined at some length in the previous parts of this paper.

With this we round off our analysis of the use of "pretends". In the remaining pages we put forward a constructive proposal for the treatment of this peculiar verb within some game-theoretical framework. For lack of space we can only hint at the basic outlines of a similar theory that could accomodate most of the problems we have come across during our analysis. The two major pillars on which the present approach to "pretends" rests and which, though they have been treated separately, should be integrated in a natural way, are what we called the Searlian condition on "pretends"

and its presupposition matrix proposed by G. Lakoff. Armed with these tools we are ready to set out on a more elaborate proposal.

8. *"Pretends" in Game-Theory*

We have already adumbrated in a concise form the problem which a game-theoretical analysis of "pretends" should resolve. As it has to be a kind of linguistic theory based on game-theoretical principles, we have to cast a glance at what results have already been achieved in the field. A by now rather extensive body of works deals with the possibility of introducing game-theory into questions of semantics: there are game-theoretical semantics elaborated by J. Hintikka and some of his followers. The basic aim of such a theoretical approach is to give an algorithm for the evaluation of infinitely long sentences by reducing them to their atomic constituents; this it does by correlating semantical games with each such sentence with the definition of proper rules to govern the moves of the two players, Nature and Myself. These verificational games however, may have no relevance to the analysis of "pretends" if the latter has no truth-conditions, and hence cannot be given a truth-value. Having a truth-value is not a linguistic fact, however, so it may not be a major default if the semantics of some sentences need to be played off by some other criterion coming from outside its linguistic context. And, correspondingly, there is another recent approach to linguistics on the basis of game-theory, which provides a similar possibility. It is elaborated in the book of L. Carlson on dialogue games. He departs from the idea of semantical games in that the aim of playing dialogues cannot be the evaluation of sentences but rather the realization of some specific agreement with respect to them. Of course, ordinary dialogues should be levelled at putting forth true sentences, for players do

want to have a common idea about how things are in reality. Biased by the idea of truth Carlson can without much difficulty accommodate the semantical game rules in his dialogue game theory. To secure adherence to truth each player's contribution to a game is viewed as an effort to approach Nature's position, whose moves can without further ado be introduced into the playing of any game. Dialogue games are then played in order to know, and hence they are epistemological.<sup>15</sup>


If we want to define what new game "pretends" may initiate, the first principle to be substituted is that of truth. What can be the aim of the players if agreement with truth is taken away? It might be answered: entertainment. But it is not a constitutive principle; it is not an aim within the game, rather an outside motivation, and as such, it could refer to any kind of play in general. Neither would passing the time or similar solutions be a better candidate. Anyway, on closer inspection it turns out that there is nothing that could coherently replace truth as a principle. Hence, what we would like to propose is that the aim of playing a game of fiction is agreement of the players simpliciter on some particular metaphysical possibility of how things could be arranged. It is important to see that this attempted arrangement can equally violate physical or even logical laws that govern ordinary dialogue games. Yet this arrangement is not something to be guessed; it should be based on the actual moves the players make in the game. If there is an author or performer, his moves are to be accommodated within the game just as those of Nature have been in ordinary dialogue games. It is his position, then to which the agreement of the participants is duly recalled. Any dialogue that takes up a passage from a text by such an author should be viewed correspondingly. Take the following example:  
/47/ Who killed Roberta?

