COORDINATION THROUGH DE BRUIJN SEQUENCES

Let µ be a rational distribution over a finite alphabet, and ( ) be a n-periodic sequences which first n elements are drawn i.i.d. according to µ. We consider automata of bounded size that input and output at stage t. We prove the existence of a constant C such that, whenever , with probability close to 1 there exists an automaton of size m such that the empirical frequency of stages such that is close to 1. In particular, one can take , where and .Coordination, complexity, De Bruijn sequences, automata

Modelling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognise Equilibrium Patterns

We model differences among agents in their ability to recognise temporal patterns of prices. Using the concept of DeBruijin sequences in two dynamic models of markets, we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which prices fluctuate in a pattern that is independent of the fundamentals and that can be recognised only by the more competent agents.DeBruijin, price fluctuations, sunspots, bounded rationality, bounded recall.

Finite automata games: basic concepts.

In this chapter we review the basic concepts on automata games, including best response, inference, equilibrium and complex system dynamics. We describe how the concept of Nash equilibrium is used to analyze the properties of automata systems and discuss its limitations. We explain why we think the topics of automata inference, the modeling of evolving automata, and the analysis of the relationship between emotions and reason, are interesting areas for further research

Playing off-line games with bounded rationality

We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payo is the average of a one-shot payo over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by introducing complexity limitations. First we dene the complexity of a sequence by its smallest period (a non-periodic sequence being of innite complexity) and study the maxmin of the game where player 1 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most n and player 2 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most m. We study the asymptotics of this value and a complete characterization in the matching pennies case. We extend the analysis of matching pennies to strategies with bounded recall.We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payo is the average of a one-shot payo over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by introducing complexity limitations. First we dene the complexity of a sequence by its smallest period (a non-periodic sequence being of innite complexity) and study the maxmin of the game where player 1 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most n and player 2 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most m. We study the asymptotics of this value and a complete characterization in the matching pennies case. We extend the analysis of matching pennies to strategies with bounded recall.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

The Complexity of Coordination Among Indonesian State Intelligence Institutions

The reforms in Indonesia have given birth to innovations in institutional arrangement and has become one of the priorities for democracy that is still being fought for. The problem that arises after the reforms have taken place is not all state institutions are arranged and in accordance with the values ​​and principles of democracy, including the arrangement of state intelligence institutions in Indonesia. The existing State Intelligence Institutions (besides Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and Indonesian National Police (POLRI)) have Task Implementation Operational Standards (SOPT) which are based on the duties and capabilities possessed, but are not supported by adequate capacity building, so that these institutions are less able to carry out the mandate stated in Article 2 of Law No. 17 Year 2011. Not all existing National Intelligence Institutions’ personnels (besides TNI and POLRI) have professional resource capabilities in the intelligence implementation as mentioned in Article 2 and Article 3 of Law No. 17 Year 2011. Almost most of the people or citizens in Indonesia assess intelligence as someone who is looking for information about crime and only in the scope of POLRI and TNI. The complexity of State Intelligence Institutions’ Coordination in Indonesia is not something that needs to be made a scapegoat for the failure of intelligence’s tasks. On the contrary, it must be seen as a source to achieve the success in carring out the tasks. Therefore the solution that can be done is by the Development of Capacity Building of the State Intelligence Institutions which is supported by the Network Type Command (NTC) coordination model, namely HTM, MTM and NTM model developments. The NTC model is a large coordination model with a broad network but still under one control or command, so that information processing can become increasingly faster and more accurate which in turn can increase high power in carrying out early detection and warning. This model is also able to make a more significant contribution in developing the operational plans and strategies of state intelligence institutions in order to achieve the role, purpose and function of state intelligence effectively. Keywords: Complexity, Institution, Intelligence, The Republic of Indonesia DOI: 10.7176/PPAR/9-1-05

Bottom-up design of strategic options as finite automata.

In this paper we look at the problem of strategic decision making. We start by presenting a new formalisation of strategic options as finite automata. Then, we show that these finite automata can be used to develop complex models of interacting options, such as option combinations and product options. Finally, we analyse real option games, presenting an algorithm to generate option games (based on automata)

Recognizing and Resolving Social Dilemmas in Supply Chain Public–Private Partnerships

The public-private partnership is a popular strategy for creating global sustainable value. However, many public-private partnerships struggle to realize their value-added potential. Why do some public-private partnerships succeed while others fail, and how may those struggling succeed? Combining supply-chain integration and social dilemma perspectives into the conversation of public-private partnerships, we examine the dynamics and psychology ofcooperation necessary for public-private partnership success. Addressing the first part of our research question, we recognize three social dilemmas that can manifest while managing public-private partnership supply chains: a give-some dilemma, a take-some dilemma, and a give-or-take-some dilemma. To address the second part of our research question, we present a taxonomy of strategies resolving these public-private partnership social dilemmas through the enhancement of trust, self-efficacy, and/or social responsibility. We discuss implications for public-private partnerships, supply-chain, and social dilemma literatures