Live Data Forensic Artefak Internet Browser (Studi Kasus Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Opera Mode Incognito)

Browser merupakan program aplikasi perangkat lunak yang digunakan untuk mengakses internet baik dari perangkat desktop maupun mobile. Browser tersebut digunakan untuk mencari segala macam informasi yang tersedia di dunia internet. Browser terdapat fitur mode incognito yang digunakan dalam menjelajah informasi di internet. Fitur ini diklaim tidak menyimpan data penelusuran pribadi, seperti riwayat penelusuran, cookies, cache, dan kata sandi, di penyimpanan browser. Namun browser mode incognito dapat meninggalkan barang bukti digital di sistem. Hal ini menjadi tantangan bagi forensik investigator untuk melakukan investigasi forensik dan mencari barang bukti digital (digital evidence) dari browser mode incognito. Investigasi forensik yang dilakukan investigator dilakukan sesuai dengan prosedur forensik digital dalam mencari barang bukti. Investigasi forensik terdapat metode yang digunakan dalam mencari barang bukti yaitu live forensic dan post morterm analytic. Post morterm analytic merupakan metode investigasi yang dilakukan setelah terjadi tindak kejahatan sedangkan live forensic yaitu metode investigasi yang dilakukan saat tindak kejahatan berlangsung. Dalam penelitian ini, investigator menggunakan metode live forensic. Penelitian yang dilakukan menggunakan metode live forensic mampu mendapatkan dan membuktikan bahwa penggunaan browser mode incognito masih meninggalkan informasi berupa barang bukti digital dari pengguna. Barang bukti yang ditemukan yaitu berupa browsing history, web search, password, username, visited url. Barang bukti kemudian digunakan dipengadilan untuk menentukan proses tindak pidana pada pelaku

Forensics Analysis of Privacy of Portable Web Browsers

Web browser vendors offer a portable web browser option which is considered as one of the features that provides user privacy. Portable web browser is a browser that can be launched from a USB flash drive without the need for its installation on the host machine. Most popular web browsers have portable versions of their browsers as well. Portable web browsing poses a great challenge to computer forensic investigators who try to reconstruct the past browsing history, in case of any computer incidence. This research examines various sources in the host machine such as physical memory, temporary, recent, event files, Windows Registry, and Cache.dll files for the evidential information regarding portable browsing session. The portable browsers under this study include Firefox, Chrome, Safari, and Opera. Results of this experiment show that portable web browsers do not provide user-privacy as they are expected to do. Keywords: computer forensics tools, RAM forensics, volatile memory, forensics artifacts, Registr

Web browser artefacts in private and portable modes: a forensic investigation

Web browsers are essential tools for accessing the internet. Extra complexities are added to forensic investigations when recovering browsing artefacts as portable and private browsing are now common and available in popular web browsers. Browsers claim that whilst operating in private mode, no data is stored on the system. This paper investigates whether the claims of web browsers discretion are true by analysing the remnants of browsing left by the latest versions of Internet Explorer, Chrome, Firefox, and Opera when used in a private browsing session, as a portable browser, and when the former is running in private mode. Some of our key findings show how forensic analysis of the file system recovers evidence from IE while running in private mode whereas other browsers seem to maintain better user privacy. We analyse volatile memory and demonstrate how physical memory by means of dump files, hibernate and page files are the key areas where evidence from all browsers will still be recoverable despite their mode or location they run from

Exploring the protection of private browsing in desktop browsers

Desktop browsers have introduced private browsing mode, a security control which aims to protect users’ data that are generated during a private browsing session, by not storing them in the file system. As the Internet becomes ubiquitous, the existence of this security control is beneficial to users,since privacy violations are increasing, while users tend to be more concerned about their privacy when browsing the web in a post-Snowden era. In this context, this work examines the protection that is offered by the private browsing mode of the most popular desktop browsers in Windows (i.e.,Chrome, Firefox, IE and Opera).Our experiments uncover occasions in which even if users browse the web with a private session,privacy violations exist contrary to what is documented by the browser.To raise the bar of privacy protection that is offered by web browsers,we propose the use of a virtual filesystem as the storage medium of browsers’ cache data. We demonstrate with a case study how this countermeasure protects users from the privacy violations, which are previously identified in this work

