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> For a perfect faith would soon bring with it a perfect contempt and scorn for this present life. If we could grasp and believe for a certainty that God is our Father and that we are his [children] and heirs, the world would immediately seem vile to us, with every thing that it regards as precious, such as righteousness, wisdom, kingdoms, power, crowns, gold, glory, riches, pleasure, and the like. We would not be so concerned about food. We would not attach our hearts so firmly to physical things that their presence would give us confidence and their removal would produce dejection and even despair. But we would do everything with complete love, humility, and patience.[1]

Although Luther could not always grasp the cultural and social implications of justification by grace through faith, he did have moments when the utter radicality of his thought broke through. The quotation above from his commentary on Galatians 4:7 is one of those moments. Certainly these words could be interpreted as the hanging on of monastic piety or of an overactive Neo-Platonism, but they also say that the person who is justified and believes that fully is free from the religion and ideology of his/her culture. "Perfect faith" brings with it a new worldview.

This is an insight that Lutherans have not taken very seriously. Many of us have spent much energy "within the camp" in recent years bringing about the creation of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, yet one wonders whether we are perhaps merely rearranging the deck chairs on the *Titanic*. Will all the emotional, physical, and material energy expended on our internal concerns actually lead us somewhere, or has it just been something to keep us busy while the uniquely Lutheran

witness to the Gospel becomes a minor footnote to the history
of mainline Christianity?

There is some evidence which could be used to support a
pessimistic reading of the past few years. Since the 1940s, as
many Lutherans have come out of their ethnic isolation into
the Canadian and American mainstreams, we have not signif-
icantly influenced those mainstreams by our presence. Rather
we have taken on more and more characteristics of the Angli-
cans or Reformed who were there before us. Our movement
into the mainstream of North American life has diminished
our confidence and sense of identity as we assumed that the
ticket to respectability lay in making ourselves look like the
already-respectable.

This may not even be a development to be bemoaned. Has
the presence of Lutherans in North American life made any dif-
ference beyond German beerfests in Ontario and Danish tourist
traps in California? One would be hard-pressed to find specific
points where the uniquely Lutheran witness to the Gospel has
had any impact at all. Given our record in Canada and the
United States, one might ask whether it is even meaningful to
speak of a "uniquely Lutheran witness to the Gospel".

If there is anything unique about Lutheranism, it is that
we have defined the Gospel as *unconditional* promise and have
held justification *sola gratia*, *sola fide*, and *solus Christus* to
be the heart and core of Christianity, the doctrine on which the
church stands or falls. Given our small impact on our North
American culture we need to ask whether we are really serious
about the doctrine of justification. If we are serious, how can
that seriousness show itself in the lives of people and in society?

One of our problems is that we have not followed up on the
possibility that the doctrine of justification might set us free
from the religion and ideology of our culture. In fact, through
a simplistic use of the "Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms" and
other devices we have specifically interpreted justification so
that it does not threaten ideology. In the North American
context this means that we have told ourselves that the ideol-
ogy of free enterprise and the doctrine of justification can live
quite nicely side-by-side. We Lutherans present ourselves as
no threat to the cultural and ideological status quo. Some of
us even establish institutes to provide a religious support to
the dominant ideology and its religious expression.

If the fundamental teaching of Lutheranism is that our relationship with God is based on unconditional promise and that meaning in life is given *sola gratia*, *sola fide*, and *solus Christus*, then we are lying to our society about being non-threatening. If we really want to support the ideological status quo, then we should stop harping about *sola gratia* and *sola fide* and especially *solus Christus* and join the mainstream of North American cultural religion.

This is an unusual challenge for a Lutheran to issue to other Lutherans but it is a challenge that has some basis in the way that worldviews and ideologies operate in human societies. The point to be considered is whether one can alter a people's fundamental understanding of their relationship with God without also altering their fundamental understanding of their relationships to one another in society. If we have left our ideology or worldview intact, do we really believe that we are justified by faith alone without works of law?

