Protocol analysis modulo exclusive-or theories: a case study in Maude-MPA

[EN] Escobar of the Universitat Politècnica de València in collaboration with José Meseguer (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA) and Catherine Meadows (Naval Research Lab, Washington, DC, USA). We focus on protocols using exclusive-or as the only cryptographic properties of symbols, apart of the standard cancellation of encryption and decryption. The protocols analyzed in this document are borrowed from the paper ”Reducing Protocol Analysis with XOR to the XOR- Free Case in the Horn Theory Based Approach” by Ralf Küesters and Tomasz Truderung published in Journal of Automated Reasoning, volume 46, pages 325-352, Springer 2011. These protocols are divided into two groups, those that can be specified in the Alice-Bob notation and those corresponding to an Application Programming Interface (API). We have proved the same security properties described in Küesters and Truderung paper, but we go beyond that paper in the sense that we have provided protocol specifications that meet all the requirements of the original protocols, whereas Küesters and Truderung paper use simplified versions of these protocols. The main problem that we have encountered is to specify API protocols in Maude-NPA, since this was the first time that this kind of protocols were specified in the tool. Another contribution of this thesis is to confirm that protocols with exclusive-or can be verified in Maude-NPA[ES] El desarrollo de esta tesis final de máster tiene como objetivo verificar diversos protocolos de seguridad existentes utilizando una herramienta de verificación automatizada de protocolos, Maude- NPA, desarrollada por Santiago Escobar, de la Universitat Politècnica de València , en colaboración con José Meseguer (Universidad de Illinois en Urbana- Champaign, EE.UU.) y Catherine Meadows (Naval Research Lab , Washington , DC, EE.UU.). Nos centramos en el uso de protocolos con el operador orexclusivo como propiedad principal criptográfica de símbolos, así como la cancelación estándar de cifrado y descifrado. Los protocolos analizados en esta tesis los tomamos del artículo ”Reducing Protocol Analysis with XOR to the XOR- Free Case in the Horn Theory Based Approach” de Ralf Küesters y Tomasz Truderung publicado en el “Journal of Automated Reasoning”, volumen 46, páginas 325-352 en el 2011 en Springer. Estos protocolos se dividen en dos grupos, los que se pueden especificar en la notación Alice-Bob y los correspondientes a una interfaz de programación de aplicaciones (API) . Hemos probado las mismas propiedades de seguridad descritas en el artículo de Ralf Küesters y Tomasz Truderung , pero yendo más allá, en el sentido de que hemos proporcionado las especificaciones de los protocolos que cumplen con todos los requisitos de los protocolos originales , mientras que en el artículo de Ralf Küesters y Tomasz Truderung utilizan versiones simplificadas de estos protocolos. El principal problema que nos hemos encontrado al especificar los protocolos API, es que esta fue la primera vez que este tipo de protocolos se especificó en Maude-NPA. Otra aportación de esta tesis es la confirmación de que los “protocolos or-exclusivos” pueden ser verificados en Maude-NPA .González Burgueño, A. (2014). Protocol analysis modulo exclusive-or theories: a case study in Maude-MPA. http://hdl.handle.net/10251/51784Archivo delegad

A Cloud-based RFID Authentication Protocol with Insecure Communication Channels

© 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has becomea widespread technology to automatically identify objects and withthe development of cloud computing, cloud-based RFID systemsattract more research these days. Several cloud-based RFIDauthentication protocols have been proposed to address privacyand security properties in the environment where the cloudprovider is untrusted therefore the tag’s data are encrypted andanonymously stored in the cloud database. However, most of thecloud-based RFID authentication protocols assume securecommunication channels between the reader and the cloud server.To protect data transmission between the reader and the cloudserver without any help from a third party, this paper proposes acloud-based RFID authentication protocol with insecurecommunication channels (cloud-RAPIC) between the reader and the cloud server. The cloud-RAPIC protocol preserves tag privacyeven when the tag does not update its identification. The cloudRAPIC protocol has been analyzed using the UPriv model andAVISPA verification tool which have proved that the protocolpreserves tag privacy and protects data secrecy

How to prevent type-flaw attacks on security protocols under algebraic properties

