Guilt By Genetic Association: The Fourth Amendment and the Search of Private Genetic Databases by Law Enforcement

Over the course of 2018, a number of suspects in unsolved crimes have been identified through the use of GEDMatch, a public online genetic database. Law enforcement’s use of GEDMatch to identify suspects in cold cases likely does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the genetic information hosted on the website is publicly available. Transparency reports from direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing providers like 23andMe and Ancestry suggest that federal and state officials may now be requesting access to private genetic databases as well. Whether law enforcement’s use of private DTC genetic databases to search for familial relatives of a suspect’s genetic profile constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is far less clear. A strict application of the third-party doctrine suggests that individuals have no expectation of privacy in genetic information that they voluntarily disclose to third parties, including DTC providers. This Note, however, contends that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States overwhelmingly supports the proposition that genetic information disclosed to third-party DTC providers is subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Approximately fifteen million individuals in the United States have already submitted their genetic information to DTC providers. The genetic information held by these providers can reveal a host of highly intimate details about consumers’ medical conditions, behavioral traits, genetic health risks, ethnic background, and familial relationships. Allowing law enforcement warrantless access to investigate third-party DTC genetic databases circumvents their consumers’ reasonable expectations of privacy by exposing this sensitive genetic information to law enforcement without any meaningful oversight. Furthermore, individuals likely reasonably expect that they retain ownership over their uniquely personal genetic information despite their disclosure of that information to a thirdparty provider. This Note therefore asserts that the third-party doctrine does not permit law enforcement to conduct warrantless searches for suspects on private DTC genetics databases under the Fourth Amendment

Trumping communitarianism: crime control and forensic DNA typing and databasing in Singapore

Liberalism and communitarianism have figured prominently in discussions of how to govern forensic DNA practices (forensic DNA typing and databasing). Despite the prominence of these two political philosophies and their underlying values, no studies have looked at the governance of forensic DNA practices in a nondemocratic country governed by a communitarian logic. To fill this lacuna in the literature, this article considers Singapore as an authoritarian state governed by a communitarian philosophy. The article highlights basic innovations and technologies of forensic DNA practices and articulates a liberal democratic version of “biolegality” as described by Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally. It goes on to consider briefly various (political) philosophies (liberalism and communitarianism) and law enforcement models (due process and crime control models). The main part of the article records the trajectory, and hence biolegal progress, of forensic DNA practices in Singapore and compares it with trajectories in England and the United States. The article concludes that Singapore's forensic DNA practices are organized according to the crime control model and therefore safety and the war against crime and terrorism trump individual rights and legal principles such as privacy, bodily integrity, proportionality, presumption of innocence. and onus of proof

The influence of relatives on the efficiency and error rate of familial searching

We investigate the consequences of adopting the criteria used by the state of California, as described by Myers et al. (2011), for conducting familial searches. We carried out a simulation study of randomly generated profiles of related and unrelated individuals with 13-locus CODIS genotypes and YFiler Y-chromosome haplotypes, on which the Myers protocol for relative identification was carried out. For Y-chromosome sharing first degree relatives, the Myers protocol has a high probability (80 - 99%) of identifying their relationship. For unrelated individuals, there is a low probability that an unrelated person in the database will be identified as a first-degree relative. For more distant Y-haplotype sharing relatives (half-siblings, first cousins, half-first cousins or second cousins) there is a substantial probability that the more distant relative will be incorrectly identified as a first-degree relative. For example, there is a 3 - 18% probability that a first cousin will be identified as a full sibling, with the probability depending on the population background. Although the California familial search policy is likely to identify a first degree relative if his profile is in the database, and it poses little risk of falsely identifying an unrelated individual in a database as a first-degree relative, there is a substantial risk of falsely identifying a more distant Y-haplotype sharing relative in the database as a first-degree relative, with the consequence that their immediate family may become the target for further investigation. This risk falls disproportionately on those ethnic groups that are currently overrepresented in state and federal databases.Comment: main text: 19 pages, 4 tables, 2 figures supplemental text: 2 pages, 5 tables all together as single fil

Hidden in full sight: kinship, science and the law in the aftermath of the Srebrenica genocide

Terms such as “relationship testing,” “familial searching” and “kinship analysis” figure prominently in professional practices of disaster victim identification (DVI). However, despite the dependence of those identification technologies on DNA samples from people who might be related to the dead and despite also the prominence of the notion of “relatedness” as a device for identifying the dead, the concepts of “relatedness” and “kinship” remain elusive both in practice and in analyses of the social and ethical aspects of DVI by DNA; they are hidden in full sight. In this article, we wish to bring kinship more to the fore. We achieve this through a case study of a setting where bio-legal framings dominate, that is, in the trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of Radovan Karadžić for the Srebrenica genocide in 1995. DNA samples from the families of those massacred in Srebrenica were vital for the identification of individual victims but are now also utilized as “evidence” by both the prosecution and the defense. By viewing practices of science (“evidence” and “identification”) and legal practices (“justice,” “prosecution” and “defence”) through the lens of kinship studies, we will present some alternative and complementary framings for the social accomplishment of ‘relatedness’

Accuracy of medical billing data against the electronic health record in the measurement of colorectal cancer screening rates.