One way to examine this question is through the concepts of "paradigm", "ideology", and "worldview". Thomas S. Kuhn has popularized use of "paradigm" in analyzing the history of scientific progress.[2] Kuhn defines paradigms as "universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners", or as "one or more past scientific achievements... that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its future practice."[3] Kuhn maintains that the advance of science consists of a series of paradigm shifts. Scientific "progress" occurs when anomalies build up, creating pressure for the old paradigm, until someone imagines a new paradigm. Once the new paradigm is accepted, then research proceeds along the new paths.

Ian Barbour has adapted Kuhn's ideas to the study of religion and the relation of religion to science. Barbour defines a paradigm as "a tradition transmitted through historical exemplars".[4] Barbour has also shown how the concept of paradigm can help understand the nature of religion and reveal similarities between religion and science.

While Barbour does not specifically examine the relationship between paradigm shifts in science and reformation in theology, it would seem safe to assume that the two operate somewhat similarly. That would mean that Luther's proposal

of justification *sola gratia, sola fide* can be understood as a paradigm shift. The Reformation did have results similar to a paradigm shift in science in that a new tradition with new "exemplars" through which people learned the faith and new problems for theologians to research came into being.

One weakness in the analysis of Kuhn and Barbour is that neither science nor religion is placed within its full social and cultural context. We can move in that direction through the concept of "ideology". This concept began with the French revolutionary thinker Destutt de Tracy, who traced his roots from Bacon, Locke, and Helvetius through Condiallac. According to de Tracy, ideology was the science which demonstrated the "relationship between experience and ideas and the relationship between truth and a well ordered world."[5] It was his hope that ideology would replace the dogmas of the church in French life. De Tracy assumed that the change in social reality brought about by the French Revolution made possible a change in the basic "dogmas" of the society and that such a change was necessary to protect and support the advances of the Revolution.

The person who is most influential in the modern approach to the concept of ideology is Karl Marx. In Marx's opinion, Hegel and even the "Left" Hegelians such as Feuerbach did not see the real connection between thought and actual social conditions. This led Marx to develop an understanding of ideology as part of his attempt to understand the relationship between distorted consciousness and economic conditions. According to Marx, ideology is thought which arises from and conceals domination of one class by another. Thus ideology is a negative concept which describes distorted thought. Marx believed that progress could not begin with changing consciousness but must begin with change of material reality. As long as contradictions in social reality exist, people will project these contradictions in ideology. In this case ideology is thought which seems to solve the contradictions but, in fact, only conceals or misrepresents them.[6]

According to Marx, ideology should be dealt with in two ways: resolution and critique. Ideology is overcome only when social contradictions are resolved and ideological thought is no longer necessary. Practice resolves in fact those contradictions which ideology seems to resolve in consciousness. Practice

which leads to resolution would include the critique of ideology.
To critique ideology is to point out the contradictions inher-
ent in ideological thought and to anticipate their solution. In
order to critique ideology one must also understand the so-
cial contradictions which have given rise to it.[7] For Marx, the
alternative to ideological thought is scientific thought which
accurately understands society and economy.

Marx spoke of religion in much the same way:

> [Humanity] is *the world of* [people], the state, society. This state,
> this society, produce religion, *a reversed world-consciousness*, be-
> cause they are *a reversed world*. Religion is the general theory of
> that world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in a popular
> form, its spiritualistic *point d'honneur*, its enthusiasm, its moral
> sanction, its solemn completion, its universal ground for consola-
> tion and justification. It is *the fantastic realization* of the human
> essence because the *human essence* has no true reality. The strug-
> gle against religion is therefore mediately the fight against *the other
> world*, of which religion is the spiritual *aroma*.
>
> *Religious* distress is at the same time the *expression* of real
> distress and the *protest* against real distress. Religion is the sigh of
> the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is
> the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the *opium* of the people.[8]

For Marx, the critique of a fundamental religious principle
would be the critique of a fundamental ideological principle.

