Beyond a Boundary of Systemic Anti-Black Racism in the Workplace in Canada

In this lecture, I will, however, focus on one of the legacies of slavery, that is, the largely untold story of racial segregation in the world of work in Canada. We have come so effectively, and rightly, to focus on the effects of discrimination, that we may have inadvertently walked past the history. Reclaiming this history will comprise the first part of my talk. The second part of my talk will reference the emergence of the duty of fair representation. I will seek to illustrate the weight of the erasure of anti-Black racism through this duty. In other words, far from representing a peculiarity of US law that failed to travel well,8 Steele v Louisville & Nashville Railway Co’s9 foundation in racial discrimination needs to be acknowledged and engaged for an inherent tension to be addressed. So third and finally, I will posit the paradox of unresolved “choice” at the heart of the majoritarian frame of the Wagner Act, not to try somehow to resolve it, but by refusing to allow us to all too quickly individualize it, and instead to steer us closer to a related, necessary justification for a proactive commitment that we have already, if incompletely, made— the commitment to embracing the societal transformation entailed by achieving and sustaining substantive equality through employment equit

“17 Going on 23”: Sentencing Young People to Life in Canada

Canada is one of 67 countries worldwide that allows young people—those under the age of 18—to be sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness of young people as a constitutional principle of fundamental justice and invalidated a law that presumed youth should be sentenced as adults for some serious crimes, including murder. The burden is, therefore, always on the Crown to rebut the presumption and prove that a youth sentence would not be long enough to hold the young person accountable for their behaviour. Where the presumption can be rebutted, for most crimes the judge has discretion to tailor an adult sentence to the facts of the offence and the person before them. However, for murder, a life sentence (with the possibility of parole) is the mandatory adult sentence. This paper analyzes reported Canadian cases from 2008–2022 in which young people were sentenced for murder and finds that life sentences are often imposed. The Crown regularly seeks them and the court orders them in more than two-thirds of the reported cases in which they are sought. Through a careful reading of the cases, the paper examines why and how life sentences are imposed so often and concludes with some thoughts on the normalization of this extreme punishment for youth and the need to revisit its constitutionality. Le Canada est l’un des 67 pays qui permettent que des jeunes âgés de moins de 18 ans soient condamnés à la prison à vie. En 2008, la Cour suprême du Canada a reconnu la présomption de culpabilité morale diminuée des jeunes comme un principe constitutionnel de justice fondamentale et a invalidé une loi qui présumait que les jeunes devaient être condamnés comme des adultes pour certains crimes graves, dont le meurtre. Il incombe donc toujours à la Couronne de réfuter la présomption et de prouver qu’une peine pour mineur ne serait pas d’une durée suffisante pour le tenir responsable de son comportement délinquant. Lorsque la présomption peut être réfutée, pour la plupart des crimes, le juge a le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’adapter la peine pour adulte aux faits de l’infraction et à la personne qui comparaît devant lui. Toutefois, pour le meurtre, la peine obligatoire pour un adulte est la réclusion à perpétuité (avec possibilité de libération conditionnelle). Cet article analyse les jugements rendus au Canada entre 2008 et 2022 dans lesquels des jeunes ont été condamnés pour meurtre et constate que la peine d’emprisonnement à perpétuité est souvent imposée. La Couronne la réclame régulièrement et le tribunal l’inflige dans plus des deux tiers des cas signalés où elle est demandée. Après une lecture attentive de ces jugements, nous examinons dans cet article le pourquoi et le comment de cette fréquence et nous concluons par quelques réflexions sur la normalisation de cette peine extrême pour des jeunes et sur la nécessité d’en réexaminer la constitutionnalité

Canada\u27s Foreign Fighter Problem: How Should the Federal Government Manage Suspected ISIS Members Held in Syria?