ObjectiveMedical billing data are an attractive source of secondary analysis because of their ease of use and potential to answer population-health questions with statistical power. Although these datasets have known susceptibilities to biases, the degree to which they can distort the assessment of quality measures such as colorectal cancer screening rates are not widely appreciated, nor are their causes and possible solutions.MethodsUsing a billing code database derived from our institution's electronic health records, we estimated the colorectal cancer screening rate of average-risk patients aged 50-74 years seen in primary care or gastroenterology clinic in 2016-2017. 200 records (150 unscreened, 50 screened) were sampled to quantify the accuracy against manual review.ResultsOut of 4611 patients, an analysis of billing data suggested a 61% screening rate, an estimate that matches the estimate by the Centers for Disease Control. Manual review revealed a positive predictive value of 96% (86%-100%), negative predictive value of 21% (15%-29%) and a corrected screening rate of 85% (81%-90%). Most false negatives occurred due to examinations performed outside the scope of the database-both within and outside of our institution-but 21% of false negatives fell within the database's scope. False positives occurred due to incomplete examinations and inadequate bowel preparation. Reasons for screening failure include ordered but incomplete examinations (48%), lack of or incorrect documentation by primary care (29%) including incorrect screening intervals (13%) and patients declining screening (13%).ConclusionsBilling databases are prone to substantial bias that may go undetected even in the presence of confirmatory external estimates. Caution is recommended when performing population-level inference from these data. We propose several solutions to improve the use of these data for the assessment of healthcare quality

Screening for familial hypercholesterolaemia in primary care: Time for general practice to play its part

Fifty per cent of first-degree relatives of index cases with familial hypercholesterolemia (FH) inherit the disorder. Despite cascade screening being the most cost-effective method for detecting new cases, only a minority of individuals with FH are currently identified. Primary care is a key target area to increase identification of new index cases and initiate cascade screening, thereby finding close relatives of all probands. Increasing public and health professional awareness about FH is essential. In the United Kingdom and in Australia, most of the population are reviewed by a General Practitioner (GP) at least once over a three-year period, offering opportunities to check for FH as part of routine clinical consultations. Such opportunistic approaches can be supplemented by systematically searching electronic health records with information technology tools that identify high risk patients. GPs can help investigate and implement results of this data retrieval. Current evidence suggests that early detection of FH and cascade testing meet most of the criteria for a worthwhile screening program. Among heterozygous patients the long latent period before the expected onset of coronary artery disease provides an opportunity for initiating effective drug and lifestyle changes. The greatest challenge for primary care is to implement an efficacious model of care that incorporates sustainable identification and management pathways

Routes for breaching and protecting genetic privacy

We are entering the era of ubiquitous genetic information for research, clinical care, and personal curiosity. Sharing these datasets is vital for rapid progress in understanding the genetic basis of human diseases. However, one growing concern is the ability to protect the genetic privacy of the data originators. Here, we technically map threats to genetic privacy and discuss potential mitigation strategies for privacy-preserving dissemination of genetic data.Comment: Draft for comment

Feline hypersomatotropism and acromegaly tumorigenesis: a potential role for the AIP gene

Acromegaly in humans is usually sporadic, however up to 20% of familial isolated pituitary adenomas are caused by germline sequence variants of the aryl-hydrocarbon-receptor interacting protein (AIP) gene. Feline acromegaly has similarities to human acromegalic families with AIP mutations. The aim of this study was to sequence the feline AIP gene, identify sequence variants and compare the AIP gene sequence between feline acromegalic and control cats, and in acromegalic siblings. The feline AIP gene was amplified through PCR using whole blood genomic DNA from 10 acromegalic and 10 control cats, and 3 sibling pairs affected by acromegaly. PCR products were sequenced and compared with the published predicted feline AIP gene. A single nonsynonymous SNP was identified in exon 1 (AIP:c.9T > G) of two acromegalic cats and none of the control cats, as well as both members of one sibling pair. The region of this SNP is considered essential for the interaction of the AIP protein with its receptor. This sequence variant has not previously been reported in humans. Two additional synonymous sequence variants were identified (AIP:c.481C > T and AIP:c.826C > T). This is the first molecular study to investigate a potential genetic cause of feline acromegaly and identified a nonsynonymous AIP single nucleotide polymorphism in 20% of the acromegalic cat population evaluated, as well as in one of the sibling pairs evaluated