After Marx's death Marxists tended to lose the negative
connotations of ideology and defined it as "the totality of so-
cial consciousness" or as "the political ideas connected with
the interests of a class". Especially in Lenin the concept loses
any negative connotations and ideology is not necessarily a
distortion of thought, but simply the political consciousness
of a particular class. Thus one can have "bourgeois" ideology
and/or "proletarian" ideology.[9] The existence of these various
definitions within Marxism has led to debates and to attempts
to draw a distinction between a general concept and a partic-
ular concept of ideology.[10]

Also influential in understanding the concept of ideology
is the work of Karl Mannheim in the period between the two
world wars. Mannheim's desire is to discover reality through
the sociology of knowledge. He believes that understanding the
two conceptions of "ideology" and "utopia" enable us to avoid
distortion of thought: "Specifically, they can be used to combat
the tendency in our intellectual life to separate thought from

the world of reality, to conceal reality, or to exceed its limits.
Thought should contain nothing less nor more than the reality
in whose medium it operates."[11] For Mannheim, the problem is
"false consciousness".[12] He attempts to deal with the problem
by tracing the historical development of the concept of ideology
and by making various distinctions brought out in the course
of such development.

The first such is the distinction between the particular and
the total conceptions of ideology. The particular use identifies
the ideas of one's opponent as misrepresentations of reality—
whether more or less conscious. The total conception calls the
opponent's entire worldview into question. It is in this latter
use that we speak of the ideology of an age or of a class, "when
we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of
the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group."[13]
The particular use of ideology always focuses on the individual
while the total use analyses the "whole outlook of a social
group"[14] and so cannot focus on either the individual or the
collection of individuals, but must deal with the theoretical
basis upon which individual and group decisions are made.

The particular conception of ideology, according to Mann-
heim, can be traced back to Francis Bacon's theory of the
idola—preconceptions which lead to false views of nature—
while Kant and Hegel are the primary progenitors of the total
conception. In the twentieth century, and especially through
the influence of Marxism, the two conceptions have begun to
merge.

Mannheim states that this gives rise to a need for another
distinction in the total use of ideology which will help under-
standing. In the past one tended to apply the total conception
to one's opponents. This is the special formulation of the total
conception. Historical development has now led to a new mode
of understanding in which some have been willing to apply the
total conception also to their own thought, so that all points
of view are seen to be ideological. This is the general form of
the total conception.[15]

With the general form of the total conception, the concept
of ideology, says Mannheim, has now acquired a new mean-
ing. Ideological analysis is now directed toward showing the
relationship of every intellectual position held with its social

situation. Now thought is seen as fully connected to the social process. Mannheim holds that, in this situation, one needs to recognize not relativism, but relationism: "Relationism signifies merely that all of the elements of meaning in a given situation have reference to one another and derive their significance from this reciprocal interrelationship in a given frame of thought."[16]

Mannheim assumes that "there are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing independently of the values and positions of the subject and unrelated to social context."[17] That is, one cannot contain historical truth in formulae like unto basic arithmetic statements. The conceptual structures which we use to understand history and society themselves arise in history and society. This leads Mannheim to what he calls the distinction between the non-evaluative general total conception of ideology and the evaluative general total conception.

The non-evaluative approach to ideological analysis does not attempt to determine the correctness of the ideas studied but only analyzes the connection of thought structure and social/historical context. The goal of such inquiry is to show how, in certain historical periods, intellectual systems were connected to life experience and to trace the interaction between system and experience.

In Mannheim's view use of this non-evaluative approach itself leads to the recognition that the historian cannot truly be non-evaluative, for this approach to ideological analysis itself questions the truth of other approaches to history, especially any approach which searches for fixed absolutes. The search for absolutes is revealed as an ideological defense of the status quo. The non-evaluative approach gives birth to the evaluative approach as the researcher realizes that even empirical procedures are based on meta-empirical judgments which are metaphysical and ontological. With this development the problem of false consciousness is put on a new level: "The danger of 'false consciousness' nowadays is not that it cannot grasp an absolute unchanging reality, but rather that it obstructs comprehension of a reality which is the outcome of constant reorganization of the mental processes which make up our worlds."[18] The task of the intellectual in the present is to determine which among the current ideas are valid in the current situation.

