On parallel Branch and Bound frameworks for Global Optimization

Branch and Bound (B&B) algorithms are known to exhibit an irregularity of the search tree. Therefore, developing a parallel approach for this kind of algorithms is a challenge. The efficiency of a B&B algorithm depends on the chosen Branching, Bounding, Selection, Rejection, and Termination rules. The question we investigate is how the chosen platform consisting of programming language, used libraries, or skeletons influences programming effort and algorithm performance. Selection rule and data management structures are usually hidden to programmers for frameworks with a high level of abstraction, as well as the load balancing strategy, when the algorithm is run in parallel. We investigate the question by implementing a multidimensional Global Optimization B&B algorithm with the help of three frameworks with a different level of abstraction (from more to less): Bobpp, Threading Building Blocks (TBB), and a customized Pthread implementation. The following has been found. The Bobpp implementation is easy to code, but exhibits the poorest scalability. On the contrast, the TBB and Pthread implementations scale almost linearly on the used platform. The TBB approach shows a slightly better productivity

Euclidean distance geometry and applications

Euclidean distance geometry is the study of Euclidean geometry based on the concept of distance. This is useful in several applications where the input data consists of an incomplete set of distances, and the output is a set of points in Euclidean space that realizes the given distances. We survey some of the theory of Euclidean distance geometry and some of the most important applications: molecular conformation, localization of sensor networks and statics.Comment: 64 pages, 21 figure

Configurable Strategies for Work-stealing

Work-stealing systems are typically oblivious to the nature of the tasks they are scheduling. For instance, they do not know or take into account how long a task will take to execute or how many subtasks it will spawn. Moreover, the actual task execution order is typically determined by the underlying task storage data structure, and cannot be changed. There are thus possibilities for optimizing task parallel executions by providing information on specific tasks and their preferred execution order to the scheduling system. We introduce scheduling strategies to enable applications to dynamically provide hints to the task-scheduling system on the nature of specific tasks. Scheduling strategies can be used to independently control both local task execution order as well as steal order. In contrast to conventional scheduling policies that are normally global in scope, strategies allow the scheduler to apply optimizations on individual tasks. This flexibility greatly improves composability as it allows the scheduler to apply different, specific scheduling choices for different parts of applications simultaneously. We present a number of benchmarks that highlight diverse, beneficial effects that can be achieved with scheduling strategies. Some benchmarks (branch-and-bound, single-source shortest path) show that prioritization of tasks can reduce the total amount of work compared to standard work-stealing execution order. For other benchmarks (triangle strip generation) qualitatively better results can be achieved in shorter time. Other optimizations, such as dynamic merging of tasks or stealing of half the work, instead of half the tasks, are also shown to improve performance. Composability is demonstrated by examples that combine different strategies, both within the same kernel (prefix sum) as well as when scheduling multiple kernels (prefix sum and unbalanced tree search)

Collocation Games and Their Application to Distributed Resource Management

We introduce Collocation Games as the basis of a general framework for modeling, analyzing, and facilitating the interactions between the various stakeholders in distributed systems in general, and in cloud computing environments in particular. Cloud computing enables fixed-capacity (processing, communication, and storage) resources to be offered by infrastructure providers as commodities for sale at a fixed cost in an open marketplace to independent, rational parties (players) interested in setting up their own applications over the Internet. Virtualization technologies enable the partitioning of such fixed-capacity resources so as to allow each player to dynamically acquire appropriate fractions of the resources for unencumbered use. In such a paradigm, the resource management problem reduces to that of partitioning the entire set of applications (players) into subsets, each of which is assigned to fixed-capacity cloud resources. If the infrastructure and the various applications are under a single administrative domain, this partitioning reduces to an optimization problem whose objective is to minimize the overall deployment cost. In a marketplace, in which the infrastructure provider is interested in maximizing its own profit, and in which each player is interested in minimizing its own cost, it should be evident that a global optimization is precisely the wrong framework. Rather, in this paper we use a game-theoretic framework in which the assignment of players to fixed-capacity resources is the outcome of a strategic "Collocation Game". Although we show that determining the existence of an equilibrium for collocation games in general is NP-hard, we present a number of simplified, practically-motivated variants of the collocation game for which we establish convergence to a Nash Equilibrium, and for which we derive convergence and price of anarchy bounds. In addition to these analytical results, we present an experimental evaluation of implementations of some of these variants for cloud infrastructures consisting of a collection of multidimensional resources of homogeneous or heterogeneous capacities. Experimental results using trace-driven simulations and synthetically generated datasets corroborate our analytical results and also illustrate how collocation games offer a feasible distributed resource management alternative for autonomic/self-organizing systems, in which the adoption of a global optimization approach (centralized or distributed) would be neither practical nor justifiable.NSF (CCF-0820138, CSR-0720604, EFRI-0735974, CNS-0524477, CNS-052016, CCR-0635102); Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana; COLCIENCIAS–Instituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y la Tecnología "Francisco José de Caldas