Since the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fell in 2019, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) has arbitrarily detained tens of thousands of accused ISIS fighters and their families in Northern Syria. Among those detained are Canadian citizens. Although Canada has repatriated Canadian women and children from AANES custody, its policy approach to date has been inadequate. Canada must take action to develop a cohesive policy for the approximately 17 Canadians remaining in AANES custody. In this paper, I will evaluate four potential policy options available to the Canadian government. First, that Canada could take no action and maintain the status quo. Second, that Canada could support AANES in bringing ISIS fighters to justice directly in Northern Syria. Third, that Canada could support the International Criminal Court (ICC) in prosecuting ISIS fighters. Fourth, that Canada could repatriate the Canadians held by AANES and, where applicable, prosecute them directly in Canada. Considering the global security and human rights concerns presented by the status quo; as well as the inherent challenges with prosecuting low-level ISIS members at the ICC and AANES’s standing as a non-State entity, I will argue that the best policy option for Canada is to repatriate its detained citizens and prosecute them domestically where possible. I will contend that, while repatriating Canadians held by AANES is not without considerable evidentiary concern, this approach advances human rights and global security objectives. Additionally, it allows Canadians involved with ISIS to be held accountable for their actions

Jim Phillips: Property Rights and the Public Interest

Join student editor, Emily Huang, as she sits down with Professor Jim Phillips to discuss his recent paper in the Dalhousie Law Journal titled “Property Rights and the Public Interest: Why Annapolis Group v Halifax Regional Municipality is wrongly decided.” Professor Phillips is a Professor of Law, History and Criminology at the University of Toronto, and Editor-in-Chief of the Osgood Society for Canadian Legal History. The discussion opens with the Annapolis case and the history of Canadian expropriation law

Property Rights and the Public Interest: Why \u3ci\u3eAnnapolis Group v Halifax Regional Municipality\u3c/i\u3e is Wrongly Decided

In a 2022 decision, Annapolis Group v. HRM, the Supreme Court of Canada, by a very narrow margin of 5-4, changed the long-standing test for a de facto expropriation, while insisting, wrongly, that it was not doing so. The requirement that the state acquire an interest in property from the regulation in question has been replaced by one that it acquire something called an “advantage.” The court was remarkably unclear about what constitutes an “advantage,’” and what kinds of ‘advantages’ will suffice. All we know kind is that “advantage” has replaced the previous requirement that the state acquire an interest in property. The Supreme Court also altered the test for what the citizen must lose. The need to establish that the claimant has lost all reasonable uses of its property has been changed to all potential reasonable uses, thereby reducing the importance of the nature of the land and the uses to which it has been put historically. The Court left unclear exactly what potential meant, and was similarly elusive about the meaning and purport of other changes it made to the assessment of whether an owner has lost all reasonable uses of property by the relevant regulation. All we can say with certainty is that the Court altered the law in an attempt to make it easier for claimants to succeed in an action alleging a de facto expropriation. These changes have implication for the Canadian law governing the relationship between the state and private property owners when property is regulated. Hitherto an issue dealt with by the democratic process, the Court has moved closer to making property a quasi-constitutional right, one limiting the freedom of the democratically elected majority to regulate private property in the public interest. Dans une décision de 2022, Annapolis Group Inc. c. Municipalité régionale d’Halifax, la Cour suprême du Canada, par une marge très étroite de 5-4, a modifié le critère de longue date relatif à l’expropriation de fait, tout en insistant, à tort, sur le fait qu’elle ne le modifiait pas. L’exigence selon laquelle l’État doit acquérir un intérêt dans une propriété par voie de réglementation a été remplacée par une exigence selon laquelle il doit acquérir ce que l’on appelle un « avantage ». La Cour a été remarquablement peu claire sur ce qui constitue un « avantage » et sur les types d’« avantages » qui suffisent. Tout ce que nous savons, c’est que le terme « avantage » a remplacé l’exigence précédente selon laquelle l’État doit acquérir un intérêt dans un bien-fonds. La Cour suprême a également modifié le critère concernant la perte que doit subir le citoyen. La nécessité d’établir que le demandeur a perdu « toutes les utilisations raisonnables de son bien » a été remplacée par « toutes les utilisations raisonnables potentielles », réduisant ainsi l’importance de la nature des terrains et de leurs utilisations antérieures. La Cour n’a pas précisé ce que signifiait exactement le terme « potentiel » et s’est montrée tout aussi évasive quant à la signification et à la portée des autres changements qu’elle a apportés à l’évaluation de la question de savoir si un propriétaire a perdu toutes les utilisations raisonnables de son bien en vertu de la réglementation pertinente. Tout ce que nous pouvons dire avec certitude, c’est que la Cour a modifié le droit dans le but de permettre aux demandeurs d’obtenir plus facilement gain de cause dans une action alléguant une expropriation de fait. Ces changements ont une incidence sur la législation canadienne régissant les relations entre l’État et les propriétaires privés lorsque la propriété est réglementée. Alors que, jusqu’à présent, ces relations étaient traitées dans le cadre d’un processus démocratique, la Cour s’est rapprochée de l’idée de faire de la propriété un droit quasi-constitutionnel, limitant la liberté de la majorité démocratiquement élue de réglementer la propriété privée dans l’intérêt public

