Reasoning about Choice

We present a logic for reasoning about choice. Choice ctl (c-ctl) extends the well-known branching-time temporal logic ctl with choice modalities, " ◊ " and "□". An example c-ctl formula is ◊ AF happy, asserting that there exists a choice that will lead to happiness. c-ctl is related to both stit logics and temporal cooperation logics such as atl, but has a much simpler and (we argue) more intuitive syntax and semantics. After presenting the logic, we investigate the properties of the language. We characterise the complexity of the c-ctl model checking problem, investigate some validities, and propose multi-agent extensions to the logic

Judicial Reasoning About Pregnancy and Choice

Women in Canada are at risk of abortion becoming increasingly difficult to access. In its landmark 1988 ruling, R. v. Morgentaler, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the prohibition of abortion in section 251 of the Criminal Code on the grounds that it violated a section of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms which guarantees, among other things, security of the person . However, all of the justices who ruled that section 25 unconstitutional nonetheless claimed that protecting the fetus is a valid objective of federal legislation, leaving open the possibility that a different and carefully crafted law against abortion might be constitutional. Abortion opponents organized in response to the decision, and in 1990, an attempt was made to re-criminalize abortion. This attempt, Bill C-43 came very close to succeeding. In light of the possibility of the reintroduction of criminal law legislation against abortion an important question for women is whether Canadian courts would find a newly·written restrictive abortion law to violate the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In seeking to answer this question, we were keen to find out whether there are any arguments already present in judicial reasoning about choice in reproduction or about a woman\u27s entitlement to make certain choices, that could be used to beat back the threat of the re-criminalization of abortion. We also wanted to determine whether there are ways of interpreting the concept of reproductive choice that can be found in judicial reasoning that are damaging to the illlerests of women. For these reasons, we embarked upon a systematic review of how the concept of choice has been used in Canadian judicial reasoning about reproduction since Morgentaler (1988). Specifically. we sought to find out how judges think about the relationship between pregnancy and choice

A semantical approach to equilibria and rationality

Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and with the environment. Rational behaviors are achieved not only through conscious reasoning, but also through spontaneous stabilization at equilibrium points. Formal theories of rationality are usually guided by informal intuitions, which are acquired by observing some concrete economic, biological, or network processes. Treating such processes as instances of computation, we reconstruct and refine some basic notions of equilibrium and rationality from the some basic structures of computation. It is, of course, well known that equilibria arise as fixed points; the point is that semantics of computation of fixed points seems to be providing novel methods, algebraic and coalgebraic, for reasoning about them.Comment: 18 pages; Proceedings of CALCO 200

(WP 2017-04) Behavioral Economics and the Positive-Normative Distinction: Sunstein’s \u3cem\u3eChoosing Not to Choose\u3c/em\u3e and Behavioral Economics Imperialism

This paper examines behavioral economics’ use of the positive-normative distinction in its critique of standard rational choice theory as normative, and argues that it departs from Robbins’ understanding of that distinction in ways that suggest behavioral economists themselves do not observe that distinction. One implication of this is that behavioral economists generally do not recognize Putnam’s fact-value ‘entanglement thesis’ while a second implication is that the charge that rational choice theory is descriptively inadequate paradoxically appears to mean that it does not employ the implicit value basis and normative vision that behavioral economics recommends, thus actually violating Robbins’ distinction. This latter argument is developed through an examination of Sunstein’s Choosing Not to Choose which uses nudge policy in the form of default rules to advance a different conception of freedom than standard choice theory employs. The paper goes on to argue that behavioral economics imperialism, particularly in the form of behavioral development economics imperialism, is more about promoting its implicit value basis and normative vision over that promoted by standard rational choice theory than about advancing an alternative conception of economics for social science. A final section comments on economics’ status and relation to the other social sciences

Preference purification and the inner rational agent:A critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics

Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference-satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational-choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic

Review of Ralph Hertwig, Timothy J. Pleskac, and Thorsten Pachur's Taming Uncertainty [...]