On the basis of Carlson's argument on representing dialogues by means of game-trees, a natural interpretation of /47/ can be given below. The necessary assumptions for doing this flow directly from the dialogue game rules Carlson formulated. To wit, to put forward /47/ one should presume an, even implicit, previous move that somebody killed Roberta. This (these) previous move(s) should play down the fact that a new game different from that of seeking the truth is at stake here; for, how else would players know what game a move by /47/ is part of? This pre-condition of game-playing can be made common by the use of "pretends", yet, there are other forms to recall attention to it, e.g. "I have read it somewhere...", "He told us the story of his latest novel", etc. But as it is simply a means of giving intention that one is playing a game, to say it out loud is not a necessary condition of playing: I may turn to somebody with the boldest intention of asking /47/ and he may or may not understand my aim when answering; moreover, he may even misunderstand my aim, and rack his memory about some actual Roberta who has been killed. And he need not be unsuccessful in his effort. Can we say then that we are playing a game? We think not. Yet, our utterances affect moves, only moves within two entirely different games. Then common understanding can be reached only by explaining explicitly what separate game each of us is playing. Asking /47/ then - just like the utterance of any sentence in general - necessitates that one's aim in putting forth that particular move the given utterance instantiates be divulged. This requirement is no more for instance than the knowledge that we are playing bridge and not poker. An utterance can easily count as a move in two different games. If so, then players should be reminded of what game they are playing or else their moves cannot be accommodated within the same game.

Albeit as we think it justified that the new game that



"pretends" might initiate should be defined as a separate game on the idea that the players are furthering a different aim, we can turn to the game-tree of /47/. We cannot give, however, a complete representation of it as it would involve all possible answers - which may easily be infinite, but rather a partial branching which, however maps the intuitively correct answer to the question.<sup>16</sup>



In drawing the figure of /48/ we did not deviate from Carlson's method of analysing dialogues, only the middle branch is to be interpreted as the silent moves of the author, this time T. Dreiser, whose position is the ideal which the other players, A and B. would like to share. This amendment, however, carries some other explanatory power: contrary to Nature, the Author may be directly addressed, and hence his moves may not necessarily remain silent. This further means that he may participate not only in a



dialogue game about some book of his but he may even be questioned about some hitherto unwritten story of his. That is, he may put forward any fictional story he likes. On the other hand, if a story, whose author is already dead or is simply unknown is at stake, his moves are doomed to be silent. This means nothing more than that the Author is at once the authority of the corresponding game.

Another justification of such an interpretation of the Author is given alongside our proof about fiction as metaphysical possibility. For, what else can one's inquiry into the way things may have turned out mean than authorizing oneself to occupy the position of Nature in a corresponding game? This is the way fictional interpretations of sentences can most differ from the original. If we are contemplating by all means in our power some epistemic possibility - which we would tend to call probability - we are trying to remain within the boundaries of the same game, i.e. we are doing our best to confine ourselves to what the moves of Nature are. To use our initial example: if one has undergone an exam, one ponders whether he is accepted or not, then *eo ipso* one guesses what the position of Nature could be by making some proper moves such as "I solved almost all the exercises" by (D. argue). "Then I have many points" by (D. infer), and "He who has many points is accepted" by (D. explain). Whereas, if one starts telling a story about being a candidate and doing some test to pass an exam, and he states that he is accepted, his audience will not take his moves - if taking them correctly - to be guesses about the position of Nature, but rather about the position of an Author who may or may not be instantiated by the speaker. This latter fact explains away the case that virtually anybody may re-tell the story of some author: it is not a serious restriction, however, for it asserts only that there should be some Author or other whose moves, either silent

or not, are incorporated in the relevant game tree of the game.

At this point we can relegate our discussion to the problem of identities; in an epistemological situation self-identities are to be safeguarded by any player of the correlated game. The use of identical terms is warranted by the logical game rules. Yet, at any stage of the game the option of starting a new game may arise; e.g. when contemplating on the result of the test, one might wish that he had never volunteered to do it. Epistemology may give way to metaphysical thinking at any moment. Then, we may have said he pretended that he did not take the exam, in which case the use of identical terms or variables were motivated by our residual claim of identity. The difference of identities is safeguarded by the difference of games; within one single game no such claim can be justified. Metaphysical games are parasitic on epistemic games in the same way as the use of "pretends" is on negation. Hence playing the former requires the awareness of some of the latter kind. Yet, this information may not be available to every player, and so misunderstanding is forthcoming; it then entails an identification of the residual identity with self-identity on the basis of the use of self-identity being warranted all through a given game. Misunderstanding may come from either direction: if one takes a residual claim of identity for self-identity, he is said to be cheated into this idea, and the first Searlian sense of "pretends" is born. If one takes somebody's self-identity claim to be based on a residual identity, he is said to consider that person as mad, i.e. as one who misconceives his own identity. Neither interpretation is however, connected with the notion of truth; for, they are based on how a player conceives the game he thinks he is playing and the game he supposes his partners are playing. Yet, from the latter fact may come other misunderstandings:

