1,186 research outputs found

    Let Cognitive Radios Imitate: Imitation-based Spectrum Access for Cognitive Radio Networks

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    In this paper, we tackle the problem of opportunistic spectrum access in large-scale cognitive radio networks, where the unlicensed Secondary Users (SU) access the frequency channels partially occupied by the licensed Primary Users (PU). Each channel is characterized by an availability probability unknown to the SUs. We apply evolutionary game theory to model the spectrum access problem and develop distributed spectrum access policies based on imitation, a behavior rule widely applied in human societies consisting of imitating successful behavior. We first develop two imitation-based spectrum access policies based on the basic Proportional Imitation (PI) rule and the more advanced Double Imitation (DI) rule given that a SU can imitate any other SUs. We then adapt the proposed policies to a more practical scenario where a SU can only imitate the other SUs operating on the same channel. A systematic theoretical analysis is presented for both scenarios on the induced imitation dynamics and the convergence properties of the proposed policies to an imitation-stable equilibrium, which is also the ϵ\epsilon-optimum of the system. Simple, natural and incentive-compatible, the proposed imitation-based spectrum access policies can be implemented distributedly based on solely local interactions and thus is especially suited in decentralized adaptive learning environments as cognitive radio networks

    Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing

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    game theory;pricing

    Strategy abundance in 2x2 games for arbitrary mutation rates

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    We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of two strategies, A and B, under mutation and selection. The game dynamical interaction between the two strategies is given by the 2x2 payoff matrix [(a,b), (c,d)]. It has previously been shown that A is more abundant than B, if (N-2)a+Nb>Nc+(N-2)d. This result has been derived for particular stochastic processes that operate either in the limit of asymptotically small mutation rates or in the limit of weak selection. Here we show that this result holds in fact for a wide class of stochastic birth-death processes for arbitrary mutation rate and for any intensity of selection.Comment: version 2 is the final published version that contains minor changes in response to referee comment

    Convergence in Models with Bounded Expected Relative Hazard Rates

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    We provide a general framework to study stochastic sequences related to individual learning in economics, learning automata in computer sciences, social learning in marketing, and other applications. More precisely, we study the asymptotic properties of a class of stochastic sequences that take values in [0,1][0,1] and satisfy a property called "bounded expected relative hazard rates." Sequences that satisfy this property and feature "small step-size" or "shrinking step-size" converge to 1 with high probability or almost surely, respectively. These convergence results yield conditions for the learning models in B\"orgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004), Erev and Roth (1998), and Schlag (1998) to choose expected payoff maximizing actions with probability one in the long run.Comment: After revision. Accepted for publication by Journal of Economic Theor

    Robust stochastic stability

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    A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.Learning in games, stochastic stability, radius-coradius theorems, logit-response dynamics, mutations, imitation
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