342 research outputs found

    Server-Aided Revocable Predicate Encryption: Formalization and Lattice-Based Instantiation

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    Efficient user revocation is a necessary but challenging problem in many multi-user cryptosystems. Among known approaches, server-aided revocation yields a promising solution, because it allows to outsource the major workloads of system users to a computationally powerful third party, called the server, whose only requirement is to carry out the computations correctly. Such a revocation mechanism was considered in the settings of identity-based encryption and attribute-based encryption by Qin et al. (ESORICS 2015) and Cui et al. (ESORICS 2016), respectively. In this work, we consider the server-aided revocation mechanism in the more elaborate setting of predicate encryption (PE). The latter, introduced by Katz, Sahai, and Waters (EUROCRYPT 2008), provides fine-grained and role-based access to encrypted data and can be viewed as a generalization of identity-based and attribute-based encryption. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we formalize the model of server-aided revocable predicate encryption (SR-PE), with rigorous definitions and security notions. Our model can be seen as a non-trivial adaptation of Cui et al.'s work into the PE context. Second, we put forward a lattice-based instantiation of SR-PE. The scheme employs the PE scheme of Agrawal, Freeman and Vaikuntanathan (ASIACRYPT 2011) and the complete subtree method of Naor, Naor, and Lotspiech (CRYPTO 2001) as the two main ingredients, which work smoothly together thanks to a few additional techniques. Our scheme is proven secure in the standard model (in a selective manner), based on the hardness of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem.Comment: 24 page

    Predicate Encryption for Circuits from LWE

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    In predicate encryption, a ciphertext is associated with descriptive attribute values x in addition to a plaintext ฮผ, and a secret key is associated with a predicate f. Decryption returns plaintext ฮผ if and only if f(x)=1. Moreover, security of predicate encryption guarantees that an adversary learns nothing about the attribute x or the plaintext ฮผ from a ciphertext, given arbitrary many secret keys that are not authorized to decrypt the ciphertext individually. We construct a leveled predicate encryption scheme for all circuits, assuming the hardness of the subexponential learning with errors (LWE) problem. That is, for any polynomial function d=d(ฮป), we construct a predicate encryption scheme for the class of all circuits with depth bounded by d(ฮป), where ฮป is the security parameter.Microsoft Corporation (PhD Fellowship)Northrop Grumman Cybersecurity Research ConsortiumUnited States. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Grant FA8750-11-2-0225)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Awards CNS-1350619)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Awards CNS-1413920)Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (Fellowship)Microsoft (Faculty Fellowship