In this context, ideology is defined as forms of thought which are no longer adequate for comprehending present reality or as forms of thought which try to resolve problems using absolutes which people cannot live by in the present situation. Mannheim says that "knowledge is distorted and ideological when it fails to take account of the new realities applying to a situation, and when it attempts to conceal them by thinking of them in categories which are inappropriate."[19]

Mannheim believes that forms of thought can fail to correspond to reality both by falling behind and by anticipating reality. This premise leads to the distinction of ideology and utopia. Every socio-economic system is attached to ideas which are "unreal" in that situation. That is, there are ideas which cannot be actualized within the given system. These ideas and thought systems are ideologies, according to Mannheim, when their goals are not realized and they cannot be put into practice without distorting their meaning. Utopias also orient conduct to ideals which cannot be realized in the current situation, but by their presence succeed in changing the situation. Utopias transform historical reality in the direction of their own conceptions.

Since Mannheim the discussion of the concept of ideology has evidenced a great deal of disagreement not only over the precise meaning of the concept, but also over whether the concept has any meaning at all in its current uses. The Marxists have generally been involved in discussion of the question whether ideology is always negative in Marx's sense or whether ideology is essentially a neutral term in Lenin's sense. Non-Marxist political scientists have also debated this question and the question whether "ideology" is a meaningful concept for empirical analysis of politics.

An illustration of a neutral definition of ideology is Patrick Corbett in his work *Ideologies*.[20] Recognizing that the word has been used to refer to a multiplicity of phenomena, Corbett suggests six stipulations for usage: First, there is no negative connotation. The use of "ideology" does not imply goodness or badness, rationality or irrationality. Second, the use of the term imposes no limits on the contents, so ideologies might be, for example, moral, political, religious, economic, or some combination. Third, the system of beliefs referred to should

imply a way of life so that commitment to the system of beliefs is also commitment to particular actions. Fourth, some part of the system designated by the term will involve basic assumptions about humanity and the universe. Fifth, the beliefs form a system. Sixth, the belief system is associated with a particular social group and holding the system is necessary for membership in the group.

The definition which Corbett derives from these specifications is:

> By 'ideology', therefore, is meant here any intellectual structure consisting of: a set of beliefs about the conduct of life and the organisation of society; a set of beliefs about [human] nature and the world in which [we live]; a claim that the two sets are interdependent; and a demand that those beliefs should be professed, and that claim conceded, by anyone who is to be considered a full member of a certain social group.[21]

We see here a definition of ideology at some variance with Mannheim's, specifically in that Corbett does not link ideology with "false consciousness". Indeed, some scholars have attempted specifically to counter the definitions of Marx and Mannheim which both assume "ideology" to be thought which distorts reality. One such is M. Seliger,[22] who argues against the "restrictive conception" and in favor of an "inclusive conception". Seliger's inclusive conception is:

> An ideology is a group of beliefs and disbeliefs (rejections) expressed in value sentences, appeal sentences and explanatory statements. These sentences refer to moral and technical norms and are related to descriptive and analytical statements of fact with which they are arranged and together interpreted as a doctrine bearing the imprint of the centrality of morally founded prescriptions. A doctrine, which is to say an ideology, presents a not entirely self-consistent, not fully verified and verifiable, but not merely distorted body of views. These views relate in the main to forms of human relationships and socio-political organization as they should and could be and refer from this perspective to the existing order and vice versa. Ideologies share with others some morally and factually based views and thus attest ideological pluralism without thereby losing their distinctiveness.[23]

According to Seliger it is impossible to separate politics from ideology because ideology directs its belief system toward justifying moral norms and explaining the facts in such a way that either change or preservation of the social order can be

implemented. Ideology is different from political philosophy in that ideology is action-oriented. Because the action-orientation demands a programme of action, ideologies tend to bifurcate into dogmatic dimensions, which are more doctrinally pure, and operative dimensions, which are more pragmatic.

