47 research outputs found
Pareto optimality in house allocation problems
We study Pareto optimal matchings in the context of house allocation problems. We present an O(\sqrt{n}m) algorithm, based on Gales Top Trading Cycles Method, for finding a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching, where n is the number of agents and m is the total length of the preference lists. By contrast, we show that the problem of finding a minimum cardinality Pareto optimal matching is NP-hard, though approximable within a factor of 2. We then show that there exist Pareto optimal matchings of all sizes between a minimum and maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching. Finally, we introduce the concept of a signature, which allows us to give a characterization, checkable in linear time, of instances that admit a unique Pareto optimal matching
The Kidney Exchange Game
The most effective treatment for kidney failure that is currently known is transplantation. As the number of cadaveric donors is not sufficient and kidneys from living donors are often not suitable for immunological reasons, there are attempts to organize exchanges between patient-donor pairs. In this paper we model this situation as a cooperative game and propose some algorithms for finding a solution
Popular Matchings in the Weighted Capacitated House Allocation Problem
We consider the problem of finding a popular matching in the Weighted Capacitated
House Allocation problem (WCHA). An instance of WCHA involves a set of agents
and a set of houses. Each agent has a positive weight indicating his priority, and a
preference list in which a subset of houses are ranked in strict order. Each house has
a capacity that indicates the maximum number of agents who could be matched to
it. A matching M of agents to houses is popular if there is no other matching M′
such that the total weight of the agents who prefer their allocation in M′
to that in
M exceeds the total weight of the agents who prefer their allocation in M to that in
M′
. Here, we give an O(
√
Cn1 + m) algorithm to determine if an instance of WCHA
admits a popular matching, and if so, to find a largest such matching, where C is the
total capacity of the houses, n1 is the number of agents, and m is the total length of
the agents’ preference lists
Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
We conduct a computational analysis of fair and optimal partitions in
additively separable hedonic games. We show that, for strict preferences, a
Pareto optimal partition can be found in polynomial time while verifying
whether a given partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete, even when
preferences are symmetric and strict. Moreover, computing a partition with
maximum egalitarian or utilitarian social welfare or one which is both Pareto
optimal and individually rational is NP-hard. We also prove that checking
whether there exists a partition which is both Pareto optimal and envy-free is
-complete. Even though an envy-free partition and a Nash stable
partition are both guaranteed to exist for symmetric preferences, checking
whether there exists a partition which is both envy-free and Nash stable is
NP-complete.Comment: 11 pages; A preliminary version of this work was invited for
presentation in the session `Cooperative Games and Combinatorial
Optimization' at the 24th European Conference on Operational Research (EURO
2010) in Lisbo
Popular Matchings in the Capacitated House Allocation Problem
We consider the problem of finding a popular matching in the Capacitated House Allocation problem (CHA). An instance of CHA involves a set of agents and a set of houses. Each agent has a preference list in which a subset of houses are ranked in strict order, and each house may be matched to a number of agents that must not exceed its capacity. A matching M is popular if there is no other matching M′ such that the number of agents who prefer their allocation in M′ to that in M exceeds the number of agents who prefer their allocation in M to that in M′. Here, we give an O(√C+n1m) algorithm to determine if an instance of CHA admits a popular matching, and if so, to find a largest such matching, where C is the total capacity of the houses, n1 is the number of agents and m is the total length of the agents’ preference lists. For the case where preference lists may contain ties, we give an O(√Cn1+m) algorithm for the analogous problem
Popular matchings
We consider the problem of matching a set of applicants to a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list, ranking a non-empty subset of posts in order of preference, possibly involving ties. We say that a matching M is popular if there is no matching M' such that the number of applicants preferring M' to M exceeds the number of applicants preferring M to M'. In this paper, we give the first polynomial-time algorithms to determine if an instance admits a popular matching, and to find a largest such matching, if one exists. For the special case in which every preference list is strictly ordered (i.e. contains no ties), we give an O(n+m) time algorithm, where n is the total number of applicants and posts, and m is the total length of all the preference lists. For the general case in which preference lists may contain ties, we give an O(√nm) time algorithm, and show that the problem has equivalent time complexity to the maximum-cardinality bipartite matching problem
Random assignment with multi-unit demands
We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents express
preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based on
the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare
random allocations of objects is stochastic dominance (SD) which also leads to
corresponding notions of envy-freeness, efficiency, and weak strategyproofness.
We show that there exists no rule that is anonymous, neutral, efficient and
weak strategyproof. For single-unit random assignment, we show that there
exists no rule that is anonymous, neutral, efficient and weak
group-strategyproof. We then study a generalization of the PS (probabilistic
serial) rule called multi-unit-eating PS and prove that multi-unit-eating PS
satisfies envy-freeness, weak strategyproofness, and unanimity.Comment: 17 page