A Framework for Interpreting Emojis in Legal Contexts

In the 2023 case of South West Terminal Ltd. v. Achter Land & Cattle Ltd., a Saskatchewan court found that a thumbs-up emoji, as a standalone item of communication, constituted the acceptance of a contract between a buyer and seller. The trial judge noted that such communication was “the new reality in Canadian society” for which courts should be prepared to interpret novel units of language arising in the digital age. However, an analysis of recent Canadian cases involving emojis shows that courts have not been prepared, with inconsistencies in how emojis are represented in evidence, how they are analysed, how much interpretive weight they are given, or whether they are dismissed as decorative and without linguistic value. This paper argues that while emojis are not a standardized form of communication, they hold linguistic value which makes them critical to the interpretation of evidence. Part I reviews how the field of linguistics has studied emojis. Part II explains how a corpus of English-language Canadian case law was built and analysed to map patterns and inconsistencies in Canadian courts’ emoji interpretation. It also argues that the South West analysis of the emoji in question provides a skeleton for an interpretive framework for emoji. Part III outlines how such a framework could be realized, drawing from both linguistics and jurisprudence. The paper concludes with a caution against courts’ downplaying the communicative value and function of emojis and argues that a structured interpretive approach could help courts more accurately infer meaning from typed communication in evidence

Vincent Wong: Racial Capitalism and International Student Policy

Join student editor Cameron Capello as he sits down with Assistant Professor and PhD Candidate Vincent Wong to discuss his recent paper in the Dalhousie Law Journal titled Racial Capitalism, Neocolonial Wealth Transfer, and Canadian International Student Policy. Professor Wong is an Assistant Professor at the University of Windsor Faculty of Law and a PhD Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School. His dissertation focuses on racial capitalism and the structures that produce unfree, status-excluded labour in Canada. This conversation explores the concept of racial capitalism and its impact on Canada’s international student policies

Legal Responses to Work-Related Intimate Partner Violence in Canada: Troubling Privatization

