17 research outputs found
Information Leakage Attacks and Countermeasures
The scientific community has been consistently working on the pervasive problem of information leakage, uncovering numerous attack vectors, and proposing various countermeasures. Despite these efforts, leakage incidents remain prevalent, as the complexity of systems and protocols increases, and sophisticated modeling methods become more accessible to adversaries. This work studies how information leakages manifest in and impact interconnected systems and their users. We first focus on online communications and investigate leakages in the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS). Using modern machine learning models, we show that an eavesdropping adversary can efficiently exploit meta-information (e.g., packet size) not protected by the TLSâ encryption to launch fingerprinting attacks at an unprecedented scale even under non-optimal conditions. We then turn our attention to ultrasonic communications, and discuss their security shortcomings and how adversaries could exploit them to compromise anonymity network users (even though they aim to offer a greater level of privacy compared to TLS). Following up on these, we delve into physical layer leakages that concern a wide array of (networked) systems such as servers, embedded nodes, Tor relays, and hardware cryptocurrency wallets. We revisit location-based side-channel attacks and develop an exploitation neural network. Our model demonstrates the capabilities of a modern adversary but also presents an inexpensive tool to be used by auditors for detecting such leakages early on during the development cycle. Subsequently, we investigate techniques that further minimize the impact of leakages found in production components. Our proposed system design distributes both the custody of secrets and the cryptographic operation execution across several components, thus making the exploitation of leaks difficult
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Architectural Support for Securing Systems Against Software Vulnerabilities
Cyberattacks are the fastest growing crime in the U.S., and they are increasing in size, sophistication, and cost. These attacks use vulnerabilities to compromise systems to leak Information (Yahoo 2016, Marriott 2018, and Facebook 2019), steal identity information (Equifax 2017), or even effecting politics (by attacking the governmental election process). Traditionally, security researchers and practitioners have viewed security as a software problem -- originating in software and to be solved by software. Recently, the Spectre and Meltdown attacks have shown that hardware should also be considered when evaluating the system security. Conversely, because many aspects of security are computationally expensive, hardware can play a role in promoting software security through computational support as well as the development of new abstractions that promote security. Under this general umbrella, the research in this dissertation pursues two research directions that demonstrate how hardware can promote software security, and how we can design hardware that is secure against Spectre and Meltdown attacks. In the first direction, security exploits and ensuant malware pose an increasing challenge to computing systems as the variety and complexity of attacks continue to increase. In response, software-based malware detection tools have grown in complexity, thus making it computationally difficult to use them to protect systems in real-time. Against this drawback, hardware-based malware detectors (HMDs) are a promising new approach to defend against malware. HMDs collect low-level architectural features and use them to classify malware from normal programs. With simple hardware support, HMDs can be always on, operating as a first line of defense that prioritizes the application of more expensive and more accurate software-detector. In this dissertation, our goal is to make HMDs practical for deployment in two ways: (1) Improving the detection accuracy of HMDs: We use specialized detectors targeted towards a specific type of malware to improve the detection of each type. Next, we use ensemble learning techniques to improve the overall accuracy by combining detectors. We explore detectors based on logistic regression (LR) and neural networks (NN). The proposed detectors reduce the false-positive rate by more than half compared to using a single detector, while increasing their sensitivity. We develop metrics to estimate detection overhead; the proposed detectors achieve more than 16.6x overhead reduction during online detection compared to an idealized software-only detector, with an 8x improvement in relative detection time. NN detectors outperform LR detectors in accuracy, overhead (by 40\%), and time-to-detection of the hardware component (by 5x). Finally, we characterize the hardware complexity by extending an open-core and synthesizing it on an FPGA platform, showing that the overhead is minimal. (2) Make them resilient to evasion attacks: we explore the question of how well evasive malware can avoid detection by HMDs. We show that existing HMDs can be effectively reverse-engineered and subsequently evaded, allowing malware to hide from detection without substantially slowing it down (which is important for certain types of malware). This result demonstrates that the current generation of HMDs can be easily defeated by evasive malware. Next, we explore how well a detector can evolve if it is exposed to this evasive malware during training. We show that simple detectors, such as logistic regression, cannot detect the evasive malware even with retraining. More sophisticated detectors can be retrained to detect evasive malware, but the retrained detectors can be reverse-engineered and evaded again. To address these limitations, we propose a new type of Resilient HMDs (RHMDs) that stochastically switch between different detectors. These detectors can be shown to be provably more difficult to reverse engineer based on resent results in probably approximately correct (PAC) learnability theory. We show that indeed such detectors are resilient to both reverse engineering and evasion, and that the resilience increases with the number and diversity of the individual detectors. Our results demonstrate that these HMDs offer effective defense against evasive malware at low additional complexity. In the second direction, the recent Spectre and Meltdown attacks show that speculative execution, which is used pervasively in modern CPUs, can leave side effects in the processor caches and other structures even when the speculated instructions do not commit and their direct effect is not visible. Therefore, they utilize this behavior to expose privileged information accessed speculatively to an unprivileged attacker. In particular, the attack forces the speculative execution of a code gadget that will carry out the illegal read, which eventually gets squashed, but which leaves a side-channel trail that can be used by the attacker to infer the value. Several attack variations are possible, allowing arbitrary exposure of the full kernel memory to an unprivileged attacker. In this dissertation, we introduce a new model (SafeSpec) for supporting speculation in a way that is immune to the side- channel leakage necessary for attacks such as Meltdown and Spectre. In particular, SafeSpec stores side effects of speculation in separate structures while the instructions are speculative. The speculative state is then either committed to the main CPU structures if the branch commits, or squashed if it does not, making all direct side effects of speculative code invisible. The solution must also address the possibility of a covert channel from speculative instructions to committed instructions before these instructions are committed (i.e., while they share the speculative state). We show that SafeSpec prevents all three variants of Spectre and Meltdown, as well as new variants that we introduce. We also develop a cycle accurate model of modified design of an x86-64 processor and show that the performance impact is negligible (in fact a small performance improvement is achieved). We build prototypes of the hardware support in a hardware description language to show that the additional overhead is acceptable. SafeSpec completely closes this class of attacks, retaining the benefits of speculation, and is practical to implement
Intelligent systems for efficiency and security
As computing becomes ubiquitous and personalized, resources like energy, storage and time are becoming increasingly scarce and, at the same time, computing systems must deliver in multiple dimensions, such as high performance, quality of service, reliability, security and low power. Building such computers is hard, particularly when the operating environment is becoming more dynamic, and systems are becoming heterogeneous and distributed.