Type-flaw attacks upon security protocols wherein agents are led to misinterpret message types have been reported frequently in the literature. Preventing them is crucial for protocol security and verification. Heather et al. proved that tagging every message field with it's type prevents all type-flaw attacks under a free message algebra and perfect encryption system. In this paper, we prove that type-flaw attacks can be prevented with the same technique even under the ACUN algebraic properties of XOR which is commonly used in "real-world" protocols such as SSL 3.0. Our proof method is general and can be easily extended to other monoidal operators that possess properties such as Inverse and Idempotence as well. We also discuss how tagging could be used to prevent type-flaw attacks under other properties such as associativity of pairing, commutative encryption, prefix property and homomorphic encryption.Comment: 16 pages, Appeared in proceedings of Security with Rewriting Techniques (SecRet09), Affiliated to CSF Symposium 2009, Port Jefferson, NY

A formal methodology for integral security design and verification of network protocols

We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural verification. It is an iterative process where the early steps are simpler than the last ones. Therefore, the effort required for detecting flaws is proportional to the complexity of the associated attack. Thus, we avoid wasting valuable resources for simple flaws that can be detected early in the verification process. In order to illustrate the advantages provided by our methodology, we also analyze three real protocols

Formal Analysis of E-Cash Protocols

International audienceElectronic cash (e-cash) aims at achieving client privacy at payment, similar to real cash. Several security protocols have been proposed to ensure privacy in e-cash, as well as the necessary unforgery properties. In this paper, we propose a formal framework to define, analyze, and verify security properties of e-cash systems. To this end, we model e-cash systems in the applied π-calculus, and we define two client privacy properties and three properties to prevent forgery. Finally, we apply our definitions to an e-cash protocol from the literature proposed by Chaum et al., which has two variants and a real implementation based on it. Using ProVerif, we demonstrate that our framework is suitable for an automated analysis of this protocol

