Sequential Two-Player Games with Ambiguity

If players' beliefs are strictly non-additive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.

CEU Preferences and Dynamic Consistency

This paper investigates the dynamic consistency of CEU preferences. A decision maker is faced with an information structure represented by a fixed filtration. If beliefs are represented by a convex capacity, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic consistency is that beliefs be additive over the final stage in the filtration.

Discrete time models for bid-ask pricing under Dempster-Shafer uncertainty

As is well-known, real financial markets depart from simplifying hypotheses of classical no-arbitrage pricing theory. In particular, they show the presence of frictions in the form of bid-ask spread. For this reason, the aim of the thesis is to provide a model able to manage these situations, relying on a non-linear pricing rule defined as (discounted) Choquet integral with respect to a belief function. Under the partially resolving uncertainty principle, we generalize the first fundamental theorem of asset pricing in the context of belief functions. Furthermore, we show that a generalized arbitrage-free lower pricing rule can be characterized as a (discounted) Choquet expectation with respect to an equivalent inner approximating (one-step) Choquet martingale belief function. Then, we generalize the Choquet pricing rule dinamically: we characterize a reference belief function such that a multiplicative binomial process satisfies a suitable version of time-homogeneity and Markov properties and we derive the induced conditional Choquet expectation operator. In a multi-period market with a risky asset admitting bid-ask spread, we assume that its lower price process is modeled by the proposed time-homogeneous Markov multiplicative binomial process. Here, we generalize the theorem of change of measure, proving the existence of an equivalent one-step Choquet martingale belief function. Then, we prove that the (discounted) lower price process of a European derivative is a one-step Choquet martingale and a k-step Choquet super-martingale, for k ≥ 2

Comparing three ways to update Choquet beliefs

publication-status: Publishedtypes: Article“NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 107, 91-94, 2010 doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.035We analyze three rules for updating neo-additive capacities. Only for Generalized Bayesian Updating is relative optimism the same for both updated and unconditional capacities. For updates of the other two, either the updated capacity is fully optimistic or fully pessimistic. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Sequential two-player games with ambiguity

Author's pre-printIf players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster–Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster–Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We argue that our equilibrium can be used to define a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.ESRC senior research fellowship scheme, H5242750259

A General Update Rule for Convex Capacities

A characterization of a general update rule for convex capacities, the G-updating rule, is investigated. We introduce a consistency property which bridges between unconditional and conditional preferences, and deduce an update rule for unconditional capacities. The axiomatic basis for the G-updating rule is established through consistent counterfactual acts, which take the form of trinary acts expressed in terms of G, an ordered tripartition of global states.ambiguous belief, Bayes' rule, update rule, convex capacity, Choquet ex- pected utility, conditional preference

Addressing ambiguity in randomized reinsurance stop-loss treaties using belief functions

The aim of the paper is to model ambiguity in a randomized reinsurance stop-loss treaty. For this, we consider the lower envelope of the set of bivariate joint probability distributions having a precise discrete marginal and an ambiguous Bernoulli marginal. Under an independence assumption, since the lower envelope fails 2-monotonicity, inner/outer Dempster-Shafer approximations are considered, so as to select the optimal retention level by maximizing the lower expected insurer's annual profit under reinsurance. We show that the inner approximation is not suitable in the reinsurance problem, while the outer approximation preserves the given marginal information, weakens the independence assumption, and does not introduce spurious information in the retention level selection problem. Finally, we provide a characterization of the optimal retention level

Sequential two-player games with ambiguity

If players' beliefs are strictly non-additive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty

CEU preferences and dynamic consistency

This paper investigates the dynamic consistency of CEU preferences. A decision maker is faced with an information structure represented by a fixed filtration. If beliefs are represented by a convex capacity, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic consistency is that beliefs be additive over the final stage in the filtration