Model-theoretic characterization of predicate intuitionistic formulas

Notions of asimulation and k-asimulation introduced in [Olkhovikov, 2011] are extended onto the level of predicate logic. We then prove that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic predicate formula iff it is invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some k, and then that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic predicate formula iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations. Finally, it is proved that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic predicate formula over a class of intuitionistic models (intuitionistic models with constant domain) iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations between intuitionistic models (intuitionistic models with constant domain)

Model-theoretic characterization of intuitionistic propositional formulas

Notions of k-asimulation and asimulation are introduced as asymmetric counterparts to k-bisimulation and bisimulation, respectively. It is proved that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to k-asimulations for some k, and then that a first-order formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations. Finally, it is proved that a first-order formula is intuitionistically equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic propositional formula iff it is invariant with respect to asimulations between intuitionistic models.Comment: 16 pages, 0 figures. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1202.119

Failure of interpolation in the intuitionistic logic of constant domains

This paper shows that the interpolation theorem fails in the intuitionistic logic of constant domains. This result refutes two previously published claims that the interpolation property holds.Comment: 13 pages, 0 figures. Overlaps with arXiv 1202.1195 removed, the text thouroughly reworked in terms of notation and style, historical notes as well as some other minor details adde

Failure of interpolation in the intuitionistic logic of constant domains

This paper shows that the interpolation theorem fails in the intuitionistic logic of constant domains. This result refutes two previously published claims that the interpolation property holds.Comment: 13 pages, 0 figures. Overlaps with arXiv 1202.1195 removed, the text thouroughly reworked in terms of notation and style, historical notes as well as some other minor details adde

From IF to BI: a tale of dependence and separation

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Vaananen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges' semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O'Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural role, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural r\^ole.Comment: 28 pages, journal versio

First-order Goedel logics

First-order Goedel logics are a family of infinite-valued logics where the sets of truth values V are closed subsets of [0, 1] containing both 0 and 1. Different such sets V in general determine different Goedel logics G_V (sets of those formulas which evaluate to 1 in every interpretation into V). It is shown that G_V is axiomatizable iff V is finite, V is uncountable with 0 isolated in V, or every neighborhood of 0 in V is uncountable. Complete axiomatizations for each of these cases are given. The r.e. prenex, negation-free, and existential fragments of all first-order Goedel logics are also characterized.Comment: 37 page