Actor Network Procedures as Psi-calculi for Security Ceremonies

The actor network procedures of Pavlovic and Meadows are a recent graphical formalism developed for describing security ceremonies and for reasoning about their security properties. The present work studies the relations of the actor network procedures (ANP) to the recent psi-calculi framework. Psi-calculi is a parametric formalism where calculi like spi- or applied-pi are found as instances. Psi-calculi are operational and largely non-graphical, but have strong foundation based on the theory of nominal sets and process algebras. One purpose of the present work is to give a semantics to ANP through psi-calculi. Another aim was to give a graphical language for a psi-calculus instance for security ceremonies. At the same time, this work provides more insight into the details of the ANPs formalization and the graphical representation.Comment: In Proceedings GraMSec 2014, arXiv:1404.163

A Fully Abstract Symbolic Semantics for Psi-Calculi

We present a symbolic transition system and bisimulation equivalence for psi-calculi, and show that it is fully abstract with respect to bisimulation congruence in the non-symbolic semantics. A psi-calculus is an extension of the pi-calculus with nominal data types for data structures and for logical assertions representing facts about data. These can be transmitted between processes and their names can be statically scoped using the standard pi-calculus mechanism to allow for scope migrations. Psi-calculi can be more general than other proposed extensions of the pi-calculus such as the applied pi-calculus, the spi-calculus, the fusion calculus, or the concurrent constraint pi-calculus. Symbolic semantics are necessary for an efficient implementation of the calculus in automated tools exploring state spaces, and the full abstraction property means the semantics of a process does not change from the original

Discovering, quantifying, and displaying attacks

In the design of software and cyber-physical systems, security is often perceived as a qualitative need, but can only be attained quantitatively. Especially when distributed components are involved, it is hard to predict and confront all possible attacks. A main challenge in the development of complex systems is therefore to discover attacks, quantify them to comprehend their likelihood, and communicate them to non-experts for facilitating the decision process. To address this three-sided challenge we propose a protection analysis over the Quality Calculus that (i) computes all the sets of data required by an attacker to reach a given location in a system, (ii) determines the cheapest set of such attacks for a given notion of cost, and (iii) derives an attack tree that displays the attacks graphically. The protection analysis is first developed in a qualitative setting, and then extended to quantitative settings following an approach applicable to a great many contexts. The quantitative formulation is implemented as an optimisation problem encoded into Satisfiability Modulo Theories, allowing us to deal with complex cost structures. The usefulness of the framework is demonstrated on a national-scale authentication system, studied through a Java implementation of the framework.Comment: LMCS SPECIAL ISSUE FORTE 201

Security-Oriented Formal Techniques

Security of software systems is a critical issue in a world where Information Technology is becoming more and more pervasive. The number of services for everyday life that are provided via electronic networks is rapidly increasing, as witnessed by the longer and longer list of words with the prefix "e", such as e-banking, e-commerce, e-government, where the "e" substantiates their electronic nature. These kinds of services usually require the exchange of sensible data and the sharing of computational resources, thus needing strong security requirements because of the relevance of the exchanged information and the very distributed and untrusted environment, the Internet, in which they operate. It is important, for example, to ensure the authenticity and the secrecy of the exchanged messages, to establish the identity of the involved entities, and to have guarantees that the different system components correctly interact, without violating the required global properties

A Spatial-Epistemic Logic for Reasoning about Security Protocols

Reasoning about security properties involves reasoning about where the information of a system is located, and how it evolves over time. While most security analysis techniques need to cope with some notions of information locality and knowledge propagation, usually they do not provide a general language for expressing arbitrary properties involving local knowledge and knowledge transfer. Building on this observation, we introduce a framework for security protocol analysis based on dynamic spatial logic specifications. Our computational model is a variant of existing pi-calculi, while specifications are expressed in a dynamic spatial logic extended with an epistemic operator. We present the syntax and semantics of the model and logic, and discuss the expressiveness of the approach, showing it complete for passive attackers. We also prove that generic Dolev-Yao attackers may be mechanically determined for any deterministic finite protocol, and discuss how this result may be used to reason about security properties of open systems. We also present a model-checking algorithm for our logic, which has been implemented as an extension to the SLMC system.Comment: In Proceedings SecCo 2010, arXiv:1102.516

Formal security analysis of registration protocols for interactive systems: a methodology and a case of study

In this work we present and formally analyze CHAT-SRP (CHAos based Tickets-Secure Registration Protocol), a protocol to provide interactive and collaborative platforms with a cryptographically robust solution to classical security issues. Namely, we focus on the secrecy and authenticity properties while keeping a high usability. In this sense, users are forced to blindly trust the system administrators and developers. Moreover, as far as we know, the use of formal methodologies for the verification of security properties of communication protocols isn't yet a common practice. We propose here a methodology to fill this gap, i.e., to analyse both the security of the proposed protocol and the pertinence of the underlying premises. In this concern, we propose the definition and formal evaluation of a protocol for the distribution of digital identities. Once distributed, these identities can be used to verify integrity and source of information. We base our security analysis on tools for automatic verification of security protocols widely accepted by the scientific community, and on the principles they are based upon. In addition, it is assumed perfect cryptographic primitives in order to focus the analysis on the exchange of protocol messages. The main property of our protocol is the incorporation of tickets, created using digests of chaos based nonces (numbers used only once) and users' personal data. Combined with a multichannel authentication scheme with some previous knowledge, these tickets provide security during the whole protocol by univocally linking each registering user with a single request. [..]Comment: 32 pages, 7 figures, 8 listings, 1 tabl