Quasi-Nash Equilibria for Non-Convex Distributed Power Allocation Games in Cognitive Radios

In this paper, we consider a sensing-based spectrum sharing scenario in cognitive radio networks where the overall objective is to maximize the sum-rate of each cognitive radio user by optimizing jointly both the detection operation based on sensing and the power allocation, taking into account the influence of the sensing accuracy and the interference limitation to the primary users. The resulting optimization problem for each cognitive user is non-convex, thus leading to a non-convex game, which presents a new challenge when analyzing the equilibria of this game where each cognitive user represents a player. In order to deal with the non-convexity of the game, we use a new relaxed equilibria concept, namely, quasi-Nash equilibrium (QNE). A QNE is a solution of a variational inequality obtained under the first-order optimality conditions of the player's problems, while retaining the convex constraints in the variational inequality problem. In this work, we state the sufficient conditions for the existence of the QNE for the proposed game. Specifically, under the so-called linear independent constraint qualification, we prove that the achieved QNE coincides with the NE. Moreover, a distributed primal-dual interior point optimization algorithm that converges to a QNE of the proposed game is provided in the paper, which is shown from the simulations to yield a considerable performance improvement with respect to an alternating direction optimization algorithm and a deterministic game

A Comprehensive Survey of Potential Game Approaches to Wireless Networks

Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In this paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless networks that have been proven to be potential games are comprehensively discussed.Comment: 44 pages, 6 figures, to appear in IEICE Transactions on Communications, vol. E98-B, no. 9, Sept. 201

Non-convex power allocation games in MIMO cognitive radio networks

Consideramos un escenario de reparto del espectro, basado en la detección, en una red de radio cognitiva MIMO donde el objetivo general es maximizar el rendimiento total de cada usuario de radio cognitiva optimizando conjuntamente la operación de detección y la asignación de potencia en todos los canales, bajo una restricción de interferencia para los usuarios primarios. Los problemas de optimización resultantes conducen a un juego no convexo, que presenta un nuevo desafío a la hora de analizar los equilibrios de este juego. Con el fin de hacer frente a la no convexidad del juego, utilizamos un nuevo concepto relajado de equilibrio, el equilibrio cuasi-Nash (QNE). Se demuestran las condiciones suficientes para la existencia y la unicidad de un QNE. El trabajo también presenta un método de optimización de punto interior primal-dual que converge a un QNE. Los resultados de la simulación muestran que el juego propuesto puede lograr una considerable mejora del rendimiento con respecto a un juego determinista.TEC2010- 19545-C04-04 “COSIMA”,CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 CSD2008-00010 “COMONSENS”“HYDROBIONETS” FP7 Grant no. 287613 FP7We consider a sensing-based spectrum sharing scenario in a MIMO cognitive radio network where the overall objective is to maximize the total throughput of each cognitive radio user by jointly optimizing both the detection operation and the power allocation over all the channels, under a interference constraint bound to primary users. The resulting optimization problems lead to a non-convex game, which presents a new challenge when analyzing the equilibria of this game. In order to deal with the non-convexity of the game, we use a new relaxed equilibria concept, namely, quasi-Nash equilibrium (QNE). We show the sufficient conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of a QNE. A primal-dual interior point optimization method that converges to a QNE is also discussed in this paper. Simulation results show that the proposed game can achieve a considerable performance improvement with respect to a deterministic game