One of the more recent theorists of ideology is John Thompson, who is attempting to bring together the study of ideology with the study of language, based in part on the work of Jürgen Habermas. For Thompson, ideological analysis then becomes the study of the intersection of language and power.[24] He argues that the best understanding of ideology is a reformulated critical conception which links ideology "to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power—that is, to the process of maintaining domination." Thus, to study ideology is to study how language and ideas are used to maintain domination.[25]

In Thompson's opinion ideology is not "a sort of social cement, binding the members of a society together by providing them with collectively shared values and norms." He argues that modern industrial societies are not marked by beliefs held in common, but by a diversity of values and beliefs. Because of that ideology involves "the complex ways in which meaning is mobilized for the maintenance of relations of domination" rather than a set of commonly held values.[26]

Thompson also holds that ideology is not pure illusion, not purely a distortion of reality. Because ideology operates through language and language is a means of action, ideology is itself one of the factors that constitutes social reality. "Ideology is not a pale image of the social world but is part of that world, a creative and constitutive part of our social lives."[27] In this sense ideology is a use of the social imagination to create and represent systems of relationship. Says Thompson, "To study ideology is to study, in part, the ways in which these creative, imaginary activities serve to sustain social relations which are asymmetrical with regard to the organization of power."[28]

How can the concept of ideology and its use by social and political thinkers help us take the doctrine of justification seriously? In the first place, it seems to be generally agreed by all of those surveyed that ideas have social and political implications and that social, economic, and political conditions

are reflected in consciousness. If that is the case, then a fundamental doctrine such as justification will have implications for a person's life in society. This is especially true if we adopt something like Thompson's definition of ideology as an imaginative linguistic construction of social relationships. The doctrine of justification puts forward a view of the world in which a person's or a people's worth is dependent solely on God's unmerited favour, not on their own achievements. This creates a representation of human relationships which calls into question any domination based on perceived performance.

The question, then, is whether the doctrine of justification supports or critiques the ideology of the North American consumer/industrial societies. If Luther realized that the doctrine was at odds with the ideology of sixteenth century Germany, he chose to support that ideology in social life even as he attacked it in ecclesiastical life. What is the ideological situation in Canada and the United States today? Does the idea that God affirms and accepts people without any regard for their performance support or undermine that ideology?

Ideologies always operate within a broader cultural framework, a framework which can perhaps be understood through the concept of worldview as used by cultural anthropologists. For the purposes of this essay we will review the definition of worldview as presented by various introductory texts in the discipline. In each of these the concept is considered basic to the understanding of the workings of culture and the effects of culture on attitude and behaviour.

John Friedl discusses worldview in his chapter on socialization. It is through socialization that children learn the worldview of a culture and the rules of behaviour that are based on that worldview. The worldview "includes the values and morals, attitudes and beliefs, and everything about the outlook on life, from how a person relates to his [sic] fellow human beings to how he relates to the universe."[29] Elsewhere Friedl defines worldview as "the basic outlook (relationship to nature, the native's point of view, values, attitudes, morals, beliefs) held in common by most members of a society."[30]

Paul Hiebert relates worldview to a culture's models of reality and models for action. Worldview includes both postulates which explain the nature of the universe and human life, and values and norms which teach people right and wrong. Some

of these worldview assumptions are explicit in the stories and beliefs of the people and others are implicit. Worldview is the total set of beliefs, values, norms, and assumptions which enable people to make sense of their experience in the world.[31]

The basic assumptions provided by the worldview are given specific content in religion. Hiebert defines religion as encompassing "all specific beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality and the origins, meaning, and destiny of life, as well as the myths and rituals that symbolically express them."[32]

Emily Schultz and Robert Lavenda define worldview as "encompassing pictures of reality created by the members of cultures."[33] Worldview is a product of the human attempt to make sense of the world in a comprehensive way. This results in a "shared framework of assumptions about the way the world works."[34]