Evaluating the End-User Experience of Private Browsing Mode

Nowadays, all major web browsers have a private browsing mode. However, the mode's benefits and limitations are not particularly understood. Through the use of survey studies, prior work has found that most users are either unaware of private browsing or do not use it. Further, those who do use private browsing generally have misconceptions about what protection it provides. However, prior work has not investigated \emph{why} users misunderstand the benefits and limitations of private browsing. In this work, we do so by designing and conducting a three-part study: (1) an analytical approach combining cognitive walkthrough and heuristic evaluation to inspect the user interface of private mode in different browsers; (2) a qualitative, interview-based study to explore users' mental models of private browsing and its security goals; (3) a participatory design study to investigate why existing browser disclosures, the in-browser explanations of private browsing mode, do not communicate the security goals of private browsing to users. Participants critiqued the browser disclosures of three web browsers: Brave, Firefox, and Google Chrome, and then designed new ones. We find that the user interface of private mode in different web browsers violates several well-established design guidelines and heuristics. Further, most participants had incorrect mental models of private browsing, influencing their understanding and usage of private mode. Additionally, we find that existing browser disclosures are not only vague, but also misleading. None of the three studied browser disclosures communicates or explains the primary security goal of private browsing. Drawing from the results of our user study, we extract a set of design recommendations that we encourage browser designers to validate, in order to design more effective and informative browser disclosures related to private mode

Emulsifiers in ultra-processed foods in the United Kingdom food supply

Abstract Objective: Ultra-processed foods (UPF), including those containing food-additive emulsifiers, have received research attention due to evidence implicating them in the pathogenesis of certain diseases. The aims of this research were to develop a large-scale, brand-level database of UPFs in the UK food supply and to characterise the occurrence and co-occurrence of food-additive emulsifiers. Design: A database was compiled sampling UPF groups contributing to total dietary energy intake in the UK from the National Diet and Nutrition Survey (2008-2014). Every food in these UPF groups were identified from online supermarket provision from the ‘‘big four’’ supermarkets that dominate the market share in the UK, comprising Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda and Morrisons. Results: A total of 32,719 food products in the UK supermarket food supply were returned in searches. Of these, 12,844 UPF products were eligible and manually reviewed for the presence of emulsifiers. Emulsifiers were present in 6,642 (51.7%) food products. Emulsifiers were contained in 95.0% of ‘‘Pastries, buns and cakes’’; 81.9% of ‘‘Milk-based drinks”, 81.0% in ‘‘Industrial desserts’’ and in 77.5% of “Confectionary”. Fifty-one percent of all emulsifier-containing foods contained multiple emulsifiers. Across emulsifier-containing foods there were a median of 2 emulsifiers (IQR 2) per product. The five most common emulsifiers were lecithin (23.4% of all UPF), mono- and diglycerides of fatty acids (14.5%), diphosphates (11.6%), xanthan gum and pectin (8.0%). Conclusions: Findings from this study are the first to demonstrate the wide-spread occurrence and co-occurrence of emulsifiers in UPF in the UK food supply

Browsers’ Private Mode: Is It What We Were Promised?

Web browsers are one of the most used applications on every computational device in our days. Hence, they play a pivotal role in any forensic investigation and help determine if nefarious or suspicious activity has occurred on that device. Our study investigates the usage of private mode and browsing artefacts within four prevalent web browsers and is focused on analyzing both hard disk and random access memory. Forensic analysis on the target device showed that using private mode matched each of the web browser vendors’ claims, such as that browsing activity, search history, cookies and temporary files that are not saved in the device’s hard disks. However, in volatile memory analysis, a majority of artefacts within the test cases were retrieved. Hence, a malicious actor performing a similar approach could potentially retrieve sensitive information left behind on the device without the user’s consent