Non-convex distributed power allocation games in cognitive radio networks

In this thesis, we explore interweave communication systems in cognitive radio networks where the overall objective is to maximize the sum-rate of each cognitive radio user by optimizing jointly both the detection operation based on sensing and the power allocation across channels, taking into account the influence of the sensing accuracy and the interference limitation to the primary users. The optimization problem is addressed in single and multiuser cognitive radio networks for both single-input single-output and multi-input multi-output channels. Firstly, we study the resource allocation optimization problem for single-input single-output single user cognitive radio networks, wherein the cognitive radio aims at maximizing its own sum-rate by jointly optimizing the sensing information and power allocation over all the channels. In this framework, we consider an opportunistic spectrum access model under interweave systems, where a cognitive radio user detects active primary user transmissions over all the channels, and decides to transmit if the sensing results indicate that the primary user is inactive at this channel. However, due to the sensing errors, the cognitive users might access the channel when it is still occupied by active primary users, which causes harmful interference to both cognitive radio users and primary users. This motivates the introduction of a novel interference constraint, denoted as rate-loss gap constraint, which is proposed to design the power allocation, ensuring that the performance degradation of the primary user is bounded. The resulting problem is non-convex, thus, an exhaustive optimization algorithm and an alternating direction optimization algorithm are proposed to solve the problem efficiently. Secondly, the resource allocation problem for a single-input single-output multiuser cognitive radio network under a sensing-based spectrum sharing scheme is analyzed as a strategic non-cooperative game, where each cognitive radio user is selfish and strives to use the available spectrum in order to maximize its own sum-rate by considering the effect of imperfect sensing information. The resulting game-theoretical formulations belong to the class of non-convex games. A distributed cooperative sensing scheme based on a consensus algorithm is considered in the proposed game, where all the cognitive radio users can share their sensing information locally. We start with the alternating direction optimization algorithm, and prove that the local Nash equilibrium is achieved by the alternating direction optimization algorithm. In the next step, we use a new relaxed equilibrium concept, namely, quasi-Nash equilibrium for the non-convex game. The analysis of the sufficient conditions for the existence of the quasi-Nash equilibrium for the proposed game is provided. Furthermore, an iterative primal-dual interior point algorithm that converges to a quasi-Nash equilibrium of the proposed game is also proposed. From the simulation results, the proposed algorithm is shown to yield a considerable performance improvement in terms of the sum-rate of each cognitive radio user, with respect to previous state-of-the-art algorithms. Finally, we investigate a multiple-input multiple-output multiuser cognitive radio network under the opportunistic spectrum access scheme. We focus on the throughput of each cognitive radio user under correct sensing information, and exclude the throughput due to the erroneous decision of the cognitive radio users to transmit over occupied channels. The optimization problem is analyzed as a strategic non-cooperative game, where the transmit covariance matrix, sensing time, and detection threshold are considered as multidimensional variables to be optimized jointly. We also use the new relaxed equilibrium concept quasi-Nash equilibrium and prove that the proposed game can achieve a quasi-Nash equilibrium under certain conditions, by making use of the variational inequality method. In particular, we prove theoretically the sufficient condition of the existence and the uniqueness of the quasi-Nash equilibrium for this game. Furthermore, a possible extension of this work considering equal sensing time is also discussed. Simulation results show that the iterative primal-dual interior point algorithm is an efficient solution that converges to the quasi-Nash equilibrium of the proposed game

Transmitter Optimization in Multiuser Wireless Systems with Quality of Service Constraints

In this dissertation, transmitter adaptation for optimal resource allocation in wireless communication systems are investigated. First, a multiple access channel model is considered where many transmitters communicate with a single receiver. This scenario is a basic component of a. wireless network in which multiple users simultaneously access the resources of a wireless service provider. Adaptive algorithms for transmitter optimization to meet Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements in a distributed manner are studied. Second, an interference channel model is considered where multiple interfering transmitter-receiver pairs co-exist such that a given transmitter communicates with its intended receiver in the presence of interference from other transmitters. This scenario models a wireless network in which several wireless service providers share the spectrum to offer their services by using dynamic spectrum access and cognitive radio (CR) technologies. The primary objective of dynamic spectrum access in the CR approach is to enable use of the frequency band dynamically and opportunistically without creating harmful interference to licensed incumbent users. Specifically, CR users are envisioned to be able to provide high bandwidth and efficient utilization of the spectrum via dynamic spectrum access in heterogeneous networks. In this scenario, a distributed method is investigated for combined precoder and power adaptation of CR transmitters for dynamic spectrum sharing in cognitive radio systems. Finally, the effect of limited feedback for transmitter optimization is analyzed where precoder adaptation uses the quantized version of interference information or the predictive vector quantization for incremental updates. The performance of the transmitter adaptation algorithms is also studied in the context of fading channels