Schultz and Lavenda argue that metaphor plays an important role in the construction of a worldview:

> World view aims to encompass the widest possible understanding of the way the world works. In constructing world views, people tend to examine what they already know well for clues that might help them make sense of what puzzles them. The power of metaphor to bring insight into areas of human experience that are vague or poorly understood constitutes its chief value as a tool for constructing world views.[35]

Worldviews vary from culture to culture. It also occurs that there are competing worldviews within a particular culture. How does a society determine which is its "official" worldview? Schultz and Lavenda give two criteria. First, the worldview "must be able, however minimally, to make sense of, to explain, people's experiences in the society in question."[36] Yet it often happens that the official worldview is less successful at explaining reality than one or more competitors. That is because of the second criterion: power. "People in power get to impose their metaphors."[37] It is possible for the less powerful to hold their own metaphors that express their unique experience and/or provide a means for transforming the situation.

Religion is an important aspect of worldview. In fact, Schultz and Lavenda refer to religion as a *version* of worldview. The definition of religion which they offer is drawn from Clifford Geertz:

> A religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in [people]

by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and
(4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that
(5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.[38]

Religion, then, is concerned with enabling people to relate what they think is to what they think ought be.[39] Religious rituals are experiences which make the worldview plausible as "the world as it is and the world as it ought to be fuse and become a single world."[40] Rituals are actions which make sense only if the participants' worldview is a correct representation of reality. They assure the participants that living in harmony with the worldview is living in harmony with reality. Thus, religion enables the society to translate the worldview into ritual, moral action, and social organization.

What can be concluded from this brief survey of worldview and the expression of worldview in religion is that a fundamental change in the premises of religion will either cause or reflect a fundamental change in worldview. That is why, for example, Philip Watson spoke of "Luther's Copernican Revolution",[41] because Luther was proposing a radical new departure for religion in the same way that Copernicus proposed a radical new departure for astronomy. Has Luther's radical new departure now become so much a part of our culture that the doctrine of justification no longer poses the possibility of a worldview change?

We should face the possibility that while Lutherans have called the doctrine of justification the doctrine on which the church stands or falls, we have not ourselves actually taken the doctrine seriously. While we have on occasion taken an adapted form of the doctrine as a pattern for theology, we have certainly not allowed the doctrine to be a critique of social ideologies, nor have we ever used it as an overarching metaphor for an alternative worldview. In fact, one could even trace the history of Lutheran attempts to domesticate the doctrine by accommodating it to the prevailing worldviews beginning with the attempts of Melanchthon to adapt the doctrine to humanism and the Lutheran Scholastics to adapt it to Aristotelian rationalism.

We say that we believe in justification *sola gratia, sola fide, solus Christus*, but we act as if we believe, like everyone else in North America, that the ground of our being is in performance,

achievement, and positive thinking. We need to face the possibility that the ideology/religion of our society is built on a completely different, if not fundamentally opposed, metaphor to that expressed in the Lutheran doctrine of justification.

The North American myth is embodied in the novels of Horatio Alger or in the popular versions of the lives of famous presidents and frontier heroes. The poor boy starts at the bottom, works hard, thinks positively, and rises to the top. The system provides him with a context for maximum possible personal achievement. He is rewarded for performance. Those who do not work hard or think positively drift toward the bottom where they receive what they deserve.

The assumption at the root of the worldview and religion of our culture is that the universe offers the context for unlimited human aspiration and that any goal can be achieved through hard work and positive thinking. We can be anything we make of ourselves. Through the ideological use of the media we are taught that those who succeed deserve to succeed; those who fail deserve to fail. Any who doubt that this view is fundamental to the ideology and worldview of Canadian and American cultures should consult transcripts of the speeches of the victors in any recent elections in the two countries.

