18 research outputs found
Statistical Tests for Key Recovery Using Multidimensional Extension of Matsui\u27s Algorithm 1
In one dimension, there is essentially just one binomially distributed statistic, bias or correlation, for testing correctness of a key bit in Matsui\u27s Algorithm 1. In multiple dimensions, different statistical approaches for finding the correct key candidate are available. The purpose of this work is to investigate the efficiency of such test in theory and practice, and propose a new key class ranking statistic using distributions based on multidimensional linear approximation and generalisation of the ranking statistic presented by Selc cuk
Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis is an important tool for studying the security of symmetric ciphers. In 1993 Matsui proposed two algorithms, called Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, for recovering information about the secret key of a block cipher. The algorithms exploit a biased probabilistic relation between the input and output of the cipher. This relation is called the (one-dimensional) linear approximation of the cipher. Mathematically, the problem of key recovery is a binary hypothesis testing problem that can be solved with appropriate statistical tools.
The same mathematical tools can be used for realising a distinguishing attack against a stream cipher. The distinguisher outputs whether the given sequence of keystream bits is derived from a cipher or a random source. Sometimes, it is even possible to recover a part of the initial state of the LFSR used in a key stream generator.
Several authors considered using many one-dimensional linear approximations simultaneously in a key recovery attack and various solutions have been proposed. In this thesis a unified methodology for using multiple linear approximations in distinguishing and key recovery attacks is presented. This methodology, which we call multidimensional linear cryptanalysis, allows removing unnecessary and restrictive assumptions. We model the key recovery problems mathematically as hypothesis testing problems and show how to use standard statistical tools for solving them. We also show how the data complexity of linear cryptanalysis on stream ciphers and block ciphers can be reduced by using multiple approximations.
We use well-known mathematical theory for comparing different statistical methods for solving the key recovery problems. We also test the theory in practice with reduced round Serpent. Based on our results, we give recommendations on how multidimensional linear cryptanalysis should be used
Multiple Differential Cryptanalysis using \LLR and Statistics
Recent block ciphers have been designed to be resistant against differential
cryptanalysis. Nevertheless it has been shown that such resistance claims
may not be as tight as wished due to recent advances in this field.
One of the main improvements to differential cryptanalysis is the use of many differentials to reduce the data complexity. In this paper we propose a general model for understanding multiple differential cryptanalysis and propose new attacks based on tools used in multidimensional linear cryptanalysis (namely \LLR and \CHI statistical tests). Practical cases are considered on a reduced version of the cipher PRESENT to evaluate different approaches for selecting and combining the differentials considered. We also consider the tightness of the theoretical estimates corresponding to these attacks
Another Look at Normal Approximations in Cryptanalysis
Statistical analysis of attacks on symmetric ciphers often require assuming the normal behaviour of a test statistic.
Typically such an assumption is made in an asymptotic sense. In this work, we consider concrete versions of some important
normal approximations that have been made in the literature. To do this, we use the Berry-Esséen theorem to derive
explicit bounds on the approximation errors. Analysing these error bounds in the cryptanalytic context throws up several
surprising results. One important implication is that this puts in doubt the applicability of the order statistics
based approach for analysing key recovery attacks on block ciphers. This approach has been earlier used to obtain several
results on the data complexities of (multiple) linear and differential cryptanalysis. The non-applicability of the order
statistics based approach puts a question mark on the data complexities obtained using this approach. Fortunately, we
are able to recover all of these results by utilising the hypothesis testing framework. Detailed consideration of the
error in normal approximation also has implications for and the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) based test statistics.
The normal approximation of the test statistics has some serious and counter-intuitive restrictions. One such
restriction is that for multiple linear cryptanalysis as the number of linear approximations grows so does the requirement
on the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs for the approximation to be proper. The issue of satisfactorily addressing the
problems with the application of the test statistics remains open. For the LLR test statistics, previous work
used a normal approximation followed by another approximation to simplify the parameters of the normal approximation. We
derive the error bound for the normal approximation which turns out to be difficult to interpret. We show that the approximation
required for simplifying the parameters restricts the applicability of the result. Further, we argue that this approximation
is actually not required. More generally, the message of our work is that all cryptanalytic attacks should properly derive and
interpret the error bounds for any normal approximation that is made
A New Test Statistic for Key Recovery Attacks Using Multiple Linear Approximations
The log-likelihood ratio (LLR) and the chi-squared distribution based test statistics have been proposed in the literature for
performing statistical analysis of key recovery attacks on block ciphers. A limitation of the LLR test statistic is that its
application requires the full knowledge of the corresponding distribution. Previous work using the chi-squared approach required
{\em approximating} the distribution of the relevant test statistic by chi-squared and normal distributions. Problematic issues
regarding such approximations have been reported in the literature.
Perhaps more importantly, both the LLR and the chi-squared based methods are applicable only if the success probability is
greater than 0.5. On the other hand, an attack with success probability less than is also of considerable interest.