for not only may one have lost the information of some previously played game, but one may attribute a similar loss to any of his partners while he is still conscious of the difference. So, if one takes somebody to be such that he considers a residual claim of identity as based on his self-identity, then one is said to take that person as a simple disbeliever (as with the mirror case of madness, it would need further elaboration as to whether it should be assembled with it or not); if one takes somebody's self-identity claim to be grounded in a residual identity, then one is said to take the person for said to take the person for mad. It seems to be similar to the second case of misunderstanding above, but it may turn out to be different if we emphasize that this time another viewpoint is being made: it is not belief simpliciter, rather attribution of a similar belief that counts. Hence, one may equally consider somebody to believe or not to believe the claim of misconceived identity; we have spoken about the first alternative, if it is the second, then one may consider the person to have been hypnotized in order to play off the given identity.

These are all proper cases which may motivate the use of "pretends". Correct or not, they can equally be represented by corresponding game-trees which contain the relevant epistemic states of the players even with respect to each other's thoughts. What should be emphasized, however, is that the fictional use of "pretends" is distinct from the previous in that it requires from every player that he be aware of having started a new game. No similar misunderstanding we have delineated is welcome. This does not, in our opinion, disqualify the use of "pretends" in the other cases; it is based on the idea that the players construe about how the relationship of two different games should be viewed. And it is the possibility of such a construal, rather than the notion of truth, that is required.

9. *Logical Game Rules and "Pretends"*


Elaborating further the concept of the new game we seem to meet with some difficulties regarding the proper specification of rules. The underlying idea, which motivated the application of logical rules in enveloping the structure of the dialogue, has been an adherence to truth, a conservation principle of consistency. If nature as an ideal player is replaced by some less omnipotent source, the whole system of logical game rules will be threatened. Consistency cannot be warranted by some application of a rule simply because any Author may authorize any move. He can even harbour inconsistency. Hence, if the aim of the players is a common sharing of his position in the game, the inconsistency, when divulged, cannot be eliminated but should be admitted into their epistemic alternatives. Intuitively, this means that everything should be allowed to be metaphisically possible. By what rules can such a claim be safeguarded? The proper answer is a serious challenge to the concept of game; by some roundabout reasoning on how people understand fictional utterances we may feel entitled to propose that understanding it is not a necessary conclusion of playing, which in game-theoretical terms would mean that players may happen to miss the rules that the corresponding game necessitates; and playing without an adequate knowledge of the rules is a contradiction in terms. Yet, we think that this latter is a non-sequitur. Examples of misrepresenting some of the rules of the game are abundant: the most fitting ones can be the apparent violations of any of the rules by some of the players, like e.g. offside in soccer, which of course result in punishment of the perpetrator. But it would be misplaced to say that he was not playing in any sense of the word. If it were so, then he would be simply disregarded as such and could not interfere with playing. The condition for his remaining in the game may be the fact that he can still be said

to have been following the rules of the game in every respect except the particular one he violated. In order to be disqualified his violations would have had to exceed a certain limit, the definition of which is almost always very arbitrary. One minor point to be noted here is that as for the violation of a rule, there is no difference methodologically whether the person has only misrepresented the rule, simply disobeyed it, or been unconscious of it. What counts is whether the move has been made or not. In order to be said to be empirically playing a game, one need only be considered to have been observing a limited number of game rules.