Review of Ralph Hertwig, Timothy J. Pleskac, and Thorsten Pachur's Taming Uncertainty. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2019, xvii + 469 pp

Behavioral economics and the positive- normative distinction: Sunstein’s Choosing Not to Choose and behavioral economics imperialism

Full Text / Article completThis paper examines behavioral economics’ use of the positive-normative distinction in its critique of standard rational choice theory as normative, and argues that it departs from Robbins’ understanding of that distinction in ways that suggest behavioral economists themselves do not observe that distinction. One implication of this is that behavioral economists generally do not recognize Putnam’s fact-value ‘entanglement thesis’ while a second implication is that the charge that rational choice theory is descriptively inadequate paradoxically appears to mean that it does not employ the implicit value basis and normative vision that behavioral economics recommends, thus actually violating Robbins’ distinction. This latter argument is developed through an examination of Sunstein’s Choosing Not to Choose which uses nudge policy in the form of default rules to advance a different conception of freedom than standard choice theory employs. The paper goes on to argue that behavioral economics imperialism, particularly in the form of behavioral development economics imperialism, is more about promoting its implicit value basis and normative vision over that promoted by standard rational choice theory than about advancing an alternative conception of economics for social science. A final section comments on economics’ status and relation to the other social sciences.Cet article examine l'utilisation par l'économie comportementale de la distinction positive-normative dans sa critique de la théorie du choix rationnel standard comme norme, et soutient qu'elle s'écarte de la compréhension de cette distinction par Robbins de manière à suggérer que les économistes comportementaux eux-mêmes n'observent pas cette distinction. Une conséquence est que les économistes comportementaux ne reconnaissent généralement pas la thèse de l'enchevêtrement fait- valeur de Putnam, alors qu'une deuxième implication est que l'accusation selon laquelle la théorie du choix rationnel est inadéquate à des fins descriptives signifie paradoxalement qu'elle n'utilise pas la conception de la valeur implicite et normative que l'économie comportementale recommande, violant ainsi réellement la distinction de Robbins. Ce dernier argument est développé à travers un examen de Choosing Not to Choose de Sunstein qui utilise la politique de nudge sous la forme de règles par défaut pour faire avancer une conception différente de la liberté que celle de la théorie du choix standard. Le papier poursuit en affirmant que l'impérialisme économique comportementaliste, en particulier sous la forme d'un impérialisme économique de développement comportemental, cherche plutôt à promouvoir sa conception implicite de la base de la valeur et sa vision normative par rapport à celle préconisée par la théorie standard du choix rationnel. Une dernière section commente le statut de l'économie et sa relation avec les autres sciences sociales

Professional vulnerability in mental healthcare contexts : a focus group study of milieu‐therapists’ experiences

Aims and objectives: To gain insight into how the workplace influences milieu‐therapists’ vulnerability in the mental healthcare context. Background: Mental health services have experienced substantial changes. Reduced institutional treatment capacity is replacing the development of locally based treatment. Changes in external conditions in mental health services have influenced the working conditions of nurses and milieu‐therapists. Design: Qualitative design. The study complied with the COREQ checklist. Methods: Focus group interviews. Results: “Vulnerability due to unpredictable and threatening working context” was the common key theme that emerged in both contexts. Two key themes were different and opposite. In municipal mental health care, “Alone and unprotected” and in institutional care, “Together and protected.” Conclusion: The participants from both specialized and community mental health care, experienced vulnerability at different levels interpreted as a contradictory relationship between the healthcare system and their own ideals of what professional practice ought to be. Relevance to clinical practice: This study contributes to extended knowledge and understanding about the experienced influence of the working environment on professional vulnerability of nurses and milieu‐therapists` in mental health services. The impact of contextual conditions on health professionals’ working conditions has multi‐professional relevance for milieu‐therapists and managers of mental health services, and it is an important topic in health and social higher education. Keywords: focus group study, mental Health care context, milieu‐therapists, professional vulnerabilitypublishedVersio