The basic story of justification is exactly the opposite. The poor boy starts with every possibility. He has a loving mother, a hard-working and pious father, and a quick mind. But it takes him until thirty even to figure out what he will do with his life. Then he becomes a wandering preacher and chooses twelve fumble-bums as followers. His activities alienate him from the good, religious people and end with his arrest, trial, and execution. Then his low-brow followers come up with some impossible story to explain it all.

The story of Jesus is not the kind of story that will fuel the engines of economic growth or inspire young people to give the best years of their lives to the pursuit of income and consumer goods. It is the kind of story that might cause people to sell all that they have, give it to the poor, and begin a life in which they are a drag on economic growth. If we take seriously the fact that Jesus died on a cross and that God justifies us without any reference to effort or achievement or performance or even positive thinking, then we will become the most subversive people in North America. We will be telling people exactly the

opposite of what our society needs them to hear in order to survive in its present form. We will set people free from the ideological power of the consumer society.

At this point it may be possible to correct our way of distinguishing "two kingdoms". In the past Lutherans have often used this distinction as a doctrine in order to protect the social, political, and the economic status quo from the critique of the doctrine of justification. The result has been that Lutherans often teach justification officially but seldom live as if justified *sola gratia, sola fide*.

A new way to conceptualize the "two kingdoms" can be seen in the argument in the opening section of Juan Luis Segundo's *Faith and Ideologies*. Segundo posits five basic facts: (1) "Freedom is gradually and steadily lost as we use it" to choose one satisfaction over another. (2) It is impossible for each human being to explore "the limits of human possibilities" directly. (3) Since we cannot compare satisfactions based on our own experience, experience has a social structure. "We must accept data given to us *by other persons*... and [they] must be *believed in*." This type of knowledge Segundo labels faith; it is this sort of faith on which we base the fundamental values and meanings of our lives. (4) When we begin to put our values into action we discover the "objective structure of reality". We must deal with the problem of the most efficacious method for translating our values into action. (5) "Meaning and efficacy are two *different but complementary human dimensions*."[42]

If Segundo's distinction of meaning and method is correct,[43] then there is still a role for the distinction of two kingdoms. What the distinction reminds us is that the methods we have at our disposal to translate the doctrine of justification into action in personal lives and in the structures of society are methods which come to us from the culture and are already influenced by the worldview, religion, and ideology of the culture.

It is not that we distinguish two kingdoms in order to leave lives and society intact as they are, but that we distinguish justification itself from the methods available to practice the implications of justification. We do not distinguish two kingdoms because *sola gratia, sola fide*, and *solus Christus* have no political and economic implications, but because we recognize that the methods we have at hand to draw out those implications are not derived from these Christian basics. We

ought not distinguish the "spiritual" and the "secular", but
we must distinguish grace and faith from the methods used to
embody grace and faith in society. The point of distinction is
that methods and techniques remain such and are not allowed
to usurp the place of fundamental meaning.

If this is correct, then we can state the distinction as follows:
It is in the realm of meaning and value that the doctrine of jus-
tification makes its radical impact and reigns supreme. Here
there is Gospel only. In the realm of methods and techniques
we have also to do with the "Law", that is, with the struc-
tures and orders of our culture. These structures and orders
will always remain ambiguous. Here is the mistake of those
who think to withdraw from society—they think that they can
practice the Gospel apart from cultural structures—and those
who mix the "two kingdoms"—they allow method to change
meaning. Our problem as Lutherans is that we have actually
been mixing the realm of meaning and the realm of method
and allowing the methods of our culture to determine the real
meaning of our doctrine.

The task before us, if we intend to take the doctrine of justi-
fication seriously, is to develop a model which enables the rad-
ical grace of God to impact our social ethics without allowing
the ideology of free enterprise to alter the doctrine of justifi-
cation. Perhaps we could begin by developing the utopian—in
Karl Mannheim's sense—potential of the doctrine. That is, the
doctrine of justification makes statements about the fundamen-
tal nature of God which cannot be translated into consistent
action in the present social situation. One cannot function in
the present North American capitalist economy on the basis of
unconditional affirmation of value. In this situation the doc-
trine of justification breaks the bounds of the possible. The
question is whether we propose this radical transcendence of
reality in order to maintain the status quo or to transform the
status quo.