This general observation can be extended to language games as well. One may err in playing and yet not be disqualified. Naturally this point is further enhanced when one's playing a game of fiction; for while Nature's moves always recall the same set of rules, which by some routine of play may have been adequately internalized, in a game of fiction the position of the Author can be instantiated by almost any player, and hence the corresponding moves may recall a different set of rules, so much so that one may be able only to guess at them at the outset. What makes the principle of playing survive, however, is that, since the means of carrying off moves, i.e. uttering a set of sentences, is essentially the same as in games with Nature; there is always a rather well-defined set of rules in the former that can have been internalized by playing the latter.


The internalization of the rules of a game of fiction is achieved by trying to cooperate with the supposed Author of the game. As he can be addressed, the use of rules can be tested by putting to him such questions the answers to which will recall one of those rules. This way to obtain some idea of the game is, then, inherent in the aim of the players: by selecting proper strategies to arrive at a common agreement they go through a process of understanding. While sharing

the position of Nature meant knowledge of how things truly are, sharing the position of the Author here means understanding what he meant by putting forward his sentences. Games of fiction are not played in order to know the truth but rather to comprehend how a player conceives things to be. A major difficulty in completing a process like this resides in the fact that the moves put forward by the Author may often leave doubt about some implicit moves needed for the internalization of rules. To formulate correct topical questions with respect to them may turn out to be decisive for understanding. It would be well worth giving some examples. Works of the fantastic, paradoxical or absurd genres can serve us here. "Dans le labyrinthe" by A. Robbe-Grillet provides us with a good many cases; consider one of the basic problems of the novel, which is also referred to by the title: What was the relationship between the boy and the soldier? Who led whom? Interpreting the Author's moves by putting questions, we arrive at the thought that the logical rule (C. cons) is no longer available; on the other hand, we have to make a case for the opposite rule (C. in-cons): contradictory moves may be admitted if both have been adequately explained in the game. To understand what is at stake here, consider the corresponding game-tree; we have indicated the rules we applied so that each node followed from the one above in the tree:



The two last moves by /D.infer/ put forward by the Author clearly violate /C. cons/. Hence it warrants our conclusion.

While /49/ keeps the other logical game rules intact, we may consider another case, which makes the use of /D. argue/ obtrusive; we are referring to the problem whether the soldier finds himself in the same room at the end of the novel as at the beginning of it. The relevant core of the game-tree is the following:





What is remarkable about /50/ is that the last move by /D.infer/ connects two branches, which have contradictory nodes higher in the tree (Yes vs No by (D.answer/)). This is clearly different from /49/ in that it not only violates /C.cons/ but also conjoins contradictory moves in an inference which directly challenges the meaning of the tree. Hence either it is the conclusion of the inference which is unwarranted, or it is the premises which are incorrectly put forward. As with /49/ we have seen that there is nothing wrong with /D.infer/, it must be the rule that connects the premises with the rest of the upper trunk of the tree, which has been misplaced here. Hence, we eliminate /D.argue/ by simply cutting the tree of /50/ at the relevant nodes into two.


A last example for the internalization of rules comes from the play "Waiting for Godot" by S. Becket. We reproduce this time the relative passage in its entirety.<sup>17</sup>

/51/ Estragon: In my opinion we were here.

Vladimir: (looking round) You recognize the place?

Estragon: I didn't say that.

Immediately we give a game-tree for it:



When interpreting /52/ we have two solutions: either we state that the Author violates /C.cons/ by putting forward Estragon's two sentences, or we note the particular role /D.explain/ plays in the tree. But as we lack the moves for relegating the right branch to the highest topical question, a respective violation of /C.cons/ seems to be unwarranted. Note here the apparent difference between /52/ and /49/: the condition for violating /C.cons/ can be defined as a condition that two contradictory answers of a polarity question should be put forward as a move by the Author. As "No" to the highest topical question remains only a possibility (in the lack of closure of proper branches), we cannot assert the violation of /C.cons/. On the other hand, we note that the move by /D.explain/ is almost ineffective as such, for, it explains nothing: from it either a positive or a negative answer to a polarity question can be inferred. The first is an implicit move, while the second is explicit. Hence our conclusion about the futility of /D.explain/. This means in other words that either nothing can be adequately explained because the contradictory possibility still survives, or anything can be explained because at least one of the answers of a polarity question can be provided with an explanation. This way we have intuitively formulated a condition on the futility of a rule: a rule /D.explain/ is ineffective if it leaves open both possibilities of a polarity question that follows from what should have been explained.

