41 research outputs found
Routing-Verification-as-a-Service (RVaaS): Trustworthy Routing Despite Insecure Providers
Computer networks today typically do not provide any mechanisms to the users
to learn, in a reliable manner, which paths have (and have not) been taken by
their packets. Rather, it seems inevitable that as soon as a packet leaves the
network card, the user is forced to trust the network provider to forward the
packets as expected or agreed upon. This can be undesirable, especially in the
light of today's trend toward more programmable networks: after a successful
cyber attack on the network management system or Software-Defined Network (SDN)
control plane, an adversary in principle has complete control over the network.
This paper presents a low-cost and efficient solution to detect misbehaviors
and ensure trustworthy routing over untrusted or insecure providers, in
particular providers whose management system or control plane has been
compromised (e.g., using a cyber attack). We propose
Routing-Verification-as-a-Service (RVaaS): RVaaS offers clients a flexible
interface to query information relevant to their traffic, while respecting the
autonomy of the network provider. RVaaS leverages key features of
OpenFlow-based SDNs to combine (passive and active) configuration monitoring,
logical data plane verification and actual in-band tests, in a novel manner
BGP Routing Information Authentication
Import 05/08/2014Diplomová práce se zabývá prozkoumáním a zdokumentováním „problematiky“ standardizace a implementace infrastruktury Secure BGP a RPKI pro autorizaci síťových prefixů ze zdrojových autonomních systémů. Tato standardizace si klade za cíl zlepšit zabezpečení BGP infrastruktury pomocí certifikace přidělených čísel autonomních systémů rozsahů IP adres jednotlivým držitelům těchto zdrojů. Další dílčí částí této diplomové práce je ověření a nasazení vyhledaných nástrojů pro implementaci infrastruktury RPKI, které jsou dále porovnány z hlediska rychlosti validace jednotlivých sítí.This thesis deals with analyze and documenting problem of standardization
and implementation SecureBGP and RPKI infrastructure for authorization of network prefixes from source autonomous systems. Aim of this standardization is improve security of BGP infrastructure by using certification of autonomous system numbers and ranges of IP addresses allocated to each holder these resources. Other part of this thesis is verified and deployment of matching tools for implementing RPKI infrastructure and then these tools are compared in terms of speed validation of networks prefixes.460 - Katedra informatikyvelmi dobř
SECURING BGP OVER SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS
In this paper use the SDN paradigm to improve the security of BGP based on the Cisco SDN platform, OnePK. The proposed solution has the characteristic that do not need big changes to the network or the devices. A test environment has been created to prove that the feasibility of the solution
Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation
Software-defined networking is considered a promising new paradigm, enabling
more reliable and formally verifiable communication networks. However, this
paper shows that the separation of the control plane from the data plane, which
lies at the heart of Software-Defined Networks (SDNs), introduces a new
vulnerability which we call \emph{teleportation}. An attacker (e.g., a
malicious switch in the data plane or a host connected to the network) can use
teleportation to transmit information via the control plane and bypass critical
network functions in the data plane (e.g., a firewall), and to violate security
policies as well as logical and even physical separations. This paper
characterizes the design space for teleportation attacks theoretically, and
then identifies four different teleportation techniques. We demonstrate and
discuss how these techniques can be exploited for different attacks (e.g.,
exfiltrating confidential data at high rates), and also initiate the discussion
of possible countermeasures. Generally, and given today's trend toward more
intent-based networking, we believe that our findings are relevant beyond the
use cases considered in this paper.Comment: Accepted in EuroSP'1
RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor
The Tor network is a widely used system for anonymous communication. However,
Tor is known to be vulnerable to attackers who can observe traffic at both ends
of the communication path. In this paper, we show that prior attacks are just
the tip of the iceberg. We present a suite of new attacks, called Raptor, that
can be launched by Autonomous Systems (ASes) to compromise user anonymity.
First, AS-level adversaries can exploit the asymmetric nature of Internet
routing to increase the chance of observing at least one direction of user
traffic at both ends of the communication. Second, AS-level adversaries can
exploit natural churn in Internet routing to lie on the BGP paths for more
users over time. Third, strategic adversaries can manipulate Internet routing
via BGP hijacks (to discover the users using specific Tor guard nodes) and
interceptions (to perform traffic analysis). We demonstrate the feasibility of
Raptor attacks by analyzing historical BGP data and Traceroute data as well as
performing real-world attacks on the live Tor network, while ensuring that we
do not harm real users. In addition, we outline the design of two monitoring
frameworks to counter these attacks: BGP monitoring to detect control-plane
attacks, and Traceroute monitoring to detect data-plane anomalies. Overall, our
work motivates the design of anonymity systems that are aware of the dynamics
of Internet routing
It bends but would it break?:topological analysis of BGP infrastructures in Europe
The Internet is often thought to be a model of resilience, due to a decentralised, organically-grown architecture. This paper puts this perception into perspective through the results of a security analysis of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing infrastructure. BGP is a fundamental Internet protocol and its intrinsic fragilities have been highlighted extensively in the literature. A seldom studied aspect is how robust the BGP infrastructure actually is as a result of nearly three decades of perpetual growth. Although global black-outs seem unlikely, local security events raise growing concerns on the robustness of the backbone. In order to better protect this critical infrastructure, it is crucial to understand its topology in the context of the weaknesses of BGP and to identify possible security scenarios. Firstly, we establish a comprehensive threat model that classifies main attack vectors, including but non limited to BGP vulnerabilities. We then construct maps of the European BGP backbone based on publicly available routing data. We analyse the topology of the backbone and establish several disruption scenarios that highlight the possible consequences of different types of attacks, for different attack capabilities. We also discuss existing mitigation and recovery strategies, and we propose improvements to enhance the robustness and resilience of the backbone. To our knowledge, this study is the first to combine a comprehensive threat analysis of BGP infrastructures withadvanced network topology considerations. We find that the BGP infrastructure is at higher risk than already understood, due to topologies that remain vulnerable to certain targeted attacks as a result of organic deployment over the years. Significant parts of the system are still uncharted territory, which warrants further investigation in this direction