Can the doctrine of justification form the basis for the cri-
tique of current social ideologies while at the same time forming
the basis of a new worldview? It seems to me that it can, and
that, if we take the doctrine of justification at all seriously, we
should begin now to develop that critique and that worldview.

Notes

1 *Luther's Works* (American Edition) 26, 393–394; WA 40, 599.

2 Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Second Edition, *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970).

3 Ibid., viii and 10.

4 Ian G. Barbour, *Myths, Models, and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974) 9.

5 D. J. Manning, "Introduction", in D. J. Manning, ed., *The Form of Ideology: Investigations into the Sense of Ideological Reasoning with a View to Giving an Account of Its Place in Political Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980) 2.

6 Jorge Larrain, "Ideology", in Tom Bottomore, ed., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983) 219–220.

7 Jorge Larrain, *Marxism and Ideology* (London, Macmillan, 1983) 205–206.

8 Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction", in *Marx and Engels on Religion*, Classics in Religious Studies 3 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, n.d.) 41–42.

9 Larrain, "Ideology", 221–222. Interestingly, the critical definition of "religion" seems to have held on.

10 For a complete review of the history of the Marxist discussion of ideology, see Larrain, *Marxism*.

11 Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, trs. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, n.d.) (original English edition, 1936) 98.

12 For the purposes of this essay we will not attempt to evaluate the success of Mannheim's proposed solution, about which scholars have long raised doubts. Cf. Walter Carlsnaes, *The Concept of Ideology and Political Analysis: A Critical Examination of Its Usage by Marx, Lenin, and Mannheim* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981) 197–226 and notes.

13 Mannheim, 56.

14 Ibid., 59.

15 Ibid., 77ff.

16 Ibid., 86.

17 Ibid., 79.

18 Ibid., 94.

19 Ibid., 96.

20 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965).

21 Ibid., 12.

22 *Ideology and Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1976).

23 Ibid., 119–120.

24 John B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 2.

25 Ibid., 4.
26 Ibid., 5.
27 Ibid., 5–6.
28 Ibid., 6.
29 John Friedl, *Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Harper's College Press, 1976) 60.
30 Ibid., 82.
31 Paul G. Hiebert, *Cultural Anthropology* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1976) 356.
32 Ibid., 372.
33 Emily A. Schultz and Robert H. Lavenda, *Cultural Anthropology: A Perspective on the Human Condition* (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1987) 376.
34 Ibid. 153.
35 Ibid., 154–155.
36 Ibid., 163.
37 Ibid., citing George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) 157.
38 Ibid., 163–164, citing Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System", in Michael Banton, ed., *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (London: Tavistock, 1966) 4.
39 One might say that religion tries to relate reality to ideology.
40 Ibid., 164.
41 Philip S. Watson, *Let God be God: An Interpretation of the Theology of Martin Luther* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970) 33–34.
42 Juan Luis Segundo, *Faith and Ideologies, Jesus of Nazareth Yesterday and Today*, Vol. 1, John Drury, tr. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984) 22– 27. Some would question whether it is worth spending time trying to rehabilitate the distinction of two kingdoms. At times I find myself wondering this as well. Perhaps we would all be better off if the distinction of two kingdoms were just allowed to die a well-earned death. But will it? Specifically because of the problems created by simplistic use of this distinction to prevent Lutherans from seeing the revolutionary potential in their most central doctrine, it does seem important to show that the usual interpretation is not necessarily what the distinction is trying to say.
43 Though accepting the basic point, I am not entirely sure that I am satisfied with Segundo's formulation. Following Stanley Hauerwas, I would question whether "satisfaction" is the best language to use for Christian commitments, and, following Ivan Illich, I would question whether "values" language does not already incorporate the economic dominance of our society. Psychology and economics are two of the most ideology-ridden disciplines of our time, and so one must use their formulations with great care.