18,007 research outputs found
Simplified Kripke Style Semantics without Possible Worlds for some Modal Logics
Simplified Kripke Style Semantics without Possible Worlds for some Modal Logic
Philosophical Issues From Kripke's 'Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic'
In ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’, Kripke articulates his project in the discourse of “possible worlds”. There has been much philosophical discussion of whether endorsement of the Kripke semantics brings ontological commitment to possible worlds. However, that discussion is less than satisfactory because it has been conducted without the necessary investigation of the surrounding philosophical issues that are raised by the Kripke semantics. My aim in this paper is to map out the surrounding territory and to commence that investigation. Among the surrounding issues, and my attitudes to them, are these: (1) the potential of the standard distinction between pure and impure versions of the semantic theory has been under-exploited; (2) there has been under-estimation of what is achieved by the pure semantic theory alone; (3) there is a methodological imperative to co-ordinate a clear conception of the purposes of the impure theory with an equally clear conception of the content the theory; (4) there is a need to support by argument claims about how such a semantic theory, even in an impure state, can fund explanations in the theory of meaning and metaphysics; (5) greater attention needs to be paid to the crucial advance that Kripke makes on the precursors of possible-worlds semantics proper (e.g. Carnap 1947) in clearly distinguishing variation across the worlds within a model of modal space from variation across such models and, finally, (6) the normative nature of the concept of applicability, of the pure semantic theory, is both of crucial importance and largely ignored
"Ought" and Error
The moral error theory generally does not receive good press in metaethics. This paper adds to the bad news. In contrast to other critics, though, I do not attack error theorists’ characteristic thesis that no moral assertion is ever true. Instead, I develop a new counter-argument which questions error theorists’ ability to defend their claim that moral utterances are meaningful assertions. More precisely: Moral error theorists lack a convincing account of the meaning of deontic moral assertions, or so I will argue
I want to, but...
I want to see the concert, but I don’t want to take the long drive. Both of these desire ascriptions are true, even though I believe I’ll see the concert if and only if I take the drive.Yet they, and strongly conflicting desire ascriptions more generally, are predicted incompatible by the standard semantics, given two standard constraints. There are two proposed solutions. I argue that both face problems because they misunderstand how what we believe influences what we desire. I then sketch my own solution: a coarse-worlds semantics that captures the extent to which belief influences desire. My semantics models what I call some-things-considered desire. Considering what the concert would be like, but ignoring the drive, I want to see the concert; considering what the drive would be like, but ignoring the concert, I don’t want to take the drive
Weak and Strong Necessity Modals: On Linguistic Means of Expressing "A Primitive Concept OUGHT"
This paper develops an account of the meaning of `ought', and the distinction between weak necessity modals (`ought', `should') and strong necessity modals (`must', `have to'). I argue that there is nothing specially ``strong'' about strong necessity modals per se: uses of `Must p' predicate the (deontic/epistemic/etc.) necessity of the prejacent p of the actual world (evaluation world). The apparent ``weakness'' of weak necessity modals derives from their bracketing whether the necessity of the prejacent is verified in the actual world. `Ought p' can be accepted without needing to settle that the relevant considerations (norms, expectations, etc.) that actually apply verify the necessity of p. I call the basic account a modal-past approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction (for reasons that become evident). Several ways of implementing the approach in the formal semantics/pragmatics are critically examined. The account systematizes a wide range of linguistic phenomena: it generalizes across flavors of modality; it elucidates a special role that weak necessity modals play in discourse and planning; it captures contrasting logical, expressive, and illocutionary properties of weak and strong necessity modals; and it sheds light on how a notion of `ought' is often expressed in other languages. These phenomena have resisted systematic explanation. In closing I briefly consider how linguistic inquiry into differences among necessity modals may improve theorizing on broader philosophical issues
Actuality and the a priori
We consider a natural-language sentence that cannot be formally represented in a first-order language for epistemic two-dimensional semantics. We also prove this claim in the “Appendix” section. It turns out, however, that the most natural ways to repair the expressive inadequacy of the first-order language render moot the original philosophical motivation of formalizing a priori knowability as necessity along the diagonal
Multi-Agent Only Knowing
Levesque introduced a notion of ``only knowing'', with the goal of capturing
certain types of nonmonotonic reasoning. Levesque's logic dealt with only the
case of a single agent. Recently, both Halpern and Lakemeyer independently
attempted to extend Levesque's logic to the multi-agent case. Although there
are a number of similarities in their approaches, there are some significant
differences. In this paper, we reexamine the notion of only knowing, going back
to first principles. In the process, we simplify Levesque's completeness proof,
and point out some problems with the earlier definitions. This leads us to
reconsider what the properties of only knowing ought to be. We provide an axiom
system that captures our desiderata, and show that it has a semantics that
corresponds to it. The axiom system has an added feature of interest: it
includes a modal operator for satisfiability, and thus provides a complete
axiomatization for satisfiability in the logic K45.Comment: To appear, Journal of Logic and Computatio
Belief Semantics of Authorization Logic
Authorization logics have been used in the theory of computer security to
reason about access control decisions. In this work, a formal belief semantics
for authorization logics is given. The belief semantics is proved to subsume a
standard Kripke semantics. The belief semantics yields a direct representation
of principals' beliefs, without resorting to the technical machinery used in
Kripke semantics. A proof system is given for the logic; that system is proved
sound with respect to the belief and Kripke semantics. The soundness proof for
the belief semantics, and for a variant of the Kripke semantics, is mechanized
in Coq
The Ontological Ground of the Alethic Modality
This paper is concerned with the wholly metaphysical question of whether necessity and possibility rest on nonmodal foundations—whether the truth conditions for modal statements are, in the final analysis, nonmodal. It is argued that Lewis’s modal realism is either arbitrary and stipulative or else it is circular. Even if there were Lewisean possible worlds, they could not provide the grounds for modality. D. M. Armstrong’s combinatorial approach to possibility suffers from similar defects. Since more traditional reductions to cognitive or linguistic facts suffer similar fates, the conclusion that the alethic modality is primitive and incapable of reduction is offered
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