Improving Roadside Unit deployment in vehicular networks by exploiting genetic algorithms

Vehicular networks make use of the Roadside Units (RSUs) to enhance the communication capabilities of the vehicles in order to forward control messages and/or to provide Internet access to vehicles, drivers and passengers. Unfortunately, within vehicular networks, the wireless signal propagation is mostly affected by buildings and other obstacles (e.g., urban fixtures), in particular when considering the IEEE 802.11p standard. Therefore, a crowded RSU deployment may be required to ensure vehicular communications within urban environments. Furthermore, some applications, notably those applications related to safety, require a fast and reliable warning data transmission to the emergency services and traffic authorities. However, communication is not always possible in vehicular environments due to the lack of connectivity even employing multiple hops. To overcome the signal propagation problem and delayed warning notification time issues, an effective, smart, cost-effective and all-purpose RSU deployment policy should be put into place. In this paper, we propose the genetic algorithm for roadside unit deployment (GARSUD) system, which uses a genetic algorithm that is capable of automatically providing an RSU deployment suitable for any given road map layout. Our simulation results show that GARSUD is able to reduce the warning notification time (the time required to inform emergency authorities in traffic danger situations) and to improve vehicular communication capabilities within different density scenarios and complexity layouts

Road-side units operators in competition: A game-theoretical approach

International audienceWe study the interactions among Internet providers in vehicular networks which offer access to commuters via road side units (RSUs). Namely, we propose a game-theoretical framework to model the competition on prices between vehicular Internet providers to capture the largest amount of users, thus selfishly maximizing the revenues. The equilibria of the aforementioned game are characterized under different mobile traffic conditions, RSU capabilities and users requirements and expectations. In particular, we also consider in the analysis the case where mobile users modify the price they accept to pay for the access as the likeliness of finding an access solution decreases. Our game-theoretical analysis gives insights on the outcomes of the competition between vehicular Internet providers, further highlighting some counter-intuitive behaviors; as an example, comparing with the case when users have constant price valuation over time, having users inclined to increasing their "acceptable" price may force vehicle Internet providers to charge lower prices due to competition

Non-cooperative RSU deployment in vehicular networks

This work considers the issue of distributing contents to vehicles through roadside communication infrastructure. Within this scenario, this work studies the dynamics of infrastructure deployment by using game theoretic tools. A strategic game is used to model the case in which the operators perform their deployment decisions concurrently, whereas an extensive game is used to study the dynamics in case one operator is the deployment leader and moves first. The equilibria of the aforementioned games are then assessed as a function of several parameters (nominal infrastructure capacity, interference, vehicle flows). Simulations are used to validate the analytical findings