2,548 research outputs found
Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
We conduct a computational analysis of fair and optimal partitions in
additively separable hedonic games. We show that, for strict preferences, a
Pareto optimal partition can be found in polynomial time while verifying
whether a given partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete, even when
preferences are symmetric and strict. Moreover, computing a partition with
maximum egalitarian or utilitarian social welfare or one which is both Pareto
optimal and individually rational is NP-hard. We also prove that checking
whether there exists a partition which is both Pareto optimal and envy-free is
-complete. Even though an envy-free partition and a Nash stable
partition are both guaranteed to exist for symmetric preferences, checking
whether there exists a partition which is both envy-free and Nash stable is
NP-complete.Comment: 11 pages; A preliminary version of this work was invited for
presentation in the session `Cooperative Games and Combinatorial
Optimization' at the 24th European Conference on Operational Research (EURO
2010) in Lisbo
Stable Roommate Problem with Diversity Preferences
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated
to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the
complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption
that agents have diversity preferences [Bredereck et al., 2019]: each agent
belongs to one of the two types (e.g., juniors and seniors, artists and
engineers), and agents' preferences over rooms depend solely on the fraction of
agents of their own type among their potential roommates. We consider various
solution concepts for this setting, such as core and exchange stability, Pareto
optimality and envy-freeness. On the negative side, we prove that envy-free,
core stable or (strongly) exchange stable outcomes may fail to exist and that
the associated decision problems are NP-complete. On the positive side, we show
that these problems are in FPT with respect to the room size, which is not the
case for the general stable roommate problem. Moreover, for the classic setting
with rooms of size two, we present a linear-time algorithm that computes an
outcome that is core and exchange stable as well as Pareto optimal. Many of our
results for the stable roommate problem extend to the stable marriage problem.Comment: accepted to IJCAI'2
Parameterized Complexity of Problems in Coalitional Resource Games
Coalition formation is a key topic in multi-agent systems. Coalitions enable
agents to achieve goals that they may not have been able to achieve on their
own. Previous work has shown problems in coalitional games to be
computationally hard. Wooldridge and Dunne (Artificial Intelligence 2006)
studied the classical computational complexity of several natural decision
problems in Coalitional Resource Games (CRG) - games in which each agent is
endowed with a set of resources and coalitions can bring about a set of goals
if they are collectively endowed with the necessary amount of resources. The
input of coalitional resource games bundles together several elements, e.g.,
the agent set Ag, the goal set G, the resource set R, etc. Shrot, Aumann and
Kraus (AAMAS 2009) examine coalition formation problems in the CRG model using
the theory of Parameterized Complexity. Their refined analysis shows that not
all parts of input act equal - some instances of the problem are indeed
tractable while others still remain intractable.
We answer an important question left open by Shrot, Aumann and Kraus by
showing that the SC Problem (checking whether a Coalition is Successful) is
W[1]-hard when parameterized by the size of the coalition. Then via a single
theme of reduction from SC, we are able to show that various problems related
to resources, resource bounds and resource conflicts introduced by Wooldridge
et al are 1. W[1]-hard or co-W[1]-hard when parameterized by the size of the
coalition. 2. para-NP-hard or co-para-NP-hard when parameterized by |R|. 3. FPT
when parameterized by either |G| or |Ag|+|R|.Comment: This is the full version of a paper that will appear in the
proceedings of AAAI 201
Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
Political parties in Northern Ireland recently used a divisor method of apportionment to choose, in sequence, ten cabinet ministries. If the parties have complete information about each others' preferences, we show that it may not be rational for them to act sincerely by choosing their most-preferred ministry that is available. One consequence of acting sophisticatedly is that the resulting allocation may not be Pareto-optimal, making all the parties worse off. Another is nonmonotonictyâchoosing earlier may hurt rather than help a party. We introduce a mechanism that combines sequential choices with a structured form of trading that results in sincere choices for two parties. Although there are difficulties in extending this mechanism to more than two parties, other approaches are explored, such as permitting parties to making consecutive choices not prescribed by an apportionment method. But certain problems, such as eliminating envy, remain.Proportional Representation, apportionment, divisor methods, Sincere and Sophisticated Choices, Envy Free Allocations, Sports Drafts
Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
Political parties in Northern Ireland recently used a divisor method of apportionment to choose, in sequence, ten cabinet ministries. If the parties have complete information about each others' preferences, we show that it may not be rational for them to act sincerely by choosing their most-preferred ministry that is available. One consequence of acting sophisticatedly is that the resulting allocation may not be Pareto-optimal, making all the parties worse off. Another is nonmonotonicty-choosing earlier may hurt rather than help a party. We introduce a mechanism that combines sequential choices with a structured form of trading that results in sincere choices for two parties. Although there are difficulties in extending this mechanism to more than two parties, other approaches are explored, such as permitting parties to making consecutive choices not prescribed by an apportionment method. But certain problems, such as eliminating envy, remain.APPORTIONMENT METHODS; CABINETS; SEQUENTIAL ALLOCATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; FAIRNESS
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