Towards a scope management of non-functional requirements in requirements engineering

Getting business stakeholders’ goals formulated clearly and project scope defined realistically increases the chance of success for any application development process. As a consequence, stakeholders at early project stages acquire as much as possible knowledge about the requirements, their risk estimates and their prioritization. Current industrial practice suggests that in most software projects this scope assessment is performed on the user’s functional requirements (FRs), while the non-functional requirements (NFRs) remain, by and large, ignored. However, the increasing software complexity and competition in the software industry has highlighted the need to consider NFRs as an integral part of software modeling and development. This paper contributes towards harmonizing the need to build the functional behavior of a system with the need to model the associated NFRs while maintaining a scope management for NFRs. The paper presents a systematic and precisely defined model towards an early integration of NFRs within the requirements engineering (RE). Early experiences with the model indicate its ability to facilitate the process of acquiring the knowledge on the priority and risk of NFRs

A framework for security requirements engineering

This paper presents a framework for security requirements elicitation and analysis, based upon the construction of a context for the system and satisfaction arguments for the security of the system. One starts with enumeration of security goals based on assets in the system. These goals are used to derive security requirements in the form of constraints. The system context is described using a problem-centered notation, then this context is validated against the security requirements through construction of a satisfaction argument. The satisfaction argument is in two parts: a formal argument that the system can meet its security requirements, and a structured informal argument supporting the assumptions expressed in the formal argument. The construction of the satisfaction argument may fail, revealing either that the security requirement cannot be satisfied in the context, or that the context does not contain sufficient information to develop the argument. In this case, designers and architects are asked to provide additional design information to resolve the problems

Arguing satisfaction of security requirements

This chapter presents a process for security requirements elicitation and analysis, based around the construction of a satisfaction argument for the security of a system. The process starts with the enumeration of security goals based on assets in the system, then uses these goals to derive security requirements in the form of constraints. Next, a satisfaction argument for the system is constructed, using a problem-centered representation, a formal proof to analyze properties that can be demonstrated, and structured informal argumentation of the assumptions exposed during construction of the argument. Constructing the satisfaction argument can expose missing and inconsistent assumptions about system context and behavior that effect security, and a completed argument provides assurances that a system can respect its security requirements

A UML-based static verification framework for security

Secure software engineering is a new research area that has been proposed to address security issues during the development of software systems. This new area of research advocates that security characteristics should be considered from the early stages of the software development life cycle and should not be added as another layer in the system on an ad-hoc basis after the system is built. In this paper, we describe a UML-based Static Verification Framework (USVF) to support the design and verification of secure software systems in early stages of the software development life-cycle taking into consideration security and general requirements of the software system. USVF performs static verification on UML models consisting of UML class and state machine diagrams extended by an action language. We present an operational semantics of UML models, define a property specification language designed to reason about temporal and general properties of UML state machines using the semantic domains of the former, and implement the model checking process by translating models and properties into Promela, the input language of the SPIN model checker. We show that the methodology can be applied to the verification of security properties by representing the main aspects of security, namely availability, integrity and confidentiality, in the USVF property specification language

Secure data sharing and processing in heterogeneous clouds

The extensive cloud adoption among the European Public Sector Players empowered them to own and operate a range of cloud infrastructures. These deployments vary both in the size and capabilities, as well as in the range of employed technologies and processes. The public sector, however, lacks the necessary technology to enable effective, interoperable and secure integration of a multitude of its computing clouds and services. In this work we focus on the federation of private clouds and the approaches that enable secure data sharing and processing among the collaborating infrastructures and services of public entities. We investigate the aspects of access control, data and security policy languages, as well as cryptographic approaches that enable fine-grained security and data processing in semi-trusted environments. We identify the main challenges and frame the future work that serve as an enabler of interoperability among heterogeneous infrastructures and services. Our goal is to enable both security and legal conformance as well as to facilitate transparency, privacy and effectivity of private cloud federations for the public sector needs. © 2015 The Authors

Integrating security and usability into the requirements and design process

According to Ross Anderson, 'Many systems fail because their designers protect the wrong things or protect the right things in the wrong way'. Surveys also show that security incidents in industry are rising, which highlights the difficulty of designing good security. Some recent approaches have targeted security from the technological perspective, others from the human–computer interaction angle, offering better User Interfaces (UIs) for improved usability of security mechanisms. However, usability issues also extend beyond the user interface and should be considered during system requirements and design. In this paper, we describe Appropriate and Effective Guidance for Information Security (AEGIS), a methodology for the development of secure and usable systems. AEGIS defines a development process and a UML meta-model of the definition and the reasoning over the system's assets. AEGIS has been applied to case studies in the area of Grid computing and we report on one of these

The Dag-Brucken ASRS Case Study

In 1996 an agreement was made between a well-known beverage manufacturer, Super-Cola Taiwan, (SCT) and a small Australian electrical engineering company, Dag-Brücken ASRS Pty Ltd, (DB), to provide an automated storage and retrieval system (ASRS) facility as part of SCT’s production facilities in Asia. Recognising the potential of their innovative and technically advanced design, DB was awarded a State Premiers Export Award and was a finalist in that year’s National Export Awards. The case tracks the development and subsequent implementation of the SCT ASRS project, setting out to highlight how the lack of appropriate IT development processes contributed to the ultimate failure of the project and the subsequent winding up of DB only one year after being honoured with these prestigious awards. The case provides compelling evidence of the types of project management incompetency that, from the literature, appears to contribute to the high failure rate in IT projects. For confidentiality reasons, the names of the principal parties are changed, but the case covers actual events documented by one of the project team members as part of his postgraduate studies, providing an example of the special mode of evidence collection that Yin (1994) calls ‘participant-observation’