Effective symbolic protocol analysis via equational irreducibility conditions

We address a problem that arises in cryptographic protocol analysis when the equational properties of the cryptosystem are taken into account: in many situations it is necessary to guarantee that certain terms generated during a state exploration are in normal form with respect to the equational theory. We give a tool-independent methodology for state exploration, based on unification and narrowing, that generates states that obey these irreducibility constraints, called contextual symbolic reachability analysis, prove its soundness and completeness, and describe its implementation in the Maude-NPA protocol analysis tool. Contextual symbolic reachability analysis also introduces a new type of unification mechanism, which we call asymmetric unification, in which any solution must leave the right side of the solution irreducible. We also present experiments showing the effectiveness of our methodology.S. Escobar and S. Santiago have been partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MEC/MICINN under grant TIN 2010-21062-C02-02, and by Generalitat Valenciana PROMETEO2011/052. The following authors have been partially supported by NSF: S. Escobar, J. Meseguer and R. Sasse under grants CCF 09- 05584, CNS 09-04749, and CNS 09-05584; D. Kapur under grant CNS 09-05222; C. Lynch, Z. Liu, and C. Meadows under grant CNS 09-05378, and P. Narendran and S. Erbatur under grant CNS 09-05286.Erbatur, S.; Escobar Román, S.; Kapur, D.; Liu, Z.; Lynch, C.; Meadows, C.; Meseguer, J.... (2012). Effective symbolic protocol analysis via equational irreducibility conditions. En Computer Security - ESORICS 2012. Springer Verlag (Germany). 7459:73-90. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_5S73907459IEEE 802.11 Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical (PHY) Specifications (1999)Abadi, M., Cortier, V.: Deciding knowledge in security protocols under equational theories. Theor. Comput. Sci. 367(1-2), 2–32 (2006)Arapinis, M., Bursuc, S., Ryan, M.: Privacy Supporting Cloud Computing: ConfiChair, a Case Study. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds.) Principles of Security and Trust. LNCS, vol. 7215, pp. 89–108. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)Basin, D., Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L.: An On-the-Fly Model-Checker for Security Protocol Analysis. In: Snekkenes, E., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2003. LNCS, vol. 2808, pp. 253–270. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)Baudet, M., Cortier, V., Delaune, S.: YAPA: A Generic Tool for Computing Intruder Knowledge. In: Treinen, R. (ed.) RTA 2009. LNCS, vol. 5595, pp. 148–163. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)Blanchet, B.: An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on prolog rules. In: CSFW, pp. 82–96. IEEE Computer Society (2001)Blanchet, B.: Using horn clauses for analyzing security protocols. In: Cortier, V., Kremer, S. (eds.) Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols. IOS Press (2011)Blanchet, B., Abadi, M., Fournet, C.: Automated verification of selected equivalences for security protocols. J. Log. Algebr. Program. 75(1), 3–51 (2008)Ciobâcă, Ş., Delaune, S., Kremer, S.: Computing Knowledge in Security Protocols under Convergent Equational Theories. In: Schmidt, R.A. (ed.) CADE-22. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 5663, pp. 355–370. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)Comon-Lundh, H., Delaune, S.: The Finite Variant Property: How to Get Rid of Some Algebraic Properties. In: Giesl, J. (ed.) RTA 2005. LNCS, vol. 3467, pp. 294–307. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)Comon-Lundh, H., Delaune, S., Millen, J.: Constraint solving techniques and enriching the model with equational theories. In: Cortier, V., Kremer, S. (eds.) Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols. Cryptology and Information Security Series, vol. 5, pp. 35–61. IOS Press (2011)Comon-Lundh, H., Shmatikov, V.: Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of exclusive or. In: LICS, pp. 271–280. IEEE Computer Society (2003)Ciobâcă, Ş.: Knowledge in security protocolsDolev, D., Yao, A.C.-C.: On the security of public key protocols (extended abstract). In: FOCS, pp. 350–357 (1981)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: A rewriting-based inference system for the NRL protocol analyzer and its meta-logical properties. Theoretical Computer Science 367(1-2), 162–202 (2006)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: State Space Reduction in the Maude-NRL Protocol Analyzer. In: Jajodia, S., Lopez, J. (eds.) ESORICS 2008. LNCS, vol. 5283, pp. 548–562. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: Maude-NPA: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Modulo Equational Properties. In: Aldini, A., Barthe, G., Gorrieri, R. (eds.) FOSAD 2007. LNCS, vol. 5705, pp. 1–50. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J., Santiago, S.: State space reduction in the maude-nrl protocol analyzer. Information and Computation (in press, 2012)Escobar, S., Sasse, R., Meseguer, J.: Folding variant narrowing and optimal variant termination. J. Log. Algebr. Program (in press, 2012)Thayer Fabrega, F.J., Herzog, J., Guttman, J.: Strand Spaces: What Makes a Security Protocol Correct? Journal of Computer Security 7, 191–230 (1999)Jouannaud, J.-P., Kirchner, H.: Completion of a set of rules modulo a set of equations. SIAM J. Comput. 15(4), 1155–1194 (1986)Küsters, R., Truderung, T.: Using ProVerif to analyze protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. In: CSF, pp. 157–171. IEEE Computer Society (2009)Küsters, R., Truderung, T.: Reducing protocol analysis with xor to the xor-free case in the horn theory based approach. Journal of Automated Reasoning 46(3-4), 325–352 (2011)Liu, Z., Lynch, C.: Efficient General Unification for XOR with Homomorphism. In: Bjørner, N., Sofronie-Stokkermans, V. (eds.) CADE 2011. LNCS, vol. 6803, pp. 407–421. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)Lowe, G., Roscoe, B.: Using csp to detect errors in the tmn protocol. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 23, 659–669 (1997)Lucas, S.: Context-sensitive computations in functional and functional logic programs. J. Functl. and Log. Progr. 1(4), 446–453 (1998)Meseguer, J.: Conditional rewriting logic as a united model of concurrency. Theor. Comput. Sci. 96(1), 73–155 (1992)Meseguer, J., Thati, P.: Symbolic reachability analysis using narrowing and its application to verification of cryptographic protocols. Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation 20(1-2), 123–160 (2007)Mödersheim, S.: Models and methods for the automated analysis of security protocols. PhD thesis, ETH Zurich (2007)Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L., Basin, D.A.: Constraint differentiation: Search-space reduction for the constraint-based analysis of security protocols. Journal of Computer Security 18(4), 575–618 (2010)Tatebayashi, M., Matsuzaki, N., Newman Jr., D.B.: Key Distribution Protocol for Digital Mobile Communication Systems. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 324–334. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)TeReSe (ed.): Term Rewriting Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2003)Viry, P.: Equational rules for rewriting logic. Theor. Comput. Sci. 285(2), 487–517 (2002)Zhang, H., Remy, J.-L.: Contextual Rewriting. In: Jouannaud, J.-P. (ed.) RTA 1985. LNCS, vol. 202, pp. 46–62. Springer, Heidelberg (1985