    ์žก์Œํ‚ค๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€์ง€๋Š” ์‹ ์›๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ ๋™ํ˜•์•”ํ˜ธ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ(๋ฐ•์‚ฌ)--์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› :์ž์—ฐ๊ณผํ•™๋Œ€ํ•™ ์ˆ˜๋ฆฌ๊ณผํ•™๋ถ€,2020. 2. ์ฒœ์ •ํฌ.ํด๋ผ์šฐ๋“œ ์ƒ์˜ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ ๋ถ„์„ ์œ„์ž„ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋Š” ๋™ํ˜•์•”ํ˜ธ์˜ ๊ฐ€์žฅ ํšจ๊ณผ์ ์ธ ์‘์šฉ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค ์ค‘ ํ•˜๋‚˜์ด๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜, ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ ์ œ๊ณต์ž์™€ ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ์š”๊ตฌ์ž๊ฐ€ ์กด์žฌํ•˜๋Š” ์‹ค์ œ ํ˜„์‹ค์˜ ๋ชจ๋ธ์—์„œ๋Š” ๊ธฐ๋ณธ์ ์ธ ์•”๋ณตํ˜ธํ™”์™€ ๋™ํ˜• ์—ฐ์‚ฐ ์™ธ์—๋„ ์—ฌ์ „ํžˆ ํ•ด๊ฒฐํ•ด์•ผ ํ•  ๊ณผ์ œ๋“ค์ด ๋‚จ์•„์žˆ๋Š” ์‹ค์ •์ด๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ๋Š” ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ชจ๋ธ์—์„œ ํ•„์š”ํ•œ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ ์š”๊ตฌ์‚ฌํ•ญ๋“ค์„ ํฌ์ฐฉํ•˜๊ณ , ์ด์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ํ•ด๊ฒฐ๋ฐฉ์•ˆ์„ ๋…ผํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋จผ์ €, ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ์•Œ๋ ค์ง„ ๋™ํ˜• ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ ๋ถ„์„ ์†”๋ฃจ์…˜๋“ค์€ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ ๊ฐ„์˜ ์ธต์œ„๋‚˜ ์ˆ˜์ค€์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜์ง€ ๋ชปํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์— ์ฐฉ์•ˆํ•˜์—ฌ, ์‹ ์›๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ ์•”ํ˜ธ์™€ ๋™ํ˜•์•”ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ๊ฒฐํ•ฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ ์‚ฌ์ด์— ์ ‘๊ทผ ๊ถŒํ•œ์„ ์„ค์ •ํ•˜์—ฌ ํ•ด๋‹น ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ ์‚ฌ์ด์˜ ์—ฐ์‚ฐ์„ ํ—ˆ์šฉํ•˜๋Š” ๋ชจ๋ธ์„ ์ƒ๊ฐํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์ด ๋ชจ๋ธ์˜ ํšจ์œจ์ ์ธ ๋™์ž‘์„ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ ๋™ํ˜•์•”ํ˜ธ ์นœํ™”์ ์ธ ์‹ ์›๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ ์•”ํ˜ธ์— ๋Œ€ํ•˜์—ฌ ์—ฐ๊ตฌํ•˜์˜€๊ณ , ๊ธฐ์กด์— ์•Œ๋ ค์ง„ NTRU ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์˜ ์•”ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ํ™•์žฅํ•˜์—ฌ module-NTRU ๋ฌธ์ œ๋ฅผ ์ •์˜ํ•˜๊ณ  ์ด๋ฅผ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์œผ๋กœ ํ•œ ์‹ ์›๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ ์•”ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ์ œ์•ˆํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋‘˜์งธ๋กœ, ๋™ํ˜•์•”ํ˜ธ์˜ ๋ณตํ˜ธํ™” ๊ณผ์ •์—๋Š” ์—ฌ์ „ํžˆ ๋น„๋ฐ€ํ‚ค๊ฐ€ ๊ด€์—ฌํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๊ณ , ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ๋น„๋ฐ€ํ‚ค ๊ด€๋ฆฌ ๋ฌธ์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋‚จ์•„์žˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์„ ํฌ์ฐฉํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ์ ์—์„œ ์ƒ์ฒด์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ํ™œ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๋ณตํ˜ธํ™” ๊ณผ์ •์„ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœํ•˜์—ฌ ํ•ด๋‹น ๊ณผ์ •์„ ๋™ํ˜•์•”ํ˜ธ ๋ณตํ˜ธํ™”์— ์ ์šฉํ•˜์˜€๊ณ , ์ด๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ์•”๋ณตํ˜ธํ™”์™€ ๋™ํ˜• ์—ฐ์‚ฐ์˜ ์ „ ๊ณผ์ •์„ ์–ด๋Š ๊ณณ์—๋„ ํ‚ค๊ฐ€ ์ €์žฅ๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ์ƒํƒœ๋กœ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์•”ํ˜ธ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์„ ์ œ์•ˆํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋งˆ์ง€๋ง‰์œผ๋กœ, ๋™ํ˜•์•”ํ˜ธ์˜ ๊ตฌ์ฒด์ ์ธ ์•ˆ์ „์„ฑ ํ‰๊ฐ€ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•ด ๋™ํ˜•์•”ํ˜ธ๊ฐ€ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์ด๋ฅธ๋ฐ” Learning With Errors (LWE) ๋ฌธ์ œ์˜ ์‹ค์ œ์ ์ธ ๋‚œํ•ด์„ฑ์„ ๋ฉด๋ฐ€ํžˆ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๊ณ , ๊ทธ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜๋ณด๋‹ค ํ‰๊ท ์ ์œผ๋กœ 1000๋ฐฐ ์ด์ƒ ๋น ๋ฅธ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜๋“ค์„ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ํ˜„์žฌ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๋™ํ˜•์•”ํ˜ธ ํŒŒ๋ผ๋ฏธํ„ฐ๊ฐ€ ์•ˆ์ „ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์Œ์„ ๋ณด์˜€๊ณ , ์ƒˆ๋กœ์šด ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜์„ ํ†ตํ•œ ํŒŒ๋ผ๋ฏธํ„ฐ ์„ค์ • ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ ๋…ผํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค.Secure data analysis delegation on cloud is one of the most powerful application that homomorphic encryption (HE) can bring. As the technical level of HE arrive at practical regime, this model is also being considered to be a more serious and realistic paradigm. In this regard, this increasing attention requires more versatile and secure model to deal with much complicated real world problems. First, as real world modeling involves a number of data owners and clients, an authorized control to data access is still required even for HE scenario. Second, we note that although homomorphic operation requires no secret key, the decryption requires the secret key. That is, the secret key management concern still remains even for HE. Last, in a rather fundamental view, we thoroughly analyze the concrete hardness of the base problem of HE, so-called Learning With Errors (LWE). In fact, for the sake of efficiency, HE exploits a weaker variant of LWE whose security is believed not fully understood. For the data encryption phase efficiency, we improve the previously suggested NTRU-lattice ID-based encryption by generalizing the NTRU concept into module-NTRU lattice. Moreover, we design a novel method that decrypts the resulting ciphertext with a noisy key. This enables the decryptor to use its own noisy source, in particular biometric, and hence fundamentally solves the key management problem. Finally, by considering further improvement on existing LWE solving algorithms, we propose new algorithms that shows much faster performance. Consequently, we argue that the HE parameter choice should be updated regarding our attacks in order to maintain the currently claimed security level.1 Introduction 1 1.1 Access Control based on Identity 2 1.2 Biometric Key Management 3 1.3 Concrete Security of HE 3 1.4 List of Papers 4 2 Background 6 2.1 Notation 6 2.2 Lattices 7 2.2.1 Lattice Reduction Algorithm 7 2.2.2 BKZ cost model 8 2.2.3 Geometric Series Assumption (GSA) 8 2.2.4 The Nearest Plane Algorithm 9 2.3 Gaussian Measures 9 2.3.1 Kullback-Leibler Divergence 11 2.4 Lattice-based Hard Problems 12 2.4.1 The Learning With Errors Problem 12 2.4.2 NTRU Problem 13 2.5 One-way and Pseudo-random Functions 14 3 ID-based Data Access Control 16 3.1 Module-NTRU Lattices 16 3.1.1 Construction of MNTRU lattice and trapdoor 17 3.1.2 Minimize the Gram-Schmidt norm 22 3.2 IBE-Scheme from Module-NTRU 24 3.2.1 Scheme Construction 24 3.2.2 Security Analysis by Attack Algorithms 29 3.2.3 Parameter Selections 31 3.3 Application to Signature 33 4 Noisy Key Cryptosystem 36 4.1 Reusable Fuzzy Extractors 37 4.2 Local Functions 40 4.2.1 Hardness over Non-uniform Sources 40 4.2.2 Flipping local functions 43 4.2.3 Noise stability of predicate functions: Xor-Maj 44 4.3 From Pseudorandom Local Functions 47 4.3.1 Basic Construction: One-bit Fuzzy Extractor 48 4.3.2 Expansion to multi-bit Fuzzy Extractor 50 4.3.3 Indistinguishable Reusability 52 4.3.4 One-way Reusability 56 4.4 From Local One-way Functions 59 5 Concrete Security of Homomorphic Encryption 63 5.1 Albrecht's Improved Dual Attack 64 5.1.1 Simple Dual Lattice Attack 64 5.1.2 Improved Dual Attack 66 5.2 Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on LWE 69 5.2.1 Noisy Collision Search 70 5.2.2 Noisy Meet-in-the-middle Attack on LWE 74 5.3 The Hybrid-Dual Attack 76 5.3.1 Dimension-error Trade-o of LWE 77 5.3.2 Our Hybrid Attack 79 5.4 The Hybrid-Primal Attack 82 5.4.1 The Primal Attack on LWE 83 5.4.2 The Hybrid Attack for SVP 86 5.4.3 The Hybrid-Primal attack for LWE 93 5.4.4 Complexity Analysis 96 5.5 Bit-security estimation 102 5.5.1 Estimations 104 5.5.2 Application to PKE 105 6 Conclusion 108 Abstract (in Korean) 120Docto