Unfortunately, computers today manage resources with many ad hoc heuristics that are suboptimal, unsafe, and cannot be composed across the computerâs subsystems. Continuing this approach has severe consequences: underperforming systems, resource waste, information loss, and even life endangerment.
This dissertation research develops computing systems which, through intelligent adaptation, deliver efficiency along multiple dimensions. The key idea is to manage computers with principled methods from formal control. It is with these methods that the multiple subsystems of a computer sense their environment and configure themselves to meet system-wide goals.
To achieve the goal of intelligent systems, this dissertation makes a series of contributions, each building on the previous. First, it introduces the use of formal MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output) control for processors, to simultaneously optimize many goals like performance, power, and temperature. Second, it develops the Yukta control system, which uses coordinated formal controllers in different layers of the stack (hardware and operating system). Third, it uses robust control to develop a fast, globally coordinated and decentralized control framework called Tangram, for heterogeneous computers. Finally, it presents Maya, a defense against power side-channel attacks that uses formal control to reshape the power dissipated by a computer, confusing the attacker. The ideas in the dissertation have been demonstrated successfully with several prototypes, including one built along with AMD (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.) engineers. These designs significantly outperformed the state of the art.
The research in this dissertation brought formal control closer to computer architecture and has been well-received in both domains. It has the first application of full-fledged MIMO control for processors, the first use of robust control in computer systems, and the first application of formal control for side-channel defense. It makes a significant stride towards intelligent systems that are efficient, secure and reliable
Distributed services across the network from edge to core
The current internet architecture is evolving from a simple carrier of bits to a platform able to provide multiple complex services running across the entire Network Service Provider (NSP) infrastructure. This calls for increased flexibility in resource management and allocation to provide dedicated, on-demand network services, leveraging a distributed infrastructure consisting of heterogeneous devices. More specifically, NSPs rely on a plethora of low-cost Customer Premise Equipment (CPE), as well as more powerful appliances at the edge of the network and in dedicated data-centers.
Currently a great research effort is spent to provide this flexibility through Fog computing, Network Functions Virtualization (NFV), and data plane programmability. Fog computing or Edge computing extends the compute and storage capabilities to the edge of the network, closer to the rapidly growing number of connected devices and applications that consume cloud services and generate massive amounts of data. A complementary technology is NFV, a network architecture concept targeting the execution of software Network Functions (NFs) in isolated Virtual Machines (VMs), potentially sharing a pool of general-purpose hosts, rather than running on dedicated hardware (i.e., appliances). Such a solution enables virtual network appliances (i.e., VMs executing network functions) to be provisioned, allocated a different amount of resources, and possibly moved across data centers in little time, which is key in ensuring that the network can keep up with the flexibility in the provisioning and deployment of virtual hosts in todayâs virtualized data centers. Moreover, recent advances in networking hardware have introduced new programmable network devices that can efficiently execute complex operations at line rate. As a result, NFs can be (partially or entirely) folded into the network, speeding up the execution of distributed services.
The work described in this Ph.D. thesis aims at showing how various network services can be deployed throughout the NSP infrastructure, accommodating to the different hardware capabilities of various appliances, by applying and extending the above-mentioned solutions. First, we consider a data center environment and the deployment of (virtualized) NFs. In this scenario, we introduce a novel methodology for the modelization of different NFs aimed at estimating their performance on different execution platforms. Moreover, we propose to extend the traditional NFV deployment outside of the data center to leverage the entire NSP infrastructure. This can be achieved by integrating native NFs, commonly available in low-cost CPEs, with an existing NFV framework. This facilitates the provision of services that require NFs close to the end user (e.g., IPsec terminator). On the other hand, resource-hungry virtualized NFs are run in the NSP data center, where they can take advantage of the superior computing and storage capabilities.