Intimate partner violence and coercive control can manifest in abusers’ attempts to sabotage their partners’ participation in employment. Work-related intimate partner violence (WRIPV) also implicates employers, governments, and society more broadly, challenging the individualizing frame often applied to IPV. However, the legal recognition of WRIPV has been slow and sporadic, disproportionately impacting women experiencing intersecting inequalities, who are more vulnerable to IPV and to work-related inequalities. This article examines how governments have responded to WRIPV, situating their responses in the continuing legacy of the public/private distinction. Using a rights-based framework, I evaluate the two newest Canadian reforms concerning WRIPV: occupational health and safety and employment leave legislation. Both reforms specifically attend to WRIPV, at least in some jurisdictions, and provide preventive potential and remedial support for the economic and other consequences of IPV. Yet they also have shortcomings, including lack of coverage of some forms of IPV and some workplaces, loss of pay, and verification requirements that draw on gendered myths and stereotypes. I conclude by identifying further government action needed to better address WRIPV. La violence conjugale et le contrôle coercitif peuvent se manifester par les tentatives des agresseurs de saboter la participation de leur partenaire au marché du travail. La violence conjugale liée au travail concerne également les employeurs, les gouvernements et la société en général, remettant en question le cadre individualisant souvent appliqué à la violence conjugale. Cependant, la reconnaissance juridique de la violence conjugale liée au travail se fait lentement et de manière sporadique, touchant de manière disproportionnée les femmes victimes d’inégalités croisées, qui sont plus vulnérables à la violence conjugale et aux inégalités en milieu de travail. Cet article examine la manière dont les gouvernements ont réagi à la violence conjugale liée au travail, en situant leurs réponses dans la continuité de la distinction entre le public et le privé. En m’appuyant sur un cadre axé sur les droits, j’évalue les deux dernières réformes canadiennes en matière de violence conjugale liée au travail : la législation sur la santé et la sécurité au travail et la législation sur les congés de travail. Ces deux réformes traitent spécifiquement de la violence conjugale liée au travail, du moins dans certaines provinces, et offrent un potentiel de prévention et un soutien visant à remédier aux conséquences économiques et autres de la violence conjugale. Elles comportent toutefois des lacunes, notamment l’absence de couverture de certaines formes de violence conjugale et de certains lieux de travail, la perte de salaire et les exigences de vérification qui reposent sur des mythes et des stéréotypes sexistes. Je conclus en indiquant les mesures supplémentaires que les gouvernements devraient prendre pour mieux lutter contre la violence conjugale liée au travail

Role Call: Can a Backbench Legislator Practice as a Criminal Defence Lawyer? A Legal Ethics Analysis

Legislators come from a range of backgrounds. Many legislators happen to be lawyers. Parliamentary rules typically allow legislators who are not members of Cabinet to practice a profession part-time. However, the part-time practice of law poses special legal ethics challenges. In this article, we consider the legal ethics issues that arise when a backbench legislator of the governing party practices criminal defence law part-time. We argue that such a dual role engages three serious, unavoidable, and perhaps even unresolvable legal ethics issues. The first issue is the time constraints imposed by outside interests. The second issue is conflicts of interest, specifically the risk that the legislator-lawyer may favour their political future over their clients’ interests by soft-peddling their advocacy to avoid embarrassing the government. The third issue is the duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice, i.e. the risk that Crown prosecutors may be, or perceived to be, pressured to give lenient treatment to the legislator-lawyer’s clients due to the possibility of retaliation. Thus, we recommend that legislators avoid this situation and law societies actively consider these issues

The Use of AI in Canadian Courts

Like many other fields, there has been growing discussion about the potential benefits of AI for the law. In light of the Federal Court’s interim principles and guidelines on the use of AI, this paper considers whether AI applications can assist the judiciary with its decision-making function. In doing so, it starts by considering the role that judges play in our legal system, finding that they are often called upon to consider and weigh information with human, emotional qualities and to assess the broader policy implications of their legal rulings. This paper concludes that the optimism of proponents of AI in the courtroom may be misplaced. The mathematical, mechanistic decision-making of AI applications does not replicate the kind of decisions judges are called upon to make. Moreover, it may be dangerous. Humans tend to defer to recommendations produced by algorithms, and AI applications are so complex that perhaps no one person—and certainly no one in the legal field—has the expertise necessary to understand how and why an AI application has reached a particular recommendation. Instead, the solution to lessening the burden on our legal system may be the more obvious, but less trendy question, of funding. More judges and more court staff may go much farther