    Non-Zero Inner Product Encryption Schemes from Various Assumptions: LWE, DDH and DCR

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    In non-zero inner product encryption (NIPE) schemes, ciphertexts and secret keys are associated with vectors and decryption is possible whenever the inner product of these vectors does not equal zero. So far, much effort on constructing bilinear map-based NIPE schemes have been made and this has lead to many efficient schemes. However, the constructions of NIPE schemes without bilinear maps are much less investigated. The only known other NIPE constructions are based on lattices, however, they are all highly inefficient due to the need of converting inner product operations into circuits or branching programs. To remedy our rather poor understanding regarding NIPE schemes without bilinear maps, we provide two methods for constructing NIPE schemes: a direct construction from lattices and a generic construction from functional encryption schemes for inner products (LinFE). For our first direct construction, it highly departs from the traditional lattice-based constructions and we rely heavily on new tools concerning Gaussian measures over multi-dimensional lattices to prove security. For our second generic construction, using the recent constructions of LinFE schemes as building blocks, we obtain the first NIPE constructions based on the DDH and DCR assumptions. In particular, we obtain the first NIPE schemes without bilinear maps or lattices

    Contributions to Latticeโ€“based Cryptography

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    Postโ€“quantum cryptography (PQC) is a new and fastโ€“growing part of Cryptography. It focuses on developing cryptographic algorithms and protocols that resist quantum adversaries (i.e., the adversaries who have access to quantum computers). To construct a new PQC primitive, a designer must use a mathematical problem intractable for the quantum adversary. Many intractability assumptions are being used in PQC. There seems to be a consensus in the research community that the most promising are intractable/hard problems in lattices. However, latticeโ€“based cryptography still needs more research to make it more efficient and practical. The thesis contributes toward achieving either the novelty or the practicality of latticeโ€“ based cryptographic systems

    Advances in Functional Encryption

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    Functional encryption is a novel paradigm for public-key encryption that enables both fine-grained access control and selective computation on encrypted data, as is necessary to protect big, complex data in the cloud. In this thesis, I provide a brief introduction to functional encryption, and an overview of my contributions to the area

    Fully Key-Homomorphic Encryption, Arithmetic Circuit ABE and Compact Garbled Circuits

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    We construct the first (key-policy) attribute-based encryption (ABE) system with short secret keys: the size of keys in our system depends only on the depth of the policy circuit, not its size. Our constructions extend naturally to arithmetic circuits with arbitrary fan-in gates thereby further reducing the circuit depth. Building on this ABE system we obtain the first reusable circuit garbling scheme that produces garbled circuits whose size is the same as the original circuit plus an additive poly(ฮป,d) bits, where ฮป is the security parameter and d is the circuit depth. All previous constructions incurred a multiplicative poly(ฮป) blowup. We construct our ABE using a new mechanism we call fully key-homomorphic encryption, a public-key system that lets anyone translate a ciphertext encrypted under a public-key x into a ciphertext encrypted under the public-key (f(x),f) of the same plaintext, for any efficiently computable f. We show that this mechanism gives an ABE with short keys. Security of our construction relies on the subexponential hardness of the learning with errors problem. We also present a second (key-policy) ABE, using multilinear maps, with short ciphertexts: an encryption to an attribute vector x is the size of x plus poly(ฮป,d) additional bits. This gives a reusable circuit garbling scheme where the garbled input is short.United States. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Grant FA8750-11-2-0225)Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (Sloan Research Fellowship

    On the Untapped Potential of Encoding Predicates by Arithmetic Circuits and Their Applications

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    Predicates are used in cryptography as a fundamental tool to control the disclosure of secrets. However, how to embed a particular predicate into a cryptographic primitive is usually not given much attention. In this work, we formalize the idea of encoding predicates as arithmetic circuits and observe that choosing the right encoding of a predicate may lead to an improvement in many aspects such as the efficiency of a scheme or the required hardness assumption. In particular, we develop two predicate encoding schemes with different properties and construct cryptographic primitives that benefit from these: verifiable random functions (VRFs) and predicate encryption (PE) schemes. - We propose two VRFs on bilinear maps. Both of our schemes are secure under a non-interactive QQ-type assumption where QQ is only poly-logarithmic in the security parameter, and they achieve either a poly-logarithmic verification key size or proof size. This is a significant improvement over prior works, where all previous schemes either require a strong hardness assumption or a large verification key and proof size. - We propose a lattice-based PE scheme for the class of \emph{multi-dimensional equality} (MultEq) predicates. This class of predicate is expressive enough to capture many of the appealing applications that motivates PE schemes. Our scheme achieves the best in terms of the required approximation factor for LWE (we only require \poly(\lambda)) and the decryption time. In particular, all existing PE schemes that support the class of MultEq predicates either require a subexponential LWE assumption or an exponential decryption time (in the dimension of the MultEq predicates)

    Secure k-NN as a Service Over Encrypted Data in Multi-User Setting

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    To securely leverage the advantages of Cloud Computing, recently a lot of research has happened in the area of "Secure Query Processing over Encrypted Data". As a concrete use case, many encryption schemes have been proposed for securely processing k Nearest Neighbors (SkNN) over encrypted data in the outsourced setting. Recently Zhu et al[25]. proposed a SkNN solution which claimed to satisfy following four properties: (1)Data Privacy, (2)Key Confidentiality, (3)Query Privacy, and (4)Query Controllability. However, in this paper, we present an attack which breaks the Query Controllability claim of their scheme. Further, we propose a new SkNN solution which satisfies all the four existing properties along with an additional essential property of Query Check Verification. We analyze the security of our proposed scheme and present the detailed experimental results to showcase the efficiency in real world scenario
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