Temporal characteristics of the influence of punishment on perceptual decision making in the human brain

Perceptual decision making is the process by which information from sensory systems is combined and used to influence our behavior. In addition to the sensory input, this process can be affected by other factors, such as reward and punishment for correct and incorrect responses. To investigate the temporal dynamics of how monetary punishment influences perceptual decision making in humans, we collected electroencephalography (EEG) data during a perceptual categorization task whereby the punishment level for incorrect responses was parametrically manipulated across blocks of trials. Behaviorally, we observed improved accuracy for high relative to low punishment levels. Using multivariate linear discriminant analysis of the EEG, we identified multiple punishment-induced discriminating components with spatially distinct scalp topographies. Compared with components related to sensory evidence, components discriminating punishment levels appeared later in the trial, suggesting that punishment affects primarily late postsensory, decision-related processing. Crucially, the amplitude of these punishment components across participants was predictive of the size of the behavioral improvements induced by punishment. Finally, trial-by-trial changes in prestimulus oscillatory activity in the alpha and gamma bands were good predictors of the amplitude of these components. We discuss these findings in the context of increased motivation/attention, resulting from increases in punishment, which in turn yields improved decision-related processing

Can hierarchical predictive coding explain binocular rivalry?

Hohwy et al.’s (2008) model of binocular rivalry (BR) is taken as a classic illustration of predictive coding’s explanatory power. I revisit the account and show that it cannot explain the role of reward in BR. I then consider a more recent version of Bayesian model averaging, which recasts the role of reward in (BR) in terms of optimism bias. If we accept this account, however, then we must reconsider our conception of perception. On this latter view, I argue, organisms engage in what amounts to policy-driven, motivated perception

Predictive Processing and the Phenomenology of Time Consciousness: A Hierarchical Extension of Rick Grush’s Trajectory Estimation Model

This chapter explores to what extent some core ideas of predictive processing can be applied to the phenomenology of time consciousness. The focus is on the experienced continuity of consciously perceived, temporally extended phenomena (such as enduring processes and successions of events). The main claim is that the hierarchy of representations posited by hierarchical predictive processing models can contribute to a deepened understanding of the continuity of consciousness. Computationally, such models show that sequences of events can be represented as states of a hierarchy of dynamical systems. Phenomenologically, they suggest a more fine-grained analysis of the perceptual contents of the specious present, in terms of a hierarchy of temporal wholes. Visual perception of static scenes not only contains perceived objects and regions but also spatial gist; similarly, auditory perception of temporal sequences, such as melodies, involves not only perceiving individual notes but also slightly more abstract features (temporal gist), which have longer temporal durations (e.g., emotional character or rhythm). Further investigations into these elusive contents of conscious perception may be facilitated by findings regarding its neural underpinnings. Predictive processing models suggest that sensorimotor areas may influence these contents

Modularity and the predictive mind

Modular approaches to the architecture of the mind claim that some mental mechanisms, such as sensory input processes, operate in special-purpose subsystems that are functionally independent from the rest of the mind. This assumption of modularity seems to be in tension with recent claims that the mind has a predictive architecture. Predictive approaches propose that both sensory processing and higher-level processing are part of the same Bayesian information-processing hierarchy, with no clear boundary between perception and cognition. Furthermore, it is not clear how any part of the predictive architecture could be functionally independent, given that each level of the hierarchy is influenced by the level above. Both the assumption of continuity across the predictive architecture and the seeming non-isolability of parts of the predictive architecture seem to be at odds with the modular approach. I explore and ultimately reject the predictive approach’s apparent commitments to continuity and non-isolation. I argue that predictive architectures can be modular architectures, and that we should in fact expect predictive architectures to exhibit some form of modularity

