Second best toll and capacity optimisation in network: solution algorithm and policy implications

This paper looks at the first and second-best jointly optimal toll and road capacity investment problems from both policy and technical oriented perspectives. On the technical side, the paper investigates the applicability of the constraint cutting algorithm for solving the second-best problem under elastic demand which is formulated as a bilevel programming problem. The approach is shown to perform well despite several problems encountered by our previous work in Shepherd and Sumalee (2004). The paper then applies the algorithm to a small sized network to investigate the policy implications of the first and second-best cases. This policy analysis demonstrates that the joint first best structure is to invest in the most direct routes while reducing capacities elsewhere. Whilst unrealistic this acts as a useful benchmark. The results also show that certain second best policies can achieve a high proportion of the first best benefits while in general generating a revenue surplus. We also show that unless costs of capacity are known to be low then second best tolls will be affected and so should be analysed in conjunction with investments in the network

Modeling and Optimization for Transportation Systems Planning and Operations

In this paper, we focus on a number of applications of network optimization techniques to transportation systems analysis. In particular, network analysis problems, network design problems, and network management problems are discussed in some detail. The intent is to survey important application areas.*To be presented at the International Symposium on Large Engineering Systems, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, August 9-12, 197

Cooperative game approaches to measuring network reliability considering paradoxes

Traditionally, game-theoretic approaches to measuring transport network reliability have relied on the outcome of a game played between on the one hand users who seek minimum cost routes, and on the other hand, one or more evil entities or demons that seek to maximize the total expected network cost to the users by damaging links in the network. As the demons are assumed to be non-cooperative, this approach has been criticized that it cannot produce the worst-case solution for reliability analysis, contradicting the original purpose of adopting game-theoretic approaches. In this paper, two cooperative game formulations, the Stackelberg-Nash formulation and the partial-cooperative Nash formulation, are proposed to determine travel cost reliability. Their relationships are analyzed and their properties are examined. This paper also investigates under what condition(s) the classical non-cooperative demon behavior can lead to the worst-case solution. Numerical studies are provided to demonstrate: (i) the effects of the number of coalitions formed by demons on total network expected cost and network/Origin-Destination (OD) travel cost reliability; (ii) the paradoxical phenomenon that if one adds a road to a network then all the travelers may be worse off in terms of expected network travel cost and/or network travel cost reliability, and (iii) the possibility of the classical game-theoretic approach of overestimating network/OD travel cost reliability. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd.postprin

Network Maintenance and Capacity Management with Applications in Transportation

abstract: This research develops heuristics to manage both mandatory and optional network capacity reductions to better serve the network flows. The main application discussed relates to transportation networks, and flow cost relates to travel cost of users of the network. Temporary mandatory capacity reductions are required by maintenance activities. The objective of managing maintenance activities and the attendant temporary network capacity reductions is to schedule the required segment closures so that all maintenance work can be completed on time, and the total flow cost over the maintenance period is minimized for different types of flows. The goal of optional network capacity reduction is to selectively reduce the capacity of some links to improve the overall efficiency of user-optimized flows, where each traveler takes the route that minimizes the traveler’s trip cost. In this dissertation, both managing mandatory and optional network capacity reductions are addressed with the consideration of network-wide flow diversions due to changed link capacities. This research first investigates the maintenance scheduling in transportation networks with service vehicles (e.g., truck fleets and passenger transport fleets), where these vehicles are assumed to take the system-optimized routes that minimize the total travel cost of the fleet. This problem is solved with the randomized fixed-and-optimize heuristic developed. This research also investigates the maintenance scheduling in networks with multi-modal traffic that consists of (1) regular human-driven cars with user-optimized routing and (2) self-driving vehicles with system-optimized routing. An iterative mixed flow assignment algorithm is developed to obtain the multi-modal traffic assignment resulting from a maintenance schedule. The genetic algorithm with multi-point crossover is applied to obtain a good schedule. Based on the Braess’ paradox that removing some links may alleviate the congestion of user-optimized flows, this research generalizes the Braess’ paradox to reduce the capacity of selected links to improve the efficiency of the resultant user-optimized flows. A heuristic is developed to identify links to reduce capacity, and the corresponding capacity reduction amounts, to get more efficient total flows. Experiments on real networks demonstrate the generalized Braess’ paradox exists in reality, and the heuristic developed solves real-world test cases even when commercial solvers fail.Dissertation/ThesisDoctoral Dissertation Industrial Engineering 201

Bridging the user equilibrium and the system optimum in static traffic assignment: a review

Solving the road congestion problem is one of the most pressing issues in modern cities since it causes time wasting, pollution, higher industrial costs and huge road maintenance costs. Advances in ITS technologies and the advent of autonomous vehicles are changing mobility dramatically. They enable the implementation of a coordination mechanism, called coordinated traffic assignment, among the sat-nav devices aiming at assigning paths to drivers to eliminate congestion and to reduce the total travel time in traffic networks. Among possible congestion avoidance methods, coordinated traffic assignment is a valuable choice since it does not involve huge investments to expand the road network. Traffic assignments are traditionally devoted to two main perspectives on which the well-known Wardropian principles are inspired: the user equilibrium and the system optimum. User equilibrium is a user-driven traffic assignment in which each user chooses the most convenient path selfishly. It guarantees that fairness among users is respected since, when the equilibrium is reached, all users sharing the same origin and destination will experience the same travel time. The main drawback in a user equilibrium is that the system total travel time is not minimized and, hence, the so-called Price of Anarchy is paid. On the other hand, the system optimum is an efficient system-wide traffic assignment in which drivers are routed on the network in such a way the total travel time is minimized, but users might experience travel times that are higher than the other users travelling from the same origin to the same destination, affecting the compliance. Thus, drawbacks in implementing one of the two assignments can be overcome by hybridizing the two approaches, aiming at bridging users’ fairness to system-wide efficiency. In the last decades, a significant number of attempts have been done to bridge fairness among users and system efficiency in traffic assignments. The survey reviews the state-of-the-art of these trade-off approaches