An Optimizing Protocol Transformation for Constructor Finite Variant Theories in Maude-NPA

[EN] Maude-NPA is an analysis tool for cryptographic security protocols that takes into account the algebraic properties of the cryptosystem. Maude-NPA can reason about a wide range of cryptographic properties. However, some algebraic properties, and protocols using them, have been beyond Maude-NPA capabilities, either because the cryptographic properties cannot be expressed using its equational unification features or because the state space is unmanageable. In this paper, we provide a protocol transformation that can safely get rid of cryptographic properties under some conditions. The time and space difference between verifying the protocol with all the crypto properties and verifying the protocol with a minimal set of the crypto properties is remarkable. We also provide, for the first time, an encoding of the theory of bilinear pairing into Maude-NPA that goes beyond the encoding of bilinear pairing available in the Tamarin toolPartially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MCIU under grant RTI2018-094403-B-C32, by the Spanish Generalitat Valenciana under grant PROMETEO/2019/098, and by the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-17-1-0286. Julia Sapiña has been supported by the Generalitat Valenciana APOSTD/2019/127 grantAparicio-Sánchez, D.; Escobar Román, S.; Gutiérrez Gil, R.; Sapiña-Sanchis, J. (2020). An Optimizing Protocol Transformation for Constructor Finite Variant Theories in Maude-NPA. Springer Nature. 230-250. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_12S230250Maude-NPA manual v3.1. http://maude.cs.illinois.edu/w/index.php/Maude_Tools:_Maude-NPAThe Tamarin-Prover Manual, 4 June 2019. https://tamarin-prover.github.io/manual/tex/tamarin-manual.pdfAl-Riyami, S.S., Paterson, K.G.: Tripartite authenticated key agreement protocols from pairings. In: Paterson, K.G. (ed.) Cryptography and Coding 2003. LNCS, vol. 2898, pp. 332–359. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40974-8_27Baader, F., Snyder, W.: Unification theory. In: Robinson, J.A., Voronkov, A. (eds.) Handbook of Automated Reasoning, vol. 1, pp. 447–533. Elsevier Science (2001)Baelde, D., Delaune, S., Gazeau, I., Kremer, S.: Symbolic verification of privacy-type properties for security protocols with XOR. In: 30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2017, pp. 234–248. IEEE Computer Society (2017)Blanchet, B.: Modeling and verifying security protocols with the applied pi calculus and ProVerif. Found. Trends Privacy Secur. 1(1–2), 1–135 (2016)Clavel, M., et al.: Maude manual (version 3.0). Technical report, SRI International, Computer Science Laboratory (2020). http://maude.cs.uiuc.eduComon-Lundh, H., Delaune, S.: The finite variant property: how to get rid of some algebraic properties. In: Giesl, J. (ed.) RTA 2005. LNCS, vol. 3467, pp. 294–307. Springer, Heidelberg (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32033-3_22Cremers, C.J.F.: The scyther tool: verification, falsification, and analysis of security protocols. In: Gupta, A., Malik, S. (eds.) CAV 2008. LNCS, vol. 5123, pp. 414–418. Springer, Heidelberg (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70545-1_38Dreier, J., Duménil, C., Kremer, S., Sasse, R.: Beyond subterm-convergent equational theories in automated verification of stateful protocols. In: Maffei, M., Ryan, M. (eds.) POST 2017. LNCS, vol. 10204, pp. 117–140. Springer, Heidelberg (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54455-6_6Escobar, S., Hendrix, J., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: Diffie-Hellman cryptographic reasoning in the Maude-NRL protocol analyzer. In: Proceedings of 2nd International Workshop on Security and Rewriting Techniques (SecReT 2007) (2007)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: A rewriting-based inference system for the NRL protocol analyzer and its meta-logical properties. Theor. Comput. Sci. 367(1–2), 162–202 (2006)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: Maude-NPA: cryptographic protocol analysis modulo equational properties. In: Aldini, A., Barthe, G., Gorrieri, R. (eds.) FOSAD 2007-2009. LNCS, vol. 5705, pp. 1–50. