826 research outputs found

    On fair cost facility location games with non-singleton players

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    In the fair cost facility location game, players control terminals and must open and connect each terminal to a facility, while paying connection costs and equally sharing the opening costs associated with the facilities it connects to. In most of the literature, it is assumed that each player control a single terminal. We explore a more general version of the game where each player may control multiple terminals. We prove that this game does not always possess pure Nash equilibria, and deciding whether an instance has equilibria is NP-Hard, even in metric instances. Furthermore, we present results regarding the efficiency of equilibria, showing that the price of stability of this game is equal to the price of anarchy, in both uncapacitated and capacitated settings

    Non-Cooperative Facility Location Games: a Survey

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    The Facility Location problem is a well-know NP-Hard combinatorial optimization problem. It models a diverse set of situations where one aims to provide a set of goods or services via a set of facilities F to a set of clients T, also called terminals. There are opening costs for each facility in F and connection costs for each pair of facility and client, if such facility attends this client. A central authority wants to determine the solution with minimum cost, considering both opening and connection costs, in such a way that all clients are attended by one facility. In this survey we are interested in the non-cooperative game version of this problem, where instead of having a central authority, each client is a player and decides where to con- nect himself. In doing so, he aims to minimize his own costs, given by the connection costs and opening costs of the facility, which may be shared among clients using the same facility. This problem has several applications as well, specially in distributed scenarios where a central authority is too expensive or even infeasible to exist. In this paper we present a survey describing different variants of this problem and reviewing several results about it, as well as adapting results from existing literature concerning the existence of equilibria, Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. We also point out open problems that remain to be addressed.

    On some cost allocation problems in communication networks

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    New technologies prompted an explosion in the development of communication networks. Modern network optimization techniques usually lead to a design of the most profitable, or the least cost network that will provide some service to customers. There are various costs and gains associated with building and using a communication network. Moreover, the involved multiple network users and/or owners possibly have conflicting objectives. However, they might cooperate in order to decrease their joint cost or increase their joint profit. Clearly, these individuals or organizations will support a globally \u27attractive\u27 solution(s) only if their expectations for a \u27fair share\u27 of the cost or profit are met. Consequently, providing network developers, users and owners with efficiently computable \u27fair\u27 cost allocation solution procedures is of great importance for strategic management. This work is an overview of some recent results (some already published as well as some new) in the development of cooperative game theory based mechanisms to efficiently compute \u27attractive\u27 cost allocation solutions for several important classes of communication networks

    Cooperative game-theoretic features of cost sharing in location-routing

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    This article studies several variants of the location-routing problem using a cooperative game-theoretic framework. The authors derive characteristics in terms of subadditivity, convexity, and non-emptiness of the core. Moreover, for some of the game variants, it is shown that for facility opening costs substantially larger than the costs associated with routing, the core is always non-empty. The theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments aimed at illustrating the properties and deriving insights. Among others, it is observed that, while in general it is not possible to guarantee core allocations, in a huge majority of cases the core is non-empty

    On the effectiveness of connection tolls in fair cost facility location games

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    We investigate the effectiveness of tolls to reduce the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in the classical fair cost facility location game. In this game, every terminal corresponds to a selfish player who wants to connect to some facility at minimum cost. The cost of a player is determined by the connection cost to the chosen facility plus an equal share of its opening cost. We are interested in the problem of imposing tolls on the connections to induce a socially optimal Nash equilibrium such that the total amount of tolls is minimized. It turns out that this problem is challenging to solve even for simple special cases. We provide polynomial-time algorithms for (i) instances with two facilities, and (ii) instances with a constant number of facilities arranged as a star. Our algorithm for (ii) exploits a relation between our tolling problem and a novel bipartite matching problem without crossings, which we prove to be NP-hard
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