A perceptual comparison of empirical and predictive region-of-interest video

When viewing multimedia presentations, a user only attends to a relatively small part of the video display at any one point in time. By shifting allocation of bandwidth from peripheral areas to those locations where a user’s gaze is more likely to rest, attentive displays can be produced. Attentive displays aim to reduce resource requirements while minimizing negative user perception—understood in this paper as not only a user’s ability to assimilate and understand information but also his/her subjective satisfaction with the video content. This paper introduces and discusses a perceptual comparison between two region-of-interest display (RoID) adaptation techniques. A RoID is an attentive display where bandwidth has been preallocated around measured or highly probable areas of user gaze. In this paper, video content was manipulated using two sources of data: empirical measured data (captured using eye-tracking technology) and predictive data (calculated from the physical characteristics of the video data). Results show that display adaptation causes significant variation in users’ understanding of specific multimedia content. Interestingly, RoID adaptation and the type of video being presented both affect user perception of video quality. Moreover, the use of frame rates less than 15 frames per second, for any video adaptation technique, caused a significant reduction in user perceived quality, suggesting that although users are aware of video quality reduction, it does impact level of information assimilation and understanding. Results also highlight that user level of enjoyment is significantly affected by the type of video yet is not as affected by the quality or type of video adaptation—an interesting implication in the field of entertainment

Literal Perceptual Inference

In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module

The Cat Is On the Mat. Or Is It a Dog? Dynamic Competition in Perceptual Decision Making

Recent neurobiological findings suggest that the brain solves simple perceptual decision-making tasks by means of a dynamic competition in which evidence is accumulated in favor of the alternatives. However, it is unclear if and how the same process applies in more complex, real-world tasks, such as the categorization of ambiguous visual scenes and what elements are considered as evidence in this case. Furthermore, dynamic decision models typically consider evidence accumulation as a passive process disregarding the role of active perception strategies. In this paper, we adopt the principles of dynamic competition and active vision for the realization of a biologically- motivated computational model, which we test in a visual catego- rization task. Moreover, our system uses predictive power of the features as the main dimension for both evidence accumulation and the guidance of active vision. Comparison of human and synthetic data in a common experimental setup suggests that the proposed model captures essential aspects of how the brain solves perceptual ambiguities in time. Our results point to the importance of the proposed principles of dynamic competi- tion, parallel specification, and selection of multiple alternatives through prediction, as well as active guidance of perceptual strategies for perceptual decision-making and the resolution of perceptual ambiguities. These principles could apply to both the simple perceptual decision problems studied in neuroscience and the more complex ones addressed by vision research.Peer reviewe

The cybernetic Bayesian brain: from interoceptive inference to sensorimotor contingencies

Is there a single principle by which neural operations can account for perception, cognition, action, and even consciousness? A strong candidate is now taking shape in the form of “predictive processing”. On this theory, brains engage in predictive inference on the causes of sensory inputs by continuous minimization of prediction errors or informational “free energy”. Predictive processing can account, supposedly, not only for perception, but also for action and for the essential contribution of the body and environment in structuring sensorimotor interactions. In this paper I draw together some recent developments within predictive processing that involve predictive modelling of internal physiological states (interoceptive inference), and integration with “enactive” and “embodied” approaches to cognitive science (predictive perception of sensorimotor contingencies). The upshot is a development of predictive processing that originates, not in Helmholtzian perception-as-inference, but rather in 20th-century cybernetic principles that emphasized homeostasis and predictive control. This way of thinking leads to (i) a new view of emotion as active interoceptive inference; (ii) a common predictive framework linking experiences of body ownership, emotion, and exteroceptive perception; (iii) distinct interpretations of active inference as involving disruptive and disambiguatory—not just confirmatory—actions to test perceptual hypotheses; (iv) a neurocognitive operationalization of the “mastery of sensorimotor contingencies” (where sensorimotor contingencies reflect the rules governing sensory changes produced by various actions); and (v) an account of the sense of subjective reality of perceptual contents (“perceptual presence”) in terms of the extent to which predictive models encode potential sensorimotor relations (this being “counterfactual richness”). This is rich and varied territory, and surveying its landmarks emphasizes the need for experimental tests of its key contributions

Backwards is the way forward: feedback in the cortical hierarchy predicts the expected future

Clark offers a powerful description of the brain as a prediction machine, which offers progress on two distinct levels. First, on an abstract conceptual level, it provides a unifying framework for perception, action, and cognition (including subdivisions such as attention, expectation, and imagination). Second, hierarchical prediction offers progress on a concrete descriptive level for testing and constraining conceptual elements and mechanisms of predictive coding models (estimation of predictions, prediction errors, and internal models)