Successful Projects - What Makes Them Work? A Cross-National Analysis

[Excerpt] This cross national analysis is based on national studies made by research teams in India, Kenya, Romania and South Africa. It aims to draw out the lessons learnt from successful social development processes in these countries. In each country, studies have been made of projects identified as interesting, successful and/or outstanding in the way they have improved the quality of life of people with intellectual disabilities. In national reports, the respective teams have made their own national conclusions. This comparative report briefly describes the national studies. It then continues with a cross national analysis attempting to identify circumstances or factors that are common to these successful projects. Finally, the report summarises the conclusions and their implications. We hope that the findings presented in the report will be used as inspiration in future planning, implementation and funding of projects aiming at improving life conditions of groups that are marginalised in society. Chapter 1 and 2, describing the research process and the national reports have been written by Annika and Lennart Nilsson. Anders Gustavsson and Johans Sandvin are responsible for the cross national analysis in chapter 3 to 7. The conclusions and implications in chapter 8 have been written jointly. The study has been commissioned by Inclusion International and financed by the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida)

\u3ci\u3eClimate, Complacency and American Culture: The Role of Narrative in the Era of the Misinformation Amid the Anthropocene\u3c/i\u3e

This article explores the relationship between climate misinformation campaigns and narratives in light of skepticism and denial of climate change in the era of the Anthropocene. Beginning in the earliest moments of human existence, this paper establishes the importance of narratives in the founding of modern humanity and how such foundational stories has led to our current Anthropogenic world. It goes on to examine misinformation created and funded by politically powerful foundations and companies that distorts the current discussions of climate change among the American public. In leu of the abundance of climate misinformation, this paper also analyzes how the complex emotions inherent in climate change can rationalize the blatant fallacies presented in misinformation campaigns and why they remain socially and politically salient. Given such emotional perils that are unequivocally intertwined with existing in a radically shifting climate, it is necessary to invoke a greater emotional response that overpowers the fear and anxiety that rationalizes the belief in misinformation. Grounded in such emotions inherent in the era of the Anthropocene, this paper argues that narratives and the art of storytelling, the very foundation of what it means to be human, are uniquely suited to convey the severity of climate change. They have the power to invoke an empathic response which works to reverse the hold misinformation has over a sector of the American public that drives climate change skepticism and denial

The complexity of neuroenhancement and the adoption of a social cognitive perspective

This contribution attempts to provide a broad perspective to the psychological study of neuroenhancement (NE). It departs from the assumption that, as the use of performance enhancing substances in sport, the use of substances with the aim of improving one’s cognitive, motivational and affective functioning in academic domains is a goal-directed behavior. As such, its scientific study may very well benefit from an analysis taking into account the psychological processes regulating people’s behavioral intentions and decisions. Within this broad framework, this contribution addresses several issues that currently seem to characterize the debate in the literature on neuroenhancement substances (NES) use. The first conceptual issue seeks to determine and define the “boundaries” of the phenomenon. The second issue concerns the empirical evidence on the prevalence of using certain substances for the purpose of NE. Finally, there is a debate around the ethical and moral implications of NE. Along these lines, the existing psychological research on NE has adopted mainly sociological and economic decision-making perspectives, greatly contributing to the psychological discourse about the phenomenon of NE. However, we argue that the existing psychological literature does not offer a common, explicit and integrated theoretical framework. Borrowing from the framework of doping research, we recommend the adoption of a social cognitive model for pursuing a systematic analysis of the psychological processes that dynamically regulate students’ use of NES over tim

On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not)

We propose another positive illusion – overconfidence in the generalisability of one’s theory – that fits with McKay & Dennett’s (M&D’s) criteria for adaptive misbeliefs. This illusion is pervasive in adult reasoning but we focus on its prevalence in children’s developing theories. It is a strongly held conviction arising from normal functioning of the doxastic system that confers adaptive advantage on the individual

Why the idea of framework propositions cannot contribute to an understanding of delusions

One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent epistemic features of primary delusions, their role in partially constituting the sense of inquiry rules out their role in helping to understand delusions

Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?

In a fallen world fraught with evidence against religious beliefs, it is tempting to think that, on the assumption that those beliefs are true, the best way to protect them is to hold them dogmatically. Dogmatic belief, which is highly confident and resistant to counterevidence, may fail to exhibit epistemic virtues such as humility and may instead manifest epistemic vices such as arrogance or servility, but if this is the price of secure belief in religious truths, so be it. I argue, however, that even in a world full of misleading evidence against true religious beliefs, cultivating epistemic humility is the better way to achieve believers’ epistemic aims. The reason is that dogmatic belief courts certain epistemic dangers, including to the true religious beliefs themselves, whereas epistemic humility empowers believers to counter them

On the public discourse of religion : an analysis of Christianity in the United Kingdom

Debates over the involvement of religion in the public sphere look set to be one of the defining themes of the 21st century. But while religious issues have attracted a large degree of scholarly attention, the public discourse of religion itself, in terms of the effort to assert and legitimize a role for faith in the public realm, has remained notably under-researched. This article marks an initial step to address this deficiency by deconstructing the public discourse of Christianity in the United Kingdom. It argues that, while appealing for representation on the grounds of liberal equality, the overall goal of this discourse is to establish a role for itself as a principal source of moral authority, and to exempt itself from the evidentially-based standards and criteria that govern public life

Re-establishing an Ecological Discourse in the Debate over the Value of Ecosystems and Biodiversity

The approach of conceptualizing biodiversity and ecosystems as goods and services to be represented by monetary values in policy is being championed not just by economists, but also by ecologists and conservation biologists. This new environmental pragmatism is now being pushed forward internationally under the guise of hardwiring biodiversity and ecosystems services into finance. This conflicts with the realisation that biodiversity and ecosystems have multiple incommensurable values. The current trend is to narrowly define a set of instrumental aspects of ecosystems and biodiversity to be associated with ad hoc money numbers. We argue that ecosystem science has more to offer the policy debate than pseudo-economic numbers based on assumptions that do not reflect ecological or social complexity. Re-establishing the ecological discourse in biodiversity policy implies a crucial role for biophysical indicators as policy targets e.g., the Nature Index for Norway. Yet there is a recognisable need to go beyond the traditional ecological approach to create a social ecological economic discourse. This requires reviving and relating to a range of alternative ecologically informed discourses (e.g. intrinsic values, deep ecology, ecofeminism) in order to transform the increasingly dominant and destructive relationship of humans separated from and domineering over Nature. (author's abstract)Series: SRE - Discussion Paper

The Liberatory Possibilities of the Doctrine of Justification

Ideology in North American Lutheran context

Getting Things Less Wrong: Religion and the Role of Communities in Successfully Transmitting Beliefs

I use the case of religious belief to argue that communal institutions are crucial to successfully transmitting knowledge to a broad public. The transmission of maximally counterintuitive religious concepts can only be explained by reference to the communities that sustain and pass them on. The shared life and vision of such communities allows believers to trust their fellow adherents. Repeated religious practices provide reinforced exposure while the comprehensive and structured nature of religious worldviews helps to limit distortion. I argue that the phenomenon of theological incorrectness noted by many cognitive scientists of religion is not as worrisome as it may appear. Believers may be employing models that are good enough for practical knowledge, as much of the relevant sociological evidence suggests. Further, communities can help us both in acquiring our initial beliefs and in correcting our errors