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03829-7_1Escobar, S., et al.: Protocol analysis in Maude-NPA using unification modulo homomorphic encryption. In: Proceedings of PPDP 2011, pp. 65–76. ACM (2011)Escobar, S., Meadows, C.A., Meseguer, J., Santiago, S.: State space reduction in the Maude-NRL protocol analyzer. Inf. Comput. 238, 157–186 (2014)Escobar, S., Sasse, R., Meseguer, J.: Folding variant narrowing and optimal variant termination. J. Log. Algebr. Program. 81(7–8), 898–928 (2012)Fabrega, F.J.T., Herzog, J.C., Guttman, J.D.: Strand spaces: why is a security protocol correct? In: Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 160–171 (1998)Guttman, J.D.: Security goals and protocol transformations. In: Mödersheim, S., Palamidessi, C. (eds.) TOSCA 2011. LNCS, vol. 6993, pp. 130–147. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27375-9_8Joux, A.: A one round protocol for tripartite Diffie-Hellman. In: Bosma, W. (ed.) ANTS 2000. LNCS, vol. 1838, pp. 385–393. Springer, Heidelberg (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/10722028_23Kim, Y., Perrig, A., Tsudik, G.: Communication-efficient group key agreement. In: Dupuy, M., Paradinas, P. (eds.) SEC 2001. IIFIP, vol. 65, pp. 229–244. Springer, Boston, MA (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-46998-7_16Küsters, R., Truderung, T.: Using ProVerif to analyze protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations, pp. 157–171 (2009)Küsters, R., Truderung, T.: Reducing protocol analysis with XOR to the XOR-free case in the horn theory based approach. J. Autom. Reason. 46(3–4), 325–352 (2011)Meadows, C.: The NRL protocol analyzer: an overview. J. Logic Program. 26(2), 113–131 (1996)Meier, S., Cremers, C., Basin, D.: Strong invariants for the efficient construction of machine-checked protocol security proofs. In: 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, pp. 231–245 (2010)Meseguer, J.: Conditional rewriting logic as a united model of concurrency. Theoret. Comput. Sci. 96(1), 73–155 (1992)Meseguer, J.: Variant-based satisfiability in initial algebras. Sci. Comput. Program. 154, 3–41 (2018)Meseguer, J.: Generalized rewrite theories, coherence completion, and symbolic methods. J. Log. Algebr. Meth. Program. 110, 100483 (2020)Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L.: The open-source fixed-point model checker for symbolic analysis of security protocols. In: Aldini, A., Barthe, G., Gorrieri, R. (eds.) FOSAD 2007-2009. LNCS, vol. 5705, pp. 166–194. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03829-7_6Sasse, R., Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: Protocol analysis modulo combination of theories: a case study in Maude-NPA. In: Cuellar, J., Lopez, J., Barthe, G., Pretschner, A. (eds.) STM 2010. LNCS, vol. 6710, pp. 163–178. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22444-7_11Schmidt, B., Sasse, R., Cremers, C., Basin, D.A.: Automated verification of group key agreement protocols. In: 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2014, pp. 179–194. IEEE Computer Society (2014)Skeirik, S., Meseguer, J.: Metalevel algorithms for variant satisfiability. J. Log. Algebraic Methods Program. 96, 81–110 (2018)TeReSe: Term Rewriting Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2003)Yang, F., Escobar, S., Meadows, C.A., Meseguer, J., Narendran, P.: Theories of homomorphic encryption, unification, and the finite variant property. In: Proceedings of PPDP 2014, pp. 123–133. ACM (2014