Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities

The question of how the probabilistic opinions of different individuals should be aggregated to form a group opinion is controversial. But one assumption seems to be pretty much common ground: for a group of Bayesians, the representation of group opinion should itself be a unique probability distribution (Madansky 44; Lehrer and Wagner 34; McConway Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76(374), 410--414, 45; Bordley Management Science, 28(10), 1137--1148, 5; Genest et al. The Annals of Statistics, 487--501, 21; Genest and Zidek Statistical Science, 114--135, 23; Mongin Journal of Economic Theory, 66(2), 313--351, 46; Clemen and Winkler Risk Analysis, 19(2), 187--203, 7; Dietrich and List 14; Herzberg Theory and Decision, 1--19, 28). We argue that this assumption is not always in order. We show how to extend the canonical mathematical framework for pooling to cover pooling with imprecise probabilities (IP) by employing set-valued pooling functions and generalizing common pooling axioms accordingly. As a proof of concept, we then show that one IP construction satisfies a number of central pooling axioms that are not jointly satisfied by any of the standard pooling recipes on pain of triviality. Following Levi (Synthese, 62(1), 3--11, 39), we also argue that IP models admit of a much better philosophical motivation as a model of rational consensus

Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence

Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Initial subjectivity, the line goes, is of mere transient significance, giving way to intersubjective agreement eventually. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures that are updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the literature. We also show that such sets converge to a shared, maximally informed opinion. Convergence to a maximally informed opinion is a (weak) Jeffrey conditioning analogue of Bayesian “convergence to the truth” for conditional probabilities. Finally, we demonstrate the philosophical significance of our study by detailing applications to the topics of dynamic coherence, imprecise probabilities, and probabilistic opinion pooling

Reliable Uncertain Evidence Modeling in Bayesian Networks by Credal Networks

A reliable modeling of uncertain evidence in Bayesian networks based on a set-valued quantification is proposed. Both soft and virtual evidences are considered. We show that evidence propagation in this setup can be reduced to standard updating in an augmented credal network, equivalent to a set of consistent Bayesian networks. A characterization of the computational complexity for this task is derived together with an efficient exact procedure for a subclass of instances. In the case of multiple uncertain evidences over the same variable, the proposed procedure can provide a set-valued version of the geometric approach to opinion pooling.Comment: 19 page

Generalized belief change with imprecise probabilities and graphical models

We provide a theoretical investigation of probabilistic belief revision in complex frameworks, under extended conditions of uncertainty, inconsistency and imprecision. We motivate our kinematical approach by specializing our discussion to probabilistic reasoning with graphical models, whose modular representation allows for efficient inference. Most results in this direction are derived from the relevant work of Chan and Darwiche (2005), that first proved the inter-reducibility of virtual and probabilistic evidence. Such forms of information, deeply distinct in their meaning, are extended to the conditional and imprecise frameworks, allowing further generalizations, e.g. to experts' qualitative assessments. Belief aggregation and iterated revision of a rational agent's belief are also explored

Opinions and Preferences as Socially Distributed Attitudes

The dissertation focuses on how to best represent the consensus and attitude dynamic of a group given the attitudes of its individuals. This is done in the Bayesian epistemology framework using pooling with imprecise probabilities, and in utility theory extending Harsanyi's aggregation theorem to characterize other directed attitudes like spite and altruism. The final part of the dissertation considers attitudes within social networks and provides explanations and simulation models for online segregation and tribalism as well as the spread of rumors through contagion. The dissertation hopes to contribute to foundational issues like that of epistemic consensus, but also to new emerging phenomena in social epistemology

Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning

We explore which types of probabilistic updating commute with convex IP pooling (Stewart and Ojea Quintana 2017). Positive results are stated for Bayesian conditionalization (and a mild generalization of it), imaging, and a certain parameterization of Jeffrey conditioning. This last observation is obtained with the help of a slight generalization of a characterization of (precise) externally Bayesian pooling operators due to Wagner (Log J IGPL 18(2):336--345, 2009). These results strengthen the case that pooling should go by imprecise probabilities since no precise pooling method is as versatile

Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation

It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This paper compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able to satisfy the demand. I then proceed to give normative and empirical arguments in support of the pragmatic criterion for opinion aggregation, and that ultimately favor opinion agglomeration

Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation

It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This paper compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able to satisfy the demand. I then proceed to give normative and empirical arguments in support of the pragmatic criterion for opinion aggregation, and that ultimately favor opinion agglomeration

Policymaking under scientific uncertainty

Policymakers who seek to make scientifically informed decisions are constantly confronted by scientific uncertainty and expert disagreement. This thesis asks: how can policymakers rationally respond to expert disagreement and scientific uncertainty? This is a work of nonideal theory, which applies formal philosophical tools developed by ideal theorists to more realistic cases of policymaking under scientific uncertainty. I start with Bayesian approaches to expert testimony and the problem of expert disagreement, arguing that two popular approaches— supra-Bayesianism and the standard model of expert deference—are insufficient. I develop a novel model of expert deference and show how it can deal with many of these problems raised for them. I then turn to opinion pooling, a popular method for dealing with disagreement. I show that various theoretical motivations for pooling functions are irrelevant to realistic policymaking cases. This leads to a cautious recommendation of linear pooling. However, I then show that any pooling method relies on value judgements, that are hidden in the selection of the scoring rule. My focus then narrows to a more specific case of scientific uncertainty: multiple models of the same system. I introduce a particular case study involving hurricane models developed to support insurance decision-making. I recapitulate my analysis of opinion pooling in the context of model ensembles, confirming that my hesitations apply. This motivates a shift of perspective, to viewing the problem as a decision theoretic one. I rework a recently developed ambiguity theory, called the confidence approach, to take input from model ensembles. I show how it facilitates the resolution of the policymaker’s problem in a way that avoids the issues encountered in previous chapters. This concludes my main study of the problem of expert disagreement. In the final chapter, I turn to methodological reflection. I argue that philosophers who employ the mathematical methods of the prior chapters are modelling. Employing results from the philosophy of scientific models, I develop the theory of normative modelling. I argue that it has important methodological conclusions for the practice of formal epistemology, ruling out popular moves such as searching for counterexamples