Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing

Following a brief overview in Part I.A of the overall system to prevent money laundering, Part I.B describes the role of the private sector, which is to identify customers, create a profile of their legitimate activities, keep detailed records of clients and their transactions, monitor their transactions to see if they conform to their profile, examine further any unusual transactions, and report to the government any suspicious transactions. Part I.C continues the description of the preventive measures system by describing the government\u27s role, which is to assist the private sector in identifying suspicious transactions, ensure compliance with the preventive measures requirements, and analyze suspicious transaction reports to determine those that should be investigated. Parts I.D and I.E examine the effectiveness of this system. Part I.D discusses successes and failures in the private sector\u27s role. Borrowing from theory concerning the effectiveness of private sector unfunded mandates, this Part reviews why many aspects of the system are failing, focusing on the subjectivity of the mandate, the disincentives to comply, and the lack of comprehensive data on client identification and transactions. It notes that the system includes an inherent contradiction: the public sector is tasked with informing the private sector how best to detect launderers and terrorists, but to do so could act as a road map on how to avoid detection should such information fall into the wrong hands. Part I.D discusses how financial institutions do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine if a particular client or set of transactions is more likely than others to indicate criminal activity. Part I.D then turns to a discussion of a few issues regarding the impact the system has but that are not related to effectiveness, followed by a summary and analysis of how flaws might be addressed. Part I.E continues by discussing the successes and failures in the public sector\u27s role. It reviews why the system is failing, focusing on the lack of assistance to the private sector in and the lack of necessary data on client identification and transactions. It also discusses how financial intelligence units, like financial institutions, do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of criminal activity. Part I concludes with a summary and analysis tying both private and public roles together. Part II then turns to a review of certain current techniques for selecting income tax returns for audit. After an overview of the system, Part II first discusses the limited role of the private sector in providing tax administrators with information, comparing this to the far greater role the private sector plays in implementing preventive measures. Next, this Part turns to consider how tax administrators, particularly the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, select taxpayers for audit, comparing this to the role of both the private and public sectors in implementing preventive measures. It focuses on how some tax administrations use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of tax evasion. Part II then suggests how flaws in both private and public roles of implementing money laundering and terrorism financing preventive measures might be theoretically addressed by borrowing from the experience of tax administration. Part II concludes with a short summary and analysis that relates these conclusions to the preventive measures system. Referring to the analyses in Parts I and II, Part III suggests changes to the current preventive measures standard. It suggests that financial intelligence units should be uniquely tasked with analyzing and selecting clients and transactions for further investigation for money laundering and terrorism financing. The private sector\u27s role should be restricted to identifying customers, creating an initial profile of their legitimate activities, and reporting such information and all client transactions to financial intelligence units

Modelling Planner-Carrier Interactions in Road Freight Transport: Optimization of Road Maintenance Costs Via Overloading Control

A bi-level modelling approach is proposed to represent the interaction between the vehicle loading practices of road freight transport carriers, and the decisions of a road planning authority responsible both for road maintenance and for the enforcement of overloading control. At the lower (reactive) level, the overloading decisions of the carriers impact on road maintenance expenditure, while at the upper (anticipatory) level the planner decides fine and enforcement levels by anticipating the responses of the carriers. A case study using data from Mexico is used to illustrate the method

The ‘Principles’ Paradox

This essay, prepared for a University of Cambridge conference on ‘Principles Versus Rules in Financial Regulation’, posits a new issue in that debate. Although principles-based regulation is thought to more closely achieve normative goals than rules, the extent to which that occurs can depend on the enforcement regime. A person who is subject to unpredictable liability is likely to hew to the most conservative interpretation of the principle, especially where that person would be a potential deep pocket in litigation. This creates a paradox: unless protected by a regime enabling one in good faith to exercise judgment without fear of liability, such a person will effectively act as if subject to a rule and, even worse, an unintended rule

Security and VO management capabilities in a large-scale Grid operating system

This paper presents a number of security and VO management capabilities in a large-scale distributed Grid operating system. The capabilities formed the basis of the design and implementation of a number of security and VO management services in the system. The main aim of the paper is to provide some idea of the various functionality cases that need to be considered when designing similar large-scale systems in the future

Promissory Estoppel and the Protection of Interpersonal Trust

This paper examines the role of trust in promissory estoppel and the extent to which the law should protect trust when a promise is made. Part II of this Article summarizes some of the scholarship discussing the nature and role of trust. In particular, it discusses the role of trust in a market economy, and the related role of trust in Contracts law. Part III examines whether there is a difference between trust and reliance, and whether it matters. Part III further asserts that a separate discussion of trust is beneficial because it has the potential to guide and inform internal decision-making in a way that is not possible by simply focusing on outward reliance. Part IV of this Article discusses the role of trust in the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Part V sets forth why the law should promote an optimal level of trust, as opposed to a maximum protection of trust no matter what. It discusses the need for promisees to exercise self-reliance and self-protection in order to avoid overreliance. Part VI identifies the types of cases where trust should be protected. Such cases include ones where the promisee is engaged in a transaction that she cannot avoid, where she has no control over the structure of the transaction, and where she has no choice but to trust the promisor (or more accurately, trust the legal system to enforce the promise). Part VII presents the polar end of the spectrum where trust should not be protected. Part VIII concludes the Article

Service-oriented coordination platform for technology-enhanced learning

It is currently difficult to coordinate learning processes, not only because multiple stakeholders are involved (such as students, teachers, administrative staff, technical staff), but also because these processes are driven by sophisticated rules (such as rules on how to provide learning material, rules on how to assess students’ progress, rules on how to share educational responsibilities). This is one of the reasons for the slow progress in technology-enhanced learning. Consequently, there is a clear demand for technological facilitation of the coordination of learning processes. In this work, we suggest some solution directions that are based on SOA (Service-Oriented Architecture). In particular, we propose a coordination service pattern consistent with SOA and based on requirements that follow from an analysis of both learning processes and potentially useful support technologies. We present the service pattern considering both functional and non-functional issues, and we address policy enforcement as well. Finally, we complement our proposed architecture-level solution directions with an example. The example illustrates our ideas and is also used to identify: (i) a short list of educational IT services; (ii) related non-functional concerns; they will be considered in future work

Radar Detectors, Fixed and Variable Costs of Crime

Raising the sanction will always reduce the utility of the criminal. However, raising the sanction will not always lead to less crime, and may lead to more crime. If a criminal has the opportunity to commit multiple criminal acts and has fixed and variable costs of committing these acts, then an increase in the criminal sanction, over a certain range of sanctions, may actually lead the criminal to commit more crime. The reason is that as the sanction is increased, the criminal may increase his expenditures on fixed costs, which may decrease his variable costs of committing a criminal act. Once the criminal pays his fixed costs, they will be sunk costs, and thus they will no longer enter into the criminal's decision process of committing criminal acts. But the variable cost of crime will enter into the criminal's decision process. If raising the sanction leads to decreasing variable costs of crime then raising the sanction may actually lead to more crime. The example of the criminal's decision to purchase a radar detector and to speed is used to illustrate the point.Crime, Criminal Law