11,760 research outputs found
Reconciling operational and epistemic approaches to the formal analysis of crypto-based security protocols
We propose a unifying framework for formal specification and verification of both epistemic and behavioral aspects of security protocols. The main novelty of the proposed framework is the explicit support for cryptographic constructs, which is among the most essential ingredients of security protocols. Due to this feature, the indistinguishability relation for the epistemic constructs gets a dynamic semantics by taking the communicated keys and cryptographic terms in the operational specification into account
A semantic analysis of key management protocols for wireless sensor networks
Gorrieri and Martinelli's timed Generalized Non-Deducibility on Compositions (tGNDC) schema is a well-known general framework for the formal verification of security protocols in a concurrent scenario. We generalise the tGNDC schema to verify wireless network security protocols. Our generalisation relies on a simple timed broadcasting process calculus whose operational semantics is given in terms of a labelled transition system which is used to derive a standard simulation theory. We apply our tGNDC framework to perform a security analysis of three well-known key management protocols for wireless sensor networks: \u3bcTESLA, LEAP+ and LiSP
A Program Logic for Verifying Secure Routing Protocols
The Internet, as it stands today, is highly vulnerable to attacks. However,
little has been done to understand and verify the formal security guarantees of
proposed secure inter-domain routing protocols, such as Secure BGP (S-BGP). In
this paper, we develop a sound program logic for SANDLog-a declarative
specification language for secure routing protocols for verifying properties of
these protocols. We prove invariant properties of SANDLog programs that run in
an adversarial environment. As a step towards automated verification, we
implement a verification condition generator (VCGen) to automatically extract
proof obligations. VCGen is integrated into a compiler for SANDLog that can
generate executable protocol implementations; and thus, both verification and
empirical evaluation of secure routing protocols can be carried out in this
unified framework. To validate our framework, we encoded several proposed
secure routing mechanisms in SANDLog, verified variants of path authenticity
properties by manually discharging the generated verification conditions in
Coq, and generated executable code based on SANDLog specification and ran the
code in simulation
Verifying Security Properties in Unbounded Multiagent Systems
We study the problem of analysing the security for an unbounded number of concurrent sessions of a cryptographic protocol. Our formal model accounts for an arbitrary number of agents involved in a protocol-exchange which is subverted by a Dolev-Yao attacker. We define the parameterised model checking problem with respect to security requirements expressed in temporal-epistemic logics. We formulate sufficient conditions for solving this problem, by analysing several finite models of the system. We primarily explore authentication and key-establishment as part of a larger class of protocols and security requirements amenable to our methodology. We introduce a tool implementing the technique, and we validate it by verifying the NSPK and ASRPC protocols
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A UML-based static verification framework for security
Secure software engineering is a new research area that has been proposed to address security issues during the development of software systems. This new area of research advocates that security characteristics should be considered from the early stages of the software development life cycle and should not be added as another layer in the system on an ad-hoc basis after the system is built. In this paper, we describe a UML-based Static Verification Framework (USVF) to support the design and verification of secure software systems in early stages of the software development life-cycle taking into consideration security and general requirements of the software system. USVF performs static verification on UML models consisting of UML class and state machine diagrams extended by an action language. We present an operational semantics of UML models, define a property specification language designed to reason about temporal and general properties of UML state machines using the semantic domains of the former, and implement the model checking process by translating models and properties into Promela, the input language of the SPIN model checker. We show that the methodology can be applied to the verification of security properties by representing the main aspects of security, namely availability, integrity and confidentiality, in the USVF property specification language
Model checking probabilistic and stochastic extensions of the pi-calculus
We present an implementation of model checking for probabilistic and stochastic extensions of the pi-calculus, a process algebra which supports modelling of concurrency and mobility. Formal verification techniques for such extensions have clear applications in several domains, including mobile ad-hoc network protocols, probabilistic security protocols and biological pathways. Despite this, no implementation of automated verification exists. Building upon the pi-calculus model checker MMC, we first show an automated procedure for constructing the underlying semantic model of a probabilistic or stochastic pi-calculus process. This can then be verified using existing probabilistic model checkers such as PRISM. Secondly, we demonstrate how for processes of a specific structure a more efficient, compositional approach is applicable, which uses our extension of MMC on each parallel component of the system and then translates the results into a high-level modular description for the PRISM tool. The feasibility of our techniques is demonstrated through a number of case studies from the pi-calculus literature
A Fully Abstract Symbolic Semantics for Psi-Calculi
We present a symbolic transition system and bisimulation equivalence for
psi-calculi, and show that it is fully abstract with respect to bisimulation
congruence in the non-symbolic semantics.
A psi-calculus is an extension of the pi-calculus with nominal data types for
data structures and for logical assertions representing facts about data. These
can be transmitted between processes and their names can be statically scoped
using the standard pi-calculus mechanism to allow for scope migrations.
Psi-calculi can be more general than other proposed extensions of the
pi-calculus such as the applied pi-calculus, the spi-calculus, the fusion
calculus, or the concurrent constraint pi-calculus.
Symbolic semantics are necessary for an efficient implementation of the
calculus in automated tools exploring state spaces, and the full abstraction
property means the semantics of a process does not change from the original
Validating a Web Service Security Abstraction by Typing
An XML web service is, to a first approximation, an RPC service in which
requests and responses are encoded in XML as SOAP envelopes, and transported
over HTTP. We consider the problem of authenticating requests and responses at
the SOAP-level, rather than relying on transport-level security. We propose a
security abstraction, inspired by earlier work on secure RPC, in which the
methods exported by a web service are annotated with one of three security
levels: none, authenticated, or both authenticated and encrypted. We model our
abstraction as an object calculus with primitives for defining and calling web
services. We describe the semantics of our object calculus by translating to a
lower-level language with primitives for message passing and cryptography. To
validate our semantics, we embed correspondence assertions that specify the
correct authentication of requests and responses. By appeal to the type theory
for cryptographic protocols of Gordon and Jeffrey's Cryptyc, we verify the
correspondence assertions simply by typing. Finally, we describe an
implementation of our semantics via custom SOAP headers.Comment: 44 pages. A preliminary version appears in the Proceedings of the
Workshop on XML Security 2002, pp. 18-29, November 200
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