Axiomatizing modal inclusion logic

Modal inclusion logic is modal logic extended with inclusion atoms. It is the modal variant of first-order inclusion logic, which was introduced by Galliani (2012). Inclusion logic is a main variant of dependence logic (Väänänen 2007). Dependence logic and its variants adopt team semantics, introduced by Hodges (1997). Under team semantics, a modal (inclusion) logic formula is evaluated in a set of states, called a team. The inclusion atom is a type of dependency atom, which describes that the possible values a sequence of formulas can obtain are values of another sequence of formulas. In this thesis, we introduce a sound and complete natural deduction system for modal inclusion logic, which is currently missing in the literature. The thesis consists of an introductory part, in which we recall the definitions and basic properties of modal logic and modal inclusion logic, followed by two main parts. The first part concerns the expressive power of modal inclusion logic. We review the result of Hella and Stumpf (2015) that modal inclusion logic is expressively complete: A class of Kripke models with teams is closed under unions, closed under k-bisimulation for some natural number k, and has the empty team property if and only if the class can be defined with a modal inclusion logic formula. Through the expressive completeness proof, we obtain characteristic formulas for classes with these three properties. This also provides a normal form for formulas in MIL. The proof of this result is due to Hella and Stumpf, and we suggest a simplification to the normal form by making it similar to the normal form introduced by Kontinen et al. (2014). In the second part, we introduce a sound and complete natural deduction proof system for modal inclusion logic. Our proof system builds on the proof systems defined for modal dependence logic and propositional inclusion logic by Yang (2017, 2022). We show the completeness theorem using the normal form of modal inclusion logic

Modal tableaux for nonmonotonic reasoning

The tableau-like proof system KEM has been proven to be able to cope with a wide variety of (normal) modal logics. KEM is based on D'Agostino and Mondadori's (1994) classical proof system KE, a combination of tableau and natural deduction inference rules which allows for a restricted ("analytic") Use of the cut rule. The key feature of KEM, besides its being based neither on resolution nor on standard sequent/tableau inference techniques, is that it generates models and checks them using a label scheme to bookkeep "world" paths. This formalism can be extended to handle various system of multimodal logic devised for dealing with nonmonotonic reasoning, by relying in particular on Meyer and van der Hoek's (1992) logic for actuality and preference. In this paper we shall be concerned with developing a similar extension this time by relying on Schwind and Siegel's (1993,1994) system H, another multimodal logic devised for dealing with nonmonotonic inference

Propositional Logics Complexity and the Sub-Formula Property

In 1979 Richard Statman proved, using proof-theory, that the purely implicational fragment of Intuitionistic Logic (M-imply) is PSPACE-complete. He showed a polynomially bounded translation from full Intuitionistic Propositional Logic into its implicational fragment. By the PSPACE-completeness of S4, proved by Ladner, and the Goedel translation from S4 into Intuitionistic Logic, the PSPACE- completeness of M-imply is drawn. The sub-formula principle for a deductive system for a logic L states that whenever F1,...,Fk proves A, there is a proof in which each formula occurrence is either a sub-formula of A or of some of Fi. In this work we extend Statman result and show that any propositional (possibly modal) structural logic satisfying a particular formulation of the sub-formula principle is in PSPACE. If the logic includes the minimal purely implicational logic then it is PSPACE-complete. As a consequence, EXPTIME-complete propositional logics, such as PDL and the common-knowledge epistemic logic with at least 2 agents satisfy this particular sub-formula principle, if and only if, PSPACE=EXPTIME. We also show how our technique can be used to prove that any finitely many-valued logic has the set of its tautologies in PSPACE.Comment: In Proceedings DCM 2014, arXiv:1504.0192

Dual-Context Calculi for Modal Logic

We present natural deduction systems and associated modal lambda calculi for the necessity fragments of the normal modal logics K, T, K4, GL and S4. These systems are in the dual-context style: they feature two distinct zones of assumptions, one of which can be thought as modal, and the other as intuitionistic. We show that these calculi have their roots in in sequent calculi. We then investigate their metatheory, equip them with a confluent and strongly normalizing notion of reduction, and show that they coincide with the usual Hilbert systems up to provability. Finally, we investigate a categorical semantics which interprets the modality as a product-preserving functor.Comment: Full version of article previously presented at LICS 2017 (see arXiv:1602.04860v4 or doi: 10.1109/LICS.2017.8005089

The Relevant Logic E and Some Close Neighbours: A Reinterpretation

This paper has two aims. First, it sets out an interpretation of the relevant logic E of relevant entailment based on the theory of situated inference. Second, it uses this interpretation, together with Anderson and Belnap’s natural deduc- tion system for E, to generalise E to a range of other systems of strict relevant implication. Routley–Meyer ternary relation semantics for these systems are produced and completeness theorems are proven

Non-normal modalities in variants of Linear Logic

This article presents modal versions of resource-conscious logics. We concentrate on extensions of variants of Linear Logic with one minimal non-normal modality. In earlier work, where we investigated agency in multi-agent systems, we have shown that the results scale up to logics with multiple non-minimal modalities. Here, we start with the language of propositional intuitionistic Linear Logic without the additive disjunction, to which we add a modality. We provide an interpretation of this language on a class of Kripke resource models extended with a neighbourhood function: modal Kripke resource models. We propose a Hilbert-style axiomatization and a Gentzen-style sequent calculus. We show that the proof theories are sound and complete with respect to the class of modal Kripke resource models. We show that the sequent calculus admits cut elimination and that proof-search is in PSPACE. We then show how to extend the results when non-commutative connectives are added to the language. Finally, we put the logical framework to use by instantiating it as logics of agency. In particular, we propose a logic to reason about the resource-sensitive use of artefacts and illustrate it with a variety of examples

Proof Theory of Finite-valued Logics

The proof theory of many-valued systems has not been investigated to an extent comparable to the work done on axiomatizatbility of many-valued logics. Proof theory requires appropriate formalisms, such as sequent calculus, natural deduction, and tableaux for classical (and intuitionistic) logic. One particular method for systematically obtaining calculi for all finite-valued logics was invented independently by several researchers, with slight variations in design and presentation. The main aim of this report is to develop the proof theory of finite-valued first order logics in a general way, and to present some of the more important results in this area. In Systems covered are the resolution calculus, sequent calculus, tableaux, and natural deduction. This report is actually a template, from which all results can be specialized to particular logics

Constructive Provability Logic

We present constructive provability logic, an intuitionstic modal logic that validates the L\"ob rule of G\"odel and L\"ob's provability logic by permitting logical reflection over provability. Two distinct variants of this logic, CPL and CPL*, are presented in natural deduction and sequent calculus forms which are then shown to be equivalent. In addition, we discuss the use of constructive provability logic to justify stratified negation in logic programming within an intuitionstic and structural proof theory.Comment: Extended version of IMLA 2011 submission of the same titl