Stochastic Differential Games and Energy-Efficient Power Control

One of the contributions of this work is to formulate the problem of energy-efficient power control in multiple access channels (namely, channels which comprise several transmitters and one receiver) as a stochastic differential game. The players are the transmitters who adapt their power level to the quality of their time-varying link with the receiver, their battery level, and the strategy updates of the others. The proposed model not only allows one to take into account long-term strategic interactions but also long-term energy constraints. A simple sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this game is provided and shown to be verified in a typical scenario. As the uniqueness and determination of equilibria are difficult issues in general, especially when the number of players goes large, we move to two special cases: the single player case which gives us some useful insights of practical interest and allows one to make connections with the case of large number of players. The latter case is treated with a mean-field game approach for which reasonable sufficient conditions for convergence and uniqueness are provided. Remarkably, this recent approach for large system analysis shows how scalability can be dealt with in large games and only relies on the individual state information assumption.Comment: The final publication is available at http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article\&id=doi:10.1007/s13235-012-0068-

Game Theory and Microeconomic Theory for Beamforming Design in Multiple-Input Single-Output Interference Channels

In interference-limited wireless networks, interference management techniques are important in order to improve the performance of the systems. Given that spectrum and energy are scarce resources in these networks, techniques that exploit the resources efficiently are desired. We consider a set of base stations operating concurrently in the same spectral band. Each base station is equipped with multiple antennas and transmits data to a single-antenna mobile user. This setting corresponds to the multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference channel (IFC). The receivers are assumed to treat interference signals as noise. Moreover, each transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers perfectly. We study the conflict between the transmitter-receiver pairs (links) using models from game theory and microeconomic theory. These models provide solutions to resource allocation problems which in our case correspond to the joint beamforming design at the transmitters. Our interest lies in solutions that are Pareto optimal. Pareto optimality ensures that it is not further possible to improve the performance of any link without reducing the performance of another link. Strategic games in game theory determine the noncooperative choice of strategies of the players. The outcome of a strategic game is a Nash equilibrium. While the Nash equilibrium in the MISO IFC is generally not efficient, we characterize the necessary null-shaping constraints on the strategy space of each transmitter such that the Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal. An arbitrator is involved in this setting which dictates the constraints at each transmitter. In contrast to strategic games, coalitional games provide cooperative solutions between the players. We study cooperation between the links via coalitional games without transferable utility. Cooperative beamforming schemes considered are either zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the core of the coalitional game with zero forcing transmission is not empty. The core solution concept specifies the strategies with which all players have the incentive to cooperate jointly in a grand coalition. While the core only considers the formation of the grand coalition, coalition formation games study coalition dynamics. We utilize a coalition formation algorithm, called merge-and-split, to determine stable link grouping. Numerical results show that while in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime noncooperation between the links is efficient, at high SNR all links benefit in forming a grand coalition. Coalition formation shows its significance in the mid SNR regime where subset link cooperation provides joint performance gains. We use the models of exchange and competitive market from microeconomic theory to determine Pareto optimal equilibria in the two-user MISO IFC. In the exchange model, the links are represented as consumers that can trade goods within themselves. The goods in our setting correspond to the parameters of the beamforming vectors necessary to achieve all Pareto optimal points in the utility region. We utilize the conflict representation of the consumers in the Edgeworth box, a graphical tool that depicts the allocation of the goods for the two consumers, to provide closed-form solution to all Pareto optimal outcomes. The exchange equilibria are a subset of the points on the Pareto boundary at which both consumers achieve larger utility then at the Nash equilibrium. We propose a decentralized bargaining process between the consumers which starts at the Nash equilibrium and ends at an outcome arbitrarily close to an exchange equilibrium. The design of the bargaining process relies on a systematic study of the allocations in the Edgeworth box. In comparison to the exchange model, a competitive market additionally defines prices for the goods. The equilibrium in this economy is called Walrasian and corresponds to the prices that equate the demand to the supply of goods. We calculate the unique Walrasian equilibrium and propose a coordination process that is realized by the arbitrator which distributes the Walrasian prices to the consumers. The consumers then calculate in a decentralized manner their optimal demand corresponding to beamforming vectors that achieve the Walrasian equilibrium. This outcome is Pareto optimal and lies in the set of exchange equilibria. In this thesis, based on the game theoretic and microeconomic models, efficient beamforming strategies are proposed that jointly improve the performance of the systems. The gained results are applicable in interference-limited wireless networks requiring either coordination from the arbitrator or direct cooperation between the transmitters