By now, we can re-assume our results about games of fiction in the following three conditions defined by means of game-trees; these three conditions are basic in the process of making a guess at the valid rules of the game, hence they are basic in understanding fiction. They attest simply how the use of some rules may be found invalid or not. Hence, they contribute to the way players must reason in order to make moves governed by rules which are accepted within the game. We state them briefly as


- /C.E/ Whether an epistemic alternative of the Author is consistent or inconsistent depends on whether two contradictory answers of a polarity question are put forward independently by him
- /C.EL/ A rule should be eliminated from the game if there is some move governed by some other rule which can be inferred from two premises put forward by the given rule as moves that are connected to the two contradictory answers of a polarity question higher up in the tree
- /C.IN/ A rule is ineffective if there is such a polarity question that in the event of one of its contradictory answers being connected with some move put forward by the use of the given rule, still permits its other answer to be put forward

Possibly, there are other such testing procedures. Yet we think it has sufficed to show that the idea of a game of fiction can be rationally based, and that the conclusion that game playing with imperfect information about some of the corresponding rules is out of place is really a non-sequitur. An inductive test at rules not only can be levelled at game-positions but should be referred to by the players of the game in order to understand the relevant structure of the game, viz. to guess at the previous moves, and hence to understand fiction as the result of the game.

A final note on this part should be made before going on. By defining the aim and the rules of a game of fiction we have almost rounded off our argument about the game-theoretical treatment of fiction. No explicit foundation of so-called supernatural sentences should be needed; if confronted for instance with a fable by La Fontaine, we do not meet any serious difficulty in correlating a game with it just because it may contain some sentence about animals that speak. Accepting a sentence as

/53/ The ant asked the cricket why he danced so much.

will not amount to a violation of some rule simpliciter; it will only incorporate a move by the Author about ants and crickets to the effect that they can speak, which is game-theoretically trivial. It can again be shown by drawing the corresponding game-tree for /53/: it is important to see that it depends on the correct formulation of the highest topical question:



From /54/ it results that the highest topical question of a game of fiction bears special importance: it represents the point of playing at which the new game we have now represented was initiated. If so, then there may have been some preceding move by which it was overtly expressed. This is in accordance with the possible use of "pretends" we proposed before. By some due re-consideration of the condition for putting forward the topical question of /54/, we can assume the point at which the game of /54/ was initiated to be instantiated by the following sentence:

/55/ x pretends that someone can speak  
where x stands for the actual Author of the game. Then, on the basis of what we said about the use of "pretends" being parasitic on negation we are confronted by the next two possibilities:

/56/ /Ex/— /x can speak/

/57/ — /Ex/ /x can speak/

The discussion of the two forms /56/ and /57/ will be the topic of the chapter below; with this we close our analysis of "pretends" and the game-theoretical framework proposed as a possible approach. This closing topic is the problem of reference, to which we will be giving a dialogue game solution.

#### 10. *Reference, Games, and "Pretends"*

A major merit of a game-theoretical approach to fiction, we consider, is that the problem of non-existents, and hence of reference, will not arise as such. Consider for instance the question of there being speaking ants in the fable by La Fontaine; it is simply a contradiction in terms, for, there is no game whatsoever in which such a question could be put forward as a valid move. No concept of play can tolerate a sentence such as:

/58/ There are speaking ants


/58/ is either misconceived or ambiguous; if it is the latter, then it is tantamount again either to /59/ or to /60/:

/59/ Speaking ants exist

/60/ "There are speaking ants" can be correlated with an accepted move in some game of fiction

