Authentication Techniques That Work Well With Mobile and Distributed Systems

In the modern technological world, the existence of minuscule devices that are able to exchange data and build networks is necessary for the completion of numerous activities. In many of these applications, the confidentiality and dependability of the information that is being transferred are of the utmost importance. The purpose of this article is to offer two novel ways for authenticating short conversations that are encrypted, with the end objective of fulfilling the requirements of mobile and ubiquitous software. We take advantage of the fact that the message that has to be verified must also be encrypted in order to propose a set of authentication codes that are not only provably secure but also surpass every other message authentication code that has been published in the past. The recommended procedures make use of encryption techniques to provide an additional layer of protection, with the goal of enhancing the performance of the conventional authentication primitives

Аналіз безпеки МАС алгоритмів стандарту ISO/IEC 9797-2

Розглянути MAC-алгоритми, що визначені у стандарті ISO/IEC 9797-2, проведено аналіз їх безпечності до основних атак.MAC-algorithms which are certain in the standard ISO/IEC 9797-2 are considered, the analysis from safety to the basic attacks is lead

On the security of XCBC, TMAC and OMAC

The security provided by the XCBC, TMAC and OMAC schemes is analysed and compared with other MAC schemes. The results imply that there is relatively little to be gained practically through the introduction of these schemes by comparison with other well-established MAC functions. Moreover, TMAC and OMAC possess design weaknesses which enable part of the secret key to be recovered much more easily than would ideally be the case — design changes are suggested which alleviate this problem. Whether or not the proofs of security are retrievable for the modified designs remains an open question, although the need for change would appear to be clear

On the Security of NMAC and Its Variants

Based on the three earlier MAC (Message Authentication Code) construction approaches, we propose and analyze some variants of NMAC. We propose  some key recovery attacks to  these  NMAC  variants, for  example, we can  recover  the  equivalent  inner  key  of NMAC  in  about O(2n/2) MAC  operations, in  a related key  setting. We  propose  NMAC-E, a  variant of NMAC  with  secret  envelop,  to  achieve  more  process  efficiency  and  no  loss  of security, which needs only one call to the  underlying hash  function, instead of two invocations in HMAC

Proficient Authentication Mechanism for Mobile and Pervasive Computing

Mobile Computing is a technology that allows transmission of data, voice and video via a computer or any other wireless enabled device without having to be connected to a fixed physical link. With today’s technology, many applications rely on the existence of small devices that can exchange information and form communication networks. In a significant portion of such applications, the confidentiality and integrity of the communicated messages are of particular interest. In this work, we propose two novel techniques for authenticating short encrypted messages that are directed to meet the requirements of mobile and pervasive applications. By taking advantage of the fact that the message to be authenticated must also be encrypted, we propose provably secure authentication codes that are more efficient than any message authentication code in the literature. The key idea behind the proposed techniques is to utilize the security that the encryption algorithm can provide to design more efficient authentication mechanisms, as opposed to using standalone authentication primitive

Multiple forgery attacks against Message Authentication Codes

Some message authentication codes (MACs) are vulnerable to multiple forgery attacks, in which an attacker can gain information that allows her to succeed in forging multiple message/tag pairs. This property was first noted in MACs based on universal hashing, such as the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation for block ciphers. However, we show that CBC-MAC and HMAC also have this property, and for some parameters are more vulnerable than GCM. We present multiple-forgery attacks against these algorithms, then analyze the security against these attacks by using the expected number of forgeries. We compare the different MACs using this measure. This document is a pre-publication draft manuscript

Comparative Study of Eight Formal Specifications of the Message Authenticator Algorithm

The Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA) is one of the first cryptographic functions for computing a Message Authentication Code. Between 1987 and 2001, the MAA was adopted in international standards (ISO 8730 and ISO 8731-2) to ensure the authenticity and integrity of banking transactions. In 1990 and 1991, three formal, yet non-executable, specifications of the MAA (in VDM, Z, and LOTOS) were developed at NPL. Since then, five formal executable specifications of the MAA (in LOTOS, LNT, and term rewrite systems) have been designed at INRIA Grenoble. This article provides an overview of the MAA and compares its formal specifications with respect to common-sense criteria, such as conciseness, readability, and efficiency of code generation.Comment: In Proceedings MARS/VPT 2018, arXiv:1803.0866

Another Look at Security Theorems for 1-Key Nested MACs

We prove a security theorem without collision-resistance for a class of 1-key hash-function-based MAC schemes that includes HMAC and Envelope MAC. The proof has some advantages over earlier proofs: it is in the uniform model, it uses a weaker related-key assumption, and it covers a broad class of MACs in a single theorem. However, we also explain why our theorem is of doubtful value in assessing the real-world security of these MAC schemes. In addition, we prove a theorem assuming collision-resistance. From these two theorems we conclude that from a provable security standpoint there is little reason to prefer HMAC to Envelope MAC or similar schemes

Specifying a Cryptographical Protocol in Lustre and SCADE

We present SCADE and Lustre models of the Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA), which is one of the first cryptographic functions for computing a message authentication code. The MAA was adopted between 1987 and 2001, in international standards (ISO 8730 and ISO 8731-2), to ensure the authenticity and integrity of banking transactions. This paper discusses the choices and the challenges of our MAA implementations. Our SCADE and Lustre models validate 201 official test vectors for the MAA.Comment: In Proceedings MARS 2020, arXiv:2004.12403. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1703.0657