17 research outputs found
On the Effectiveness of Ambient Sensing for Detecting NFC Relay Attacks
Smartphones with Near-Field Communication (NFC) may emulate contactless smart cards, which has resulted in the deployment of various access control, transportation and payment services, such as Google Pay and Apple Pay. Like contactless cards, however, NFC-based smartphone transactions are susceptible to relay attacks, and ambient sensing has been suggested as a potential countermeasure. In this study, we empirically evaluate the suitability of ambient sensors as a proximity detection mechanism for smartphone-based transactions under EMV constraints. We underpin our study using sensing data collected from 17 sensors from an emulated relay attack test-bed to assess whether they can thwart such attacks effectively. Each sensor, where feasible, was used to record 350-400 legitimate and relay (illegitimate) contactless transactions at two different physical locations. Our analysis provides an empirical foundation upon which to determine the efficacy of ambient sensing for providing a strong anti-relay mechanism in security-sensitive applications. We demonstrate that no single, evaluated mobile ambient sensor is suitable for such critical applications under realistic deployment constraints
Contactless payments :usability at the cost of security?
PhD ThesisEMV (Europay, MasterCard, Visa), commonly termed “Chip & PIN”, is becoming the dominant card
based payment technology globally. The EMV Chip & PIN transaction protocol was originally
designed to operate in an environment where the card was physically inserted into the POS terminal /
ATM and used a wired connection to communicate. The introduction of EMV contactless payments
technology raises an interesting question “has usability been improved at the cost of security?”.
Specifically, to make contactless payments more convenient / usable, a wireless interface has been
added to EMV cards and PIN entry has been waived for contactless payments. Do these new usability
features make contactless cards less secure?
This PhD thesis presents an analysis of the security of the EMV contactless payments. It considers
the security of the EMV contactless transaction protocols as stand-alone processes and the wider
impact of contactless technology upon the security of the EMV card payment system as a whole.
The thesis contributes a structured analysis methodology which identifies vulnerabilities in the EMV
protocol and demonstrates the impact of these vulnerabilities on the EMV payment system. The
analysis methodology comprises UML diagrams and reference tables which describe the EMV
protocol sequences, a protocol emulator which implements the protocol, a Z abstract model of the
protocol and practical demonstrations of the research results. Detailed referencing of the EMV
specifications provide a documented link between the exploitable vulnerabilities observed in real
EMV cards and the source of the vulnerability in the EMV specifications.
Our analysis methodology has identified two previously undocumented vulnerabilities in the EMV
contactless transaction protocol. The potential existence of these vulnerabilities was identified using
the Z abstract model with the protocol emulator providing experimental confirmation of the potential
for real-world exploitation of the vulnerabilities and test results quantifying the extent of the impact.
Once a vulnerability has been shown to be exploitable using the protocol emulator, we use practical
demonstrations to show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited in the real-world using off-the-shelf
equipment. This presents a stronger impact message when presenting our research results to a nontechnical
audience. This has helped to raise awareness of security issues relating to EMV contactless
cards, with our work appearing in the media, radio and TV
Does the online card payment system unwittingly facilitate fraud?
PhD ThesisThe research work in this PhD thesis presents an extensive investigation into the security settings of
Card Not Present (CNP) financial transactions. These are the transactions which include payments
performed with a card over the Internet on the websites, and over the phone. Our detailed analysis on
hundreds of websites and on multiple CNP payment protocols justifies that the current security
architecture of CNP payment system is not adequate enough to protect itself from fraud.
Unintentionally, the payment system itself will allow an adversary to learn and exploit almost all of
the security features put in place to protect the CNP payment system from fraud. With insecure modes
of accepting payments, the online payment system paves the way for cybercriminals to abuse even the
latest designed payment protocols like 3D Secure 2.0.
We follow a structured analysis methodology which identifies vulnerabilities in the CNP payment
protocols and demonstrates the impact of these vulnerabilities on the overall payment system. The
analysis methodology comprises of UML diagrams and reference tables which describe the CNP
payment protocol sequences, software tools which implements the protocol and practical
demonstrations of the research results. Detailed referencing of the online payment specifications
provides a documented link between the exploitable vulnerabilities observed in real implementations
and the source of the vulnerability in the payment specifications.
We use practical demonstrations to show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited in the real-world
with ease. This presents a stronger impact message when presenting our research results to a nontechnical audience. This has helped to raise awareness of security issues relating to payment cards,
with our work appearing in the media, radio and T
Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems
The chapters in this open access book arise out of the EU Cost Action project Cryptacus, the objective of which was to improve and adapt existent cryptanalysis methodologies and tools to the ubiquitous computing framework. The cryptanalysis implemented lies along four axes: cryptographic models, cryptanalysis of building blocks, hardware and software security engineering, and security assessment of real-world systems. The authors are top-class researchers in security and cryptography, and the contributions are of value to researchers and practitioners in these domains. This book is open access under a CC BY license
Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems
The chapters in this open access book arise out of the EU Cost Action project Cryptacus, the objective of which was to improve and adapt existent cryptanalysis methodologies and tools to the ubiquitous computing framework. The cryptanalysis implemented lies along four axes: cryptographic models, cryptanalysis of building blocks, hardware and software security engineering, and security assessment of real-world systems. The authors are top-class researchers in security and cryptography, and the contributions are of value to researchers and practitioners in these domains. This book is open access under a CC BY license
Security of Contactless Smart Card Protocols
Tato práce analyzuje hrozby pro protokoly využívající bezkontaktní čipové karty a představuje metodu pro poloautomatické hledání zranitelností v takových protokolech pomocí model checkingu. Návrh a implementace bezpečných aplikací jsou obtížné úkoly, i když je použit bezpečný hardware. Specifikace na vysoké úrovni abstrakce může vést k různým implementacím. Je důležité používat čipovou kartu správně, nevhodná implementace protokolu může přinést zranitelnosti, i když je protokol sám o sobě bezpečný. Cílem této práce je poskytnout metodu, která může být využita vývojáři protokolů k vytvoření modelu libovolné čipové karty, se zaměřením na bezkontaktní čipové karty, k vytvoření modelu protokolu a k použití model checkingu pro nalezení útoků v tomto modelu. Útok může být následně proveden a pokud není úspěšný, model je upraven pro další běh model checkingu. Pro formální verifikaci byla použita platforma AVANTSSAR, modely jsou psány v jazyce ASLan++. Jsou poskytnuty příklady pro demonstraci použitelnosti navrhované metody. Tato metoda byla použita k nalezení slabiny bezkontaktní čipové karty Mifare DESFire. Tato práce se dále zabývá hrozbami, které není možné pokrýt navrhovanou metodou, jako jsou útoky relay. This thesis analyses contactless smart card protocol threats and presents a method of semi-automated vulnerability finding in such protocols using model checking. Designing and implementing secure applications is difficult even when secure hardware is used. High level application specifications may lead to different implementations. It is important to use the smart card correctly, inappropriate protocol implementation may introduce a vulnerability, even if the protocol is secure by itself. The goal of this thesis is to provide a method that can be used by protocol developers to create a model of arbitrary smart card, with focus on contactless smart cards, to create a model of the protocol, and to use model checking to find attacks in this model. The attack can be then executed and if not successful, the model is refined for another model checker run. The AVANTSSAR platform was used for the formal verification, models are written in the ASLan++ language. Examples are provided to demonstrate usability of the proposed method. This method was used to find a weakness of Mifare DESFire contactless smart card. This thesis also deals with threats not possible to cover by the proposed method, such as relay attacks.