/59/ is clearly false; for, there is no move by Nature whereby the putting forward of /59/ could be taken to be a means of furthering common agreement with respect to truth, i.e. the position of Nature. /60/, on the other hand, is true as /54/ testifies it. Yet why can forms like /58/ arise? If we retrace our steps to the two kinds of identity, an answer may be forthcoming: /58/ belies the same misconception of identity claims as was seen to motivate the use of "pretends". Though we cannot go into the different interpretations of /58/ according to which a misconception is created -- we have already given a similar enumeration, but we at

least hint at the source the dilemma of /58/ may come from; in order to see it, consider a transcription of /54/ with variables to indicate semantical structure. We also add the necessary dialogue premise of /54/, i.e. the complement-sentence of /55/ as the game-initiator move. A partial dialogue semantical tree of /54/ is the following:



Now, it should be clear that the underlying dilemma of /58/ is the misconception of an identity claim  $/x = y/$  in the form of self-identity  $/x = a/$ . Whereas the only warranted conclusion might have been something like  $/y = a/$ , which is, in turn, the proper interpretation of /60/. /61/, and hence /54/, is ambiguous: they can induce either an ordinary or a new dialogue game interpretation. It is /55/, which should be taken to be a necessary dialogue premise of /54/ and /61/ in order to safeguard fictional reading; to avoid misconceived forms, such as /58/ a game-initiator move such as /55/ should be henceforth remembered.

By now we are ready to answer the problem of choosing between /56/ and /57/; if our previous argument is sound, then to understand /54/ we have to assume /55/ as a dialogue premise, which is neutral to the difference of /56/ and /57/. It is simply irrelevant on what kind of negation the use of "pretends" is parasitic in particular; it will only become relevant if "pretends" is used merely as a proxy for negation (see our distinction above), i.e. if epistemology replaces metaphysical thinking. If dialogue games have any explanatory power, then it need not come as a surprise that

the meaning of a sentence is not a matter per se, but rather a matter of embedding it into some dialogue context or other. If sentences are semantically ambiguous, they must induce various contextual analyses. Since reference is part and parcel of semantics, it is, in our opinion natural that an ambiguity like the real/fictional, boils down to the construction of different dialogue game contexts between which no direct inferential relation need be adequately based. The use of fiction is justified as long as the information of playing a separate game is kept alive.

11. *To Sum up*

In this paper we have attempted to give a detailed treatment of the word "pretends" and its semantical character. We stated that its ordinary uses give rise to a neat distinction of identity claims, and sought for a possible coherent formulation of the ambiguities attested. We hinted at the inadequacy of the classical framework and proposed a game-theoretical solution. In outlining the corresponding theory, we touched upon some related phenomena as logical structure, reference and real/fictional ambiguity and argued that they can be accommodated in dialogue game construction in a very natural way. We think finally that a game-theoretical analysis of fiction can be considered as further evidence of the utility of introducing the concept of game into the field of the humanities, besides the already available approaches, Hintikka's semantical and Carlson's dialogue game theories.

Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Cf. for instance Searle (1974), Pavel (1981), Lieb (1981).
- <sup>2</sup> Saarinen (1982a) makes a similar claim with respect to reference simpliciter; his approach encouraged our distinction, though we will argue that it is a distinction in the way how identities are viewed.
- <sup>3</sup> Searle (1974); also in Searle (1979) p. 65.
- <sup>4</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>5</sup> Lakoff (1970) ch. V.
- <sup>6</sup> Cf. Searle (1979) p. 7.
- <sup>7</sup> See note 3.
- <sup>8</sup> Cf. Karttunen (1974).
- <sup>9</sup> Cf. Partee (1975).
- <sup>10</sup> It is Partee herself who brings up an argument by Castañeda; for the latter, see for instance Castañeda (1968).
- <sup>11</sup> In: Saarinen (1982c) pp. 1-69. See p. 47.
- <sup>12</sup> This example is taken from a short satirical piece by a fairly well-known Hungarian author, F. Karinthy; Science.
- <sup>13</sup> What is at stake here, in other words, is that John may think that he is identical with, say, de Sade, who, in turn, is mad, without forcing us into a circle of reasoning on John's madness.