This work proposes a new test statistic for key recovery attacks which has the following features.
Its application does not require the full knowledge of the underlying distribution; it is possible to carry out an analysis using this
test statistic without using any approximations; the method applies for all values of the success probability.
The statistical analysis of the new test statistic follows the hypothesis testing framework and uses Hoeffding\u27s inequalities to
bound the probabilities of Type-I and Type-II errors
Nonlinear cryptanalysis of reduced-round Serpent and metaheuristic search for S-box approximations.
We utilise a simulated annealing algorithm to find several nonlinear approximations to various S-boxes which can be used to replace the linear approximations in the outer rounds of existing attacks. We propose three variants of a new nonlinear cryptanalytic algorithm which overcomes the main issues that prevented the use of nonlinear approximations in previous research, and we present the statistical frameworks for calculating the complexity of each version. We present new attacks on 11-round Serpent with better data complexity than any other known-plaintext or chosen-plaintext attack, and with the best overall time complexity for a 256-bit key
Linear Cryptanalysis Using Multiple Linear Approximations
In this article, the theory of multidimensional linear attacks on block ciphers is developed and the basic attack algorithms and their complexity estimates are presented. As an application the multidimensional linear distinguisher derived by Cho for the block cipher PRESENT is discussed in detail
How Far Can We Go Beyond Linear Cryptanalysis?
Several generalizations of linear cryptanalysis have been proposed in the past, as well as very similar attacks in a statistical point of view. In this paper, we define a rigorous general statistical framework which allows to interpret most of these attacks in a simple and unified way. Then, we explicitely construct optimal distinguishers, we evaluate their performance, and we prove that a block cipher immune to classical linear cryptanalysis possesses some resistance to a wide class of generalized versions, but not all. Finally, we derive tools which are necessary to set up more elaborate extensions of linear cryptanalysis, and to generalize the notions of bias, characteristic, and piling-up lemma
Multivariate Profiling of Hulls for Linear Cryptanalysis
Extensions of linear cryptanalysis making use of multiple approximations, such as multiple and multidimensional linear cryptanalysis, are an important tool in symmetric-key cryptanalysis, among others being responsible for the best known attacks on ciphers such as Serpent and present. At CRYPTO 2015, Huang et al. provided a refined analysis of the key-dependent capacity leading to a refined key equivalence hypothesis, however at the cost of additional assumptions. Their analysis was extended by Blondeau and Nyberg to also cover an updated wrong key randomization hypothesis, using similar assumptions. However, a recent result by Nyberg shows the equivalence of linear dependence and statistical dependence of linear approximations, which essentially invalidates a crucial assumption on which all these multidimensional models are based. In this paper, we develop a model for linear cryptanalysis using multiple linearly independent approximations which takes key-dependence into account and complies with Nyberg’s result. Our model considers an arbitrary multivariate joint distribution of the correlations, and in particular avoids any assumptions regarding normality. The analysis of this distribution is then tailored to concrete ciphers in a practically feasible way by combining a signal/noise decomposition approach for the linear hulls with a profiling of the actual multivariate distribution of the signal correlations for a large number of keys, thereby entirely avoiding assumptions regarding the shape of this distribution. As an application of our model, we provide an attack on 26 rounds of present which is faster and requires less data than previous attacks, while using more realistic assumptions and far fewer approximations. We successfully extend the attack to present the first 27-round attack which takes key-dependence into account
Some Results on Distinguishing Attacks on Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are cryptographic primitives that are used to ensure the privacy of a message that is sent over a digital communication channel. In this thesis we will present new cryptanalytic results for several stream ciphers. The thesis provides a general introduction to cryptology, explains the basic concepts, gives an overview of various cryptographic primitives and discusses a number of different attack models. The first new attack given is a linear correlation attack in the form of a distinguishing attack. In this attack a specific class of weak feedback polynomials for LFSRs is identified. If the feedback polynomial is of a particular form the attack will be efficient. Two new distinguishing attacks are given on classical stream cipher constructions, namely the filter generator and the irregularly clocked filter generator. It is also demonstrated how these attacks can be applied to modern constructions. A key recovery attack is described for LILI-128 and a distinguishing attack for LILI-II is given. The European network of excellence, called eSTREAM, is an effort to find new efficient and secure stream ciphers. We analyze a number of the eSTREAM candidates. Firstly, distinguishing attacks are described for the candidate Dragon and a family of candidates called Pomaranch. Secondly, we describe resynchronization attacks on eSTREAM candidates. A general square root resynchronization attack which can be used to recover parts of a message is given. The attack is demonstrated on the candidates LEX and Pomaranch. A chosen IV distinguishing attack is then presented which can be used to evaluate the initialization procedure of stream ciphers. The technique is demonstrated on four candidates: Grain, Trivium, Decim and LEX