As an application, we also present a novel technique to deploy a distributed service, specifically a web filter, to leverage both the low latency of a CPE and the computational power of a data center. We then show that also the core network, today dedicated solely to packet routing, can be exploited to provide useful services. In particular, we propose a novel method to provide distributed network services in core network devices by means of task distribution and a seamless coordination among the peers involved. The aim is to transform existing network nodes (e.g., routers, switches, access points) into a highly distributed data acquisition and processing platform, which will significantly reduce the storage requirements at the Network Operations Center and the packet duplication overhead.
Finally, we propose to use new programmable network devices in data center networks to provide much needed services to distributed applications. By offloading part of the computation directly to the networking hardware, we show that it is possible to reduce both the network traffic and the overall job completion time
On the malware detection problem : challenges and novel approaches
Orientador: AndrĂ© Ricardo Abed GrĂ©gioCoorientador: Paulo LĂcio de GeusTese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal do ParanĂĄ, Setor de CiĂȘncias Exatas, Programa de PĂłs-Graduação em InformĂĄtica. Defesa : Curitiba,Inclui referĂȘnciasĂrea de concentração: CiĂȘncia da ComputaçãoResumo: Software Malicioso (malware) Ă© uma das maiores ameaças aos sistemas computacionais atuais, causando danos Ă imagem de indivĂduos e corporaçÔes, portanto requerendo o desenvolvimento de soluçÔes de detecção para prevenir que exemplares de malware causem danos e para permitir o uso seguro dos sistemas. Diversas iniciativas e soluçÔes foram propostas ao longo do tempo para detectar exemplares de malware, de Anti-VĂrus (AVs) a sandboxes, mas a detecção de malware de forma efetiva e eficiente ainda se mantĂ©m como um problema em aberto. Portanto, neste trabalho, me proponho a investigar alguns desafios, falĂĄcias e consequĂȘncias das pesquisas em detecção de malware de modo a contribuir para o aumento da capacidade de detecção das soluçÔes de segurança. Mais especificamente, proponho uma nova abordagem para o desenvolvimento de experimentos com malware de modo prĂĄtico mas ainda cientĂfico e utilizo-me desta abordagem para investigar quatro questĂ”es relacionadas a pesquisa em detecção de malware: (i) a necessidade de se entender o contexto das infecçÔes para permitir a detecção de ameaças em diferentes cenĂĄrios; (ii) a necessidade de se desenvolver melhores mĂ©tricas para a avaliação de soluçÔes antivĂrus; (iii) a viabilidade de soluçÔes com colaboração entre hardware e software para a detecção de malware de forma mais eficiente; (iv) a necessidade de predizer a ocorrĂȘncia de novas ameaças de modo a permitir a resposta Ă incidentes de segurança de forma mais rĂĄpida.Abstract: Malware is a major threat to most current computer systems, causing image damages and financial losses to individuals and corporations, thus requiring the development of detection solutions to prevent malware to cause harm and allow safe computers usage. Many initiatives and solutions to detect malware have been proposed over time, from AntiViruses (AVs) to sandboxes, but effective and efficient malware detection remains as a still open problem. Therefore, in this work, I propose taking a look on some malware detection challenges, pitfalls and consequences to contribute towards increasing malware detection system's capabilities. More specifically, I propose a new approach to tackle malware research experiments in a practical but still scientific manner and leverage this approach to investigate four issues: (i) the need for understanding context to allow proper detection of localized threats; (ii) the need for developing better metrics for AV solutions evaluation; (iii) the feasibility of leveraging hardware-software collaboration for efficient AV implementation; and (iv) the need for predicting future threats to allow faster incident responses
Cyber defensive capacity and capability::A perspective from the financial sector of a small state
This thesis explores ways in which the financial sectors of small states are able todefend themselves against ever-growing cyber threats, as well as ways these states can improve their cyber defense capability in order to withstand current andfuture attacks. To date, the context of small states in general is understudied. This study presents the challenges faced by financial sectors in small states with regard to withstanding cyberattacks. This study applies a mixed method approach through the use of various surveys, brainstorming sessions with financial sector focus groups, interviews with critical infrastructure stakeholders, a literature review, a comparative analysis of secondary data and a theoretical narrative review. The findings suggest that, for the Aruban financial sector, compliance is important, as with minimal drivers, precautionary behavior is significant. Countermeasures of formal, informal, and technical controls need to be in place. This study indicates the view that defending a small state such as Aruba is challenging, yet enough economic indicators indicate it not being outside the realm of possibility. On a theoretical level, this thesis proposes a conceptual âwhole-of-cyberâ model inspired by military science and the VSM (Viable Systems Model). The concept of fighting power components and governance S4 function form cyber defensive capacityâs shield and capability. The âwhole-of-cyberâ approach may be a good way to compensate for the lack of resources of small states. Collaboration may be an only out, as the fastest-growing need will be for advanced IT skillsets