- 14 The following remark may be in order here: as our analysis is biased by the concept of identity, this argument cannot be connected directly with an approach based on coreference like e.g. that in Hintikka-Carlson (1977). Coreference can be realized by either kind of identity: in game-theoretical semantics it is expressed by the fact that the same set of rules is used in each case. What is at stake here is a distinction in the rules that support the different identity claims (see especially when our game-theoretical framework is put forward). Our restrictions then may be looked upon as a restriction on the uses of variables rather than on the individuals they refer or corefer to. Laziness is a matter of independent substitution of the same term into different variables - hence giving way to some, say, residual claim of identity  $/x = y/$  because there may be terms for which a similar process is not valid, whereas in Hintikka-Carlson (1977) the question of a pronoun's being lazy or not depends on its corefering with one term or other, hence in each case a claim of self-identity with respect to the coreferred individual applies.
- 15 In what follows we constructively apply Carlson's dialogue game treatment to the problems of "pretends" and of fiction. For lack of space we cannot reproduce his arguments in detail, neither can we repeat his definitions of game rules. Yet, we do not think that a complete acquaintance with his work should be necessary in order to understand the basic claims of our paper.
- 16 Cf. Carlson (1983) p. 11.
- 17 We use the Faber paperback edition of Becket's play; Samuel Becket: *Waiting for Godot*, Faber and Faber, 1956, London, p. 15.

References

- Carlson, Lauri, 1983, *Dialogue Games*, D. Reidel, Dordrecht
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri, 1968, On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others, in: *Journal of Philosophy* LXV, pp. 439-456.
- Gazdar, Gerald, 1979, *Pragmatics*, Academic Press, New York.
- Hintikka, Jaakko and Carlson, Lauri, 1977, Pronouns of Laziness in Game-Theoretical Semantics, in: *Theoretical Linguistics*, IV, pp. 1-29.
- Hintikka, Jaakko, 1973, *Logic, Language Games, and Information*, Clarendon Press, Oxford
- Karttunen, Lauri, 1973, The presuppositions of Compound Sentences, in: *Linguistic Inquiry*, IV, pp. 169-193.
- Lakoff, George, 1970, Linguistics and Natural Logic, in: *Synthese*, XXII, N. 1-2. Reprinted in: Davidson-Harman (eds), *Semantics of Natural Language*, pp. 545-665, D. Reidel, Dordrecht
- Lieb, Hans-Heinrich, 1982, Questions of Reference in Written Narratives, in: *Poetics*, X, pp. 341-559.
- Pärtee, Barbara-Hall, 1975, Deletion and Variable Binding, in: Keenen (ed.), *Formal Semantics of Natural Language*, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, pp. 16-35.
- Pavel, Thomas, 1983, On the Existence of Non-existing Entities, in: *Studia poetica*, V, (this volume) pp.49-72.
- Saarinen, Esa, 1977, Game-Theoretical Semantics, in: *The Monist*, LX, pp. 406-418.
- 1982a How to Frege a Russell-Kaplan, in: *Nous*, XVI, pp. 253-276.
- 1982b Propositional Attitudes, in: Niniluoto-Saarinen (eds.), *Intensional Logic: Theory and Applications*, *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, XXXV, Helsinki, pp. 130-163.

Saarinen, Esa and Peters, Stanley (eds.), 1982, Process,  
Beliefs, and Questions, D. Reidel, Dordrecht

Searle, John R., 1969, Speech Acts, Cambridge UP, Cambridge  
1979, Expression and Meaning, Cambridge UP,  
Cambridge

1974, The Logical Status of Fictional  
Discourse, in( New Literary History,  
VI. pp. 319-332.

C 432161





Fk: Dr. Kemencs Béla rektorhelyettes

Készült a JATE Sokszorosító Üzemében, Szeged

Engedélyszám: 105/85.

Méret: B/5

Példányszám: 525

Fv: Lengyel Gábor